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ABSTRACT 
 
 In this dissertation I argue that, according to the Phaedo, the ψυχή should not be 
understood as a reified, quasi-physical entity which can travel to another τόπος upon 
separation from the body; that is, the soul should not be understood as what came to be 
called a “spiritual substance.” Rather, I will show that the Phaedo presents the proper 
ontology of the soul to be based in an understanding of its characteristic activity. I will 
argue that this activity is revealed to be the gathering of multiplicities (‘parts’) into the 
intelligible unities (‘wholes’) which we experience. This gathering occurs in accord with 
the λόγοι in which the soul has been educated; that is, it is on the basis of our παιδεία 
that we gather the ‘many’ of bare perceptual experience into the meaningful ‘ones’ of our 
world. Attention to this characteristic ἔργον constitutes the root of virtue.  
 Attending to this activity will reveal that, initially and for the most part, humans 
find themselves in a state of internal multiplicity, conflict, and cognitive dissonance. This 
internal dissent is not to be ultimately explained with reference to ‘parts’ of the soul. I 
will argue that the Phaedo reveals this internal multiplicity to be far greater than a ‘tri-
partite’ theory can explain. Rather, we need to attend to the disharmonious nature of the 
λόγοι to which we adhere, and through which we gather the world into an intelligible 
order such that we are called to act. Ethical responsiveness to the world will be shown to 
be rooted in ontology. That is, it is in light of the way the world appears to us as a 
meaningful environment that we are called to act and respond ethically.  
 When this world is fractured by internal dissent – that is, specifically, by 
conflicting opinions within the soul as to what is best – ethical action becomes difficult, 
and self-mastery is necessary. This self-mastery, however, is only necessary in the 
absence of internal harmony; when the self has undergone a process of gathering itself to 
itself – into a unified whole oriented toward the good – the soul as a unity is drawn 
toward the good, akrasia appears impossible, and the violence of self-mastery becomes 
unnecessary.  
 The first step in the development of this harmony is a recognition of the essential, 
defining activity of the ψυχή. Only on this basis is it possible to ‘care for the soul.’ This 
basic ontology of the ψυχή must first be understood; the centrality of the condition of the 
soul to the way we experience the world must be recognized. On this basis we can begin 
to examine the λόγοι through which we gather the world, and our own selves, into 
intelligible unity; only then can we begin the difficult process of developing a harmony in 
these λόγοι which can give rise to unified, ethically and rationally directed actions and 
responsiveness to the world. The initial step in the development of the defining human 
ἀρετή is turning the soul toward itself. 
 The development of this ontology, self-knowledge, and harmony of the self is the 
essential defining work of the philosopher; it is only on the basis of this proper ontology 
of the soul, and subsequent development of self-understanding, that care of the self can 
be grounded. That is: In order to know the self, it is essential to understand the nature of 
the ψυχή; to understand the nature of the ψυχή, it is essential to understand its defining 
activity. The development of excellence (ἀρετή) of the soul is rooted in a proper 
understanding of this ἔργον.  
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 The Twin Pillars of Platonism 
 
 The connection between the separation of the soul from the body and the 
transcendence of the forms is well attested. The Phaedo has often been taken as a locus 
classicus for these “Twin Pillars” of traditional Platonism. In the introduction to his 
translation of the dialogue, R. S. Bluck writes: “. . . the theory of the Forms and the 
theory of the immortality of the soul are mutually interdependent; and we may take it that 
Plato was anxious to justify his belief [in both] before going on to apply his Forms to a 
wide range of problems in the Republic and later works.”1  
 However, in this dissertation, I will offer a reading of the text which shows that 
Socrates’ arguments for the immortality of the soul are intentionally inconclusive. 
Further, I will argue that the presentation of the hypothesis of the existence of the forms 
is intentionally incomplete. This reading will open the question for us: If the goal of the 
Phaedo is not to prove these twin pillars, what is at work in the arguments and actions 
depicted in the Phaedo?  
 Before turning to a preliminary account of how I will answer this question, it is 
necessary to describe what I take to be the character of the work of interpreting a Platonic 
dialogue.  
 
 
                                                
1 1955, p 2 
 2 
1.2 Reading Plato 
 
 In the second paragraph of the introduction to their edition of the Phaedo, Eva 
Brann, Peter Kalkavage, and Eric Salem write: 
 
. . . we would do well to pay close attention to the Phaedo in our pursuit of the 
question, “Who is Socrates, and was he blessed or happy?” In the Phaedo the 
philosopher Socrates “meets his end.” He does so in the double sense of the 
phrase: He reaches the termination of his deathbound life, and he reflects, in the 
company of his friends, on the deathless intellectual vision to which his life has 
been devoted. To pay serious attention to the Phaedo, then, is to do more than 
investigate what Socrates talked about and did on the day he died. It is to pursue 
the question that underlies and pervades all the dialogues of Plato: Who is the 
true philosopher, and is he really the most blessed and happiest of men?2  
 
But how should we read the dialogue in order to discover the answer to this question? 
What does it mean to attend to a dialogue in a way that does more than investigate what 
Socrates and his interlocutors talk about?  
 In this dissertation, I intend to perform an answer to this question by reading the 
dialogue closely; however, in preface, I will try to make my “method” of reading more 
explicit. I will do this in part by showing how this method is in accord with trends in 
recent scholarship, in which it has been argued repeatedly that we must attend not only to 
the arguments, but also to the “dramatic elements” of the texts.3 Further, I will also 
follow the Straussian concept of “logographic necessity,” assuming that Plato wrote 
nothing by chance; we will assume that Plato chose everything we find there, every 
example and every seemingly-off-hand comment, carefully and with conscious intent.  
                                                
2 Brann, Kalkavage, Salem 1998, pg 1, emphasis added. 
3 On the importance of attention to the dramatic elements to proper interpretation of the 
dialogues, see especially Sallis 1996, Burger 1984, Brann 2004, Davis 1980, Gonzalez 1995, 
1998, and 2009, Miller 1980, 1991, Gordon 1999, Hyland 2004, Klein 1965, and Dorter 1982, as 
well as the works of Seth Benardete, Leo Strauss, Harold Bloom, and the “Straussian” school of 
interpretation.  
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 In order to initially approach the Phaedo, we have to become clear about the 
nature of a Platonic dialogue. As a student of Socrates, who refused to put his 
“philosophy” in writing, Plato was suspicious of written texts. Plato chose the dialogue 
form in order to attempt to avoid the problems that he and Socrates perceived in 
communicating philosophical ideas through text. By looking at what those problems are, 
we can develop an approach to the dialogues which might be more in accord with Plato’s 
reasons for using the dialogue form.  
 Plato, in the Seventh Letter, states clearly that the dialogues are not his own 
philosophy written down for us to decipher and condemn or endorse. They are, rather, a 
portrait of Socrates grown “young and beautiful.” We will turn in a moment to what this 
might mean; for now, let us look very briefly at what the character Socrates says in the 
Phaedrus at 275c-e concerning the problems of writing. He says that a τέχνη cannot be 
“left behind” in writing. No one, he says, can hope to discover something “distinct and 
solid” (σαφὲς καὶ βέβαιον) from written text; Socrates says the mistake is thinking that 
written λόγοι can do more than “remind” (ὑπομνῆσαι) someone who knows of the 
things written about (275c-d).  
 Socrates’ first specific complaint about written λόγοι is that they are like 
paintings of living beings which do not answer when we ask them about something. He 
says we might think that a written λόγος can “speak with some understanding 
(φρονοῦντας), but if you ask them about the things said, wishing to learn, it indicates 
(σημαίνει) some one thing only, and always the same.” (275d) With this in mind, I argue 
that Plato must have been attempting to design a mode of writing in which the text speaks 
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differently to the reader when the reader returns to read it more than once. Further, 
questions raised in initial readings must be “answered,” or at least addressed and pressed 
further, in subsequent readings; this must be the case if the text is to “respond” to us 
when we approach it with questions.  
 When we read the Phaedo, we are immediately struck with doubts about the 
sincerity of the proofs for the immortality of the soul. We might then want to ask of 
Plato, “Are these arguments in earnest?” It is as if the dialogue is able to reply, for when 
we return to the text with this question in mind, we find many subtle indications that the 
arguments are not meant to be taken at face value. We might than ask, “To what end do 
you present such arguments, if not to convince?” Here, too, we will find that in returning 
to the text with this question in mind, we are given answers that further drive our 
questioning. 
 The implication of this observation is that we are not to take any reading as final. 
If we couple this with Plato’s statement that the dialogues are not an account of his 
“philosophy,” we find that the conclusions we might be inclined to search for in our 
interpretations are not, in fact, Plato’s beliefs. As Sallis says, “to propose to write a 
treatise on the philosophy of one who wrote no treatises is, to say the least, 
questionable.”4 Toward what “end,” then, are we searching when we find questions raised 
by the dialogues and return to them to find “answers”? I can say in preface, with 
reference to the Republic (at 518c-d), that Plato does not intend to put the power of 
discernment into our souls, but to turn us toward questions, and let us work through the 
                                                
4 1996, p 1 
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questions ourselves; with this power, we return to the dialogues not for Plato’s answers, 
but for his questions.  
 Socrates’ second complaint in the Phaedrus is that the writings can “roll around 
everywhere,” being read by people to whom it ought to speak and those to whom it ought 
not. The result of this, Socrates says, is that it can be unjustly reviled by those who do not 
understand it, and thus needs the defense of its “father.”5 At 271aff Socrates gave an 
account that states that the rhetorician has to be able to understand the different kinds 
(γένη) of souls, and to present the right kind of λόγος to each kind of soul on the basis of 
an account of what kind of soul is persuaded by what kind of λόγος. The failure of 
writing is, then, that it is unable to make this judgment, and instead speaks the same to all 
people. The dialogues would, then, have to overcome this defect by attempting to speak 
differently to different kinds of souls. If this were the case – if it were the case that Plato 
attempted to overcome the defects in writing which he obviously was aware of in 
composing the dialogues – then we must not expect the dialogues to have the same 
meaning for different people.  
 
 These considerations certainly place the interpreter in a difficult position. In what 
way are we to understand how the dialogues are intended as tools for teaching – first 
teaching the members of the Academy, and then the rest of us? In what way are we to 
                                                
5 It is interesting to note the term “father” here. It could lead us to the image of Socrates as barren 
in the Theaetetus, but as the one capable of delivering others of their wisdom. The dialogues thus 
can be seen as performing the function of a midwife, and thus being, again, the image of Socrates. 
Also, we could turn to the Symposium to look at the “levels” of ἔρος that seek natural offspring 
(an issue conspicuously suppressed in the Phaedo’s account of generation) at one level, and 
poetic offspring at another.  
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understand that Plato intended the study of these texts to make us better people? Again, 
we can turn to the dialogues themselves for some clues.  
 What we learn from looking at the Meno (as I will argue in Chapter 5) and 
elsewhere is that it is not words and arguments that make men good; in this sense, it is as 
impossible to teach virtue as it is to teach self-knowledge. This is the heart of the conflict 
between the sophists – who claim to teach virtue – and Socrates and Plato. What we find 
in the dialogues, rather, is Socrates leading by example. It is not merely the teachings, but 
the presence of people that influences us to act in certain ways. As I will show, in the 
Meno, Socrates is being ironic when he claims the poet Theognis is contradicting himself 
at 95dff. In the first passage Socrates quotes, Theognis speaks of living with good people, 
drinking and eating with them, and so “from good men you will be taught good things.” 
(95d) In the second passage Socrates quotes, Theognis claims that “by teaching you will 
never make the bad man good.” (95e) We understand that there is an enormous difference 
between teaching someone with words and arguments – λόγοι that could be written down 
– on the one hand, and spending time in each others’ company, on the other. We teach by 
example and by sheer presence, drawing people toward the good or away from it with our 
influence. With this in mind, it is easy to see that Theognis is not contradicting himself. 
Socrates is drawing our attention to these passages, and this tension, in order to draw into 
the light the unspoken influence the people with whom we surround ourselves have on 
our values.  
 In short, there is a recognition of our social nature; Plato draws our attention to 
the fact that we come to act in ways that mirror, in a variety of ways, those around us.6 It 
                                                
6 Cf Alcibiades I 133a; Socrates calls for Alcibiades to look to his reflection in the eyes of others.  
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is clearly the case – looking to the Republic and the Laws, especially – that Plato further 
recognized the importance of having good models to mirror and aspire to in poetry, as 
well as in life. This might be the very sense in which Socrates claims to have been 
engaging in the greatest poetry without ever writing anything down. That is, it is possible 
that in his dialectic work with his friends and students Socrates was creating an image of 
virtue and of the courageous pursuit of self-knowledge and wisdom; perhaps in Plato’s 
eyes he was creating in his life a work of art to rival the creations of Homer.  
 If we take this to be the case with Socrates’ self-conception – or more likely with 
Plato’s conception of Socrates – then we could postulate a further dimension of our 
approach to the dialogues: We are, in the dialogues, supposed to spend time with 
Socrates.7 This may help us make sense of Plato’s comment in the Seventh Letter 
presenting the dialogues as an image of Socrates grown young and καλός – beautiful and 
noble. In reading the dialogues, we are being presented with a beautiful/noble ideal, and 
we spend our time – sometimes considerable amounts of time! – in the company of his 
spirit, in addition to his λόγοι. 
 
 I will show that these observations have a deep connection to Plato’s conception 
of philosophy as presented in the Phaedo and elsewhere. Specifically, we will find that a 
“philosophy” is not understood there as a self-consistent system of beliefs, or doctrine. It 
is essential that we not take Socrates to be Plato’s “mouthpiece” presenting Plato’s 
                                                
7 Gadamer notes: “As Nietzsche has so aptly put it, this figure of the dying Socrates became the 
new ideal to which the noblest of the Greek youth dedicated themselves instead of to that older 
heroic ideal, Achilles.” (1980, p 22) Cf Davis 1980: “Throughout the Phaedo Socrates' apparent 
praise of death is, beneath it all, a praise of a certain kind of life. In that sense he is competing 
with the poets.” (p 567, emphasis added) As Oliver Goldsmith put it: "People seldom improve 
when they have no other model but themselves to copy." 
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“doctrine” to the readers of the dialogues. Rather, we will find that philosophy is depicted 
as a kind of life, dedicated to the pursuit of wisdom, courage, and justice – philosophy is 
always questioning, underway, and in between wisdom and ignorance. This will mean 
that we must not take our own ὁδός to be the only way, neither for other people, nor for 
ourselves given time. This will also indicate to us the necessity of choosing those who we 
surround ourselves with. Louie Simmons – the guru of power lifting – says that if you 
want to get strong, surround yourself with strong people. Plato will be sure to warn us 
that we had better surround ourselves with people dedicated to the pursuit of truth, rather 
than of wealth, fame, or power. In the Protagoras Socrates laments that people will seek 
out doctors and nutritionists to learn what to take into their bodies, but will take any old 
thing into their souls.  
 
 While these observations place the commentator in an extremely difficult position, 
I want to stress that it is not the case that the dialogues are empty of “positive assertions.” 
These assertions are hidden in subtle ways as often as they appear explicitly in Socrates’ 
mouth, but they are there. These assertions are always to be taken with a critical eye, and 
never to be simply or immediately accepted as Plato’s “teaching” or belief, but they are 
there. The comments above indicate that the reader must take an active role in the reading 
the dialogues; we become engaged in the conversation, answering differently when we 
disagree, and carrying our thinking beyond the text.8 As Klein says, we must be active 
                                                
8 Cf Gordon 1996b: “Whereas one always stands outside the given object and experiences it qua 
object, a literary text requires the participation of the subject inside of the object in order to 
constitute the aesthetic experience.” (p 260) Drawing on the work of Wolfgang Iser, Gordon 
offers an excellent analysis of the “phenomenology” of reading the dialogues. Specifically, she 
performs an excellent analysis of the work of the engaged reader in dealing with the 
“indeterminacy,” “interruptions,” and “negations,” in the text, which she describes as working 
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participants in the dialogue: “lacking such participation, all that is before us is indeed 
nothing but a book.”9 Thus, while the Phaedo will be discovered to have much to say 
about the nature of the soul, the claims presented in the dialogue are always incomplete. 
Thus, the Phaedo demands of us the work of clarifying their foundations and 
consequences.  
 
1.3 Λόγος, Ψυχή, and the Self 
 
 In this dissertation I argue that, according to the Phaedo, the ψυχή should not be 
understood as a reified, quasi-physical entity which can travel to another τόπος upon 
separation from the body; that is, the soul should not be understood as what came to be 
called a “spiritual substance.” Rather, I will show that the Phaedo presents the proper 
ontology of the soul to be based in an understanding of its characteristic activity. I will 
argue that this activity is revealed to be the gathering of multiplicities (‘parts’) into the 
intelligible unities (‘wholes’) which we experience. This gathering occurs in accord with 
the λόγοι in which the soul has been educated; that is, it is on the basis of our παιδεία 
that we gather the ‘many’ of bare perceptual experience into the meaningful ‘ones’ of our 
world. Attention to this characteristic ἔργον constitutes the root of virtue.  
 Attending to this activity will reveal that, initially and for the most part, humans 
find themselves in a state of internal multiplicity, conflict, and cognitive dissonance. This 
                                                                                                                                            
toward ‘synthesizing the meaning’ of a text. On the importance and difficulty of unifying the 
meaning of a dialogue, see also Russon 1995. In light of the apparent inconsistencies in the 
dialogues, and the “ambiguity” inherent in the dialogue form, Russon argues that “these features 
of the text require of us that we approach the dialogue with the question, ‘How can this be a 
coherent articulation of a unitary content?’” (p 401) Russon shows that this participation of the 
reader in finding a unity of meaning is at stake in the Phaedo at multiple levels. (Russon 2000) 
9 1965, p 6 
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internal dissent is not to be ultimately explained with reference to ‘parts’ of the soul. I 
will argue that the Phaedo reveals this internal multiplicity to be far greater than a ‘tri-
partite’ theory can explain. Rather, we need to attend to the disharmonious nature of the 
λόγοι to which we adhere, and through which we gather the world into an intelligible 
order such that we are called to act. Ethical responsiveness to the world will be shown to 
be rooted in ontology. That is, it is in light of the way the world appears to us as a 
meaningful environment that we are called to act and respond ethically.  
 When this world is fractured by internal dissent – that is, specifically, by 
conflicting opinions within the soul as to what is best – ethical action becomes difficult, 
and self-mastery is necessary. This self-mastery, however, is only necessary in the 
absence of internal harmony; when the self has undergone a process of gathering itself to 
itself – into a unified whole oriented toward the good – the soul as a unity is drawn 
toward the good, akrasia appears impossible, and the violence of self-mastery becomes 
unnecessary.  
 The first step in the development of this harmony is a recognition of the essential, 
defining activity of the ψυχή. Only on this basis is it possible to ‘care for the soul.’ This 
basic ontology of the ψυχή must first be understood; the centrality of the condition of the 
soul to the way we experience the world must be recognized. On this basis we can begin 
to examine the λόγοι through which we gather the world, and our own selves, into 
intelligible unity; only then can we begin the difficult process of developing a harmony in 
these λόγοι which can give rise to unified, ethically and rationally directed actions and 
responsiveness to the world. The initial step in the development of the defining human 
ἀρετή is turning the soul toward itself. 
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 The development of this ontology, self-knowledge, and harmony of the self is the 
essential defining work of the philosopher; it is only on the basis of this proper ontology 
of the soul, and subsequent development of self-understanding, that care of the self can 
be grounded. That is: In order to know the self, it is essential to understand the nature of 
the ψυχή; to understand the nature of the ψυχή, it is essential to understand its defining 
activity. The development of excellence (ἀρετή) of the soul is rooted in a proper 
understanding of this ἔργον.  
 
 The ψυχή, upon self-examination, initially discovers itself to be in a condition of 
internal dissent and disharmony. In the Phaedrus, Socrates says “[I would rather] 
examine (σκοπῶ) not [myths] but myself, whether I happen to be some wild animal more 
multiply twisted (πολυπλοκώτερον) and filled with desire (ἐπιτεθυμμένον) than 
Typhon, or a gentler and simpler animal, having by nature a share in a certain lot that is 
divine and without arrogance (ἀτύφου).” (230a) Typhon was a mythical beast with a 
body composed from various parts of snakes and birds and beasts of many kinds. 
Socrates is asking if he is himself a harmonious whole, or if his own multiplicity is that of 
the beast, filled with ἐπιθυμία and excessive pride. Socrates calls for unity and harmony 
in the self in many of the dialogues, as I will show, and often connects this harmony to 
virtue. Most famously, in the Republic, this internal multiplicity is figured as rooted in 
three different ‘parts’ of the soul which are initially in conflict with one another, but 
which can, ideally, brought into a harmonious order (justice). However, Socrates 
explicitly calls for a “longer path” of inquiry into the nature of this internal multiplicity in 
the ψυχή. In this dissertation, I will be reading the Phaedo as presenting one possible 
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approach to that “longer path” to understanding the soul – specifically, the “longer path” 
to understanding the nature of the internal multiplicity of the self.  
 
1.4 Outline of the Argument 
 
 In Chapter 1, I begin with an analysis of the implications of the first word of the 
dialogue: Aὐτός. By attending to this opening lines of the dialogue, I establish that the 
nature – and specifically the unity – of the self is a central theme in the text. I argue that 
the process of questioning into the nature of the ψυχή begins in the existential awareness 
of the need to ask: “Who am I?” Thus, I connect the nature of ψυχή to the nature of the 
“self.” I then develop an account of how to understand how the concept of “self” was 
functional in Athens in Plato’s time; specifically, I warn against, and find ways to avoid, 
importing a modern conception of self into the text.  
 In Chapter 2, by continuing to attend to the opening lines of the dialogue as a path 
to understanding how Plato frames the conversation on Socrates’ last day, I show that the 
mythological context in which Plato places the dialogue points to misology as a central 
danger in the text; specifically, this supposed “digression” at the center of the dialogue is 
revealed to be central to the text. Coming to know the self – and thus the initial ethical act 
of turning to the self – is intimately connected to our stance toward λόγοι. Developing 
harmony within the self and harmonizing our λόγοι turn out to be deeply interconnected 
enterprises. I argue that developing the proper τέχνη of trusting in λόγος is essential to 
the philosophical life.  
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 In the third Chapter, I demonstrate that the arguments for the immortality of the 
soul presented in the first half of the dialogue are not intended to be taken as Plato’s 
“doctrine.” By attending to the context in which Socrates presents these arguments, it will 
be clear that Plato was fully aware of the insufficiency of the arguments. Thus, we are 
forced to pose the question: Why does Plato have Socrates present such bad arguments? 
The specific failings of these arguments frame the way the dialogue wants us to pose 
questions about the self, the nature of the ψυχή, and the philosophical life. Specifically, I 
show that these arguments indicate that the ψυχή should not be understood to be a 
“thing” which, entombed in the body, ‘escapes’ and travels to Hades after our death. The 
specific failings of these conceptions will lead us toward a deeper understanding of the 
self, and the place of λόγος in the activity of the soul. Recognizing that Socrates is 
himself not convinced by his arguments, we are further forced to ask: What is the source 
of his courage in the face of execution, if it is not a certainty that he will continue to exist 
after death?  
 Further, I will argue that the search for “purity” (εἰλικρινής or καθαρός) of 
knowledge – a search which Socrates projects onto the “true-born philosophers” – is 
discovered to be an impossibility; thus, the attentive reader of the Phaedo is driven to 
develop an epistemology which is not based in the ‘pure’ contact of the soul, ‘purified’ of 
the body, with the ‘pure’ forms. That is, an understanding of human finitude will be 
essential to the epistemology of the Phaedo. I argue that the activity of knowing, as 
gathering multiplicities into intelligible unities, is the essential ἔργον of the soul; thus, 
the development of an epistemology rooted in essentially embodied, finite human beings 
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– which we will find to be the purpose of the second sailing and its turn to the λόγος – is 
essential to self-knowledge, care of the soul, and thus philosophy as μελέτη θάνατος.  
 In Chapter 4, I begin to articulate the essential activity of the ψυχή by turning to a 
brief reading of the Theaetetus. I focus on the passage where Theaetetus and Socrates 
articulate how the soul “itself through itself” determines the “being and benefit” of the 
things we encounter. I begin to show how knowledge attaches itself to unities that arise 
out of, and are not ontologically identical to, the parts. The determination of these unities 
is preliminarily connected to the good of the beings we encounter. Further, I establish the 
centrality of our own individual histories, political situations, and ‘education’ (παιδεία), 
in the activity of determining the “being and benefit” of the unities we encounter. The 
importance of λόγος to this process, and thus to the problem of ‘the one and the many,’ 
or part and whole, is emphasized. I further emphasize the way that the soul has to hold 
the whole in view, in some sense, prior to physical perception for meaning and 
understanding to be possible. This observation will lead to a discussion of recollection. 
 In Chapter 5, I turn to an account of the argument from recollection. I will show 
that the account of the kind of knowledge proper to an embodied being placed in the 
mouths of the “true-born philosophers,” which has been taken to be true to Plato’s 
“doctrine,” is faulty. Specifically I will show, with reference to Socrates’ argument 
concerning seeing two equal sticks or stones, that perception does not simply reveal 
physical objects, materialistically understood; rather, in perception, through the body, we 
perceive beings in their striving, in accord with our λόγοι.  
 I make a short digression into the account of recollection in the Meno. There, I 
identify that the purpose of the “theory of recollection” is not to communicate Plato’s 
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belief to the reader that the soul existed prior to birth; rather, this theory is presented in 
order to get Meno to begin a process of self-examination. I show that Meno’s failing is in 
“taking refuge in λόγοι,” and focusing on developing eristically powerful propositional 
accounts of virtue, rather than in developing a virtuous condition of his own soul.  
 Returning to the Phaedo, I will continue to develop an epistemology proper to 
finite, embodied beings which does not take knowledge to be paradigmatically pure 
contact of a pure soul with the pure forms. I argue that perception – for example, the 
perception of these two sticks as ‘equal’ – involves not only an unconscious synthesis in 
order to hold the objects together as unitary individuals, but also a world and a context in 
which the perceived object derives its meaning. By attending to what is necessary in 
order for the soul to make the identification that, e.g. “These two sticks are equal,” we 
will discover the way any perception involves the activity of the soul, and cannot be 
considered a simply passive reception of sensory data. Thus, I demonstrate that the 
perception of anything as equal, or good, or as a ‘this,’ is only possible due the activity of 
the self drawing the multiplicity of a phenomenon together into a unitary ‘this,’ in accord 
with λόγος. In so doing, the self determines the “being and benefit” of everything it 
encounters. Plato shows us that this determination happens in accord with the λόγοι that 
the individual making the judgment accepts as true, as well as with their own erotic, 
social, and interpersonal history. Thus, the perception of anything will be shot through 
with ‘recollection,’ based not in a time before birth, but rather in our παιδεία, and in the 
λόγοι to which have a ‘wondrous’ hold on us.  
 In Chapter 6, I turn to an account of ἁρμονία, to Simmias’ argument that the soul 
is a ‘tuning,’ and to Socrates’ response. I show that a close reading of these passages 
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points to the necessary embodiment of the ψυχή. I show that the soul is not something 
simply distinct from the active and living body of an animal, but rather is the animate 
principle of a physical body. To understand the soul is not to attend to something 
otherworldly – as the “true-born philosophers” contend; rather, to understand the soul is 
always to attend to the active principle of a living thing. 
 In this Chapter, I argue that the activity of the soul in drawing the multiplicity of 
phenomenal field into ‘beings’ is identical to the structure of identifying a harmony as a 
unitary ‘this’ beyond a simple conglomeration of parts. I show that Socrates’ response to 
Simmias is specifically attuned to countering the tendency toward misology that he warns 
against immediately prior to responding. Specifically, I show that a central aspect of his 
response is an account of how we should hold to λόγοι, and his call for a harmonization 
between our λόγοι. I discuss the connection between harmony and virtue, and show that 
it is with respect to λόγοι that Plato wants us to consider the nature of internal 
multiplicity; thus, it is with respect to the λόγοι in our soul that we must seek internal 
harmony.  
 I then turn to a brief digression into the Republic, and specifically, the account of 
the “tri-partite soul.” I show that the Republic does not present this theory as Socrates’ 
own belief, let alone that of Plato. Attending to the failings of that account to explain 
human internal multiplicity and cognitive dissonance, I point to the “longer path” to 
understanding the soul; I argue that the Phaedo presents one possibility of following this 
“longer path” by connecting internal multiplicity to the diverse and conflicting λόγοι in 
our souls.  
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 In Chapter 7, I turn, finally, to the second sailing itself. In this chapter, I draw 
together into a unity the many threads of discussion that arise in my interpretation of the 
dialogue.  I offer an analysis of the fear of death revealed by Cebes’ image of the soul as 
a “weaver,” and show how that fear poses a threat to our trust in λόγος. Thus, in response 
to the danger this fear poses to our rationality, Socrates offers an account of his own 
method of investigation in order to explicate the proper τέχνη of λόγος. I attempt, with 
reference to secondary discussions of these passages, to articulate the ‘first sailing,’ as 
described in Socrates’ autobiography, to which his own method would be a ‘second.’ I 
thus carry out a lengthy analysis of Socrates’ search for the αἰτίαι. Specifically, I show 
that his fear of blindness does not come from looking to φύσις simply, but rather is a 
response to the “excessive brightness” (ὑπερήφανος) that he found in the materialism of 
“natural philosophy,” (περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν). Thus, I argue that it is not that Socrates 
simply turns away from φύσις, but rather away from a specific form of inquiry into 
nature, and the nature of things.  
 I then argue that the problems that Socrates finds himself puzzled by – how one 
and one come to form two, why one man is bigger than another, etc – all point to the 
activity of the soul. It is the soul that holds these objects together into unities, and into the 
dyad present in any act of comparison. I show that recognition of this power – which 
places Mind at the “center” of the whole – is the reason why young Socrates was so 
excited to hear the works of Anaxagoras, who claimed that Mind was the cause of all 
things. Further, I demonstrate that how the soul engages in this activity is determined by 
the λόγοι that we adhere to. Thus, to turn to the λόγοι is to turn to the soul, and to the 
way the soul articulates and names the unities which we experience. This is also true of 
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the self; that is, the self that we discover in self-examination appears as a unitary object 
only through the λόγοι that we tell ourselves about ourselves. We gather ourselves to 
ourselves in the λόγοι we tell – about our pasts, our goals in life, and about what it means 
“to be a man,” or how a “real woman” behaves, what it means to be Athenian, or a 
patriotic American, etc. This will allow us to see how Plato is offering the dialogues, and 
the character of Socrates in particular, as a new image of the ideal man to transform the 
images of human ἀρετή in the poets.  
 In my explication of the turn to the λόγοι, I pay special attention to the way 
Socrates’ second sailing is designed to reveal the truth of beings in light of their good; the 
materialistic accounts of the ‘natural philosophers’ blind us to the connection between 
good and being. This is also, of course, true of self-knowledge; that is, in attending to our 
own selves, it is essential that we attend to the good. In the case of human beings, 
however, this good is, in part, self determined. We do not simply seek the good itself the 
way a plant grows toward the sun; we must be conscious and active in the pursuit of our 
uniquely human τέλος.  
 In Chapter 8, I offer a very brief account of the ‘method of hypothesis,’ the 
hypothesis of the existence of the forms, forms as αἰτίαι, and the final argument for the 
immortality of the soul. My discussion draws heavily on the enormous amount of 
discussion carried out in the secondary literature. In this literature, there is little 
agreement about what Plato’s purpose was in presenting these arguments. I give an 
account of the basic outlines of the debates surrounding these passages, and show what is 
lacking. Specifically, I will show that the a critical lynch-pin to the argument – an 
account of the meaning of “participation” (μέθεξις) – is completely absent.  
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 I argue that the myriad secondary accounts of this passage do not approach the 
text in the proper way. First, they take this passage, and the final argument, in radical 
isolation from the rest of the dialogue. Secondly, they assume the process of harmonizing 
λόγοι Socrates calls for is a logical analysis of arguments, mistaking the nature of λόγος, 
and the connection between λόγος, ψυχή, and human virtue. Thirdly, they assume that 
Plato believed in “the forms,” without being critical enough about what this belief means, 
what the εἶδει actually are, and what their relation to particulars is. As such, they assume 
that, since this is Plato’s “final word” on the soul in the dialogue, and since the argument 
uses the existence of the forms as a hypothesis, the argument must have been intended as 
valid proof. 
 I end the dissertation by pointing to what I have not said. Specifically, in this 
dissertation I give an account of the soul and its connection to λόγος; I say nothing about 
νοῦς. It is in and through λόγος that the philosophical life happens, and it is never “free” 
or “rid,” or working in and through λόγος. However, “rubbing accounts together like fire 
sticks” is not simply an end in itself, but is intended to give rise to a noetic vision of the 
truth of beings. Thus, the account of the method of philosophy presented in the Phaedo is 
limited in that it does not articulate the “upward way” (which I argue, is dialectic), does 
not distinguish it from the “downward way” of the ‘method of hypothesis,’ and thus the 
dialogue does not, finally, give a full account of philosophical inquiry.  
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Chapter 1  
The Questions of the Self 
 
§ 1. Αὐτός 
 
 The Phaedo begins with the word “αὐτός,” “itself.” This word is used within the 
Platonic texts, and in the Phaedo in particular, to refer to what are often called the 
“forms”: Beauty itself, Courage itself. However, here it is used to refer to the character 
Phaedo himself; Echecrates is asking if Phaedo “himself” was present at the death of 
Socrates.  
 This first word raises many questions which echo throughout the dialogue.10 I will 
work through several of those questions as points of ingress into the issues I will be 
drawing out of the dialogue. I will show that the issues raised in the opening word 
already point to the second sailing as the “heart” of Socrates attempt to rescue his friends 
from the Minotaur of misology. As indicated in the Introduction, it is necessary to be on 
                                                
10 For examples of commentators who see the importance of reading the first words of a Platonic 
dialogue carefully, see Burger: “The attempt to reinterpret the meaning of “separation,” . . . is, 
one might say, the fundamental intention of the Phaedo. The clue to this intention is provided by 
the very first word of the dialogue – αὐτός. The very expression that will be used to designate the 
“idea,” that which is “itself by itself,” refers at the outset to the individual and identifies the self 
with the living being, without implying any separation of ψυχή from body.” (1984, p. 7). Sallis 
notes this fact about the Phaedo, as well as noting a similar fact about the first word of the 
Republic: “Of all Socrates says in the opening of the Republic, what is most telling is the very 
first word of the dialogue.” (Sallis 1996, p. 315) The opening sentences of both of these dialogues 
are carefully worded by Plato, and we would do well to attend with care to these implications. We 
see here Burger pointing to the central theme of my reading of the Phaedo by reading the first 
word with this care. We will find this care warranted not by some prior decision made about our 
“method” of reading, but rather by the way such reading bears out insight into the deeper 
implications of this difficult and complicated labyrinth of a dialogue. The “proof” lies in finding 
oneself able to return to the dialogue with fresh eyes opened to new levels of questioning. Cf. 
Brann, Kalkavage, Salem 1998, p 2. See also the first words of the Gorgias: “πολέμου καὶ 
μάχης,” and Sallis’ comments on them 1996, p 166.  
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guard against the tendency to read the dialogues in light of what has come to be known as 
“Platonism.” In order to avoid this tendency it is advisable that readers take their 
direction for reading the text from the text itself. Plato has taken great care in the opening 
lines of this dialogue to prepare the reader to think through the text in the proper spirit, 
and to attune us to a set of issues which will be central to this dissertation. As such, 
attention will be focused on the opening lines of the frame dialogue between Phaedo and 
Echecrates as providing the context in which to properly receive the arguments presented 
in the text.  
 
1.1 Presence and Λόγος  
 
 First, the reader should attend to the central sense of the question as Echecrates 
most explicitly means it: Was Phaedo present, physically, at the event of Socrates’ death, 
or did he hear about it from someone else? This issue of presence – that is, of being a 
first-hand observer and witness – is a frequently repeated theme in the dialogue.11 Often, 
this theme appears when the dialogue shifts from Socrates’ discussion with his friends on 
his last day to the frame-dialogue between Phaedo and Echecrates.12 In many of these 
                                                
11 Cf. Friedlander 1969 p 36. 
12 See 102a and 88c-e. On the importance of the “interruptions” of the dialogue effected by these 
shifts to the frame-dialogue, see Sallis 2004: “These two interruptions serve also to delimit the 
λόγος with which the dialogue attains, in philosophical significance, its pinnacle. In the interval 
between the interruptions, Socrates presents two λόγοι in behalf of λόγος, first, a defense against 
misology and then, more significantly, a discourse on how he came to philosophize as he does, on 
how he came to launch – as he calls it – his second sailing. In launching his second sailing – as in 
the absence of wind sailors take to the oars – Socrates carries out the decisive turn by which a 
new beginning is inaugurated. In this move he turns away from things, takes distance from them, 
and does so primarily by turning to λόγοι, by having recourse to them. On his second sailing he 
forgoes directly investigating things as well as heir causes and instead, taking refuge in λόγοι, 
“looks in them for the truth of beings” (99e). Thus the form of the Phaedo, that of a λόγος set at a 
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shifts, explicit mention is made of the different stance of Echecrates toward the λόγοι 
that Phaedo recounts and the stance of Phaedo, and of anyone else who was present to 
hear the conversations. Significantly Plato does not count himself among that number, 
since he was feeling too sick to be with his teacher, mentor, and friend in his last hours! 
This is a very strange passage which should give us pause; it is likely that Plato is being 
ironic here. Phaedo can’t even claim to be sure about this absence, saying he “thinks” 
Plato was sick, at 59b. It is probable that Plato knew his readers, especially within the 
Academy, were aware that Plato was, in fact, present. As such, this line further draws 
attention to the issue of presence at a λόγοι, in addition to many other issues regarding 
authorship and authority.13  
 The Phaedo, as will be demonstrated, is in many ways a λόγος about λόγος. 
While many of the arguments are explicitly about the existence of the soul after death, I 
will argue that there is much to be learned from them about the proper place of argument 
and thinking in our lives. When Socrates speaks of his second sailing in search of the 
cause of things, he speaks of the turn to λόγος as second best to an idealized, but 
ultimately impossible, direct access to ‘things.’ As the concept of λόγος is explored in 
this dissertation, the reader should keep in mind the initial reference to presence and 
                                                                                                                                            
distance from the things of which it speaks, matches perfectly the figure of the second sailing that 
is drawn at the high-point of the dialogue.” (p 154, emphasis added). Sallis here identifies the 
connection between the form and content of the Phaedo that I argue is present in the very first 
word, and further identifies λόγος (and the distance and separation implied in attending to beings 
through the mediation of λόγος) as central themes in the Phaedo.  
13 Hackforth’s “guess” is that these passages indicate that Plato was in fact not present, and this is 
why Phaedo is chosen as the speaker, since he must have been the one who told Plato about the 
events of that day; he further says that there is no reason to doubt that the “factual framework” of 
the conversation that actually took place is substantially different from what is represented in the 
dialogue. (Hackforth 1955, p 13) I argue that these observations misunderstand the nature of the 
dialogue form, and contribute to an interpretive stance which impairs the ability to read the 
dialogues properly.  
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absence brought forth in the first word. It is λόγος that allows Phaedo to report to 
Echecrates many years later how Socrates met his death; it is, indeed, λόγος that allows 
Phaedo to remember how Socrates met his death. There is a wondrous, ὑπερφυῶς, even 
daimonic power of λόγος. It can carry ‘knowledge’ from one person to another, reporting 
“what happened” concerning the λόγος and ἔργον of an event distant in time or space. 
The power of λόγος allows a speech or an argument to be passed around for all to hear.14 
This power is to be marveled at, and it is to be noted that it places us at a distance from 
the things we hear about. I will argue, in my discussion of the second sailing, that while 
this distance creates the possibility for deceit, it is also the grounds for the possibility of 
truth itself. It would be best to be there “ourselves,” to have un-mediated access to the 
πρᾶγμα; as things stand with human beings, the second best way of λόγος is all that is 
accessible. The reader is reminded of this by the very first word of the dialogue, by the 
fact of the bare existence of the dialogue, by the dialogue structure itself, and again by 
Plato’s rare mention of himself as absent.15  
                                                
14 cf. Phaedrus 274d-276a 
15 In addition to the discussion referenced above of distance and λόγος in Sallis 2004 (p 154-
156), for a good discussion of the “distancing” effect of the narrative frame of the Phaedo, and of 
several other dialogues, see Johnson 1998, p 577-598. Johnson argues that the narrative distance 
between the truth of what was said, and the memory or report of what was said is used by Plato to 
call to mind “not only the remove between written representation and the doing of philosophy, 
but also the remove between perceptible and Ideal world as suggested in Plato’s vision of the 
Ideas.” Cf Prufer 1986: “That the itself-by-itself (auto kath' hauto, 100b4-7) is mediated to soul 
by (true) logos is itself mirrored by the dramatic form of Phaedo, the recollection of the last day 
of Socrates by Phaedo, who was himself there, to Echecrates, who was not there, but who would 
gladly hear what Socrates said and how he died.” (p 547) Panos Dimas expresses a standard 
interpretation of this distance: “Plato says that he was not present at that conversation (59b10). 
We cannot therefore expect an exact reproduction of what Socrates said, as he said it in these last 
hours of his life. By thus removing himself from the actual scene, Plato creates sufficient 
dramatic space in which he may present philosophical ideas that are not Socrates', but his own, 
and at the same time also to portray the philosophical life and activity of this influential teacher, 
in the language that Plato, himself now reaching maturity as a philosopher, is beginning to 
develop.” (2003, p 179) One central tenet of much literature on the Phaedo claims that, as a 
“middle period” dialogue, it is an example of Plato presenting his own doctrine, as opposed to 
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1.2 Identity, Time, and Λόγος 
 
 The second point I note about the first word, αὐτός, is that it raises an issue that 
we might call a question of “personal identity.” Is the Phaedo of the frame-dialogue, 
conversing with Echecrates many years after the execution, the “same” Phaedo that sat as 
a young man and watched Socrates drink the φάρμακον, and so meet his end? In what 
senses can one speak of Phaedo as the “same” person? In what senses can one speak of 
him as different? How is the passage of time brought to the fore by this question, and 
how is human temporality thus connected to a concern with “self”? 
 The Phaedo is commonly considered to be a dialogue about the separabilty of the 
soul from the body, and the continued existence of the personal soul after death. The 
question of the possibility of personal existence after death inevitably raises the issue of 
what the “self” is. Am I my soul? Am I, then, a pure being entombed in a physical body 
and plagued by its base desires? Am I essentially a body plagued by a fiction of an 
immaterial soul sprung from fear of death and hope for eternal life? Or am I an 
essentially embodied being, whose ψυχή is the principle of life and conscious extension 
of that body, but is not describable in simply reductive materialistic terms? The answers 
one offers to these questions provide the ontological basis for developing an answer to 
                                                                                                                                            
repeating what he had heard from Socrates (see Bluck 1955, Hackforth 1955, Akrill 1973, Allen 
1991, Bedu-Addo 1979, 1991, Vlastos 1969, and many others). Thus, it is claimed, the distance 
created by claiming to have not been present allows Plato to go beyond what the historical 
Socrates might have said on his last day, and insert his (Plato’s) own ideas into the conversation. I 
side with Sallis, Burger, and others, who realize that the dialogue form does not distance us from 
what the character says, but rather distances the author from the conversation; thus, the levels of 
distancing seem to serve the opposite effect, and take us further from the traditional stance of 
treating the dialogue as an expression of Plato’s own doctrine. Most importantly, this observation 
is borne out by a reading of the dialogue itself, as I will show.  
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the explicit question of the dialogue concerning the existence of the personal soul after 
death.  
 One certainly would, prima facie, have reason to believe that if she is essentially 
her body, then she is not the same person she was as a child. Our bodies suffer the same 
uncertainty, in terms of maintaining identity over time, as Theseus’ ship, referred to at 
Phaedo 58a-b; there, Phaedo says that Socrates’ execution had been delayed while 
waiting for the return of the sacred ship from its mission to Delos. During this time, the 
city is to remain “pure” and hold no public executions. The ship is said to be the same 
one Theseus sailed to Crete. However, Phaedo notes that it is only according to what the 
Athenian “say” (φασιν) that this is the identical ship that Theseus set sail on (58a-b).  
 This λόγος, told and retold by the Athenian people, holds the ship together; it is 
this λόγος that gathers it together as one and the same ship in the face of the ravages of 
time, wearing the ship away board by board, until nothing physical of the original ship is 
left.16 At 87e, Cebes argues that if the body is constantly in flux and constantly being 
worn-away during life, then the soul must continually re-weave what wears out (ἀεὶ τὸ 
κατατριβόμενον ἀνυφαίνοι).17 Noting how this problem is subtly brought to light in 
the first word of the dialogue, and following the issue into a reading of the later passages, 
as we demonstrated here, a subtle connection begins to emerge between self, ψυχή, and 
λόγος: It is the λόγος of the Athenians that weaves the threads of the story which claims 
that this ship is the same ship on which Theseus sailed, just as the soul continually 
                                                
16 This is, of course, the same philosophical problem that has come to be known as “Locke’s 
Socks.” 
17 Plato has seemingly coined a very uncommon construction in the word ἀνυφαίνοι. In forming 
this construction he has used φαίνο, which draws our attention to the way the soul’s weaving is 
thought by Cebes to be what brings the body to appear. The visibility of the body is thus 
contrasted with the cause of the visibility which is itself invisible – or at least invisible to human 
beings, if we take what Cebes says at 79b into account. 
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weaves the body together, gathering it together into a whole in the face of its constant 
dissolution.18 These considerations propel the reader beyond the materiality of physical 
flux to look for the stability that allows us to say “the same” of the self. I will argue that 
one of the central threads of the Phaedo is an understanding of the importance of self-
knowledge to the goal of developing harmony in the self; this harmony, according to the 
Phaedo, must be based in a proper ontology of the self grounded in an awareness of and 
engagement with the activity of the ψυχή. Here, we begin to see the possibility that our 
soul weaves together the self through the λόγοι we tell about ourselves, in our 
accounting both to ourselves and to others, which presents our life as a unitary object that 
can be the object of care and reflection. Turning the souls of its readers toward care of the 
self will appear as one of the central purposes of the Phaedo, and indeed, of Platonic 
philosophy.  
  
 This concern for the basis of the sameness of a self over time can lead to the 
postulation of the existence of something beyond the material body as the locus of 
selfhood. This postulation seems necessary in order to guarantee, and theoretically 
ground, the fact that I am the same person I was ten years ago – a fact which we consider 
experientially obvious. However, the issue might not be as simple as it first appears. In 
the Symposium, at 207d, Diotima says 
For in the eros of beasts, in terms of the same argument as that concerning men, 
the mortal nature seeks as far as possible to be forever and immortal. Mortal 
nature is capable of immortality only in this way, by generation (τῇ γενέσει), 
because it is always leaving behind another that is young to replace the old. For 
while each one of the animals is said to live and be the same (τὸ αὐτό) – for 
example, one is spoken of as the same from the time one is a child until one is an 
                                                
18 Later, in our discussion of the argument from recollection, we will find reason to attend to the 
place of λόγος and ψυχή in any attribution of “sameness” or “equality.” 
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old man; and though he never has the same things in himself, nevertheless he is 
called the same – he is forever becoming new in some respects as he suffers 
losses in other respects: his hair, flesh, bones, blood and his whole body. And this 
is so not only in terms of the body but also in terms of the soul: his ways, 
character, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, fears, each of these things is never 
present as the same for each, but they are partly coming to be and partly 
perishing.19 
 
Here, Diotima’s speech makes it clear that there is a connection between the desire for 
immortality, the explicit theme of the Phaedo, and the question of the “sameness” of a 
person with himself over time. In light of this passage from the Symposium, it is 
increasingly difficult to maintain the naïve position that while the body changes, the soul 
remains ever the same, unchanged and ἀθάνατος, and is the locus or source (the αἰτία) 
of one’s being the same person from childhood to adulthood. However, Diotima should 
not simply be considered a mouthpiece for Plato, and the reader should beware of 
importing conclusions from other dialogues into our discussion of the Phaedo. Suffice it 
to say that these issues clearly appear to be connected, and the reader should keep in 
mind this passage, and how it bears on the discussion of the Phaedo regarding the issue 
of personal identity and personal identification with the body, the soul, or recognition of 
the embodiment of all knowing. At this point, it seems clear that the first word opens the 
question of the sameness of a person with herself over time, and that this issue bears on 
questions of immortality. 
 
 These observations show that the opening lines of the dialogue attune the reader 
to the possibility that there is a multiplicity within “identity” – which demands that we 
wonder at how the ψυχή grants unity to the “self.” I will argue that, according to the 
                                                
19 Translation modified from Benardete 2001. 
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Phaedo, this unity does not lie in a physically or metaphysically present entity which 
underlies the changes in experience. Rather, this unity will appear as a possibility for the 
self based in a certain activity of the soul which will draw the self into unity and harmony 
(ideally). The healthy condition of the soul is the harmony of the salient parts of a 
person’s identity at any given time. We will see that the interlocutors are driven into 
confusion by conflicting drives within the self. One way to understand this diversity is 
simply in terms of the body and the soul struggling against one another. If we look to the 
Republic, we see that this is not the only way to understand this diversity, and that 
different vocabularies and ontologies of the soul are deployed at different times and in 
different dialogical contexts in order to illuminate the nature of this diversity, and in 
order to drive the reader toward developing harmony and unity in themselves. 
 
1.3 Ethics and Identity 
 
 The first word thus prompts the question: “What am I?” The reader is led by the 
dialogue to provisionally structure answers to this question in terms of body, soul, or 
embodied being. Further, it becomes clear that this answer will bear on how one would 
consider one’s ethical life to be structured. For example, if I see myself as a pure soul 
entombed in a body, I will conceive of temperance as the soul being plagued from 
“outside” itself by the desires of the body. Temperance, then, will be “me” fighting 
against a set of desires that find their cause in the “not me.”20 If, on the other hand, I think 
                                                
20 We will find that many of the answers Simmias and Cebes give, and many of the positions 
ascribed to the “True Philosophers” in this dialogue, point to a desire to push responsibility for 
“base” desires away form the self and onto something “other,” absolving themselves of the 
responsibility for not being temperate. Cf Burger 1984, p 43. 
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of “myself,” or, “my” soul, as a being that is not simple, but is composed of many 
“parts,” temperance will appear as a struggle of myself with myself.21    
 Let these musings stand simply as a comment on why it might be important to 
inquire into what might seem, at first, a frivolous question; an inquiry such as “Am I the 
same person I was when I was a child?” might first be perceived as an empty, 
meaningless thought experiment. The discussion, however, has revealed the ways in 
which this question might help expose and articulate deeply held ontological beliefs 
about the self which might bear great weight, most likely unconsciously, on an 
understanding of the power of self-knowledge and the ethical demands we place on 
ourselves. The most effective way to answer this question would be go ‘straight’ to the 
self itself and directly uncover its being. However, this direct, pure apprehension is 
impossible. The position sketched in the second sailing, as will be demonstrated, insists 
that the reader attend to the λόγοι in which the self appears as either pure soul, material 
body, or soul-and-body; this insistence, I argue, is both based in and working toward an 
understanding of the limitations of the self which reveal that Socrates is pushing toward 
an awareness of the nature and consequences of embodiment.  
 Further, the reader should note that this question encourages an orientation toward 
the past. In connection with the narrative frame – of Phaedo telling Echecrates how 
Socrates met his death – the opening words of the dialogue orient the reader toward the 
past, and to memory; these passages turn the reader toward questions arising from the 
contemplation of time, the passage of time, and personal change – indeed, toward human 
                                                
21 Cf O’Connell 1997: “One could not settle on what human ἀρετή was unless one came to know 
what the “human being” was: was the human being a body, a soul, or a combination of the two?” 
(p xvii) 
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finitude. Thus, this ‘personal’ dimension of memory should be kept in mind during the 
discussion of the argument from recollection in the Phaedo. Personal change over time 
and human finitude will be especially important as this dissertation gives an account of 
μελέτη θάνατος – the practice, or care of dying.  
 
§2 “Self” in Athens 
 
 Throughout the dialogues, Plato provokes his readers to ask questions about their 
lives which will lead them toward self-knowledge.22 However, this concept of “self-
knowledge” remains extremely vague; it is unclear what the Delphic maxim “γνῶθι 
σεαυτον” meant to a 6th, 5th, or 4th century Athenian.23 While the term αὐτός certainly 
means “self,” it is generally used as a pronoun, as it is in the first line of the Phaedo, and 
not as a substantive; it is difficult to determine whether there is something “substantial,” a 
“substance,” referred to when Socrates repeatedly asks us to examine our “selves.” This 
leaves open the question: Does he mean to examine our opinions? Our habits? Our 
histories? It is not immediately clear. 
                                                
22 I will argue that the question of the nature of the soul, and thus the nature of the self, is 
certainly at the heart of the Phaedo. Michael Davis says that Socrates’ “original, but only implicit 
question” in this dialogue is about the “nature of man.” (1980, p 565) 
23 There is, however, strong evidence that γνῶθι σεαυτον implores the man who enters the 
oracle to remember that he is finite, a mere mortal, and to keep his limits in mind while 
interpreting the words of the oracle. Also, we remember that it is the ultimate act of hubris to 
place oneself above the gods, even if only in words. Cf Burkert 1985, p 274. On the centrality of 
self-knowledge to the dialogues, see Hamilton’s comments in his translation of the Phaedrus: 
“The inscription ‘Know thyself’ upon the temple of Apollo at Delphi expresses the essence of the 
philosophy of Socrates, who turned philosophy away from the study of external nature to that of 
man as a moral being.” (1973, p 25, n. 1). On self-knowledge as σωφροσυνη, and thus its 
connection with virtue, see Charmides 164dff. For a good discussion of the Charmides’ account 
of virtue, see Vorwerk (2001). He argues that the one of the positive results of the discussion of 
σωφροσυνη in that dialogue is to (attempt to) develop a desire for self-knowledge and with it, 
for philosophical discussion (in the form of Socrates “charms”), in Charmides’ soul (p 36). On 
the importance of σωφροσυνη in the Phaedo, see 68cff. 
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 Further, in many instances Socrates seems to use the term “self” almost 
interchangeably with “ψυχή”; in telling us to “examine” (ἐξετάζω) or “care” 
(ἐπιμελεῖσθαι) for ourselves, Socrates at the same time provokes us to examine the state 
of our ψυχή in terms of φρόνησις or ἀρετή.24 Without fully determining the concept of 
the self, it becomes apparent that there is a complex connection being drawn between 
“self,” the nature of the ψυχή, φρόνησις, and virtue; further, the considerations of 
examining one’s life, and striving to live the best possible life, lie at the heart of this 
constellation of ideas.25 
 In any case, interpreting these injunctions risks importing a modern understanding 
of “self” into the discussion, and thus of reading a foreign element into Plato’s texts. 
Given this risk, it is important to briefly clarify the space of the question of the self as it 
might have been experienced by students in the Academy, and Plato’s Greek audience 
more generally.26  
 
 
                                                
24 For example, see the Apology, where Socrates’ injunction slips between examining (ἐξετάζω) 
oneself (28e, 38a), to examining or giving account (ἔλεγχον) of one’s “life” (βίου) (38a, 39c), to 
making the soul as “good” (βέλτιστος, or ἄριστος) as possible (29e, 30b), to caring for virtue 
(ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετήs) (31b), to caring that “oneself” be as good (βέλτιστος) and wise 
(φρονιμώτατος) as possible (36c). 
25 cf Griswold 1986: “The problem of self-knowledge must be approached with some care. There 
is a Greek word for “self” in Plato, but the word is used as a pronoun, not as a substantive. The 
word “ψυχή” functions as the noun corresponding to our “self.” In the Phaedrus, however, 
“soul” does not necessarily have the connotation of “substance” that came, during the history of 
philosophy, to be associated with “self.” In this dialogue the “soul” is fundamentally different 
from Descartes’ res cogitans. . . The Phaedrus’ account of “self-knowledge” begins not with a 
technical interpretation of the notion but with an ordinary one. Socrates wants to know what he in 
particular – as an individual person – is. At the end of the dialogue he returns to this 
commonsensical level in his famous prayer to Pan: he prays that (among other things) he in 
particular might lead a harmonious sort of life. . . Still further, at the start of the dialogue “self-
knowledge” is an ethically charged term . . . That is, Socrates wants to connect self-knowledge 
with leading a morally right life.” (p 2-3)  
26 Hackforth notes that the idea of the ψυχή as the “self” is “post-Homeric.” (1955, p 4, note 2)  
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2.1 Heidegger, Hegel, and the Cartesian Subject 
 
 It is often noted that an element of caution is necessary when reading the self in 
the dialogues in terms of modern conceptions of subjectivity. In “Hegel and the Greeks,” 
Heidegger argues that reading Pre-Socratic Greek philosophy as Hegel does has the effect 
of obscuring the meaning of ἀλήθεια, and thus of obscuring the experience of 
concealment and unconcealment which “holds sway over the beginning of Greek 
philosophy.”27 In Hegel’s studies of the history of philosophy, this danger arises from his 
reading of the Pre-Socratics. Hegel reads these texts as expressions of nascent forms of 
Spirit’s progress toward absolute self-knowledge. As such, Hegel reduces the concept of 
ἀλήθεια in Greek thought to his own conception of “truth” as the goal of philosophy 
only achieved at the completion of philosophy. For Hegel, the Greeks have not reached 
this completion; thus, as Heidegger says, they remain “in the ‘not yet.’”28 
 According to Hegel, the Greeks lacked a developed conception of the subject. 
They had not yet reached the truth of the subject which, according to him, would finally 
be formulated by Descartes.29 With Cartesian philosophy, Hegel finally finds the 
explicitly posited subject which can be the solid foundation of scientific philosophy. This 
subjectivity was, for Hegel, the truth of ἀλήθεια and of the self, αὐτός, even in Greek 
times, but had not yet been brought to consciousness. In his lectures on the history of 
philosophy, he says, “The human being (of the Greek world) was not yet turned inward 
                                                
27 Heidegger 1998 p 332 
28 Ibid. p 331 
29 On the difference between the self, and the relation between soul and body, in Descartes and 
Plato’s Phaedo, see Broadie 2001. 
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upon himself as he is in our times. He was indeed subject, but he had not yet posited 
himself as such.”30 
 If Heidegger and Hegel are right about there being a radical difference between 
modern individuals who think of themselves in terms of what we call “subjectivity,” and 
the Greek experience of the individual, and if in fact individuals now experience 
themselves in post-Cartesian terms as rational subjects fundamentally in opposition to the 
“objects” of the world, then the reader is presented with an enormous difficulty: We 
appear to be cut off from the experience of self which held sway in Athens, and to which 
Socrates is referring when he implores us to care for ourselves. In light of this problem, 
the project Heidegger sets for thinking is to return to the pre-Socratics (and to Aristotle, 
who is for Heidegger an “ontologically earlier” thinker than Plato) to uncover what was 
heard in the word ἀλήθεια. In doing so, a Greek “subject” is not recovered, but rather the 
space of the event of human being as one who speaks is disclosed. Heidegger tells us that 
“ἀλήθεια, thought in a Greek manner, certainly holds sway for human beings, but the 
human being remains determined by λόγος. The human being is the sayer.”31 
 This connection between the human being for whom unconcealment happens 
must not be confused with the subject by whom unconcealment is thought to be 
accomplished; ἀλήθεια is not something that the subject effects, it is the space in which 
human being, determined by λόγος, can happen. That is, the necessity of the human 
being, and of λόγος, for unconcealment does not make the event of truth unavoidably 
“subjectivized.”32 
                                                
30 Quoted in Heidegger 1998, p 331 
31 Heidegger 1998 p 334 
32 Ibid. For more on the connection between truth and the subject in his reading of Plato 
specifically, see Heidegger’s essay “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” in Heidegger 1998, p 155. 
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 It is in learning how to think this connection – the connection between λόγος as 
holding sway over human being, ἀλήθεια as the site in which human being comes into 
its possibility, and the question of the “self” which is ontologically prior to the subject – 
that one can begin to think the self outside the sway of a self-present, transcendent 
Cartesian subject. This thinking, however, should come from a reading of the dialogues, 
and cannot be a “settled matter” prior to that reading. It should avoid determining in 
advance what Plato might have meant by the “self” to which we must turn, and for which 
we must have care (ἐπιμέλεια). That is, in provoking his readers to ask the question of 
the self in the dialogues, Plato is at the same time giving us the tools to formulate that 
question in productive ways, and, I would argue, in different ways in different dialogues. 
Thus, rather than approaching the Phaedo with a fully-formulated question of the self 
ready-at-hand – whether formulated from readings of modern philosophy or of 
interpretations of Plato’s philosophy – this analysis will allow the reading of the dialogue 
make the self questionable again. It is not Plato’s intent to simply present a theory of the 
self, nor a “doctrine of truth”; rather, he intends to engage his audience in a project of 
questioning.  
 
 That being said, I would like to outline what the reading of the Phaedo 
undertaken in this dissertation will present as the space of questioning which will free us 
                                                                                                                                            
Heidegger argues that in Plato – specifically, in the cave allegory in the Republic – we can find a 
shift in the conception of truth from ἀλήθεια, unconcealedness, to ὀρθότης, or the correctness of 
statements. With the dominance in Plato of the idea, the way to truth lies in the subject attempting 
to come into the proper relation to the idea as object. Truth lies in the ὀρθότης, “the correctness 
of the gaze.” (p 177) As such, while both conceptions of truth are at play in the dialogues, 
Heidegger argues that in the cave allegory “ἀλήθεια comes under the yoke of the idea.” (p 176) 
Thus, the stance of the subject over against the idea as object brings with it a conception of truth 
as adequatio intellectus et rei which becomes dominant in Western philosophy. For a good 
account of the problems with Heidegger’s reading of Plato, see Gonzalez 2009.  
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from thinking of the self in terms of a Cartesian subjectivity. As argued earlier in this 
paper, and as Heidegger has said, it is impossible to formulate a conception of the self 
outside an understanding of truth and λόγος. It is only when we begin to understand how 
the world is gathered around us in and through λόγος that we can begin to understand 
what we are, or who we are. In reading the Phaedo, this analysis will uncover the idea 
that humans do not have unmediated access to the truth of things. As limited, finite, 
embodied human beings we find that we must turn to the λόγοι in which we present the 
world to ourselves to begin to uncover our world; it is only through careful consideration 
of these guiding λόγοι – including, centrally, what come to be called “master narratives” 
– that we are able understand our experience, and thus begin to fathom the nature of the 
embodied, finite self.  
 In discovering this, we find that we cannot understand ourselves outside the 
specific political context – that is, the context in which the λόγοι are formed by which we 
understand ourselves. In other words, it is only within a given historico-political context 
that one can come to understand “what it means to be a man,” what it means to be 
Athenian, and indeed what the “self” is. We cannot simply turn away from these λόγοι, 
which, as Echecrates says, have a “wondrous” hold on us; we cannot simply assume an 
unmediated apprehension of the things themselves, or of the self itself. The process by 
which we might ideally achieve this pure vantage point – as that of a disembodied soul – 
is a long and arduous climb which must work through the λόγοι of the πόλις, and cannot 
simply leap beyond them. This is, in fact, the path of self-knowledge, and the path of 
caring for ourselves.  
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 This will indicate that in coming to know the self we come to know the world into 
which the self is thrown; we do not come to know the self as a “subject” standing 
opposed to the world as its “object.” We find rather that we are fundamentally a part of 
the world that would initially appear to be our “object”; discovering ourselves as 
‘extended’ out into this world, as συγγενοῦς with the world, we cannot understand 
ourselves as simply standing outside it, judging it. Thus, this stance “outside” the world, 
and this would-be disconnected judgment, can no longer be the locus of truth, as 
Heidegger has repeatedly argued. 
 This observation, however, cannot stand as the answer to the question of the self; 
rather, it acts as further provocation, redirecting us back into the project of discovering 
the self. That is because this claim, on its own grounds, insists that the self cannot be 
uncovered as a metaphysical entity existing outside the dimensions of its specific world, 
its specific λόγοι. In other words, the philosopher seeking self-knowledge must turn to 
the λόγοι in which the concrete self presents itself to him or herself. The work of the 
philosopher as Socrates describes it is not essentially characterized by the development of 
an abstract, ‘scientific’ theory of the self; rather, the life of philosophy is the work 
(ἔργον) of caring for and uncovering one’s own self, and living toward self-knowledge.  
 We will now to turn to an account of the political situation of Athens in Plato’s 
lifetime. The argument will show that the λόγοι by which people understood themselves 
were in radical flux in Plato’s time. This, in turn, will help illuminate what is at stake for 
Plato in turning people toward the self.  
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2.2 Of Sophists, Tyrants, and the Uncertainty of Politics 
 
 In the Seventh Letter, Plato gives an account of how he turned from the life of 
politics to that of philosophy. When he was young, he says, he was under the same πάθη 
as many other youths in the πόλις: he intended to enter political life – to enter into the 
common (κοινός) life of the πόλις – as soon as possible (324b-c). Plato’s situation was 
extremely favorable in this respect; he had many connections to people in political power 
and could easily have led a very successful political career, as everyone certainly 
expected him to do. How does it happen that he gives up this life and becomes a 
philosopher?  
 In 404 BC, at the end of the Peloponnesian War, the Golden Age of Athenian 
democracy and empire came to an end when The Thirty came into power.33 These 
“tyrants,” with favorable ties to the Spartan regime, included Plato’s relatives Charmides 
and Critias among their number, with his uncle Critias in particular holding a seat of great 
influence. Plato was 23 years old, and states in the Seventh Letter that as a result of his 
youthful idealism he thought that this new regime would wash away the injustices of its 
democratic predecessor, which, he says, was “reviled by many.” (324c) Unfortunately, he 
soon saw that in comparison, the previous democratic regime appeared as precious as 
gold. (324d-e) Seeing the injustices of what had seemed so promising – some of them 
committed against Socrates, who by this time had become Plato’s mentor – Plato 
“recoiled from this evil (κακός).” (325a)  
                                                
33 For a good account of how the fall of Athens set the stage for the philosophy of Plato, and his 
conflict with the sophists for the souls of Athens, see Jaeger 1943, esp p 3-6. Jaeger argues that 
the 4th century was built on the novel principle of “equality under law – isonomia,” which arises 
out of the newly-created conception “of a personality fully self-conscious and responsible for 
itself.” (p 6)  
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 This first encounter with political life teaches Plato that in the real world, things 
do not always accord with his ideals. Just as the political structure of Athens is in radical 
flux and turmoil, Plato begins to doubt the path that has been laid out for him as the 
proper life of an ἄριστος Athenian male; he begins to doubt what it means to have 
ἀρετή. At the same time that he witnesses the injustices committed by The Thirty, Plato 
sees that Socrates presents a contrasting image of virtue. When The Thirty try and coerce 
Socrates into unjust actions, Socrates “refused to obey and risked the uttermost penalties 
rather than be a partner in their unholy deeds (ἀνόσια ἔργα).” (325a) 
 When The Thirty were shortly deposed, Plato states that he was again taken with 
a desire to enter politics. However, the renewal of democracy – of the πάτριος πολιτεία– 
in Athens proves to be an enormously difficult project; by the time Plato comes of age, 
democratic Athens is in sharp decline. Plato witnesses injustices being committed by the 
followers of Thrasybulus in their rise to power following the overthrow of The Thirty. He 
says that this is to be expected, and that many of those who returned to power sought 
revenge on their enemies, but did so with “great restraint.” However, at this time “some 
of those in power” sought to bring Socrates to trial for impiety. (325b-c) Seeing the man 
who Plato believes to be the least deserving of such a dishonor brought before a 
democratic jury and sentenced to death has a profound effect on Plato’s opinion of public 
life, the possibility of democracy, and indeed the possibility of having any substantive, 
positive effect in the political world.  
 Plato came to consciousness in a time of great turmoil; it was no longer clear what 
Athens was, and what it meant to be an Athenian was thrown into uncertainty. To better 
understand the tenor of this time, and the way this political turmoil could call for self-
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examination, we can look to Thucydides’ History. Writing during the troubling time 
leading up to the fall of Athens and the tyranny of the Thirty, Thucydides has Pericles, in 
his famous funeral oration, spend a great deal of time praising Athens as a whole, as an 
institution, rather than speaking directly of the dead and their honorable deeds, as would 
have been customary. In this speech, Pericles, and Thucydides through him, is attempting 
to (re)create a sense of what it means to be an Athenian. Pericles says: “I have dwelt upon 
the greatness of Athens because I want to show you that we are contending for a higher 
prize than those who enjoy none of these privileges, and to establish by manifest proof 
the merit of these men whom I am now commemorating. Their loftiest praise has been 
already spoken. For in magnifying the city I have magnified them, and men like them 
whose virtues made her glorious.”34 It is precisely this sense of self-as-Athenian that is in 
decline during Plato’s time; that is, in light of the political turmoil of Athens, the question 
of the self is drawn into the light.35 Further, Pericles connects the sense of what it means 
to be Athenian to the ἀρετή that Athenian citizens display as a result of being Athenian. 
Thus, as what Athens itself is is called into question in the years following the rule of The 
Thirty, so the traditional conception of ἀρετή which Pericles is calling-upon/(re)creating 
in his oration is also problematized. 
 The specifics of the formulation that Thucydides has Pericles express in his 
speech is not centrally important to this discussion. However, it is interesting to note that 
the ἀρετή praised in the speech centers on achieving a balance between λόγος and 
ἔργον; this balance is said to be made possible because an Athenian is raised to 
                                                
34 2.42.1 
35 This is convincingly argued in Munn 2000, esp. 294-296. See also Martha Taylor 2010, 
Goldhill and Osborne 2006, Dunn 2007. 
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appreciate both the best of things offered by peace, as well as the benefits of valor in 
times of war; in this, the Athenian is unlike the Lacedaimonian, who can only thrive in 
war time. Pericles seems to ascribe this possibility to the freedom of the Athenians.36 It is 
this freedom that makes Athens the “school of Greece”: “I say that Athens is the school 
of Hellas, and that the individual Athenian in his own person seems to have the power of 
adapting himself to the most varied forms of action with the utmost versatility and grace. 
This is no passing and idle word, but truth and fact; and the assertion is verified by the 
position to which these qualities have raised the state.”37 Pericles begins his oration 
pointing to specifically this connection between the institutional structure of Athens – 
specifically its “freedom” (ἐλεύθερος) and the fact of its “being administered in the 
interests not of the few but of the many”38 – and the virtue of its citizens. Pericles says 
that he wants to demonstrate by what devotion, or cultivation of habit (ἐπιτήδευσις) the 
Athenians have come to power, and from what form of government (πολιτεία) and what 
“national character” (τρόπος) their greatness has resulted.39 
 In calling upon these democratic principles of equality and freedom, Pericles is 
speaking to a primary class division in Athenian society.40 In his funeral oration, Pericles 
insists that it is the virtues of the demos that are responsible for the greatness of Athens, 
and not (simply) the ἀρετή of its most wealthy and influential citizens.41 There were 
                                                
36 Cf Balot 2001. 
37 2.41.1 
38 2.37.1 
39 2.36.4 
40 Cf Munn 2000: “The tension between his aristocratic ideals and the democratic political order 
in which he grew up marks the great fault line in the social foundations of political power at 
Athens that was building pressure throughout the youth of Plato.” (p 50) 
41 Some have argued that this represents Pericles’ actual speech, and does not reflect Thucydides 
position, who is argued to have more critical of the demos and thus suspicious of democracy. E.g. 
Balot 2001: “I sharply distinguish Pericles’ arguments and reasoning from those of Thucydides 
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factions within Athens which idealized the Spartan way of life over these democratic 
ideals – factions which included Plato’s relatives Critias and Charmides, as well as his 
brother Glaucon; Plato himself has been traditionally held to have great sympathies for 
this position.42 In any case, we can easily see how the traditional conception of the virtues 
proper to someone raised in free, democratic Athens are in turmoil at this time; with this, 
there is a kind of “identity crisis” endemic in the culture, and we can see this echoed in 
Plato’s turn away from the political life, and his call for self examination.   
 
 One form this turn away from the values of the καλοί κἀγαθοί takes can be 
clearly seen in Socrates’ account of virtue in the Apology, as well as in the Gorgias, 
Republic, and many other works. Socrates repeatedly attacks the dogma which holds that 
the excellences traditionally defining the καλοί κἀγαθοί – political power, public honor, 
wealth, physical beauty, etc – are inherently and unquestionably good. In this traditional 
‘system,’ these ‘external’ goods are the true sign of ἀρετή – to have ἀρετή is to amass 
wealth and to protect your household and your πόλις from destruction, death, and 
enslavement. Socrates’ attacks on these conventionally held values further dovetail with 
Plato’s feud with the Sophists. This “battle between rhetoric and philosophy” begins to 
appear as a battle for the souls of the men of Athens. 
                                                                                                                                            
himself: where Pericles in the Histories is an advocate of and spokesman for participatory 
democracy, and develops a notion of courage in light of his democratic ideals, Thucydides, in my 
view, is critical of participatory democracy because of his negative opinions of the demos.” (p 
506, n 3) Thus, we see that the proper structure of the politeia, and thus of the proper source of 
ἀρετή and ἀνδρεία, is publicly in debate in the early years of Plato’s political education, as it 
was a prevalent theme in Thucydides’ work.  
42 Though the account of Plato as simply and univocally an enemy of the Open State has been 
rightly called into doubt by some recent scholarship, especially on the Republic and the 
Statesman. See Recco 2007, Miller 1980. I argue that a careful reading of the dialogues can see a 
clear undercurrent of criticism of the values of the καλοί κἀγαθοί, as well as a suspicion of 
democratic ideals.  
 42 
 The claim that Sophists customarily make is that they can teach virtue.43 Socrates 
repeatedly attacks them for claiming to teach virtue without knowing what virtue itself is. 
In these attacks, Socrates characteristically shows them to be simply parroting traditional 
conceptions of virtue – specifically of the καλοί κἀγαθοί – which they know will appeal 
to their employers’ sensibilities. In these discussions, the question is consistently raised: 
“If these are the virtues of an Athenian, why are special teachers – often from beyond the 
walls of Athens – necessary to teach a youth ἀρετή? If these are Athenian virtues, why 
isn’t every Athenian a sufficient teacher of ἀρετή?”44 This question indicates the loss of 
a basis for a clear and stable sense of self in Athens during the years surrounding the 
Peloponnesian War. The Athenian empire experiences a rapid, dramatic, and traumatic 
collapse. As a result, the sense of ‘manhood’ (ἀνδρεία) which traditionally served as a 
clear guide to Athenian youth in his coming of age is thrown into uncertainty. There is a 
void that opens up with the fall of Athens and the rise of The Thirty – the defining events 
of Plato’s youth; if, in fact, success and prosperity are the true signs of ἀρετή, then these 
defeats seem a clear call for self-examination. 
 In these times of uncertainty, the Sophists appear as opportunists claiming to 
teach the virtue, and rhetorical skill, necessary to become powerful and influential – to 
rise above the mass of the δῆμος, the οἱ πολλοι, and become one of the rich and 
beautiful καλοί κἀγαθοί. Plato, in the Seventh Letter, said that he, too, was under this 
πάθος, and so desired to enter the political world and gain esteem and authority in the 
πόλις. However, he came to realize, partly through Socrates’ example, a clearer 
                                                
43 Cf Burkert 1985: “. . . the true goal of sophistic education was the highest value of traditional 
morality, namely, distinction won through achievement and success, ἀρετή . . .” (p 311) 
44 See especially the Apology and the Meno.  
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understanding of true virtue; Plato came to believe that, given the loss of the traditional 
conception of ἀρετή, it was necessary to care for the self, for the ψυχή, to achieve the 
kind of ἀρετή which he saw exemplified by Socrates’ life. This self-examination 
becomes the cornerstone of his inquiry into traditional values, and, I argue, is key to a 
more complete interpretation of what is commonly understood as Plato’s metaphysics 
and epistemology.  
 The kind of power that the Sophists intended to teach is, in the Phaedrus (among 
other places), framed in opposition to dialectic, understood as a “writing in the soul.” 
Plato turns away from his youthful desire to externalize himself and achieve political 
power; instead, he begins to idealize the virtue displayed by Socrates – Socrates, who met 
precisely the end that Callicles in the Gorgias, Anytus in the Meno, and others warn waits 
for those who deny the ἀρετή of achieving amoral power and value-neutral, δεινός 
influence in the πόλις. As Plato turns away from these crumbling traditions, he discovers 
the path to Socratic virtue in earnest self-examination; in so doing, he develops insight 
which allows him to use discourse to disclose the truth of himself rather than to 
manipulate those around him.45 
 It should also be noted that the Sophists, especially Protagoras of Abdera and 
Gorgias of Leontini, introduce into democratic Athens a new form of ἀγών: the ἀγών of 
λόγος. These itinerant teachers introduce verbal and logical disputation into the space of 
gymnastic contests, and in so doing lead a kind of “revolution” in which even tightly held 
traditional beliefs became open to question and analysis. An example of this is found in 
                                                
45 This can be seen especially by attending to Socrates comments to Thrasymachus in the 
Republic, to Phaedrus in the dialogue of that name, and to Polus and Callicles in the Gorgias. 
Plato seems to have dedicated much of the work of the dialogues toward developing an 
excellence in speech – along the lines of the “writing in the soul” spoken of in the Phaedrus, esp. 
at 276a – dedicated to the cultivation of self, rather then the manipulation and control of others. 
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the opening lines of Protagoras’ book On Gods, “Concerning the gods, I have no means 
of knowing whether they exist or not or of what sort they may be, because of the 
obscurity of the subject, and the brevity of human life.”46 This line of reasoning was 
enough to have Protagoras put on trial, and may have led to his books being burned in 
Athens, but such a reaction only served to make these analyses more famous and 
influential to Plato’s young mind.47 We will now turn to a brief account of the changing 
religious context in which Plato began to formulate his conception of the importance of 
self examination. 
 
2.3 Individual and Πόλις, and the  
Concept of Ψυχή in the “Mystery Religions” and Pythagoreanism 
 
Religion in ancient Greece had a strong public character and was, in many 
respects, a way of integrating the individual into the community. Within this 
public religion. . . there were special cults that addressed people on an individual 
basis and were voluntarily selected by each person. . . As these cults had to do 
with the individual’s inner self, privacy was necessary and was secured by an 
initiation ceremony, a personal ritual that brought the individual to a new 
spiritual level, a higher degree of awareness in relation to the gods. Once 
initiated, the individual was entitled to share the eternal truth, to catch a glimpse 
of the eternal reality. – Michael B. Cosmopoulis Greek Mysteries: The 
Archaeology and Ritual of Ancient Greek Secret Cults  
 
 
                                                
46 80B4 DK. Cf Burkert 1985 p 311ff. 
47 For an account of the social constraints on the intellectual in Athens, see K.J. Dover, “The 
Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society,” reprinted in Dover 1988. Also, see R. W. Wallace, 
“Private Lives and Public Enemies: Freedom of Thought in Classical Athens,” in Boegehold and 
Scafuro 1994.  
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 In addition to the political upheavals of Plato’s youth, religion in Greece 
undergoes radical transformations in the 6th and 5th centuries.48 The Phaedo can, in large 
part, be understood as a transformation or development of religious concepts; 
specifically, the dialogue develops the concept of the ψυχή, and of the afterlife that the 
ψυχή can expect, from out of the context of these religious traditions which were integral 
to the πόλις.49 Thus, it is clear, in line with Socrates’ conviction on the charge of impiety, 
that philosophy begins with a tense relationship to the πόλις, and to religion.  
 In Plato’s time Mystery cults gained prominence which, while staying within the 
broader outlines of the traditional accounts of the gods as presented in Homer and 
Hesiod, nevertheless begin to question the place of the individual both within the πόλις 
and within the kosmos. While many of these cults had been in existence for over a 
thousand years, these cults gained in size and import within Athens in the 6th century 
(particularly, the Eleusinian Mysteries under Peisistratus, who ruled Athens from 546 to 
527). These movements are connected to a transformation of the understanding of the 
meaning and nature of the ψυχή. At this same time, agnosticism regarding the nature and 
even the existence of the gods begins to become fashionable with the sophists and 
educated people of Athens. A brief account of some of these changes will clarify what 
might be at stake in Plato’s discussion of the self.  
 
 The figure of Pythagoras looms large in the background of the Phaedo – a fact 
which will receive further examination later, during my discussion of Socrates’ 
                                                
48 For general accounts of the changes in religion during these times, see Burkert 1985 and 1987, 
and Parker 1996. 
49 Hackforth argues that the opposition of soul and body found in the Phaedo is a Platonic 
modification of Socrates’ thought, based in Orphic and Pythagorean influences on Plato. (1955, p 
4) 
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presentation of the doctrine of reincarnation. For now, let it suffice to note that Simmias 
and Cebes are both Pythagoreans, and that the frame-dialogue presents Phaedo telling of 
Socrates’ death to Echecrates, a Pythagorean, in the town of Phlius, which is a 
Peloponnesian city associated with Pythagoreans. While historical evidence for the exact 
nature of life in a Pythagorean community is far from complete, it is clear that this was a 
radical departure from everyday life. 
 When one chose to join the Pythagorean community, it was a radically individual 
and personal choice. The Pythagoreans apparently had no rite of initiation, and thus there 
was no mass gathering or group ritual such as found in the Eleusinian mysteries. Upon 
entry, there was a five-year vow of silence, a renunciation of all personal possessions, 
and the promise to follow the esoteric and strict ἄκουσματα which governed every 
aspect of life.50 One’s πάτριος πολιτεία was no longer the significant group to which 
one owed allegiance, and from which one drew the meaning of one’s identity. Burkert 
argues that by imposing new strictures governing how to live, and by removing the 
individual from the purview of the πόλις, Pythagoreanism represented a “protest 
movement against the established πόλις.” 51 
 The essential aspect of this protest is that the individual chooses to leave the 
communal life of the πόλις to begin a life dedicated to the purification of their own 
                                                
50 1985, p 303. These strictures included burial practices; we will discuss this aspect when we 
look at Socrates’ lack of concern over the treatment of his body at 115c. Duty requires that the 
body be buried with the proper rites in every species of Greek religion. Rohde argues that the 
Greeks of the 6th and 5th centuries took this “even more seriously than the Homeric people had 
done.” (1950, p 162) Thus, I will argue that Socrates’ disinterest in the method of his burial – 
coupled with his choice to bathe himself in order to save the women the trouble of washing a 
corpse –  is emblematic of the transformation of religious tradition that Plato is undertaking in the 
Phaedo. 
51 It should be noted that these Pythagorean communities only existed until the early 5th century, 
at the latest, and were gone by Socrates’, and certainly by Plato’s, time, and probably only in 
southern Italy, and never in Greece. 
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ψυχή, with an eye toward their own existence in the afterlife. Thus, each individual is 
still a member of a community, identifies themselves in terms of the strictures of that 
community, and habituates themselves to seek specific values within the context of that 
community; the crucial difference is that this community is not based on the accidents of 
birth, but on individual choice. As Burkert writes, “. . . instead of the pre-existing 
communities of family, city, and tribe there was now a self-chosen form of association, a 
community based on a common decision and a common disposition of mind.”52 We find 
that Socrates calls for the formation of a similar, philosophical community after his 
passing, at 78a, and that Plato accomplished precisely this with the Academy.53  
 The break from the πόλις is less radical, but no less significant, in the case of the 
Mystery cults. While there were important festivals in which thousands were initiated 
into the Mysteries at Eleusis – festivals so important to the Greeks that even wars were 
suspended to enable people from both sides to participate54 – this decision to be initiated 
was still an individual decision not governed by the demands made upon one as a 
member of a πόλις.55 
 Further, with the Mystery Cults, the essential religious context was no longer a 
relation between a πόλις or a tribe and its own protecting deity, but a relation between 
the individual and the divine. Luther Martin writes of the rise of Mystery cults: “. . . a 
sacred order of things was no longer assumed to be immanent in a particular terrestrial 
                                                
52 1985, p 303. 
53 We can see here one reason why post-Socratic schools often set themselves up as apolitical, 
e.g. Antisthenes and the Cynics, who suggested that people withdraw from public life and 
become ἰδιότης. We see also the Epicurean schools, which idolized Socrates and chose to form 
communities ‘outside’ the purview of the πόλις. 
54 Cf Martin 1987 p 66ff. 
55 “In contrast to traditional piety, which belonged to social convention, initiation into the 
mysteries was both voluntary and individual” (Martin 1987, p 61) 
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realm or locale but it was elevated to the universal locus of the celestial realm.”56 At the 
center of this relation was the concept of the purity of the ψυχή. This purity, while still 
an act of community, fundamentally altered the conception of the world and the place of 
the individual within it for the individual initiate themselves. What was seen in the 
Eleusinian Mystery rites was not openly discussed, but the feeling of living in a world in 
which one was initiate, chosen, and thus destined for “salvation” in the afterlife must 
have had profound effects on the way the individual understood his or herself in the 
context of the world.57  
 
 Connected to the way initiation into these groups called attention to the individual 
as distinct from the πόλις, tribe, or family is a revolution in the concept of ψυχή.58 
Speaking of Orphic, Bacchic, Eleusinian, and Pythagorean movements, Burkert writes: 
 
What is most important is the transformation of the concept of soul, ψυχή, that 
takes place in these circles. The doctrine of transmigration presupposes that in 
the living being, man as animal, there is an individual, constant something, an 
ego that preserves its identity by force of its own essence, independent of the 
body which passes away. . . This ψυχή is obviously not the powerless, 
unconscious image of recollection in a gloomy Hades, and in Homer’s Nekia; it 
                                                
56 1987, p 59. 
57 Martin writes: “No longer was the initiate homeless in the midst of a chaotic, labyrinthian 
world: through initiation, the rule of that world was revealed as that of divine providence. The 
cosmic abyss that separated humans from the gods had been bridged, and their at-homeness in the 
world and with the gods had been established.” (1987, p 62) In Ancient Mystery Cults, Burkert 
argues that, unlike Pythagorean communities, an initiate into the Eleusinian Mysteries did not 
have daily contact with their new community of believers. After the celebration, the group 
disbands, does not meet regularly, and the πίστις of the individual in their private, secret 
recollection of the event become central. Everyday life is continued just as it was before 
initiation, and no moral rules for conduct are imposed upon the initiate – all that is changed is 
their spiritual awareness of their place in relation to the divine. (Burkert 1987, p 42ff.) 
58 Hackforth notes that the concept of the ψυχή as the locus of the self is present in 
Pythagoreanism, but is predates the Pythagorean formulation. (1955, p 4) Dodds writes: “In fifth-
century Attic writers, as in their Ionian predecessors, the “self” which is denoted by the word 
ψυχή is normally the emotional rather than the rational self.” (1962, p 139) This self as ψυχή 
was not considered to be alien to, nor opposed to, the body, until Pythagoreanism. 
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is not affected by death: the soul is immortal, ἀθάνατος. That the epithet that 
since Homer had characterized the gods in distinction from men now becomes 
the essential mark of the human person is indeed a revolution.59 
 
These various religious traditions do not finally coincide in a single conception of what 
that soul is, nor do they agree on the nature of immortality and rebirth; however, in each 
of them is developed – slowly, incrementally – a conception of ψυχή as distinct from the 
body and as bearing the ego into a far richer existence after death than that described in 
Homer or Hesiod.60  
 This new conception of the ψυχή had profound influence on Plato, and 
specifically provided the context in which he could begin to use the concept of ψυχή as a 
cornerstone of his metaphysics of the self; ψυχή, in the sense developed in the 5th century 
by such groups as the Pythagoreans and Orphic and Bacchic mystery cults, provided the 
ontological starting-point for Plato’s investigations into the Socratic notions of self-
                                                
59 Burkert 1985, p 300. 
60 Rohde argues that the accounts of ψυχή in Homer are multifaceted, and do not present a clear 
picture of the nature of ψυχή. However, with some exceptions which he attributes to later poets’ 
additions to the Homeric Poems, the Homeric account of the ψυχή in Hades is an unthinking 
shadow of the self, lacking will and desire: “The ψυχή of Homeric belief does not, as might have 
been supposed, represent what we are accustomed to call “spirit” as opposed to “body.” All the 
faculties of human “spirit” in the widest sense – for which the poet had a large and varied 
vocabulary – are indeed only active and only possible so long as a man is still alive: when death 
comes the complete personality is no longer in existence. The body, that is the corpse, now 
becomes mere “senseless earth” and falls to pieces while the ψυχή is untouched. But the latter is 
by no means the refuge of “spirit” and its faculties, any more than the corpse is. It (the ψυχή) is 
described as being without feeling, deserted by mind and the organs of mind. All power of will, 
sensation and thought have vanished with the disintegration of the individual man into his 
component parts.” (1950, p 5) We will look at this more closely when we discuss the accounts of 
the self as ‘body plus soul’ in the Phaedo; for now let us note that it is unclear how this account 
of ψυχή in Homer is consistent with the portrayal of the shades as able to speak with still-living 
Odysseus (once given blood to drink) or as able to “appreciate” their punishment, as in the cases 
of Tityus, Tantalus, and Sisyphus (who Rohde argues are “exceptions to the rule” of the ψυχή as 
unconscious shade in Hades – p 40ff). 
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examination and virtuous living.61 However, the ontology of the self is left vague by the 
variety of conceptions arising from this religious context. It is left to Plato and Aristotle 
to thematize the concept of the ψυχή as the metaphysical basis of the self; it is their work 
– including significant misunderstandings of their work – that provide the basis of 
metaphysical speculations concerning the soul for the entire history of Western 
philosophy.62 Their importance as original thinkers notwithstanding, their inquiries into 
the nature of the ψυχή are not created ex nihilo, but rather arise from the context of 
religious speculation in their time, and thus must be understood as an extension of this 
zeitgeist.63  
  
 While Plato is clearly borrowing a great deal from the Pythagorean and other 
traditions in his account of the nature of the ψυχή, there are important ways in which he 
departs from these traditions, as will become clear in my account of the Phaedo. In the 
Republic, Plato has Adeimantus refer to the practices of many wandering priests of the 
Orphic cults who claim to be able to purify people of any injustice they or their ancestors 
have done. Adeimantus argues that Socrates should give an account of how justice is 
                                                
61 cf Kahn 2001: “In Pythagorean thought immortality is conceived both in terms of the 
transmigration of souls. . . and also in the possibility of purification and escape from the cycle of 
rebirth, from the bondage of bodily form. (It is this conception of the afterlife that is common to 
the Orphic and Pythagorean traditions.)  This Pythagorean view of the soul is most systematically 
developed in Plato’s Phaedo. . .” (p 4). I disagree with Kahn’s assumption that Plato is simply 
continuing with the Pythagorean and Orphic conception of the ψυχή, and of the afterlife. I will 
argue that Socrates use of this vocabulary is strategic, in order to appeal to his listeners, and not to 
be a mouthpiece for Plato’s own views. 
62 Burkert writes: “. . .with the idea of the immortal soul the discovery of the individual had 
reached a goal which is only fulfilled in philosophy. It was Socratic care for the soul and Platonic 
metaphysics that gave it the classical form that was to predominate for thousands of years.” (1985 
p. 301) 
63 On the connection between Orphism and Plato’s dialogues, see Cornford (1903). Specifically, 
Cornford argues that Plato’s image of the body as a “tomb” for the soul is of Orphic origin.  
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good “by itself,” and not in terms of the benefits that might accrue from having a “good 
reputation” with people or with the gods. Adeimantus states that the poets present justice 
as something hard to achieve and the just life as unpleasant and difficult; further, they 
present injustice as something that does not permanently harm an individual’s relation to 
the gods, since one can be absolved of his or her wrongdoings through sacrifice and 
prayer: 
But the most wonderful of all these speeches are those [the poets] give about 
gods and virtue. They say that the gods, after all, allot misfortune and a bad life 
to many good men too, and an opposite fate to opposite men. Beggar priests and 
diviners go to the doors of the rich man and persuade him that the gods have 
provided them with a power based on sacrifices and incantations. If he himself, 
or his ancestors, has committed some injustice, they can  heal it with pleasures 
and feasts . . . And they present a babble of books by Musaeus and Orpheus, off-
spring of the Moon and the Muses, as they say, according to whose prescriptions 
they busy themselves about their sacrifices. They persuade not only private 
persons, but cities as well, that through sacrifices and pleasurable games there 
are, after all, deliverances and purifications from unjust deeds for those still 
living. And there are also rites for those who are dead. These, which they call 
initiations, deliver us from the evils in the other place; while, for those who did 
not sacrifice, terrible things are waiting. (364b-365a) 
 
Adeimantus presents this argument as a challenge to Socrates: He and Glaucon demand 
that Socrates show that the life of justice is beneficial on its own grounds, and not with 
reference to hypothetical benefits in the afterlife. 
 Socrates responds by giving an account of justice which shows that it is beneficial 
to the soul itself, and not simply beneficial in terms of what happens to the individual, in 
the πόλις or in Hades64; his account argues that injustice harms the soul directly, that it 
                                                
64 This is a complicated issue, and unfortunately we cannot undertake an account of the place of 
the Myth of Er as it is presented at the end of the Republic. For an account of how this Myth 
represents a return to the ‘level’ of traditional understanding of the benefits of justice –  as 
presented by the poets – after the descent, the κατάβασις, into the deeper philosophical levels of 
understanding represented by the central books of the Republic, see Brann 2004, esp p 106-107, 
256-272. She argues that “Socrates – having shown the two youngsters Glaucon and Adeimantus 
that justice is good not only as a political virtue but as a human way of being, since it is in fact 
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has negative internal effects on the soul by creating disorder and sickness in the ψυχή; 
thus, justice is not simply choiceworthy due to factors external to the soul, such as how 
the soul fares in the afterlife, or is viewed by the gods. Justice is no longer an issue of the 
relation between the individual and the divine. If injustice is external to the soul – if it is 
simply a matter of angering the gods, or of creating some sort of karmic debt to be paid in 
a less desirable reincarnation – then it follows that a priest could wipe away these 
injustices by appealing to the external source of judgment: to the gods, or to the divine in 
some sense. If, on the other hand, injustice does its damage internally to the soul, then 
there is nothing a priest can do by turning to the divine, and only a turn inward can begin 
to address the damage done by injustice; this turn inward is not achievable by a priest, but 
must be effected through a process of education and self-inquiry which turns the soul 
toward justice.65 It is this radical shift away from the accounts of the nature of the soul 
and of injustice in these various cults that marks the turn from religion to philosophy.66 
Thus, as I will argue in Chapter 3, there is a radical shift in the concept of “purity” 
(εἰλικρινής or καθαρός) that was central to the Orphic and Pythagorean traditions.  
                                                                                                                                            
nothing less than the healthy condition of the well-constituted soul – now wants to bring back in 
abundance the external rewards of which the just man had been stripped for the sake of 
experiment.” (p 260) 
65 This formulation makes the turn seem deceptively simple, however it is anything but. The 
nature of this turn, the means of effecting it, and the issue of how the turn makes the soul more 
just is extremely complicated. Much of the work in this dissertation will be useful in 
understanding how λόγος and an understanding of the χωρισμός clarifies the nature and 
importance of this turn.  
66 It is important to note the importance of this shift in the context of the historically developing 
understanding of individuality and the self. In the context of Homeric “ethics,” injustice is so 
centrally located in an external relation between the individual and the gods that one’s ancestors 
could be punished for one’s injustice. In the context of a philosophical/Platonic understanding of 
virtue, no such punishment is possible. This represents a radical shift in the concepts of self, 
justice, purity, and ultimately, of what is “real.”  
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 The account we give of the nature of the soul, the self, and the place of 
philosophy and λόγος in human life as it is presented in the Phaedo will be speaking, in 
one way or another, to this turn inward as the path to purity. That is, we will be 
developing, in part, an understanding of the soul which provides the ontological basis for 
the Platonic account of justice and injustice; that is, we will show how the choice of the 
best life – the philosophical life of self-examination – benefits the self internally in terms 
of participation in the benefits of a healthy and harmonious soul, rather than externally in 
terms of its relation to the divine or of pleasures in the afterlife.  
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Chapter 2 
Λόγος and the Minotaur 
 
Introduction: Socrates as Theseus 
 
 In this chapter, I will give an initial account of the danger of misology in the 
Phaedo. I will show that the opening lines of the dialogue point to misology as a major 
danger to the life of philosophy. I argue that the specific images of that danger presented 
in the opening section of the dialogue are intended to serve as a primer for how to receive 
– and how not receive – the arguments in the text. I will also show that emotion, in this 
case, specifically fear of death, plays a significant role in the way the Phaedo presents the 
danger that misology poses to the life of philosophy.  
 
 It has been argued convincingly that, in the opening lines of the Phaedo, Plato 
presents Socrates as a Theseus figure attempting to rescue his 14 friends from the dangers 
of the minotaur.67 The dialogue’s structure re-tells the myth of the descent into the 
labyrinth, the battle with the Minotaur, and the return and rescue of the 14 youths.  
 We are told by Phaedo that the execution of Socrates has been delayed. The city 
has the custom (or law – νόμος) of keeping “pure” (καθαρεύειν) during the time when 
the ship is sent to Delos in honor of Theseus’ journey, 
This is the ship, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus once went to Crete with 
the fourteen youths and maidens, and saved them and himself. Now the 
Athenians made a vow to Apollo, as the story goes, that if they were saved they 
                                                
67 Cf Davis 1980: “We are given an account of Socrates' deeds in which he is repeatedly referred 
to as an aner, a real man (57a, 58c, 58e, etc.), in which he is likened to a hero, Theseus. . .” (p 
575) 
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would send a mission every year to Delos. And from that time even to the present 
day they send it annually in honor of the god. Now it is their law that after the 
mission begins the city must be pure and no one may be publicly executed until 
the ship has gone to Delos and back. . . (58a-b) 
 
Shortly after this account, Phaedo lists the names of those present at the discussion re-
told in the Phaedo, and there are 14 names listed. Brann concludes that “The Phaedo is a 
playful recasting of this well-known myth. Socrates is the new, philosophic Theseus. He 
is the heroic savior of the friends gathered around Socrates as he is about to make his 
final journey. . . But who or what plays the role of the Minotaur?”68 
 This dissertation follows the suggestion of Francisco Gonzalez and John Russon, 
among others, in taking the minotaur to be the danger of misology.69 The Phaedo itself, 
and the arguments for the immortality of the soul in particular, present the reader with a 
labyrinth. At the center of this labyrinth Socrates is explicitly concerned about the danger 
of misology and with warning his friends against falling into this trap.70 In order to 
understand the dangers of the hatred of λόγος, with the further goal of understanding the 
powers and limitations of λόγος (especially as figured by the second sailing), we will 
examine this danger as it appears in the context of Socrates’ invocation of misology. I 
will argue that there are many dangers presented in the dialogue that lead people away 
from trusting in λόγοι.  
                                                
68 1998, p 3. 
69 cf Gonzalez 1998 p 189, Russon & Sallis 2000.  
70 Henry Piper calls this passage the “existential center of the dialogue.” (2005, p 266) I argue that 
Socrates’ discussion of misology in the “digression” from 88c-91c is central to understanding the 
context and spirit in which to receive the arguments for the immortality of the soul. Contrast this 
stance to the practice of R. E. Allen, who, in his re-print of the Phaedo in Greek Philosophy: 
Thales to Aristotle chose to excise this part of the text – presumably to return the ‘more 
important’ arguments for the immortality of the soul.  
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 First, I will discuss the danger that arises from trusting in λόγοι in the wrong way 
as discussed at 89dff. Then, I will discuss the important danger of emotion to the proper 
relation to λόγος. Specifically, I will show that the dialogue warns us against the danger 
of attachment to traditional λόγοι which have a “wondrous” hold on us – which can lead 
to violent and aggressive reactions when these “wind-eggs” are taken away from us. My 
analysis will show that seeking to overcome the internal disharmony of cognitive 
dissonance is essential to philosophical παιδεία. Further, I will show that  fear of death, 
and temptation – specifically, the temptation to seduce or dominate others by seeking 
“that what they themselves put forward should seem to be the case to those present” (91a) 
– pose a serious threat to attending “to the way it is with the things the argument is 
about.” (91a) Avoiding these dangers will prove essential to the ethical work of 
examining traditional λόγοι, and of developing a unified, harmonious self by turning to 
the λόγοι through which we gather beings into intelligible unities. The process of 
harmonizing the λόγοι which guide and govern our lives cannot begin if we are caught 
by this most terrible Minotaur.  
 
   
§ 1.  Πίστις and Παιδεία 
 
 We will begin our inquiry into how Socrates rescues his friends by looking at 
Phaedo’s description of the experience which provoked Socrates to speak about 
misology. At 88c, Phaedo finds himself to be sharing in the emotions of his friends.71 
                                                
71 Cf Gorgias 481c-d. 
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They are so affected by Simmias and Cebes’ attacks on Socrates’ arguments for the 
immortality of the soul that they later commented to one another how they felt at that 
moment in the conversation. Phaedo says that they were all persuaded (πεπεισμένους) 
by Socrates’ earlier λόγος concerning the immortality of the soul (ibid). After hearing the 
λόγοι of Simmias, presenting the soul as a harmony, and of Cebes, presenting the 
analogy of the cloak maker, they felt that they had been “thrown down” (καταβαλεῖν) 
into confusion (ἀναταράξαι) and distrust (ἀπιστίαν) (ibid.).72 In this confusion, they 
found themselves distrustful not only of the argument Socrates had presented, but of 
“what would be said later on.” Phaedo worries: “Who knows, we might be worthless 
judges, or these matters themselves might be beyond trust (τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἄπιστα 
ᾖ)!” (88c)  
 I will note several issues regarding this initial expression of the danger of the 
mistrust of arguments. First, the reader should attend to the use of the word “trust” 
(πίστις) in order to develop an understanding of what is at stake in this account of the 
danger of misology. It is important to keep in mind the etymological connection between 
πίστις and πείθω (persuasion), which is also used in this passage and throughout the 
dialogue. In the Republic, Socrates says that what he at first placed his trust in, he later 
                                                
72 It is interesting to note that the term translated as “confusion” in this passage – ἀναταράξαι – 
is formed as the negation of ἀταραξία: A calm, centered and peaceful state of mind. Αταραξία 
was considered by some Hellenistic philosophers – notably the Epicureans – to be the central 
virtue of the philosophical life. Thus, being pulled between one’s rational beliefs and social 
conditioning is said here to be an obstacle to this central virtue. It is in some sense in overcoming 
the sort of cognitive dissonance which caused Phaedo and Echecrates to experience ἀναταράξαι 
that we will find peace of mind.  
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came to distrust; he describes philosophical education as compelling the soul to develop 
from πίστις in things to higher modes of belief in what is truly real (Book 6, 509cff.).73  
 To see what is at stake here, regarding the Phaedo as well as the Republic, it is 
important to develop an understanding of what Socrates is referring to when he speaks of 
time in this passage – and particularly, how what he placed his trust in changed over time. 
He is not simply referring to the passage of time simplicter, but is describing the process 
of the education of his soul in philosophy; Socrates is speaking of παιδεία. As such, an 
understanding of how the Phaedo is a document concerning the education of the soul is 
necessary to clarify the way this education and turning of the soul takes place.  
 
1.1 Παιδεία and the Defense of the Life of Philosophy 
 
 The Phaedo is, among many other things, a defense of the life of philosophy.74 
Socrates failed, in a sense, to defend his choice of life to the Athenian “judges.”75 Plato 
undertakes a defense of this life in writing the Phaedo (there is an important sense in 
which each of the dialogues takes up this challenge in various forms). This fact is evoked 
                                                
73 In the Republic, at 523aff, Socrates says that one of the important steps in this development is 
the “summoning of the intellect (διάνοια).” The example he uses, of the finger that is ‘both big 
and little,’ mirrors the example of Simmias as both big and little at Phaedo at 102bff. Cf Byrd 
2007, p 145.  
74 Cf Davis 1980: “Throughout the Phaedo Socrates' apparent praise of death is, beneath it all, a 
praise of a certain kind of life. In that sense he is competing with the poets.” (p 567) Ferit Guven 
argues that there is a “constantly renewed desire” to define the work of philosophy in the 
dialogues, and specifically to delimit it from sophistry and rhetoric. He says that the Phaedo (and 
Phaedrus) are notable examples of dialogues where the philosophical activity is the attempt to 
define philosophy. He even suggests that one might “suspect that this attempt to delimit 
philosophy as a discourse is itself what philosophizing is.” (2005, p 13) I will argue that, while he 
is right to suggest that such delimiting is necessary, the more important task of the philosopher 
can be discerned when we attend to the philosophical life, and not philosophical “discourse,” and 
that therein lies the cardinal distinction between philosophy and sophistry.  
75 Although Socrates notably refrains from calling the members of the jury who voted to convict 
him “judges.” Cf White 1989, p 41 
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at many places in the dialogue where juridical language is used to describe Socrates’  
defense of the life of philosophy, here presented as the “practice of death.”76  
 This juridical language appears most notably at 63b. After putting his feet down 
on the earth, Socrates praises Cebes for his willingness to engage in argument, and his 
habitual unwillingness “to be persuaded (πείθεσθαι) right off by what anybody says.” 
(63a) Simmias and Cebes then charge Socrates with abandoning them. Arguing for the 
“practice of death,” Socrates says: “What you’re both saying is that I should make my 
defense against these charges, just as in the law court.” (ibid.) He continues, “I’d better 
try to give a more persuasive defense before you than I did before my judges.” (ibid.) The 
way in which this defense of the practice of death is, in fact, a defense of the life of 
philosophy is central to understanding the importance of self-knowledge and the 
development of a harmonious condition of the soul to the philosophical life as presented 
in the dialogues.  
 In order to understand how the Phaedo presents the life of the philosopher, and 
how the work of the philosopher is to be distinguished from that of the sophist or the 
rhetorician, it is important to understand how the philosopher stands with respect to 
death. At 61b-c, Socrates expresses that anyone who is truly a philosopher should be 
willing to follow Socrates into death. He says that if Evenus is a philosopher he should do 
as anyone “who takes a worthy part in this business” of philosophy should do, and take 
                                                
76 μελέτη θάνατος – It will have to wait until we make more progress concerning the life of 
philosophy before I can explicate what I take the practice of death to mean. For now, let it be 
noted that this phrase indicates that the life of the philosopher cannot deny or obscure the 
immanence of death. Just as Socrates faces death on the day of this conversation, all philosophers 
live in the awareness that death can approach at any moment.  
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Socrates’ advice – which is, apparently to follow Socrates into death (61c).77 That is, the 
true philosopher is one who will face death as Socrates does; we can know the 
philosopher from the sophist, the believer from the one who spouts eloquent and empty 
phrases, by their willingness to die for their ideals. It is after giving this strange advice 
that Socrates put his feet down on the earth, and remained sitting in that posture for the 
rest of the dialogue (61d). 
 This is not the only connection between awareness of death and the παιδεία that 
the soul of the philosopher undergoes – a παιδεία lacking in the sophist, the 
ἀντιλογικός, and the misologist. The παιδεία indicated by the progress from youth to 
maturity is indicated in several places in the dialogue. At the opening of the dialogue, as 
we saw in the last chapter, we are asked to consider Phaedo’s development from being a 
youth – in arguments as in age – to the time when he recounts his tale. Of course, at the 
close of the dialogue, the image of the dying Socrates demands that we consider our own 
mortality, and thus the significance of the fact that we age, and that our life is finite, as 
well as changing and developing. At the structural center of the dialogue we find the 
passage we are considering, concerning misology.78 In that passage, the language 
Socrates uses to describe the process of development concerning our stance toward λόγοι 
(and toward other people) evokes the passage of time and the importance of accounting 
for human development. He says we come to be misanthropic over a period of time, after 
                                                
77 We will see, however, in our discussion of the passage at 64bff, that it is not yet clear what 
“sort of death” (οἵου θανάτου) the philosopher should seek, and is “worthy” (ἄξιοί) of.  
78 For other examples of misology in the dialogues, see the Laches 188c, and Republic 411d. In 
the Republic, misology results from the soul becoming “savage,” and never using persuasion. The 
love of learning in the soul becomes small and weak, and so we turn to forcing others to think the 
way we want them to think. On the Laches, see Gotshalk 2002, p 4ff. Laches says that he can be 
considered to be a misologue, since he hates to hear an argument from someone whose λόγος 
does not accord with his ἔργα. (188c) 
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dealing with untrustworthy people “many times” (89d). We are all familiar with how in 
youth it is not uncommon to tend toward seeing the good in people and trusting in a 
handshake; as we get older, we become jaded, assume the worst, and make sure to get 
everything in writing. It is a similar process with misology, and Socrates speaks of the 
danger to those who have “spent their days in debate arguments (περὶ τοὺς 
ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες)” (90c). That is, Socrates warns that the way we 
‘wear away’ (διατρίβω) time has an enormous effect on our development, and on the 
kind of people we become. He goes on to warn that those who spend their time with the 
ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους will “finish out the rest of [their] life hating and reviling λόγοι,” 
(90d)79 which once again reminds us of the passing of our lives. Finally, at what I take to 
be the philosophical center of the dialogue, we find the second sailing passage coming at 
the end of Socrates giving an autobiography in which he recounts his own philosophical 
development. 80 
 The Phaedo, then, is a text which demands that we take into account the fact that 
we age, the fact that our stance toward the world, toward each other, and toward λόγοι 
                                                
79 Note that at Sophist 225b, the ἀντιλογικοὺς is defined as a species of argument which is 
“chopped up into questions and answers.” At Phaedrus 261d, Plato uses this word to include 
public debate, including that in the courts, such as the one in depicted in the Apology, where 
Socrates begins by saying that he will not speak in the “usual manner” for the court. There, it is 
also used to include the arguments of Zeno. Cf Robinson: by ἀντιλογικοὺς Plato indicates “a 
tendency to contradict, to maintain aggressively whatever position is opposite to that of one’s 
interlocutor.” (1953, p 89) Thus, spending time oriented toward “what is said,” in order to defeat 
others in an eristic battle designed to create the appearance of wisdom in public, and not toward  
“the way it is with the things the argument is about,” can harm our philosophical education and 
even habituate us to believe that the only thing λόγος can accomplish is defeating others. On the 
relevance of Socrates’ call for a turn away from debating λόγοι and toward truth in the context of 
Athens at the time, see Hackforth 1955, p 110. 
80 On the importance of this autobiography as looking into his past on the day of his death, Sallis 
says: “It is as though, confronted by his own death, Socrates looks into himself, back into his own 
past. . .” (1996, p 39) Sallis notes that the issue of philosophical “growth,” which reveals 
philosophy to be a process, a life, is raised in this passage: “Socrates’ own growth consisted in his 
coming to see that the common opinions regarding growth are questionable.” (ibid.) 
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changes and develops over time, and the fact that we will all die. The swans “sing the 
most and the most beautifully when they sense that they must die (οἳ ἐπειδὰν αἴσθωνται 
ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν).” (84e-85a) The ‘perception’ that death is inevitable is 
essential to our most beautiful speeches. The life of the philosopher, then, will be that life 
which does not obscure or deny this fact. That is to say, the life of the philosopher will 
understand itself to be a life – not a theory, not a doctrine, but a growing, developing, 
inconstant human life.   
 
1.2 Trust in Λόγοι, and the Technology of Speech 
 
 The life of philosophy, marked by the second sailing as an inquiry into λόγοι, is, 
in an important sense, a life which progresses from trust in “things” to trust in λόγοι. Of 
course, Socrates’ autobiography of his own παιδεία culminates in a turn to λόγοι. While 
it remains unclear what trust in λόγοι might mean, we note here Socrates’ insistence that 
a mistrust of λόγος would be a crippling impediment to the life of philosophy. If Socrates 
is unable to save Phaedo and his companions from this Minotaur, they will be cut off 
from what Socrates takes to be the best life. It is, in some sense, in respect to λόγος that 
the philosophical life progresses from youth to maturity. This progress – this παιδεία and 
turning of the soul – is marked by our stance toward λόγοι relating to the issues of trust 
(πίστις) and persuasion (πείθω). 
 It also becomes clear why the reader needs to beware of thinking in translation, 
and must stay close to the original Greek. To translate λόγος as “argument,” and thus 
misology as “hatred of arguments” is to reduce this point to the true, but misleadingly 
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simple statement: “Hatred of argument is damaging to philosophy.” This is misleading 
because, while true, this interpretation conceals the importance of λόγος to the life of 
philosophy. The danger of misology is not simply that we do not trust arguments to give 
us the “truth” of the external world; rather, the situation of dwelling with λόγος has far 
deeper implications for ethical living than one might expect if one understands λόγος 
simply in terms of the arguments we consciously accept or deny concerning ethics.  
 In fact, I will argue that attending to the ethical dimensions of life is based in a 
certain stance toward λόγος itself81; i.e. λόγος is not reducible to being merely the 
means by which we come to belief about ethical demands. Λόγος is not a set of 
arguments about what is real or how we should behave, and misology is more than being 
mistrustful of these arguments. Rather than being merely a means to the end of proper 
belief, λόγος is instead the logic of the space in which reality appears to us as something 
“in” which we are called to act. We will see that it is the activity of the soul to determine, 
“through” the senses – that is, through bodily engagement with the world – the “being 
and benefit” (οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν) of what is encountered, as it is put in the Theaetetus 
(186c).82 It is in accord with λόγος that the soul gathers beings into unities, gathering 
them into their being as the beings they are, and determines the “benefit” of each one – 
that is, what should be pursued, and what avoided. Thus, translating λόγος as “argument” 
closes off the question of this dissertation before it can begin, and does not allow us to 
understand how hatred of λόγοι could be the worst evil that one could undergo, 
                                                
81 This is the thrust of Francisco Gonzalez’ argument in his discussion of the Meno in Dialectic 
and Dialogue. He says that Socrates, in refuting Meno’s definitions of knowledge, has the goal of 
getting “Meno genuinely to inquire for the first time in his life, not because inquiry is a means to 
an adequate definition of virtue, but because inquiry is itself an essential part of being virtuous.” 
(1998, p 163) 
82 This will be discussed in Chapter 4 and in the subsequent Chapters.  
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according to Socrates. In the next chapters, I will show that this danger is figured in the 
dialogue in part by the way Socrates’ interlocutors take, or mistake, his λόγοι.  
 
 “Πίστις” is said by Socrates to be at the heart of the trouble which leads to 
misology. Like misanthropy, misology is described repeatedly as a πάθε – i.e. an 
“experience” in which the person undergoing the “experience” is largely passive83; this 
πάθε is, however, the result of an active stance the person takes toward λόγοι. This 
stance is one of excessive trust. At 89 c-e, Socrates says, “Misology and misanthropy 
come about in the same way. For misanthropy comes about from artlessly (ἄνευ τέχνης) 
trusting someone to excess, and believing that human being to be in everyway true and 
sound and trustworthy (πιστὸν), and a little later discovering that this person is 
untrustworthy (ἄπιστον) – and then having this experience again with another.” When 
this process is repeated, Socrates says, “especially at the hands of those he might regard 
as his most intimate (οἰκειοτάτους) friends and comrades,” people often end up 
distrusting everyone, or thinking there is nothing “sound” (ὑγιὲς) in anyone. (ibid.)84 
  
                                                
83 Socrates says we must be on our guard not to “experience this experience” (τι πάθος μὴ 
πάθωμεν) at 89c. 
84 It is interesting to note here the connection between knowing and trusting a person and 
knowing and trusting a λόγος. At the opening of the dialogue, the word “αὐτός,” which is how 
Plato usually refers to the “forms,” (e.g. beauty itself) is used to refer to Phaedo himself. 
Something is at play here indicating a connection between the experience of knowing, 
encountering, or being involved with a person and the experience of knowing, encountering, or 
being involved with an εἶδος or a λόγος. This point is also connected to Plato’s use of the word 
ὑγιὲς, which can refer to a sound and healthy body, or a logically sound argument; as such, I 
note, without being able to follow this observation out explicitly, that this implies a sense in 
which the soundness of a λόγος is like a healthy body, and thus, a sense in which being 
persuaded of and trusting an unsound λόγος is like a disease.  
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 Socrates uses the word τέχνη to describe the stance toward λόγος and toward 
people. He implies that there is in some sense a τέχνη of judging people which would 
demand measured trust; thus, there would perhaps analogously be a τέχνη of λόγος itself 
that would dictate the proper stance, not toward any specific argument, but rather toward 
λόγοι in general – this, again, in terms of trust and persuasion. This dissertation is 
working toward an account of how a general stance toward λόγοι is being presented in 
the Phaedo. It would seem that λόγος itself might be a form of τέχνη which we must 
turn to in order to become aware of the unity and the good of beings (99a – 100b); thus, 
λόγος is in some sense a τέχνη which mediates our experience of the world, and it is 
thus somehow through this τέχνη that we determine the “being and benefit” of the beings 
we encounter. Thus the world we inhabit would in some sense be a product of the 
technology of λόγος – a technological world manufactured in accord with the λόγοι 
which have a “wondrous” hold on us.  
 
 Socrates asks if it would be shameful (αἰσχρόν) to attempt to deal with human 
beings without this “τέχνη” (89e). Phaedo, a youth in arguments and in dealing with 
people, does not get a chance to answer. The reader is thus left to follow out the question: 
Is it shameful to attempt to deal with people without a τέχνη of human affairs? Is it, in 
fact, even possible to avoid dealing with people until we acquire this τέχνη? How can we 
acquire this τέχνη without dealing with people? How could it be shameful to deal with 
people with whatever, however untechnical, means we have at our disposal if we have no 
choice but to be always already thrown into a life with other people?  
 66 
 A passage from the Theaetetus is useful here: In the midst of a discussion with 
Theaetetus examining Theaetetus’ conceptions of knowledge, Socrates breaks off and 
says they are being “shameless” (ἀναίσχυντος). Throughout a discussion trying to 
define what “knowledge” (ἐπιστήμη) means they have been using the word “know,” 
“recognize” (γιγνώσκω),  and others as if they knew what they meant. Theaetetus is a bit 
exasperated by this, saying “In what way (τρόπος) will we converse (διαλέξῃ) if we 
avoid [such words]?” (196d) Socrates says that there is no other way, since “I am who I 
am.” (197a)85 
 We are always already underway in dealing with people, and involved in human 
affairs; we are always already underway in λόγος.86 We do not have the luxury of a 
rehearsal for life. We are thrown into a fully articulated human situation, a culture, a 
language, and a family, whose logic we are forced to learn how to navigate even as we 
are underway navigating it. 
 One particular form of this navigation is the skill of finding safe passage between 
the Scylla of excessive trust and the Charybdis of excessive distrust. We might be 
inclined, by temperament as well as by training and enculturation, to overly trust people; 
analogously, we can trust too readily in the λόγοι we tell and have been told about the 
meanings that form the content of our human situation. This most readily takes the form 
                                                
85 To make even clearer the connection to the passage of the Phaedo we are concerned with here, 
immediately after saying this – that he proceeds as he does since he is who he is – Socrates 
contrasts himself with the ἀντιλογικός, “the debaters.” In the Phaedo at 90b-c, Socrates says that 
it is the ἀντιλογικός who have become misologists and find nothing sound in any λόγος.   
86 “The Phaedo begins in error because there is no other place to begin. Put differently, we do not 
ever begin; we rather discover that we have already begun. . . Misology and misanthropy are the 
same because to be an anthropos is already to be immersed in logos. Of course that does not 
mean that we are born with logos. Rather, when learning to speak it is unthinkable that we could 
begin by learning what it means to speak. We must begin in ignorance of what we are doing. Our 
first speech cannot be about speech; it must therefore be self-forgetful. Only when we have 
spoken do we have anything to say about speech.” (Davis 1980, p 574) 
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of shared cultural beliefs, e.g. religion, what it means to “be a man,” what it means to be 
beautiful, the dogmas of patriotism, etc.87 The belief in death as separation of the soul 
from the body – and thus the underlying assumption that a person is the combination of 
soul and body – is one such belief that is at play in the Phaedo, along with traditional 
concepts of Hades and the afterlife as presence in a τόπος, and the soul as a “harmony,” 
etc. I will show how attachment to such λόγοι – and the dangerous attempts by 
philosophers to rid people of these traditional dogmas – give rise to powerful emotional 
responses which speak to the multiplicity and cognitive dissonance in the soul. The 
dialogues provide a myriad of examples of how people can become upset, and even 
violent, when their ignorance is revealed to them; Socrates’ conversation on the day of 
his execution makes this danger very real for readers of the Phaedo. 
 
 In the Theaetetus, Socrates shows that these inherited, traditional beliefs have a 
genealogy; Theaetetus’ initial claim that knowledge is perception is revealed as the 
offspring of Protagoras – Protagoras is the “father” who has “impregnated” Theaetetus 
with this idea.88 This process of uncovering the histories of our concepts has a liberating 
effect; when we see that these conceptions do not fall from heaven – are not handed down 
by the gods, so to speak – we begin to see them as questionable, and are driven to 
question them. Seeing that they are contingent on specific histories and specific traditions 
                                                
87 We saw above how the political turmoil in Athens during Plato’s political education called all 
of these values into question, and helped provide the impetus to his call to self-examination. One 
dimension of this examination is, of course, the process by which we become aware of our 
ignorance. This ignorance, however, comes in the form of δόξα: “Ignorance is not simply 
emptiness; a human soul is never simply empty. Ignorance rather manifests itself in opinion, 
appearance, doxa. It is in awareness of our opinions as opinions that we become aware of the 
power of a soul, that we become self-aware.” (Davis 1980, p 574, emphasis added) 
88 cf. Greater Alcibiades esp. 109-113ff, where Socrates implicitly names Homer as the father of 
young Alcibiades’ conception of justice, through the tutelage of the οἱ πολλοι.   
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frees us to imagine things otherwise. Only when we recognize them as contingent upon a 
particular tradition can we seek to understand the reasons behind these beliefs such that 
we can form the kind of opinion that comes with knowledge, rather than the kind of 
persuasion that happens without knowledge.89 It is obviously one of the primary purposes 
of Socratic elenchos to shake the foundations of these traditions. It is precisely because of 
the threat this activity poses to the origin myths of the community that Socrates finds 
himself faced with execution.  
 Much of the work Socrates does in the Phaedo is directed toward this kind of 
archaeology. As demonstrated later in this dissertation, Socrates is explicitly calling us to 
this work in his discussion of the ‘method of hypothesis’ which he is driven to adopt after 
his second sailing. There, at 101d-e, Socrates makes it explicit that this method is 
designed to allow the dialectician to inquire into the consequences and the 
presuppositions of any λόγος. We have to begin from where we are because we are who 
we are; this starting place does not mean, however, that our cultural presuppositions are 
unalterably fixed. We do have the capacity to develop a vantage-point from which to 
draw these assumptions into the light and question them. This vantage-point is only 
possible if we allow ourselves to ‘own’ these traditions, and admit to our own limitations 
as humans. From this perspective we recognize that the inquiry into our cultures’ 
presuppositions is essentially self inquiry.  
 I will argue that examining the values that have, as Echecrates says at 88d, a 
“wondrous” hold on us is essential to the process of developing harmony in the self. I 
will show that the process of examination that Socrates describes as his “second sailing” 
                                                
89 cf Gorgias 454c-455a 
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has the ethical importance of being the only possibility for developing a harmonious 
mode of living in which we are no longer acting blindly out of the values of our tradition; 
it is only once we have freed ourselves of the chains of this tradition and turned toward 
the light, as it were, that we can begin to live out of a set of values which we consciously 
and rationally adhere to. However, it will also appear that the limitations of being a finite, 
embodied human, born into a specific socio-political context, reveal the process of 
developing this self-awareness and self-possession to be, unfortunately, not subject to 
total completion.  
 Gnothi seauton, ‘know thyself,’ is commonly taken to mean “know your 
limitations; know that you are mortal.” In knowing ourselves to be mortal, limited beings, 
we come to realize, in addition to the fact that we will all die, that we are not the authors 
of our own existence. We do not lay the ground for our being, but are thrown into the 
human situation. One form in which this makes itself apparent is through the λόγοι that 
shape and form the basis of a specific culture. Excessive distrust of these λόγοι would be 
marked by an attempt to flee this tradition too readily and too easily.  Just as we might 
choose to avoid human contact out of distrust, we quickly find that the basis of our lives 
just is this involvement.90 Such avoidance is impossible because we are who we are.  
 In order to understand the problems of excessive distrust as figured in the 
dialogue, a return to Phaedo’s expression of his experience in the conversation which was 
pushing him toward misology is in order. 
                                                
90 We see, for example, Thrasymachus in the Republic and Callicles in the Gorgias suffering from 
a distrust of λογοι; they both attempt to cast off the traditions of their culture, and think of 
themselves as self-sufficient. We can find in Socrates’ refutations of both of them the seeds for a 
conception of human life as essentially interpersonal – i.e. for man as the “political animal.” For 
example, Socrates is able to show Thrasymachus that even if he wants to be a tyrant he will need 
other people.  
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§ 2 Distrust, Dogma, and Emotion 
  
 We will now return to Phaedo and Echecrates’s accounts of the πάθος they 
underwent upon hearing Simmias and Cebes’ objections.  I will argue that a stance 
toward the arguments, and thus toward argument in general, is revealed in these 
comments. It will become clear that an understanding of emotion plays a critical role in 
accounting for how we are to stand with regard to λόγος if we are to avoid the minotaur 
of misology.  
 
2.1 Fear and Persuasion 
 
 Phaedo says that he and his friends were ‘thrown down’ upon hearing Simmias 
and Cebes’ objections because they were so “powerfully persuaded by the previous 
λόγος.” (88c) We must note a very puzzling fact about Phaedo’s response here: he refers 
to Socrates’ arguments for the immortality of the soul in the singular (as does Echecrates 
in his response at 88d); he is, then, either ignoring the fact that Socrates has made three 
distinct arguments, or he is only dealing with the last argument concerning the similarity 
of the soul to divine incomposite eternal Being.91 
                                                
91 The first argument, on the generation from opposites, spanning 70c-72d, the second, the 
argument form recollection, from 72d-76e, and the third from 78b-84c. At 77c-d Socrates refers 
to the first two arguments as distinct before proceeding to the third.  
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 The first possibility – i.e. that Phaedo is treating all three of Socrates’ arguments 
as one argument – raises the question: Why would he take them as a single argument? 
There is a common problem with thinking in terms of simple binaries; in this way of 
thinking, all arguments for one position form a single argument, and all arguments 
against that position are arguments for the “opposite” position. This naïve attitude toward 
λόγοι leads one to dismiss as ridiculous all arguments against a position one holds to be 
true. In other words, when λόγοι are thought of in this way, there could never be a good, 
sound argument for the wrong position. Such people often revel in straw-man arguments 
and in the worst examples of arguments for the position they oppose. As such, Phaedo 
and Echecrates might be taking all of Socrates’ arguments together, as if they were 
necessary parts of a larger, unitary λόγος about the soul which reveals it as immortal. 
 
 It is, however, more likely that what is indicated by Phaedo and Echecrates’ 
referring to the arguments for the immortality of the soul in the singular is that they have 
chosen, consciously or not, to ignore the first argument. We will explore the question of 
why they ignore it in order to better understand the dangers of misology – specifically, in 
how it can lead to excessive distrust in λόγοι.  
 
 At 77c, Socrates chides Simmias and Cebes for forgetting that their first argument 
had proven that the soul continues to exist after death, just as the argument from 
recollection proves that the soul existed before birth. It seems that they were unmoved by 
this first argument, and understanding why they are not persuaded might help explain 
why Phaedo and Echecrates have chosen to ignore it as well.  
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 Simmias and Cebes have just said, at 77a-c, that while they are persuaded by the 
argument from recollection that the soul exists before birth, they are not convinced that it 
will continue to exist after death. This is a peculiar position to take. They have been 
‘convinced’ of the separation of soul and body, and they admit that the soul can exist 
without the body, specifically, prior to the body’s existence; strangely, however, this 
belief is not enough to convince them that the soul may continue to exist after death. 
Why is this? 
 Socrates immediately identifies the problem: Fear. Socrates says they “have the 
fear of children – that in truth the wind will blow the soul away and scatter her in all 
directions as she departs form the body, especially whenever somebody happens to die, 
not in a calm, but in some great gust of wind.” (77d-e) In the face of this visceral fear, the 
abstract argument from opposites holds no sway. It is one thing to be persuaded of the 
abstract proposition that the soul has a being and an existence separate from the physical 
body; it is another matter entirely to face death calmly. Thus, the Phaedo warns that we 
must be on our guard against the dangers of “taking refuge in λόγοι,” as Aristotle 
cautions in the Nichomachean Ethics, at 1105b12. 
 
2.2 Persuasion, Refutation, and Emotion 
 
 Considering that Simmias and Cebes already accept that the soul can exist 
separately from the body, it must be their fear of death that prevents them from accepting 
the idea that the soul can ‘survive’ death. In order to understand how their emotions 
affect their conclusions concerning the arguments for the immortality of the soul, we 
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must examine why they hold these beliefs; specifically, it is relevant to the discussion to 
discover if they have been convinced by rational argument or if, rather, they believe 
unquestioningly as a matter of dogma. This will lead us to examine how they hold those 
beliefs, and thus how they stand with regard to the logical consequences of their beliefs. 
That is, if they are rationally convinced of an argument, we might find them to be more 
willing to accept the logical consequences of their belief; if, on the other hand, their 
belief is a matter of unquestioning acceptance, they are more likely to be unaware, and 
less immediately accepting, of those consequences.92  
 Often, people are happy to be persuaded of a position without wanting to accept 
many of the consequences of that position; a variety of forms of willful ignorance arise to 
cope with this situation. Later in the dialogue, Socrates pushes Simmias and Cebes 
toward this realization in his discussion of the method of hypothesis. There, he calls for 
the work of examining, clarifying, and affirming the “propositions” that are harmonious 
with one’s hypotheses. In understanding Simmias, Cebes, Phaedo, and Echecrates’ 
specific reactions to Socrates’ arguments – specifically, in seeing how they do not 
understand or accept the consequences of the λόγοι which they put forward – we come to 
a clearer understanding of the dangers of misology. Specifically, we find these characters 
do not suffer from complete misology; rather, they are in an intermediate stage where an 
“untechnical” stance toward λόγοι allows trust to be placed in arguments in the wrong 
way, thus placing them in danger, in Socrates’ estimation. 
 
                                                
92 Recognizing this fact about how we hold to arguments is much of the point of Socrates’ first 
refutation of Simmias, at 92a-93a – which I will show in Chapter 6.  
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 How is it that Simmias and Cebes can be persuaded of the argument from 
recollection and not believe that the soul will continue to exist after death? How is 
Simmias able to profess complete agreement with the argument from recollection, 
assume that this argument proves the pre-existence of the soul, and yet put forward the 
argument that the soul arises from the harmonious interaction of the parts of the physical 
body (91eff)? Plato is drawing our attention to the way these characters stand with regard 
to their λόγοι. 
 At 77c, Socrates says that his argument for the immortality of the soul is complete 
if they “put together” (συνθεῖναι) the argument from recollection with the one that 
claims that “Every living thing comes to be from what is dead.” (77c-d) This is a strange 
claim: If the argument from opposites is true, it proves that the living come from the 
dead, and that the dead come from the living in an endless cycle; why, then, must it be 
“put together” with the argument from recollection?93 What would it mean to “put 
together” these two arguments?94 What kind of a picture of human persuasion is being 
called upon here, where two completely distinct arguments are ‘added together’ to push a 
person toward conviction? If the first argument is rationally convincing, there is no need 
for the addition of the other argument; if it is not convincing, what good is the addition of 
a better, more convincing argument? If I offer a bad argument for a true proposition, can I 
                                                
93 Cf Burger, p 82-84. 
94 On this point, see also Gadamer, 1980, p 26: “As if these two proofs could actually compliment 
each other! For certainly it cannot be overlooked that “soul” in the one means something quite 
different from “soul” in the other. The Pythagoreans do not think at all in terms of the Socratic 
“soul” which knows itself.” On the (unasked) question of the nature of the soul in these 
arguments, cf Davis 1980 “[the argument from opposites] is not sufficiently aware of its own 
origins, or, this argument which purports to show the immortality of the soul fails to ask the 
crucial question, "What is soul?" Socrates' first argument, like his first sailing, is pre-Socratic.” (p 
568)  
 75 
then ‘put it together’ with a good argument? Does the good argument, in showing the 
proposition to be true, lend credence to the bad argument?  
  It seems that Simmias and Cebes remain unconvinced by the argument from 
opposites. Perhaps it is in an attempt to not upset Socrates on the day of his death, as 
Socrates remarks95, that they do not express their objections to it. In any case, their failing 
to attack the logic of the argument from opposites directs the course of the dialogue. The 
conversation looks very different than it would have had it been an analysis of the type 
outlined later in the dialogue in the ‘method of hypothesis’ – that is, it would have 
included an analysis of the conclusions and presuppositions of this first argument. Many 
commentators have noted the problems with these presuppositions implicit in the 
argument from opposites (which I will discuss in the next chapter) and thus have carried 
out the discourse as it might have proceeded had Simmias and Cebes expressed their 
discontent with the argument more directly. Once again, the reader of the Platonic text 
must participate in the dialogue by taking up the mantle and engaging in the 
philosophical work of following out the dropped threads of the conversation – just as we 
must do in the face of the explicit aporias of many of the dialogues. That is, the reader is 
guided to pursue the direction the dialogue would have taken if, instead of offering 
arguments for the contrary position, the interlocutors had examined and attacked the logic 
of the argument that they found unpersuasive. 
 These are two different forms of refutation: To present opposing arguments, on 
the one hand, and to attack the reasoning behind the claim, on the other. I will argue in 
                                                
95 84eff. Not wanting to upset people around us, especially our teachers or parents, is one form in 
which emotion can affect the arguments we make and find persuasive. Our political context can 
also provide a context in which we are afraid to speak. In his speech at 84e, Socrates reminds us 
of this context when he assures Simmias and Cebes that they need not fear upsetting him, that 
they can say whatever they want, “as long as the Athenian Eleven allow it.” (85b) 
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the discussion of the argument from opposites that there is much to be learned from a 
critical analysis of the particular conception of the self, the soul, and human existence 
implied in this argument; thus, the interlocutors could have learned a great deal by 
attending to the reasoning behind the argument rather than merely avoiding it by re-
stating their belief in the opposite position.  
 Instead of this form of refutation, Simmias and Cebes simply offer λόγοι which 
present images of the soul which describe it as mortal, and as dying with body (I will 
discuss the specific structure of these arguments in later chapters). It is important to 
understand how these arguments, and the way they are taken up by the characters in the 
dialogue, open up the danger of misology. Specifically, Phaedo and Echecrates express 
that they felt the presence of this danger as result of the way the arguments affected them 
– “throwing them down” from their confidence and persuasion. What gave them this 
experience was not a detailed attack or analysis of Socrates’ arguments; rather, it was the 
experience of hearing other arguments which, as Echecrates states, have a wonderful 
(θαυμαστῶς) hold on them.  
 The discovery of their own inner conflict regarding their conviction about these 
arguments is, clearly, very unsettling. The interlocutors are beginning to become aware of 
their own cognitive dissonance, of their internal multiplicity, and of the disharmonious 
nature of their souls.96  
                                                
96 I once heard a feminist film maker speak about an experience she had. She was on a plane, and 
the captain came over the intercom, and it was a woman’s voice. The film maker said that, for 
just a moment, she thought, “Oh no, can she, a female pilot, fly this thing?” Of course she was 
appalled at herself, rationally realizing the possession of a Y chromosome is not a pre-requisite 
for skilled flying. However, the experience, as she said, made her wonder if feminist discourse 
had the power to root-out these deeply-ingrained cultural biases. She was flirting with misology.  
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 This experience is essential to the development of harmonious, philosophical 
mode of life; i.e. an understanding and awareness of internal conflicts is essential to 
philosophical παιδεία and the turning of the soul toward self-knowledge. However, this 
unsettling experience can also be very dangerous, because it can lead to a kind of apathy 
with regard to arguments – that is, based on this experience, some audiences may come to 
feel that equally good arguments may be made for either side of any given proposition, 
and thus, that there is no hope of discovering truth in λόγος.97 In other words, Socratic 
elenchos can be described as dangerous to the project of philosophy because it creates an 
experience of confusion in people which can stun them into radical doubt in the power of 
λόγος.  
 In the Meno, Meno describes Socrates as the Torpedo fish; in so doing, he reveals 
that he feels paralyzed by Socrates’ arguments. This image stands in stark contrast to 
Socrates’ description of himself in the Apology as the gadfly, constantly keeping people 
moving and thinking. On the one hand we have an image of paralysis and apathy; on the 
other, we have the image of being spurred into action. The unpleasant experience that 
Phaedo and the others undergo has a similar structure, balanced between two 
possibilities: On one hand, they can begin questioning into the presuppositions of the 
arguments with renewed vigor; on the other hand, they might also sink into the apathetic 
stance that equally good arguments may be given for any position, the weaker argument 
can be made stronger, and, in the end, man is the measure of all things. This danger is 
realized, Socrates says, when people place trust in arguments in the wrong way. We will 
                                                
97 We might think of Kant’s antinomies here; see also 85c, where Simmias says “It seems to me, 
Socrates, as perhaps it does to you too, that to know anything sure about such matters in our life 
now is either something impossible or something altogether hard . . .”  
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now turn to an examination of how the danger of cognitive dissonance can be understood 
with regard to the “wondrous hold” that traditional, inherited λόγοι have on us.98 
 
2.3 The “Wondrous Hold” of Traditional Λόγοι 
 
 Echecrates reveals that the source of the unsettling experience he and Phaedo 
underwent upon hearing the objections is the “wondrous” power over him which the 
argument that the soul is a harmony holds, and has always held. He says, “and your 
speaking of it reminded me, as it were, that I myself had believed this before 
(προυδέδοκτο).” (88d, translation altered) Echecrates says that this conversation has 
been unsettling because it has put the persuasiveness of Socrates’ argument (singular) in 
conflict with what he ‘has always believed,’ his “pro-doxa” (προδοκέω), his 
presupposed belief. The first argument, from opposites, does not have this hold on him – 
or on Simmias and Cebes – because, unlike the image of the soul as a harmony, in its 
abstraction it does not speak to his dogma, to that which he already, in some way, 
                                                
98 This discussion will help us understand Heidegger’s comments in his lectures on the Sophist: 
“according to its original sense and original facticity, λόγος is not at all disclosing [aufdekend], 
but is, if one may speak in an extreme way, precisely concealing [verdeckend]. .  . λόγος has the 
facticity of not allowing themselves to be seen, but producing instead a self-satisfaction in resting 
content with what ‘one says.’” (p 197, as quoted in Gonzalez 2009, p 8) We will encounter many 
situations in the dialogue in which the λόγοι of the οἱ πολλοι pose a serious threat to the 
philosophical life by concealing, as Socrates warns “the way it is with the things the things the 
argument is about” (91a). On Heidegger’s understanding of λόγος and dialectic in Plato, cf 
Gonzalez 2009. I agree that language, and the linguistically structured reality enforced by “idle 
talk” can be limiting and confining. However, I will argue that Plato is correct to find in λόγος 
and dialectic something more than the philosophical “embarrassment” that caused Heidegger to 
see Aristotle as a far more advanced thinker. I see in λόγος the resources to lead thinking, 
through and beyond the confining stories of our tradition.  
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believed.99 As such, it held no power over his fear of death. Echecrates and the others are 
deeply convinced of the argument from recollection; further, Socrates’ third argument 
speaks to their implicit conceptions of the soul as immaterial, invisible, and divine. Thus, 
these arguments, taken “together,” were enough to persuade them to put their childish 
fear aside, if only for a moment. The recollection argument alone is not sufficient since it 
speaks, explicitly, only to a belief in a mythical time before birth, not after death. 
However, since the fear itself has not been dealt with directly, as soon as they hear 
contrary arguments that have an equally “wondrous” hold on them, their fear returns, and 
they feel confused. They were certain a moment ago; now they have been thrown down, 
back into their original condition of fear. Even after Socrates’ great and convincing 
arguments cleverly appealing to another set of deeply-held cultural assumptions, they 
find that they can be thrown down, and they begin to doubt that the soundness they desire 
can be found in any λόγος. Socrates suggests that they sing charms to the frightened 
children inside them instead of making arguments.   
 
                                                
99 We will see how this fact is a serious problem for Simmias and Cebes, who claim to be 
Pythagoreans, and thus should believe in reincarnation, and find the argument from opposites 
compelling. Michael Pakaluk gives a substantial interpretation of this argument which concludes 
that it represents Plato’s own Orphic/Pythagorean-influenced belief. However, he bases his 
argument on the position that Plato had already proved the independence of the soul from the 
body (2003). I will argue, with Burger, that the Phaedo is designed to drive the active reader to 
realize the essentially embodied nature of the soul, and thus the ontological interdependence of 
body and soul (see Chapter 6 and 7). Burger says: “Socrates brings to light the inseparability of 
body and psyche; for his opinion of the best, which should represent the intention of psyche in 
contrast to the mechanical operation of the body, would have been carried not only through the 
bones and sinews but in their service.” (1984, p 143) 
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 Thus, there is a conflict depicted within the characters; they are described as being 
complex, and possessing conflicting drives.100 They have their emotions driving them – 
specifically, their fear of death. They have their cultural presuppositions, which 
themselves often conflict. They also have those beliefs which they find “rationally” or 
logically persuasive, but which may or may not hold sway over what they believe. 
Distrust in λόγος can result when we get a glimpse of this complexity; it can be 
enormously difficult to puzzle out the complex relations between these “parts” of 
ourselves, and in exasperation, we may insist that rational argument is not an adequate 
source for the drive to right action and true belief. According to Socrates, this is the worst 
thing that can happen to a person.  
 Previously, we saw that excessive trust can be placed in cultural conceptions – in 
our pro-doxa. When these beliefs are attacked by something of sufficient persuasive 
force, we find ourselves in danger of distrusting rational accounts, in general. One 
situation in which these conflicts are revealed is through Socratic elenchus. Socrates’ 
interrogation often reveals that one’s cultural presuppositions are complex, and are often 
                                                
100 The intellectual conflict within Simmias – specifically, his inclination to accept both the theory 
of recollection, proving that the soul pre-exists the body, and the theory of the ψυχή as a 
harmonia, which necessitates that the soul could not pre-exist the body – is explicitly mentioned 
by Socrates at 92a. This conflict is the source of a debate between Grube (1980, appendix I) and 
Hackforth (1955, p 50 n 2). I side with Hackforth, who argues that “Simmias, or at least the 
Simmias of this dialogue, was a man who could simultaneously hold two beliefs without realizing 
their inconsistency. . .” In this discussion, I go beyond Hackforth by treating the conflict within 
Simmias as not exhausted by his holding inconsistent metaphysical claims to be true; I argue that 
Plato wants us to see this tendency as arising from conflicting drives within Simmias’ soul. This 
reading will serve as the basis for my re-interpretation of how the soul is, in fact, a harmony; I 
will argue that the path to virtue is the work of harmonizing both these internal drives and the 
theoretical claims to which these drives incline us. Thus, I do not see how Hackforth can 
recognize this conflict within Simmias, and still maintain that in the Phaedo “the incomposite 
nature of the soul is asserted in emphatic terms” (p 11) without recognizing the possible irony of 
this account of the soul, especially given the tri-partite soul of the Republic (which I will discuss 
in Chapter 6). Hackforth concludes that Plato had not “discovered” the divisions within the soul 
at the time of writing the Phaedo, but his own recognition of conflict within Simmias’ soul seems 
to belie his claim that the soul is “conceived as wholly good and rational.” (ibid)  
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in conflict with one another. A central aspect of Socrates’ skill is his ability to expose 
these contradictions; he asks the right questions, at the right time, in order to cause his 
interlocutor to reveal these inconsistencies. The process of working through these 
conflicts – the turn toward care of the self and toward developing a philosophically-
grounded, harmonious mode of life – is precisely what Socrates calls for in the second 
sailing. We will see that it is with regard to λόγοι that this process of harmonization 
takes place, and thus why misology is such a danger.  
 
 
2.4 Intermediate Misology 
 
 Socrates warns that trusting in λόγοι in the wrong way can lead a person to 
become a misologist, and to “finish out the rest of his life hating arguments.” Before full-
blown misology happens, however, there must be intermediate stages of distrust. At these 
stages, experiencing the ‘betrayal’ of specific λόγοι in which we placed excessive trust 
leads us to distrust not all λόγοι, but merely those individual λόγοι. This situation is 
analogous to the one described by Socrates, in which, before moving on to full-blown 
misanthropy, one simply finds that an individual person is not worthy of trust (89d-e).  
 It is important to understand the dimensions of the intermediate stages between 
the philosophical way of approaching λόγος and misology since this is where the 
interlocutors – and, indeed, most people most of the time – find themselves. It is in this 
space that we find people reacting to λόγοι which at one time seem utterly convincing 
and adequate, and at another, seem false or suspect. At this point, they begin to doubt 
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these arguments, and, “putting them together” with all other arguments for that specific 
position, begin to excessively distrust that position, and that tradition. Seeing their 
traditions and pro-doxa intelligently and persuasively challenged, they move from 
excessive trust to excessive distrust of these inherited λόγοι.  
 
 When we consider how certain λόγοι form the very basis of our shared cultural 
identity, it becomes clearer what Socrates might have in mind when he speaks of certain 
people, and thus by analogy, certain λόγοι, as being our most intimate (οἰκειοτάτους) 
friends (89e). These arguments are most οἰκειοτάτους because we live in and through 
these accounts – these values and meanings are our proper home (οἶκος). These are the 
stories and concepts that structure our very lives, and present to us the landscape of 
values and reality itself in which we are called to make ethical “decisions” and live 
responsible lives. When we find these stories untrustworthy, as with the people we take to 
be οἰκειοτάτους, we do not immediately become full-blown misologists. Instead, we 
find fault with the particular offending λόγος, or person, and reject it as completely false 
and unhealthy. As Socrates says at 89d-e, it is only when this happens again and again 
that we become misologists or misanthropists. What happens when someone is at an 
intermediate stage of localized mistrust?  
 At 90d, Socrates says that the danger of misology comes about when someone, 
instead of “blaming (αἰτιῷτο) himself or his own artlessness, instead in his distress is 
only too pleased to push the blame (αἰτίαν) off himself and onto the arguments. . .” We 
will return to this passage later, but for now simply note that Socrates here indicates that 
the cause (αἰτία) of the experience of distress is a problem of “blame” (αἰτίαν) and 
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responsibility. Noting in advance that the experience Socrates recounts which drove him 
to the second sailing “in search of the αἰτία” stemmed from a style of inquiry into the 
causes of things, we should take special note of this desire to push the αἰτίαn for the 
experience of distress onto the λόγοι. We note, then, that the problem lies with the way 
(τρόπος) a person stands with regard to λόγος.  
 If we think the cause of the λόγος appearing at one time true and at another time 
false is a problem with the λόγος, we think that it is unsound. In then rejecting this 
λόγος as the problem, we then feel we are free of the cause of the problem, and often 
turn our belief toward the perceived opposite of that λόγος; we then repeat the problem 
by remaining unchanged, ourselves, in how we orient ourselves toward λόγοι in general. 
We can avoid this if we take the cause of this changing appearance of truth to be our lack 
of a τέχνη with regard to λόγος (a lack that we suggested above is the natural and 
unavoidable starting place of all thinking – though we have not said whether or not we 
can expect to ever perfectly develop this τέχνη). The mistake is thinking that 
disappointment by a λόγος is the fault of the λόγος; often, then, the λόγος is rejected 
entirely, and there is a turn to what is perceived to be the opposite of every claim 
associated with this λόγος. This is the mark of an unsophisticated understanding of 
λόγος.  
 Phaedo and Echecrates’ reaction to the λόγοι about the immortality of the soul is 
an example of this lack of sophistication; this reaction places them in an intermediate 
state between philosophical thinking and misology by causing them to doubt if there is 
anything sound in arguments. There is a naive conception of arguments which treats them 
as simply either “for” or “against” a position; thus, they are good or bad arguments based 
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on whether they argue for what we presuppose to be true, or against it. When Echecrates 
expresses his experience of distrust, he says, “And now what I really need is some other 
argument which will, from a new beginning as it were, persuade me that when somebody 
dies, the soul won’t die along with him.” (88d) His self-diagnosis is that he needs yet 
another account to be given to convince him not to fear death. It is my contention here 
that this is not at all what Echecrates needs; instead, he should review what has been said 
and carefully examine precisely what in the arguments has appealed to him, and what did 
not, and why.  
 I will argue, in the next chapter, that in this case the dichotomy of “for” or 
“against” covers the presuppositions of the argument which make it appear that only one 
or the other of the arguments must be true. Often, the two antitheses share common 
presuppositions, and holding tight to their apparent contradiction does not allow this 
common basis to appear. We will find, specifically, that attending to Socrates’ 
presentation of the soul as a divine substance in the third argument shares with Simmias’ 
conception of the soul as a harmony the unquestioned assumption of the quasi-material 
nature of the soul which Socrates will implicitly challenge in his discussion of harmony. 
Only when the soul is conceived as a being of substance, and thus as existing in a topos, 
can the dichotomy that confuses Echecrates be an issue. What he needs is not another 
argument for either side of the dichotomy but the gadfly to goad him into questioning the 
bases of both positions; that is, he needs to be driven toward the kind of self inquiry 
which will reveal the cultural presuppositions and dogmas which make the two sides of 
the dichotomy appear as the only possibilities. This process can begin when he begins to 
wonder at the wondrous hold that these traditional λόγοι have over him.  
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2.5 Misology and Desire 
 
 We have seen that, in addition to the things usually said about misology, there are 
dimensions of intermediate misology that must be explored. These stages are necessary to 
understand, not simply what happens when someone is a full-blown misologist, but how 
misology comes about, and how trust is often placed in arguments in the wrong way. We 
saw above some of the problems with excessive trust and excessive distrust in specific 
λόγοι. The difference between a misologist and someone who is on the way toward 
misology is their explicit understanding of the place of λόγος in their belief. That is, the 
person who is on-the-way to misology – who is excessively trusting or distrusting 
specific λόγοι – is largely being moved by emotional reactions stemming from their 
“pro-doxa,” from their deeply-ingrained cultural presuppositions. However, they still 
believe themselves to be being moved by rational argument. The full-blown misologist, 
on the other hand, is aware of this fact; that is, they are also acting out of the basis of their 
emotions and desires, but they have accepted this as the best, and indeed, the only way of 
dealing in λόγος. For the misologist, λόγοι are tools, not for reaching truth, but for 
satisfying one’s own desires and manipulating the desires of others. Socrates explicitly 
points to the temptation to engage in λόγος with the goal, not of truth, but of seduction 
and domination at 91a. He argues that “altogether uneducated people” (οἱ πάνυ 
ἀπαίδευτοι) are not philosophers – lovers of wisdom – but rather are φιλόνικος – lovers 
of victory. They engage in argument not to seek the benefit of being proven wrong – and 
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thus being ‘cured’ of the evil of having false ideas (as Socrates puts it) – but rather to 
seem wise to others, and thus achieve the power that comes from dominating others in the 
ἀγών of λόγος.  
 The dialogues are full of encounters with characters who have been reduced to 
this state. As a result, it has often been argued that Plato is calling for λόγος to be 
purified of emotion. Pure rationality would then be the guide of the philosopher 
unhampered by emotions and desires, and unafraid, he would be ready for death. If the 
emotions – especially fear and temptation – provide such an obstacle to philosophical 
inquiry, it does make sense to seek to purify the self of emotion. If the body is the source 
of these emotions, then it makes sense, further, that this purification should take the form 
of a turn away from the body and to the pure soul. I will briefly explore how this turn 
away from emotion and the body has been the traditional account of Platonic philosophy, 
before giving, in the next chapter, a demonstration that this simple account cannot hold-
up to a careful reading of the dialogue. Thus, we will be called to develop a richer 
conception of the symptomatology and resolution of our inner conflict and cognitive 
dissonance than such a simple turn can effect – that is, a turn away from the body and 
toward a traditional account of “Platonic doctrine.”101 
 
 In Plato’s Theory of Knowledge, Francis M Cornford states: “the ‘separation’ of 
the Platonic Forms from any dependence on material things went with the separation of 
                                                
101 Certainly, a richer account of internal conflict is present in the tri-partite soul in the Republic, 
and in the ample literature on this account. However, as I will demonstrate in my discussion of 
the Republic in Chapter 6, what is needed is an inquiry into the “longer road” (435c) Socrates 
calls for there, and it is this which I am attempting to carry-out in this dissertation. 
 87 
the soul which knows them from any dependence on the physical organism.”102 I agree 
that it is essential to understand how the χωρισμός operates with regard to the 
‘separation’ between the soul and body in order to understand how the “Forms” are to be 
thought of as transcendent, and vice versa. However, since I take a very different stance 
on the relation between the soul and the body, as it appears in the Phaedo, the χωρισμός 
becomes a far more complicated issue than Cornford presents. As such, I will show why 
his account moves too quickly and glosses over many ontological presuppositions when 
he speaks of “dependence.”  
 Regardless, Cornford argues that Plato believed both that the soul and the forms 
were transcendent, and that “the Phaedo is designed to plead for both conclusions 
concurrently.”103 He also argues that Socrates intends his speeches to convince his 
listeners of these two concurrent beliefs: 
In his opening discourse it is assumed form the outset that the soul can exist 
without the body; for ‘to be dead’ is defined as meaning ‘that the body has come 
to be separate by itself apart from (choris) the soul, and the soul separate by itself 
apart from the body.’ . . . The contrast is not between mind and matter, or even 
between soul and body as commonly understood. The psyche here is what was 
later called by Plato and Aristotle the Reason (nous), or the spirit, in opposition 
to the flesh. To the flesh belong the senses, and the bodily appetites and 
pleasures. The spirit’s proper function is thought or reflection, which lays hold 
upon unseen reality and is best carried on when the spirit withdraws from the 
flesh to think by itself, untroubled by the senses. The pursuit of wisdom is a 
‘loosing and separation (chorismos) of the soul form the body’ – a rehearsal of 
that separation called death (67d).104 
 
Reading the dialogue, it is easy to see why Cornford makes this argument, and why most 
commentators agree with his basic argument.105 Even excepting the obviously post-
                                                
102 1957, p 4. 
103 Ibid. 
104 1957, p 4. 
105 For another example, see Vlastos (1991): “. . . chorizein . . .generally stands for something far 
stronger, else Plato would not have used it to express the harshest of dualisms in the credo of his 
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Christian form this reading often takes, the dialogue presents Socrates explicitly arguing 
for the body as the source of base appetites and desires which introduce impurities that 
block the soul from reaching the truth it may achieve when separate itself by itself.
 However, it also been noted by many recent commentators that the self-
abnegation of all desires, even all bodily desires, cannot be simply taken as the message 
of the dialogue. For example, as he begins to give his account of the dangers of misology 
at 88c, Socrates is said to be playing with Phaedo’s beautiful hair – something he had a 
habit of doing, according to Phaedo. As Brann, Kalkavage, and Salem argue in the 
introduction to their translation of the Phaedo, this “is surely one of the most remarkable 
moments in the Platonic dialogues.” They argue that “this affectionate gesture is alone 
sufficient to dispel any notion that Socrates is simply a hater of bodily things.”106 Further, 
one of the first things we are told about the setting of the discourse which took place on 
the day of Socrates’ execution is that his friends found him sitting with his wife 
Xanthippe, who was holding Socrates’ “little boy.” Socrates is in his seventies, and he 
has a small child. This is clearly not a man without some enjoyment of the body.107  
                                                                                                                                            
middle period – that view of the soul . . . which makes it an immigrant form another world, 
attached precariously to a piece of matter in this one, from which death shall “separate” it to 
“exist separately” (choris einai, Phd. 64c6-8; 67a1) until its next incarnation.” (p 257) See also 
Bluck: “. . . the theory of the Forms and the theory of the immortality of the soul are mutually 
interdependent; and we may take it that Plato was anxious to justify his belief [in both] before 
going on to apply his Forms to a wide range of problems in the Republic and later works.” (1955, 
p 2) Again, I agree that there is a deep connection between the separation of soul and body and 
the separation of forms and particulars; I also agree, and take as a structural motivation for this 
dissertation, that it is necessary to become clear about the relation of soul and body in order to 
understand the nature and transcendence of the forms. However, I will argue that a close reading 
of the Phaedo shows the soul to be separable only in λόγος, and to be, unfortunately, not 
immortal; we will find that Socrates insists that the body is a necessary condition for life (99a-b). 
Thus, while I take the standard view that the relation between body and soul is a ‘model’ for the 
relation between sensible and intelligible, I disagree with the standard view of how the Phaedo 
presents that relation.    
106 1998, p 11.  
107 The Phaedo is, further, anything but a dialogue devoid of emotion. Lange argues “The 
 89 
 This enjoyment, however, cannot be read as an answer to the questions of 
separation, nor of the relation of the ‘self’ to ‘its’ bodily desires. Rather, these moments 
in the dialogue indicate that we are not to rest content with the surface arguments that 
Socrates makes in the dialogue concerning emotions and bodily desires, and their place 
(or lack thereof) in the philosophical life. Rather, they make us return to the text with a 
more critical eye, looking beneath surface arguments which we can no longer take at face 
value.   
 How, then, should we take these arguments? Plato obviously wants us to consider 
them, as he spent considerable time carefully constructing them. If he does not want the 
reader to simply believe in the “independence” of the soul from the body, why would he 
have Socrates argue for that independence convincingly enough for virtually every 
commentator in the tradition to take that as his final word? We must ask: Of what use is it 
to spend time considering the independence of ψυχή and body if they are not in fact, 
finally, independent?108 Of what use is the λόγος that tells us that the ψυχή is “separate” 
                                                                                                                                            
dialogue is not cold – it is replete with exquisite feeling. We are constantly kept aware of the fact 
that the day is passing and the sun will set, that tomorrow Phaedo must cut his fair tresses in 
mourning (89b). And just because the situation so poignant and keeps us on the verge of an 
overpowering emotion, Plato here applies the balance of reason and calmness.” (1938, p 297) In 
agreement with this point, I will argue that dialogue does not posit the philosophical life as 
transcending emotion toward purity, but rather of developing a philosophical stance in which we 
can experience moderate emotions, and not be overwhelmed by them into rash or irrational 
decisions. Thus, while I argue that emotions and desires can be dangerous, it is not being devoid 
of them that is our goal.  
108 On this point, Gadamer notes: “. . . it seems appropriate to me to first examine Plato’s mode of 
demonstration to see if it indicates whether Plato was fully aware of the insufficiency of these 
proofs and, if we find that he was, to ask then what the actual intent of his demonstration is.” 
(1980, p 22) Cf Davis 1980: “Few readers of the Phaedo have been tempted to consider Socrates' 
first arguments for the immortality of the soul simply persuasive. A refreshingly large number 
have even been willing to entertain the possibility that Plato was aware of their inadequacy. Of 
the first argument Bluck says that "there are strong indications that Plato did not consider the 
present argument to be conclusive," and of the second that "it is admittedly incomplete by itself." 
According to Gallop the first proof "is better construed as an opening dialectical move than as an 
argument to which Plato was seriously committed." While refreshing, these admissions are not 
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from the body, if that is not the “truth”? What do we gain from contemplating soul and 
body as two elements of our being if we are, finally, a metaphysical unity? These 
questions, are, of course, premature. We do not understand “soul,” nor “body,” nor 
“combination,” nor “unity.” We take these questions with us into a reading of the text.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
enough. One is compelled to ask why Plato begins with arguments which are so obviously 
inadequate. It is not sufficient to say that Plato threw in a mechanistic argument for his 
mechanistic readers (Bluck). Nor will it do to suggest that the first argument is an opener in a 
dialectical game (Gallop). We still wish to understand why Plato plays this game. Or, supposing 
the purpose of the Phaedo (as its subtitle suggests) is to teach us about the soul, why does the 
dialogue begin with errors about the soul? To understand why we must turn to the logoi 
themselves.” (p 566, Davis notes Bluck 1955, p 20-22, Gallop 1999, p 104) 
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Chapter 3 
Arguments for Immortality 
 
§ 1 Body and Soul 
 
 As I argued in the introduction, it is easy to mistake the dialogues as documents 
presenting Plato’s teachings, and Plato’s personal beliefs; in the case of the Phaedo, one 
might initially take it to be Plato’s doctrine that the ψυχή continues to exist after death, 
that this ψυχή is a quasi-physical entity which exists independently of the body and 
which travels to an other τόπος where it communes with the forms.109 After being 
reborn, the soul comes into some un-thematized relationship with a new body, forming a 
new individual. The process of philosophy is, then, understood to be a process of 
recollecting the knowledge that the soul gained while it was “dead,” or, living in the land 
of the forms. The concept of ‘separation’ that is implied in this account mirrors the 
separation between the intelligible and the sensible – that is, the separation between the 
“forms” and perceptible particulars. Those forms, as unchanging objects of knowledge, 
ground the possibility of epistemological certainty by providing the stability necessary 
for knowledge to be possible – a stability that cannot be found in the Heraclitean flux of 
                                                
109 The first Chapter showed how this account of the soul accurately represents the transformation 
of the ontology of the ψυχή effected by Pythagoreanism and the Mystery Cults. While many 
commentators recognize the irony in the first three argument for immortality (assuming the final 
argument to be genuine), Pakaluk takes the first three to be true to Plato’s belief: “The three 
arguments are meant to establish merely the mini- mal claim that the continued existence of the 
soul across cycles of reincarnation is the most plausible view to take, given substance dualism; 
and it is left to the Final Argument to argue for something that we might regard as immortality, 
that is, the imperishability of the soul, come what may.” (2003, p 89) 
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the world of sensible particulars. These forms, then, exist at the same level of remove 
from this perceptible world as the soul does from the body, existing in an other τόπος to 
which “we” – or our souls – retire when we die.  
 A close reading of the text, however, calls this interpretation into question. In this 
chapter, I argue that the “proofs” Socrates presents for the separation of body and ψυχή, 
far from settling the issue of the relation of the body to the ψυχή, are rather the initial 
steps in a line of thinking which raises the question of that relation. It is only when the 
nature of the ψυχή and body are hypothetically considered as separate that the truth of 
embodiment can be revealed. This same hypothetical movement demands that we 
consider the objects of knowledge to be, in some sense, separate from the sensible 
particulars which we encounter; in later chapters, I will argue that Plato presents us with 
this radical separation such that an epistemological vocabulary proper to embodied life 
can be developed. One path to this development is by analogy to the understanding of the 
χωρισμός revealed in understanding the nature of the ψυχή and its relation to the body. 
That is, any account of the transcendence of the forms – an account which, as I will show, 
is beyond the scope of a work on the Phaedo, since the dialogue fails to provide an 
explanation of μέθεξις – must be based in an understanding of the relation between 
ψυχή and body.  
 
1.1. Preparation for the Λόγος 
 
 It is essential to take note of the context in which Socrates’ arguments for the 
existence of the ψυχή after death arise. Plato has presented the reader with a complex 
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situation in which the arguments are raised; these are arguments made, not in the abstract, 
but by specific people in a specific situation. Attending to these specifics is essential to 
reading a Platonic dialogue in the proper way. Further, Socrates makes several explicit 
statements about how one should “prepare” oneself to hear the λόγοι presented in the 
conversation. Plato makes it clear that these preparations, and this context, are central to 
receiving the λόγοι in the proper spirit. This dissertation argues that a clear 
understanding of the proper spirit in which to take any λόγοι – especially λόγοι as 
difficult and as influential as the nature of the soul – is central to the message of the 
Phaedo.  
 Rather than the dialogue being constructed to convince the reader of a doctrine of 
the soul’s existence after death, Plato is concerned that we not take the specific stance 
toward λόγοι that some readings would have us understand to be Plato’s own motivation 
in composing the Phaedo. At 91a-b Socrates makes clear a distinction between the stance 
in which philosophers, on the one hand, and lovers of victory (φιλονικία), on the other, 
“hold” themselves with regard to λόγοι. This distinction is based in the desire that the 
speaker has with regard to the audience: The philosopher desires to clarify that which the 
λόγοι is about; the φιλόνικος merely seeks the agreement of the audience. Thus, this 
section will demonstrate that, taking the dialogue’s own direction concerning the proper 
spirit in which to receive the λόγοι presented in the dialogue, it is essential that we begin 
to raise the question of the nature of the soul for ourselves, and not take the Phaedo to be 
a document whose intent is to make what seems true to Plato also seem true to its readers.  
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 Of course, it is of central importance that these arguments about death as 
separation of soul from the body are made by a man who is himself facing death. It is 
Socrates who argues, makes speeches, and Socrates will die today. He remarks that no 
one, even a comic poet, could accuse him of talking about things that do not concern him 
(70c). The reference is to Aristophanes, who in The Clouds paints a satirical picture of 
Socrates as asking questions and making arguments about things “in the heavens and 
beneath the Earth,” as Socrates claims in the Apology. We will see how Socrates has 
given up asking such questions, despite the surface appearance of the myth of the true 
Earth. In his account of his reading of Anaxagoras’ book Nοῦς, Socrates shows how he is 
no longer interested in materialistic explanations of phenomena. When we turn to this 
account, and to the second sailing which it inaugurated, we will see the significance of 
this turn for a man facing death, and thus reflecting on his choice of life. For now, it is 
clear that Socrates is not idly explaining death as an abstracted phenomenon. He is facing 
death itself on this very day.110  
 This Socrates who gives λόγοι about death and faces death says, later in the 
dialogue, that Crito seems to believe that he is the corpse which will soon be lying before 
them, rather than “this Socrates – the one who is now conversing (διαλεγόμενος) and 
marshalling (διατάττων) each of our arguments.” (115c) He goes on to say that Crito 
must take note “that not to speak in a fine way not only strikes a false note (πλημμελές) 
in itself, but also makes for something bad in our souls.” (115e, emphasis added) How 
the improper forming of λόγοι can negatively affect our souls has not been clarified; 
                                                
110 As is true of each of us – death can come at any time to any one of us. Plato seems to want to 
make his readers aware that the recognition of death as immanent is the proper stance of the 
philosopher, since Socrates claims that philosophy is a kind of preparation for death. The 
technologies and privileges of modern life make it easy to forget the specter of death – the same 
would not have been true of ancient Athens.  
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however, we note that in Chapter 2, it became clear that λόγοι can have a wondrous hold 
on us, and that this hold often places us in a state of ἀναταράξαι as a result of cognitive 
dissonance. Socrates demands that we examine these traditional λόγοι, and that this 
examination take the form of a self-examination – in some sense, an examination of our 
own souls. I have argued that this self-examination is integral to care of the ψυχή, and to 
the development of ἀρετή, but the mechanisms of this relation remain unthematized. It 
begins to become clear from Socrates’ comments at 115c-116a that there is a sense in 
which the formation of ‘bad’ λόγοι – which have a “wondrous hold” on us – could be 
understood as a formation of the self, as well as a cultivation of the ψυχή. We will return 
to this passage later, but for now let us note that Socrates is speaking from the position of 
someone who faces death, and who believes that speaking well is important to the 
cultivation of one’s soul.  
  
 It is essential to attend to how the issue of the separation of soul and body arises 
in the conversation in the Phaedo. Socrates raises the issue unexpectedly. He had been 
musing about pleasure and pain when his friends mentioned the rumor that he had been 
making poetry (60b-d). His friends had spent as much time as allowed by the guards 
conversing with Socrates in his cell. Apparently, then, Socrates has spent the time when 
he was not speaking with his friends converting Aesop’s fables into verse. Making a 
distinction between λόγος and μῦθος, Socrates says that he is not a maker of μῦθος, so 
he chose to work with the stories of Aesop (60e-61c).111  
                                                
111 This is a fascinating passage, which opens the question of the relation between philosophy and 
poetry, and wonders at the possibility that philosophy is μουσική. Unfortunately, I cannot give an 
adequate examination of this complex issue. For a good discussion, see Burger 1984, Roochnik 
2001. Also, for a good discussion of the word “μουσική,” see the Appendix in Dorter 1982.  
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 When he is not able to engage in making λόγοι with his friends in living 
conversation, Socrates chooses what might be considered a second-best option of 
composing verse which he specifically distinguishes from making λόγοι. While he is 
tentative about whether or not his philosophical λόγοι are under the province of the 
Muses, he is quite clear that there is a distinction to be made, however provisionally, 
between giving a μῦθος and giving a λόγος (61a-b). When his friends arrive and ask him 
about his making of poetry – that is, when they ask him about what he does to fill the 
time when he does not have his friends around with whom to make λόγοι – he changes 
the subject. He has gained some sort of solace in his time alone in prison working in 
creation of beautiful verse; however, with his friends at hand, he chooses to steer the 
conversation toward λόγοι – specifically, λόγοι about death, and about how philosophy 
is related to death and dying.  
 His conversants immediately seize this opportunity to put Socrates to the question 
regarding his willingness to die, and leave them. This questioning leads Socrates to frame 
his account of the existence of the soul separate from the body in terms of a defense of 
the way he has chosen to live, as well as how he has “chosen” to die. After saying that he 
is sure he will come among the blessed after his death, he quickly adds, “I wouldn’t 
altogether insist (διισχυρισαίμην) on this.” (63c) “Διισχυρίζομαι” does mean to 
“insist” on something, or to affirm it confidently, but this sense of the word comes from 
its primary meaning: to lean on, or rely on. Socrates is not confident enough to rely on 
the story that he will meet blessed dead men after his own death.112 He says that if he 
                                                
112 Thus, I am disagreeing with readings such as that by Bedu-Addo, who claims that Since 
Socrates obviously does not consider himself a simpleton, and is indeed portrayed throughout the 
dialogue as being quite unperturbed by the prospect of his own impending death, we may safely 
assume that he thinks he knows that the soul is immortal, and can give an account of this.” (1969, 
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were to assert “any such thing” it would be that he has hopes (εὔελπις) that he will come 
among good masters, and “that there is something for those who have met their end, and 
just as has been said of old, something better for the good than for the bad.” (ibid.) 
Socrates does not rely on the μῦθος that we will find ourselves in Hades after we die, but 
he does assert with confidence that in facing one’s death, one can expect something better 
for the ἀγαθός than for the κακός.113 This raises the question: Since Socrates is facing 
death with incredible poise, what is he relying on, if not the traditional μῦθοι of the soul? 
 Plato immediately presents us with an image of how we might understand this 
idea that the ἀγαθός person will face something better in death than the κακός. Simmias 
accepts this discussion of why the better person has reason to expect a better fate in 
facing death than the κακός person as Socrates’ defense, and immediately Crito cuts in 
with a practical matter. He is afraid that if Socrates gets “heated up” in conversation he 
might have to drink the φάρμακον twice or three times (63d-e). The sub-text here is that 
the drinking of hemlock is, in fact, an extremely painful way to die. Crito is worried that 
Socrates will face a far more drawn-out and painful death if he engages in the 
conversation. Socrates is unafraid, twice saying of the executioner: “ἔα,” “leave him be.” 
(63e) 
 Unafraid of death, and even of the increased pain he might suffer in dying as a 
result, Socrates constructs the first stage of his defense, that is, of his defense of his 
                                                                                                                                            
p 111) 
113 Henry Piper, in his paper “Socrates in the Phaedo: Knight of Faith” (2005), argues that this 
passage – along with others in the corpus where Socrates confesses to uncertainty concerning the 
afterlife – shows that Socrates is operating on “faith” rather than certainty or rational 
argumentation. While Piper is correct to identify that Socrates resists the “temptation” of too-easy 
“certainty” in such matters, I argue that the text offers avenues for understanding Socrates’ poise 
in the face of death other than either faith or certainty in some specific form of the afterlife. 
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choice of the life of the philosopher.114 He will tell Simmias and Cebes “the reason it 
appears to me that a man who has genuinely spent his life in philosophy is confident 
when he is about to die and has high hopes that when he has met his end, he will win the 
greatest goods There.” (63e-64a, translation altered) He begins this defense quite 
formally, referring to his listeners as his “judges” (δικαστής). This beginning colors 
what he is about to say as being a kind of ‘presentation,’ designed to have a specific 
effect on his listeners, rather than being Socrates’ own, let alone Plato’s own, belief. 
Socrates indicates this later in the conversation, saying 
For at present as far as that goes, I run the risk (κινδυνεύω) of being in a mood 
not to love wisdom but to love victory, as do altogether uneducated people (οὐ 
φιλοσόφως ἔχειν ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονίκως). These people, 
whenever they dispute (ἀμφισβητῶσιν) about something, don’t give a thought 
(φροντίζουσιν) to the way it is with the things the argument is about, but put 
their hearts into this: that what they themselves put forward should seem (δόξει) 
to be the case to those present. And at present I seem to myself to differ from 
those people in this way only: I won’t put my heart into making what I say seem 
to be true to those present, except as a side effect, but in making it seem to be the 
case to me myself as much as possible. For I’m calculating (λογίζομαι), my dear 
comrade – behold how self-servingly! – that if what I’m saying happens to be 
true, I’m well off believing it; and if there’s nothing at all for one who’s met his 
end, well then, I’ll make myself so much the less unpleasant with lamenting to 
those who are present during this time, the time before my death; and this 
mindlessness (ἄνοια) of mine won’t continue – that would be an evil! – but will 
perish a little later. Thus prepared (παρεσκευασμένος), Simmias and Cebes,’ he 
said, ‘I enter on the argument.’ (91a-b) 
 
                                                
114 Ferit Guven suggests that the willingness to face death calmly distinguishes the philosopher 
from the Sophist. Referencing Heidegger in What is Metaphysics, he suggests that it is only in 
(courageously) facing death that proper attunement to being is possible – i.e. the attunement 
which calls-forth the wonder that is the origin of philosophy (2005 p 14ff.). Cf Davis 1980: “We 
are given an account of Socrates' deeds in which he is repeatedly referred to as an aner, a real 
man (57a, 58c, 58e, etc.), in which he is likened to a hero, Theseus, and in which in all honesty 
we must admit we are at least as impressed with the noble and graceful manner of his death as we 
are with the arguments he introduces to prove the immortality of the soul.” (p 575) 
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The question before us is: How does this preparation, how does Plato’s careful setting of 
the scene, color the arguments to come? There are several issues to note about this 
preparation.  
 One sense in which the philosopher’s readiness to die can be understood, and one 
sense in which the philosopher will expect to fare better than others in meeting with 
death, is a sense which is modeled in Socrates’ own comportment on the day of his death. 
That we should attend to this behavior is at once obvious, and it is signaled by Plato when 
he has Echecrates ask, at the opening of the dialogue, to hear both what Socrates said 
before he died, and how he died, “how he met his end”. (57a) Socrates, as we have 
already seen, meets his death calmly. One of the dimensions of that calm is expressed in 
what he says above regarding his preparation for the argument; Socrates does not want to 
spend his last hours lamenting, and listening to his friends crying and wailing. He wants 
to spend it calmly and pleasantly, engaged in conversation. He adjusts his own, at least 
outward, reaction to the situation to bring about the outcome he desires – a last time in 
which to engage in his favorite ἔργον, philosophical conversation. Many aspects of the 
situation – from the high-running emotions of himself and his friends to the wishes of his 
executioner – stand in the way of his desires, but he is able to strategically and 
intelligently overcome them. 
 
 Another important aspect of this preparation is that Socrates compares himself to 
the φιλόνικος in his desire to make his arguments convincing, rather than “giving 
thought” to “the way it is with the things the argument’s about.” (91a) He states that he is 
risking not “holding himself” as a philosopher – οὐ φιλοσόφως ἔχειν. Socrates is not 
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willing to strictly affirm that he is holding himself in a non-philosophical frame of mind; 
however, he says that he runs the risk (κινδυνεύω) of this in arguing as he does for the 
immortality of the soul. We must, then, be on our guard for the danger that the arguments 
Socrates presents are designed to elicit agreement rather than truth.115  
 
 At 64a-b, Socrates makes Simmias laugh. He laughs because Socrates has 
presented an image of the life of the philosopher which is comically close to the image 
that is dominant with the οἱ πολλοι, as well as that of Socrates himself presented by 
Aristophanes in The Clouds. Socrates says that people who happen to get in touch with 
philosophy in the right way “devote themselves to nothing else than dying and being 
dead.” (64a) Simmias thinks the οἱ πολλοι will find this claim all too true, and would add 
that the philosopher “deserves” (ἄξιοι) death as well. “They would be speaking the 
truth,” replies Socrates, “except of course about their not being unaware (σφᾶς μὴ 
λεληθέναι).” (64b, emphasis added) 
 The many hold an image of the philosopher as ripe and ready, and even deserving 
of death. They believe they understand who and what the philosopher is, and that the life 
of the philosopher might as well be death, or they might as well be a stone.116 What 
Socrates says, however, is that while the claim “the philosopher is worthy of being dead” 
is, in the abstract, true, those who say this do not understand what they are saying. They 
                                                
115 I will argue that this is specifically the case with the final argument, which is often taken to be 
Plato’s final word on the soul, but which I will show is intentionally flawed, and structured to 
appeal specifically to Cebes.  
116 Cf Gorgias 492e. 
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believe that this ‘fact’ is not concealed from them, not λανθάνω; that it has not escaped 
their notice that the philosopher is ἄξιοι, worthy of, or deserving of, death.117  
 They are, however, unaware of their own ignorance in this matter. Not knowing 
who the philosopher is, they do not know in what way the philosopher is ἄξιοι of death. 
Further, Socrates says that they do not know “what sort of death” the philosopher is 
worthy of. (64b) We will see that until we understand what death itself is, we cannot 
know in what way the philosophical life prepares us for death. That is, the conception of 
death we have will inherently inform the way in which we understand the philosopher to 
be preparing for death. Specifically, if we think of death as the separation of soul from 
body, and we believe that the philosopher prepares for this separation, then we will be led 
to believe that the philosophical life is a preparation for the separation of the soul from 
the body. If this belief leads to a series of absurdities, then we would do well to listen to 
Socrates’ words at the opening of this argument and question more closely into “what 
sort of death” we assume the philosopher to be “worthy” of. We will note later that 
Socrates closes this series of arguments in the dialogue with another injunction to 
question into their “very first hypotheses,” at 107b.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
117 Recall that in the last chapter we saw that the philosophical life is one that happens in the face 
of the full realization of human temporality – that is, of growth, development, and eventual death. 
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1.2 Assumptions 
 
 At 64c Socrates says that they should bid the οἱ πολλοι, and their unphilosophical 
ideas about a philosophical death, farewell, and talk amongst themselves; however, we 
will see that leaving the many behind is not as easy as it seems.  
 Socrates begins the investigation with a strange question: “Do we consider that 
there’s such a thing called death? (ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι;)” (64c) Simmias 
answers quickly, interrupting: πάνυ γε, “altogether,” “certainly.” The word that Plato 
uses here for “interrupting” – ὑπολαβὼν– can also mean, more literally, to “interpret,” or 
“to take up by getting under” something. In interrupting Socrates with such a quick 
answer, Simmias has also offered an interpretation, and in so doing, has taken up the 
discussion. Socrates’ questions will now be answered by Simmias, and the proceeding 
discussion will thus be an examination of Simmias’ beliefs.  
 Socrates’ question is a strange way to begin the inquiry: “Is there such a thing 
called death?” It seems more logical to assume that death is real, and to ask what we take 
death to be. What is Socrates’ purpose in asking if we consider (ἡγέομαι) there to be a 
thing, a “this” that is death? While ἡγέομαι is a perfectly typical word for “belief,” it is 
interesting to note that its primary definition is “going ahead,” which is connected to its 
secondary sense of a leader or ruler. Simmias’ belief has, in fact, gone ahead and 
answered the question even before Socrates gets a chance to fully formulate it as a 
question. Simmias’ belief, his certainty that death is real and that he understands its 
nature – as separation of soul and body – has gone ahead of him, and has led him to his 
answer. As we will see, his beliefs continue to move the discourse through this first 
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argument; these beliefs remain unquestioned, and are in fact the object of the questioning, 
rather than death “itself.” With Simmias leading the way, they are, in fact, in danger of 
being unphilosophical to the extent that they are primarily concerned with how their 
beliefs appear to themselves and to their listeners, as Socrates will remark later in the 
conversation; they are in danger of not giving “a thought to the way it is with the things 
the argument is about.” (91a) 
 Socrates picks up on this too-ready answer; he presents a strange formulation of a 
standard conception of death: Death is separation of soul from the body, and of body 
from soul. Socrates – perhaps encouraging Simmias to break the mold of his already-
formed dogma, his προδοκέω – tries to press the issue, asking: “Death couldn’t be 
anything other than this – could it?” (64c) Simmias has a ready reply: “No, just that.” In 
addition to earlier ignoring the strangeness of the question: “Is there such a thing as 
death?” Simmias here ignores the strange formulation Socrates has given of the 
traditional idea of death as separation of soul from the body. At 64c, Socrates begins his 
account by saying that death is the “freeing” (ἀπαλλαγέν) of the body from the soul. 
This is certainly not how this is usually phrased. The body is said to be the prison or the 
tomb of the soul, not vice versa.118 To speak of the body as “imprisoned” by the soul, and 
thus of death as the “freeing” of the body from that imprisonment is a clever satire, an 
ironic and playful way to attack the traditional conception of body and soul as two self-
identical entities at war with each other; Simmias misses this entirely.119  
                                                
118 Cf Gorgias 493a. 
119 Cf Vlastos 1991, p 260, for an example of someone else completely missing the import of the 
playfulness in this formulation. For a criticism of Vlastos’ general stance toward irony in the 
dialogues, see Gordon 1996. She shows the failings in Vlastos’ extremely influencial account of 
“complex irony” (see Vlastos 1991, Chapter 1). Gordon shows how Vlastos does not account for 
the full complexity of irony as a pedagogical tool. She states: “Socratic irony is among the most 
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 Having established that Simmias is inclined to frame his answers in terms of an 
unquestioned set of traditional beliefs, Socrates immediately turns to making an image of 
the ἔργον and life of the philosopher on the basis of these beliefs. Insofar as we find that 
this image conflicts with the image of Socrates presented in the dialogue(s) – and, further,  
that it leads to obvious absurdities – it is important not to assume that Socrates’ account 
in this passage represents Plato’s conception of the philosophical life.120 As such, we will 
be led to question the conception of death upon which this philosophical ἔργον, as the 
work of the practice of death, is based. 
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
powerful tools at Socrates' disposal for turning the lives of his interlocutors toward philosophy. 
And so for Plato and his readers.” (p 137) In line with this interpretation, when I claim Socrates is 
being “ironic,” I do not intend to say that he simply “does not mean” what he says, nor that he 
“does and does not mean” what he says, as Vlasto’s “complex irony” claims. Rather, with 
Gordon, I will show how Socrates’ ironic statements are often intended to mirror back to the 
interlocutor their own views, or views they are flirting with, in order to push them to question 
further, and to wonder again in the face of their revealed ignorance.  
120 Pointing to the turn away from Socrates as the primary speaker in the “later” dialogues, 
Stanley Rosen (1983) argues that we should not restrict our conception of the philosopher to the 
image presented of Socrates in the dialogues; he goes so far as to suggest that we have to see 
Socrates as a proto-philosopher, and must move beyond his ‘style’ of inquiry in order to reach 
true philosophy. However, considering Plato’s statement in the Seventh Letter that the dialogues 
are intended as a an “image of Socrates grown young and καλός,” I argue that we should be 
attentive to the passages in which images of philosophical life are presented which do not accord 
with the life Socrates chooses. See also Theaetetus 173d-e. There, Socrates presents an image of 
the philosopher’s life to Theodorus. He describes the philosopher as not knowing the way to the 
agora, and being unconcerned with political and ethical matters since spends his time in 
contemplation of things “deep down below the earth,” and “above heaven.” (173e) I argue that 
this, like the image of the “true philosophers” in the Phaedo, is intended to mirror back to the 
interlocutor his own conceptions of the nature of philosophical practice. In this case, Theodorus, 
who spends his time in contemplation of mathematics and does not know who Theaetetus’ father 
is (144b), is having his image of the politically-disinterested φυσικός philosopher mirrored back 
to him to attempt to call him to self-awareness.  
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1.3 So-Called Pleasures 
 
 With the traditional conception of death as separation of soul from body on the 
table, Socrates paints a portrait of the life of the philosopher that is fitting to the οἱ 
πολλοι’s conception of the “true-born philosopher.” 
 At 64d-e, Socrates asks Simmias if he thinks “being serious (ἐσπουδακέναι) 
about the so-called pleasures” goes with being a “philosophical man.” The way Socrates 
phrases this question is interesting; he does not say “serious in pursuing” the so-called 
pleasures. He merely says serious about pleasures: “περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς.” Such seriousness 
does not fit Simmias’ idea of the philosopher. As Socrates will say in a moment, for 
Simmias, the philosopher “stands apart from (the body) and keeps turned toward the soul 
(πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι) as much as he can.” (64e) 
 The argument Socrates uses to elicit Simmias’ agreement is interesting in its own 
right. Socrates asks if the philosopher will be serious about the θεραπείας of the body; as 
an example of these θεραπείας, Socrates mentions buying fine cloaks and sandals. We 
do know that Socrates does not buy such things, but this a very weighted example of 
bodily θεραπείας; these are examples which cast care of the body in a specific light – as 
an ‘outward’ thing, a thing to be looked at, and not as essential to the self. This leads 
Simmias to easily answer that the individual should decide to ‘turn away’ from the body 
as something external to the self. The image of “turning away” indeed contains within it 
the idea of something external; one cannot ‘turn away’ from oneself (64e).  
 The choice of these examples immediately calls to mind what other θεραπείας of 
the body a philosopher might be serious about. Socrates asks us to consider this by 
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adding to the argument that we can only avoid such θεραπείας to a limited extent – 
limited by the θεραπείας of which we necessarily must have a share (μετέχειν). 
Socrates asks if the philosopher will hold bodily θεραπείας in “dishonor (ἀτιμάζειν) 
except insofar as there is an urgent necessity for him to have his share of them?” (64d) In 
this formulation, the philosopher will honor θεραπείας insofar as they are necessary. 
This raises the question – what sorts of bodily θεραπείας and pleasures are necessary? 
To what extent should the philosopher partake (μετέχειν) in these pleasures, and to what 
extent should the philosopher engage in these “therapeutic” practices?121 
 No answers are given, since Simmias is not interested in discussing the body; this 
disinterest stems from his image of the philosopher as completely unconcerned with the 
things of the body. According to Simmias, then, no seriousness is necessary in the 
apparently un-philosophical work of understanding the proper place and balance of 
pleasures in our lives.122 As such, his answers, and his failure to ask clarifying questions 
of Socrates, reduces this stage of the discussion to a simple binary: On the one hand, 
there is the body and ‘its’ pleasures, which are dishonorable, and on the other, the soul, 
where philosophy ‘happens’ and which is the sole source of honorable pleasure.123 This 
                                                
121 On the significance of the term θεραπείας, see Burkert 1985: “In epic theraps, therapon is the 
henchman, as Patroclus is in relation to Achilles. This implies a relation of reciprocity and mutual 
interest in spite of an unmistakable difference in rank. Therapeuein means to take care of in 
relation to parents, children, domestic animals, or plants, to the sick, to public favor, and most 
eminently in relation to the gods. Parallel is epimeleia, care, in contrast to ameleia, negligence.” 
(p 273) 
122 Cf. the Philebus and the Republic, for philosophical discussions of the proper place of 
pleasures in life. See also, Gorgias 494a, where Callicles claims that any life which is not 
constantly seeking any pleasure is like the “life of a stone,” which leads us to consider the proper 
balance of pleasures, and demands that we make a distinction between good and bad pleasures – 
as Socrates often does (see, for example, Gorgias 499cff.).  
123 Bluck takes these passages unironically as Plato’s own doctrine, and thus as going beyond the 
philosophy of the historical Socrates. Bluck argues that Plato had been strongly influenced by the 
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reduction might, in fact, be devastating to the project of a balanced life guided by λόγος. 
In other words, Simmias remains in that space of discourse that risks being ‘un-
philosophical’ by focusing on the defense of his own beliefs, rather than attending to 
“how things are with the things the argument is about”; as a result, he has closed himself 
off to the path of questioning which would open a serious philosophical discourse on the 
importance and proper place of pleasure in philosophical life.124  
 In fact, we often find Socrates expressing serious concern for the proper condition 
and training of the body. For example, in the Republic, at 410cff., Socrates argues that a 
person who spends all of his time with “music” and never touches gymnastic – the 
training of the body – “cuts the sinews from his soul” and becomes weak and cowardly in 
his pursuit of truth (411b). Not only is training the body, as a bodily θεραπεία, a 
‘serious’ issue for philosophy, it is here argued to be an essential condition for the 
philosophical life.125  
   
                                                                                                                                            
Orphic/Pyhtagorean asceticism, and thus developed a hatred of the body and ‘its’ pleasures. He 
calls this the “essence of Plato’s creed.” (1955, p 47) 
124 In Xenophon’s Memorabilia 27, Socrates argues against the pleasures of drink, sex, sauces, 
and clothes etc. by saying that they will “destroy the household and the body.” Thus, the danger is 
not from the pleasures themselves, but indulging in them to excess – an excess marked by 
negative results on one’s life and affairs. Baltzly, 1996, takes these passages unironically, and 
argues that any pleasures or pains have a negative effect: “pleasures and pains lead one to 
develop mistaken priorities (83c-d).” However, it is not clear how we are supposed to avoid pains 
in life. Blalsky has thus erased any possibility of understanding how the philosopher recognizes 
the danger of intemperately engaging in pleasure, or avoiding pain in a cowardly manner, which 
requires recognizing the priority of virtue and wisdom over pleasure and pain, but does not equate 
to denying and avoiding all pleasures (and pains, as if that were possible). However, after 
interpreting these passages in such a simple way, Blalsky claims that these “are not good reasons” 
to deny the senses or the body, and turn to the radical asceticism he finds in the Phaedo – a 
position which he claims Plato rejects “later” in his career. I agree that they are not good reasons, 
but they are not Plato’s reasons, nor Socrates’ – they are the reasons that flow from Simmias and 
the οἱ πολλοι’s mistaken conception of philosophy. Cf Gorgias, where Callicles accuses the 
philosopher of living the life of a stone (494a-b).   
125 We note that Socrates describes the body as a necessary condition for life at 99a-b. 
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 In each of Socrates’ first three questions about pleasure there is reason to think 
that Simmias has answered incorrectly. Socrates continues to draw out the image of the 
“true-born philosopher” from Simmias’ answers. With these answers in hand, at 65a 
Socrates states that this conception which Simmias has brought to the table concerning 
the proper philosophical stance toward pleasures is exactly what “most people” think 
makes the philosopher worthy of death; the interlocutors attempted to leave ‘the many’ 
behind, but after a few answers from Simmias, we find that the conceptions of the οἱ 
πολλοι still haunt the discussion. Socrates repeats that such a “true-born philosopher” has 
“no share (μετέχειν) in” bodily pleasures; however, in addition to seeing Socrates 
enjoying such pleasures in measure, we note that at 64e he has just said that everyone, of 
necessity, must have some “share” of them.126  
  
1.4. Purity, and the Impossibility of φρόνησις 
 
 Socrates now begins to question Simmias about the “true-born philosopher’s” 
account of φρόνησις. We will find that Simmias, and the οἱ πολλοι’s conception of this 
life, makes φρόνησις an impossibility for an embodied being.  
 Socrates asks: “What about the attainment of φρόνησις itself? Is the body an 
impediment or not when somebody takes it along as a companion in his search?” (65a-b) 
Socrates then gives a λόγος in which the way the body ‘knows’ anything is by the senses, 
                                                
126 Cf Hackforth: “. . .outside the Phaedo, his general attitude does not seem to be that of an 
enemy of the ‘flesh’ and its pleasures; he can, on occasion, enjoy his wine, and drink with the 
best; but he is, in the Greek phrase, ‘master of himself’ (κρειττων αὐτόυ) one who is not be 
overcome by pleasure.” (1955, p 49) 
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and any other kind of knowledge is ‘through’ the soul (65b-c).127 With the possibility of 
knowledge for an embodied being reduced to sensory knowledge, Socrates proceeds to 
show that no “pure” knowledge is possible while we are alive.128  
                                                
127 See also 79c. 
128 Bluck takes this purity to be unironically the goal of the philosopher’s life, in Plato’s own 
opinion. He claims that Plato “borrowed the ideas from the religious mysticism of the Orphics, 
who believed in transmigration of souls, and claimed a soul could not be freed from the cycle of 
birth and death until it was wholly purified.” (1955, p 47) Since the body is an impediment to 
knowledge, purity of soul (from the body) is necessary for knowledge. The “body is a hindrance,” 
he claims, for two reasons. First, because “the senses are not accurate or reliable.” (p 46, 
emphasis added) Most commentators, of course, agree that Plato wants us to transcend the body, 
in part because of the fallibility of the senses. See for example, see Dimas 2003, p 181, Hackforth 
1955, et al. In the coming Chapters, I will show that Plato does not hold the senses in such serious 
disregard in the Phaedo, and thus Bluck’s central argument for why the body is an impediment to 
knowledge is misleading. See, for example, the Seventh Letter, where Plato argues that 
knowledge can be had only once “names, logoi, and visual and other perceptions have been 
rubbed against one another and tested.” (344b, emphasis added) See also Hare 1965, p 34, for an 
account of the ‘method of hypothesis’ which includes testing our hypotheses against evidence of 
the senses – as I will discuss in Chapter 8. Bluck’s second argument that the soul must be rid of 
the body is that “emotions and bodily needs distract the mind.” (p 46) While it certainly true that 
bodily needs distract the mind, Plato presents us with many images of Socrates withstanding the 
need for warmth and food (for example, in the Symposium) and thus it would seem that 
philosophical virtue allows to stand up in the face of such needs, and to treat them temperately, 
rather than simply seeking to be rid of them. Emotions are only an impediment insofar as they 
overwhelm reason. One needs simply point to the central importance of ἔρος to see that emotions 
are only dangerous when directed toward the wrong object. Again, mistaking the emotions as 
such as an impediment to philosophy cripples the philosophical life by rendering it unable to give 
an account of the proper order and place of emotion and desire in human (including the 
philosophical human) life. By assuming that Plato’s Socrates (if not the historical Socrates) faces 
death with courage because of a certainty of achieving pure knowledge in the afterlife, Bluck 
mistakes Socrates’ – and the philosopher’s – stance toward fear, and thus courage in the face of 
death. Grube also takes this radical asceticism to be unironically the teaching of the Phaedo; 
recognizing that it does not accord with the “later” works, specifically, the Symposium, Grube 
assumes Plato changed his mind: “Philosophy as a training for death is a dangerously negative 
point of view in which no allowance is made for the development of the human emotions. There 
is good reason to regard the teaching of the Phaedo, splendid though it be, as pure intellectualism 
from life, its final aim being the eternal preservation of the soul in the cold storage of eternally 
frozen absolute Forms.” (1980, p 129) It is unfortunate that Grube was not attuned to the levels of 
irony – especially considering the projection into the mouths of the “true-born philosophers” – to 
see that Plato did not substantially change his position on emotions and desires. Stella Lange 
agrees: “In his ultimate interpretation of Plato Grube is undoubtedly correct. Plato was not an 
ascetic nor a cold intellectual. This is evident throughout not only the Symposium and the 
Phaedrus but the Republic and the Laws also, and to a lesser extent in all the dialogues. It was 
because Plato himself felt so strongly the appeal of the "honeyed Muse" that he realized the 
danger of excessive emotion (Rep. 607A-608B).” (1938, p 296) Lange does not explain the 
difference by appealing to hidden levels of the text, nor by seeing how Socrates ironically mirrors 
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 Simmias agrees that there is such a thing as “Justice itself,” as well as Goodness 
and Beauty themselves, and Socrates argues that we do not “attach ourselves to” 
(ἐφήψω) such “forms” with any of our bodily senses (65d). Therefore, since we do not 
“see” Justice, we must we come to knowledge of it without the body – since Simmias has 
already agreed to the epistemology that claims that the body can only have knowledge 
through the senses.129 Socrates then says, “And I am speaking about the Being of all such 
things, about Bigness, and Health, and Strength and, in a word (ἑνὶ λόγῳ) all the rest – 
whatever each happens to be.” (65d-e)  
 If Socrates is trying to get Simmias to agree that body is not involved in any way 
with the knowledge of such things, bigness, strength, and health are provocative and 
problematic examples. How do we come to know strength? How do we come to know 
health? Socrates says that the soul comes to this knowledge αὐτῇ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν – itself by 
itself.130 How can the soul come to know health without any contact with the body? It 
would seem, at least at first glance, that embodiment is essential to the knowledge of 
strength, health, and size. As Burger puts it, “Socrates’ apparently superfluous reference 
to these characteristics tacitly invites us to step back and reconsider the cases of the just, 
beautiful, and good.”131  
                                                                                                                                            
back to his interlocutors their own conceptions of philosophy; she argues, against those who 
would propose that the differences be attributed to Plato’s supposed development, and to a 
specious chronology of the dialogues: “So may we not rather say that the Phaedo and the 
Symposium represent two aspects of truth, two moods, if we will? Any intelligent person of keen 
sensibilities – not to say any artist – is aware that his attitude even toward great matters changes 
from time to time.” (p 297) 
129 This position is often taken to be Platonic doctrine. See Dimas 2003: “The body's way of 
making epistemic contact with the world is by making use of the senses. Unfortunately, the 
senses cannot be trusted.” (p 182) 
130 For a good discussion of Plato’s use of the phrase αὐτῇ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν, see Kutash 1993, p 
134ff. See also Dimas 2003, p 183.  
131 1984, p 41. 
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 In fact, these characteristics make no sense outside of embodied physicality; the 
choice of these examples from the myriad possibilities Plato could have chosen which do 
not imply embodiment seems to imply that we should be careful not to immediately agree 
with Simmias’ answers at 65e and 66a that the body is not in any way involved in the 
knowledge of the forms, even if forms are not the objects of sense perception. I will 
return to these examples when I present a reading of the argument from recollection, and 
specifically of Socrates’ account of the perception of “equal” sticks, and how we come to 
know equality itself. In Chapter 7, I will argue that this epistemological situation, as 
described in the Phaedo, implies the necessary embodiment of the knower – for now, I 
am simply concerned with how the passage problematizes the traditional account of the 
body as an impediment to φρόνησις.  
  In addition, by adding, at 65d-e, “all” the rest, in their being (οὐσία), Socrates 
draws all such “forms” into a unity ἑνὶ λόγῳ; while this might mean “in a word,” it 
literally implies that all “such” things have their unity in λόγος – ἑνὶ λόγῳ. Socrates thus 
invites us to reconsider how we come to know the being of each thing itself, and thus to 
reconsider the place of the fact of our embodiment in this act of knowing; this invitation 
is subtly connected to the issue of λόγος. When we turn to the second sailing, and how 
Socrates attends to the being of each thing in λόγος, we will find that there is, in fact, a 
necessary sense in which we do not see, nor detect with any of our other senses, the truth 
of the world around us. Nevertheless, it is wrong to think of this knowledge as the contact 
between a pure soul and pure being in some “other” τόπος, and thus it is wrong to think 
that the body is simply an impediment to learning.  
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 That is, in my reading of Socrates’ attack on materialism I will argue that 
Simmias is right to agree, in abstract, that we do not come to knowledge of Justice itself –  
or of the αἰτία of anything, for that matter – “with” the body alone, nor with the senses 
alone, if  the body and senses are understood as some sort of tool or mechanism the self 
employs in order to acquire sensory experience. We will find that there is truth beyond 
the material explanations of knowledge which places the physicality of sensation at the 
heart of an account of human knowledge.  
 However, It will become clear that Simmias, driven by his conception of the soul 
as continuing to exist in a τόπος after death, thinks of ‘binding to’ or ‘contact with’ the 
forms as contact in a “spiritual” τόπος; thus, this ‘contact’ would only be possible 
without the body, since the body limits us to the physical τόπος ‘here.’ In my reading of 
the second sailing and Socrates’ biography, I will argue that there is a non-physical, 
nonmaterialistic explanation to the truths of our experience that does not commit us to the 
physical reality of some other τόπος, in which our souls would stand in some quasi-
physical relationship to the “forms” before we are born and after we die. It is by engaging 
with the way in which the soul’s activity “itself through itself,” guided by λόγος, 
determines the “being and benefit” of the beings we encounter in perceptual life in this 
τόπος that the philosopher is able to work toward harmony in the soul, and a 
philosophical mode of life. Thus, an understanding of the epistemology proper to an 
embodied being is essential to a development of the ethical life characterized by a 
philosophically-grounded harmonious mode of living.  
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 Guided by Simmias’ answers, Socrates does not proceed to these deeper issues at 
this point in the dialogue; rather, he continues to fill out the image of the “true-born 
philosopher.”  
 
1.5 The “Short-Cut” to Purity 
  
 Socrates convinces Simmias to agree, on the basis of the assumptions they have 
made about knowledge and the body, that the thinker who approaches each pure 
(εἰλικρινεῖ) thing with pure (εἰλικρινεῖ) thought (διάνοια) who can “hit on what is 
(τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος),” if anyone can, he adds (66a). Simmias answers, more aptly 
than he knows, that Socrates, in giving this λόγος of what the pure, disembodied soul can 
know while he himself is still embodied, is speaking “supernaturally” – ὑπερφυῶς.132  
 Socrates distances himself even further from sincerity in giving this λόγος by 
putting the next speech in the voice of the “true-born philosophers,” (γνησίως 
φιλοσόφοις) miming what they of necessity (ἀνάγκη) must “think and say to one 
another.” (66b) He begins by saying these philosophers have found a “short-cut,” an 
ἀτραπός, a path without any turnings. It is clear that they must have found such a path. 
How else could they know what sort of knowledge is possible for a dis-embodied being 
while themselves, the “true-born philosophers” are “still” embodied? Once again 
Socrates is playing with Simmias, presenting a playful and ironic attack. Simmias misses 
the playfulness in the answer, as do the majority of commentators on the Phaedo.133  
                                                
132 Simmias says it is “supernatural” how truly Socrates speaks: “ὑπερφυῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς 
ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.” (66a) 
133 With the notable exception of Ronna Burger: “(The true-born philosopher’s) claim to be led to 
this insight by some sort of ‘short-cut’ may be a sign of their awareness of its inexplicability: 
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 The “true-born philosophers” then outline an extensive list of grievances against 
the body, drawing conclusions from Simmias’ conception of the body as an evil entity, 
external to the self, which serves only as an obstacle to the soul’s search for contact with 
truth. It is not necessary for us to explicate each of the inconsistencies in this account, nor 
to work out what more sophisticated understanding of the soul might help us deal with 
such inconsistencies – although those are interesting and important issues. My intention 
here is to show that the text gives several indications that it cannot be taken as Plato’s 
doctrine that knowledge is the “pure” contact between the soul and the forms – a contact  
which takes place in a τόπος transcendent and χωριστός of the world in which we 
embodied beings live. 
 The conclusion of their argument is that “pure” knowledge is impossible for an 
embodied being. In other words, Simmias’ conception of philosophy has lead to the 
conclusion that philosophy cannot lead a person to φρόνησις in this life. Philosophy – if 
it is still able to prove itself as the best life – must give an account of its benefits without 
claiming to provide certainty purified of the exigencies of embodied life. Philosophy thus 
appears impotent to free us of τύχη. With this in mind, Socrates constructs an image of 
what value the life of philosophy has, since it does not lead us to a stable, “pure” 
understanding of our situation which would allow us to live in a better way as long as we 
are embodied. With this in mind, he applauds the “people who instituted our mystic 
                                                                                                                                            
apparently conversing while alive, “in the body,” how could they justify the truth of the claim 
that the body prevents all possible access to the truth?” (Burger 1984, p 43 emphasis added) By 
saying “apparently,” she shows that she has not missed the humor of the situation. For an 
example of one of the many commentators who take this unironically, see Bluck 1955: “Socrates 
maintains that death means release from the distractions and snares of the body, and the 
opportunity to contemplate truth unimpeded. . .” (p 1) On why this should not lead to suicide, 
Bluck also takes the text to unironically suggest that Socrates’ position is that we belong ot the 
gods. (ibid.) See also Hackforth 1955, Bostock 1986.  
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rites,” in their teaching that “whoever arrives in Hades ignorant of the mysteries and 
uninitiated will lie in muck, but he who arrives There purified and initiated will dwell 
with gods.” (69c-d)   
 In the Republic, Glaucon and Adeimantus ask Socrates to prove that justice is 
choiceworthy without reference to benefit accrued in the afterlife (as discussed in Chapter 
1). This question leads Socrates to a description of the soul as being composed of three 
‘parts.’ These parts can stand in an ordered and harmonious relation to one another, and 
this state of harmony is justice; or, they can be disordered and disharmonious, which is 
injustice and vice. A great deal of this discussion centers on the place of pleasure and 
desire in the well-ordered life. That is, an account of the importance of philosophy which 
does not avail itself of hypothetical benefits in the afterlife demands a more sophisticated 
account of the nature of the soul. Specifically, it is necessary to develop an account of 
desire and of the nature of the individual which goes beyond the level of simply dividing 
the self into the body and ‘its’ desires, on the one hand, and the soul on the other.  
  Without turning to this other dialogue at this time, it is clear from the context of 
the conclusion Socrates draws from Simmias’ conception of philosophy in the Phaedo 
that this conception is extremely problematic. Socrates formulates the benefits of the 
philosophical life in terms of benefits for the afterlife immediately after distinguishing 
between ‘philosophical and ‘non-philosophical’ virtues. He says that non-philosophical 
courage is when people face evil “through terror at greater evils.” (68d) He concludes 
that “all but the philosophers are courageous by fearing and fear. And yet it’s certainly 
unreasonable (ἄλογόν) for somebody to be courageous by fear and cowardice.” He goes 
on,  
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. . . maybe this isn’t the right way of making exchanges for virtue, by exchanging 
pleasures for pleasures and pains for pains and terror for terror and the greater for 
the less, as if they were coins (νομίσματα); but maybe this alone is the right coin 
for virtue, the coin for which all things must be exchanged – φρόνησις. Maybe 
this is the genuine coin for which and with which all things must be bought and 
sold; and maybe courage and moderation and justice and true virtue as a whole 
are only when accompanied by φρόνησις, regardless of whether pleasures and 
terrors and all such things are added or subtracted. (69a-b)  
 
The first thing to note about this passage is that, if Socrates is to be taken at his word 
here, without φρόνησις we cannot have true virtue, but merely what he calls a “shadow-
painting” of virtue (69b). He has just shown, based on Simmias’ conception of the true 
philosopher, that φρόνησις is impossible for an embodied being, and therefore virtue 
would be impossible as well. More importantly for our purposes here, it is immediately 
after this passage that Socrates, in light of the impossibility of virtue and φρόνησις, gives 
the account of the benefits of the philosophical life as being benefits – in some sense, the 
pleasures of dwelling with the gods and the avoidance of the pains of lying in muck – in 
the afterlife.134 Thus, Simmias’ account of the preparation for death as the proper work of 
the true philosopher – understood as preparing the soul for separation from the body – 
has lead to the “shadow-painting” of virtue in which the philosopher exchanges pleasures 
in this life for pleasures in the afterlife.135  
                                                
134 Bluck apparently misses the importance of this account of virtue when he says it is “the 
essence of Plato’s creed” that: “Only purification can qualify us for bliss in the life after death.” 
(1955, p 47, emphasis added) Socrates is clearly attempting to get his interlocutors to see the 
inconsistency here, and thus to seek virtue for its own good, and not for hope of “bliss” in Hades, 
just as he seeks to show that the just, ordered soul is good in itself in the Republic.  
135 Weiss has an excellent analysis of this argument, and on hedonic calculus more generally. 
Specifically, she compares the treatments of this calculus in the Phaedo and Protagoras. She 
concludes that the major difference in the way Socrates argues in based in the different 
interlocutors Socrates is dealing with. “When we leave the world of Protagoras and turn once 
again to the Phaedo, we find ourselves in arguably more familiar surroundings, in a world where 
pleasure is not the only value and where some people – philosophers – actually value phronesis 
over pleasure.” (1989, p 520). See also Weiss 1987. 
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 This set of observations raises the question: What is the purpose of the 
philosophical life? If we have reason to believe, from the dialogue, that a pseudo-Orphic 
purification of the soul for the sole purpose of gaining benefits in the afterlife is not, in 
fact, the goal of a true philosopher, then what is that goal? In what sense is philosophy a 
“practice of dying?” 
 
 Whatever answers we discover to these questions, it is clear that the problematic 
conception of philosophy as the practice of purifying the soul of bodily pleasures stems 
from the conception of the body as the source of all human problems, as an obstacle to 
knowledge, and as something to be “turned away from.” It seems, then, that this 
conception of soul and body as simply distinct, and even opposing, entities is not the final 
teaching of the Phaedo, much less that of Plato.  
 
1.6 Digression: Self-Conception, Responsibility, and the Foreign Body 
 
 The true-born philosophers blame the body for all evils in the world: “The body 
and its desires are the only cause of wars and factions (στάσεις) and battles.” (66c, 
emphasis added) In the first chapter, I argued that the first word of the dialogue, αὐτός, 
referring to Phaedo “himself,” opens up questions of personal identity. It became clear in 
that discussion that identifying the “self” with certain constellations of desires, and 
treating other desires as external to the self, can allow a person to disown such desires. 
This process allows a person to deny responsibility for being the source of those desires, 
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and thus to avoid dealing with the painful aspects of self-knowledge that such an 
admission of responsibility might create.  
 Here I will argue that the proper understanding of the relation between soul and 
body does not allow us to avoid this responsibility; relating ourselves to our desires and 
our fears is wrestling not with some foreign entity, but with the truth of ourselves – a 
truth which is troublingly diverse, lacking the harmony and unity that we might want to 
assume of ourselves, and rife with cognitive dissonance. Dealing in and with the variety 
of stories we tell ourselves in order to either face up to or to avoid these responsibilities, 
to either achieve or avoid self-knowledge, will be revealed as the proper work of 
philosophy. This will, in turn, allow us to see to what extent misology is the worst πάθε 
that a person can undergo.  
 We have seen that the primary story through which the body has been presented is 
one of externalization: The body is something foreign to the self.136 I have argued that this 
                                                
136 Hackforth argues that this strict opposition between soul and body isn’t present in the other 
accounts of Socrates, including the Apology: “The conception of the mind or soul (ψυχή) and the 
body as hostile to each other, which runs through this section (64cff.), goes further than anything 
said by the Socrates of the Apology. He there says ‘What I do as I go about amongst you is simply 
to urge both young and old not to make their bodies nor their possessions their primary and chief 
concern, but rather to strive for the fullest perfection of their souls.’ (30a-b)” (1955, p 48) He 
concludes from this that the opposition of soul and body is Plato’s conception, not that of 
Socrates. I argue that this is rather a result of Simmias’ misconception, based in a 
misunderstanding of the way the philosopher resists temptation and is moderate in seeking 
physical pleasures, rather than totally ascetic. On this point, see Bluck 1955: “When set against 
some of Plato’s other works – and particularly, perhaps, the Symposium – the Phaedo might 
appear at first sight to recommend a morality that is strangely ascetic. It seems to recommend that 
the pleasures of this life should be almost entirely eschewed.” (p 2) However, Bluck does not see 
any inconsistency, and thus does not use Socrates’ stance toward pleasure in virtually all of the 
other dialogues to interfere with his interpretation of the account of pleasure placed in the mouths 
of the “true-born philosophers,” and based in Simmias’ answers: “But there is no real 
inconsistency: the contrast lies in the difference of standpoint from which the two dialogues are 
written.” (ibid.) He explains that the Symposium and Republic are concerned with the “ordinary 
virtue of the ordinary worldly man,” while the Phaedo is solely concerned with “the philosopher 
alone.” (ibid.) However, if Bluck, and the “true-born philosophers,” claim that the root of the 
status of these pleasures lies in the nature of the soul (as distinct from the body and as only 
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λόγος serves to absolve the individual from responsibility for “base” desires. We have 
also seen how this absolution is connected to Simmias’ conception of the concern with 
desire and θεραπείας of the body as unphilosophical.  
 
 The dialogue also presents us with another image of projection of emotions or 
desires onto a ‘foreign’ entity in order to avoid responsibility. After Socrates presented 
the argument we have just discussed – the argument proving that body and ‘its’ desires 
are an impediment to the work of the “true-born philosophers” – Cebes “broke in” 
(ὑπολαβὼν, again) and said:  
Socrates, the rest seems to me to have been beautifully put (δοκεῖ καλῶς 
λέγεσθαι), but what you said about the soul induces a lot of distrust (ἀπιστίαν) 
in human beings. They fear that the soul, once she’s free of the body is no longer 
anywhere and is destroyed and perishes on that very day when a human being 
dies; and that as soon as she is free of the body and departs, then, scattered like 
breath or smoke, she goes fluttering off and is no longer anywhere. (70a)  
 
 
The conversants then press upon Socrates that he should show that the soul continues to 
exist “somewhere” (εἴπερ εἴη που) after death, in order to defend the conclusions he 
drew from the argument based in Simmias’ conception of the “true philosophers.”  
 Socrates then presents the argument of the generation from opposites, and the 
argument from recollection; however, he finds that he has still failed to convince them. 
Socrates states that reason for this is that they have a “childish” fear that the soul will be 
blown away when they die (77e). Cebes, “with a laugh,” dismisses the suggestion that he 
has a childish fear. Projecting that fear onto something external to himself, Cebes says 
                                                                                                                                            
seeking the good) and its relation to the body (as the source of all base desires, and of all factions 
and strife), then Bluck’s account of the inconsistency does not make sense; that is, there is no 
reason to think that the nature of soul and body, and their relation, are any different for the 
philosopher than for the “ordinary man.”  
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that Socrates should persuade (ἀναπείθειν) them “not as if we were afraid – perhaps 
even in us there’s some child present who is terrified by such things.” (77e) 
 Ronna Burger says the following about this projection:  
(Cebes) projects his internal dissention onto an autonomous and alien being by 
transforming Socrates’ accusation of “childish fear” into “the child in us” who 
fears. The tension between Socrates’ adjective and Cebes’ noun points to the 
question of whether “the psyche in us” is anything other than a reification of the 
quality of “ensouled” body: it was only, indeed, by projecting all internal 
dissention onto the body as alien that the genuine philosophers could postulate 
the separabilty of the psyche as an autonomous being.137 
 
In this passage she astutely connects the issue of personal responsibility to the issue of 
the reification of the soul. When we think of the soul as a “thing,” we begin to see it as 
distinct from the body (and as we have seen, as opposed to the body), and we begin to see 
it as the bearer of characteristics, as the “subject” which would be the bearer of 
predicates. This is a common and understandable tendency of thought; it is a tendency 
which Simmias and Cebes exhibit throughout the dialogue, and which is virtually 
demanded by grammar.  
 There are, however, real dangers in succumbing uncritically to this tendency, as I 
will demonstrate. Our discussion of the second-sailing will show that the dialogue is 
asking us to consider how the stories we tell ourselves, and the stories we inherit from the 
πόλις – and in which we participate by ‘re-telling’ and enacting them in our personal and 
political lives – affect our self-understanding; this self-understanding, in turn, affects how 
we understand our ethical life to be structured. In this specific instance, we can see, as 
Burger has claimed, that the common conception of the self as soul and body (cf. 79b) is 
intimately connected with a conception of death as the separation of the one ‘thing’ from 
                                                
137 1984, p 85. 
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the other ‘thing.’ We saw earlier how Socrates points to this connection in his satire of 
this view by beginning the account with the playful reversal of its usual structure, 
speaking of the body as being freed from the soul at death. With this firmly established 
tradition of self-understanding, it is easy for the “true-born philosophers” to claim that the 
body, an external thing, is responsible for the desires which they name as the source of all 
faction and strife, not they themselves. Cebes is engaging in the same tendency of thought 
when he disowns the fear of death that Socrates claims drives his distrust of the λόγος 
Socrates is presenting. With this picture in mind, the ethical life is a “turning away” from 
a set of desires foreign and alien to the self. We have already seen how this conception of 
the self makes serious consideration of and concern with the “so-called pleasures of the 
body” appear to be a non-philosophical concern. 
  
 
§2. Purity, Blending, and Opposition in the Ψυχή 
 
 I have shown that the simple transcendence of the physical cannot be taken as the 
unequivocal goal of the philosopher. If it was, philosophy would be useless for guiding 
embodied human life, useless for developing the practical wisdom necessary to withstand 
fear and temptation, and would be reduced to a pseudo-religious practice designed to gain 
benefits in the afterlife. As we have seen, this trading of the “pains” of temperance and 
justice in this life for pleasures in the afterlife is explicitly said not to be the goal of 
philosophy – which can be seen from within the context of the Phaedo, and which 
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appears with greater clarity if we look to the discussion of justice and φρόνησις in the 
Republic.  
 Socrates’ courage in the face of death must be accounted for by something other 
than his supposed certainty in the continued existence of his individual soul after death; 
by analogy, the account of the soul and the forms as χωριστός must be accounted for by 
something other than supposed access to another τόπος. Additionally, I will show that 
Socrates’ philosophical poise in the face of death can be distinguished from religious 
certainty in the different understandings of purity that they involve. As I argued in 
Chapter 1, Plato is playing on religious conceptions of purification in the Phaedo. These 
conceptions are undergoing a transformation in Plato’s texts. Understanding this 
transformation will be critical for understanding the philosophical, as opposed to 
religious, reaction to the fear of death and the attendant desire for purity; it will also be 
critical for understanding the philosophical way of life that orients itself in relation to the 
recognition of human finitude, and the inevitability of death.  
 That is, both a religious and philosophical life and conception of reality arise as 
reactions to the fear of death. For both, there is an attempt to purify the soul of this fear, 
and to live out of something other than this emotional reaction. The differences appear 
when we note that the religious thinker denies their own finitude, claiming that they have 
within themselves a purity which allows for immortality, and for contact with Truth. For 
Plato, I will argue, this amounts to a denial of the Delphic Maxim “know thyself” – an 
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aphorism which I have argued calls for a recognition that one is mortal as preparation for 
hearing the words of the oracle – and a denial of the human situation.138  
 The Phaedo, as Socrates’ death scene, ending with the presence of a corpse, 
refuses to let us forget this mortality. In the face of this body, in recognition of the 
decomposition it will soon undergo, it is difficult to forget the limitations of the human 
situation. At the end of the dialogue we are left with a body that will need to be handled 
and washed by those left behind; this is the origin of the philosophical ethical gesture that 
Socrates inaugurates by bathing before he dies in order to save the women “the trouble of 
bathing a corpse” (115a). The religious gesture concerns itself with how the treatment of 
the body will affect the fate of the soul. For Socrates, this is not a concern; it is not how 
his body is treated after death, but rather how he chose to live, that affects his fate (115c). 
His concern is not for his own soul, but for the still-living women he sees in front of him, 
who will have to deal with this corpse. The religious traditions of Plato’s time sought to 
purify themselves of this corpse, this tomb; in the very structure of the Phaedo, Plato 
reminds us of the origin of this desire for purity by re-presenting to us the physicality of 
Socrates’ cold, unmoving, corpse. In so doing, he reminds each of his readers of their 
own physicality, and of the impending inevitability of their own deaths.  
                                                
138 In his interpretation of the Cratylus in Being and Logos, John Sallis points out that Socrates 
there hypothesizes a “law-giver” of names who has direct access to Truth, and being itself, 
unmediated by language. What distinguishes the lawgiver, as the proper giver of names is that the 
lawgiver has access to the things themselves unmediated by language (389d). When the 
interlocutors turn to judging if the lawgiver has done his job well, they have to assume that they 
have, as did the lawgiver, pure access to beings distinguished in their being without needing the 
names which the lawgiver gave in order to distinguish these beings in the first place. As such, 
they have “abstracted” from the real function of naming, which is to distinguish beings in their 
being. Sallis states, “As a result of this abstraction, which amounts to a forgetfulness of the 
condition of man, a self-forgetfulness, the lawgiver proved  to be comic, and what followed 
proved to be a comedy.” (1975, p 306)  
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 In this discussion of the presentation of purity in the Phaedo, a certain conception 
of purity will appear as an impossibility; this observation will lead to a consideration of 
the nature of an impure, “blended” life – a life caught between carnal physicality and 
daemonic transcendence – as the proper context for philosophical practice.   
 Before turning to the explicit discussion of the purification of the soul, it is 
necessary to see how the issue of projection of purity in the face of uncertainties inherent 
in the “blended” nature of human existence is raised early in the dialogue.  
 
2.1 The Aτόπος Blending of Pleasure and Pain 
 
 The issue of blending is raised early in the dialogue. At 59a, as Phaedo begins his 
account of the philosophical conversation that took place on the day of Socrates death, he 
states that neither the usual pleasure at discussing philosophy nor the pity he would 
expect at seeing a friend about to die “came into” (εἴσειμι) him. Rather, a “simply absurd 
(ἀτεχνῶς ἄτοπόν)” πάθος was present in him: “an unusual blend (κρᾶσις), blended 
(συγκεκραμένη) together from pleasure and pain too.” (59a) Phaedo notes that the 
others were in this condition as well, “sometimes laughing, sometimes weeping, and one 
of us especially – Appolodorus. I suppose you know the man and the way he is (τρόπον 
αὐτοῦ).” (59b)  
 Socrates makes an observation similar to, but importantly different from, 
Phaedo’s about the ἄτοπος “blend” of pleasure and pain when the shackles are removed 
from his legs;  
How absurd a thing this seems to be, gentlemen, which human beings call 
(καλοῦσιν) “pleasant!” How wondrously (θαυμασίως) related it is by nature to 
its seeming (δοκοῦν) contrary – the Painful – in that they’re not both willing to 
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be present with a human being at the same time, but if somebody chases the one 
and catches it, he’s pretty much compelled always to catch the other one too, just 
as if the pair of them – although they’re two – were fastened by one head! (60b) 
 
Socrates is not amazed by an unusual experience of “blending,” as Phaedo was, but rather 
by their “wondrous” relation; while the two are not “willing” to be present together, they 
are inseparable.139 
 Unlike Phaedo, Socrates does not claim to be speaking about pleasure and pain 
“themselves”; rather, he speaks of what people call (καλοῦσιν) pleasure and pain. He 
remarks that its relation to its “seeming” (“what people believe to be,” δοκοῦν) opposite 
                                                
139 Kenneth Dorter argues that that the significance of Socrates discussing what people “call” 
pleasant is that he is deriding the bodily pleasures (1982, p 23-24); thus, this passage could be 
read as an account of a spiritual pleasure that would not be accompanied and sullied by its 
attending opposite, pain, upon the inevitable cessation of that pleasure (see also Hackforth 1955, 
p 33, n 2). We will find that while this reading makes some sense of this passage alone, the 
reading we are interested in of the dialogue as a whole shows this desire for a “pure” pleasure to 
be a questionable expression of the human will to purity and personal immortality. While 
Dorter’s reading makes some sense of the passage, it assumes too easily the distinction between 
physical and spiritual pleasures. He claims that Phaedo, at 59a, is describing “mental” feelings 
which allow for mixture, as opposed to the physical pleasures Socrates describes at 60b,c – which 
people “call” pleasure – which do not allow for any mixing. As such, Dorter defines the pleasure 
and pain Phaedo describes as being of the type that, as “mental” pleasure, are not attached to their 
relative opposite; i.e. physical pleasure is always made impure by the fact that at the cessation of 
that pleasure, pain will result, while “mental” pleasures do not have this attendant relative 
opposite. However, it is not clear from the Phaedo that Phaedo’s sorrow at the loss of his friend is 
not intrinsically connected to the joy of having a friend in the first place; nor is it clear that his 
pleasure in partaking in philosophical discussion not always attended by the displeasure of having 
to stop such discussions to deal with worldly matters. The central issue that Dorter’s analysis 
misses is that the distinction between bodily, and thus ‘base’ pleasures and “mental” pleasures, 
which we would desire to be pure of any bodily element, is not at all clear. He makes reference to 
the Republic’s more detailed account of pleasure, at 583bff; however, in that text, different kinds 
of pleasure are not distinguished by the simple body/soul dichotomy, but are rather distinguished 
by being the pleasures proper to different parts within the soul itself. Dorter’s reference to the 
account of unmixed pleasures in the Philebus is even more problematic, considering the problems 
associated with that difficult text in general, and with the fact that smells are listed among the 
unmixed, “pure,” pleasures (at 51e); thus, the idea that pure pleasures are those of the soul and 
impure are those of the body cannot hold. Further, at 52a, Socrates says that they must agree that 
the pleasures of learning are unmixed if they agree that there is no “hunger for learning,” which is 
not entirely obvious; we would also have to agree that there is no pain associated with forgetting 
what once had been learned.  
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is “wondrous” (θαυμασίως).140 In his wonder, Socrates composes a μῦθος, as he says 
Aesop might have, had he noticed this wondrous facet of experience.  
 He says that it is “as if” the two were fastened by one head (60b); this is a strange 
and striking image. Socrates anthropomorphizes pleasure and pain by projecting a will, or 
desire, onto them: They are not “willing” to be reconciled, as he says at 60c. However, 
“the god” wants them to end their war. Unable to accomplish this, the god fastened their 
heads together so that one would always follow the other (ibid.). In this passage, Socrates 
gives two accounts of how pleasure and pain come to be “wondrously” related. In the 
Aesopian μῦθος, there is an original dyad that is unified by the power of the god. On the 
other hand, there is the human will to separate them – to keep them pure from one 
another; in an act of personification, there is a projection “onto the feelings themselves of 
the human will to separate them.”141 Burger comments: “If . . . the attempt to unify 
pleasure and pain were really successful, they would together become one, or if the 
attempt to separate them were really successful, each would become one with no relation 
to the other. Addition and division thus constitute not only opposite causes of how two 
comes to be, but the same opposite causes of how one comes to be.”142 
 This is precisely the perplexity that leads Socrates, according to his account of his 
own philosophical development later in the dialogue, in search of the “safe” answer to the 
αἰτία of anything becoming “one” or “two.” (96e ff.) Here, we find that the two stories 
present a tension between the divine will to unify pleasure and pain, on the one hand, and 
the human will (projected onto the feelings themselves) to separate out what they call 
                                                
140 We will see how this issue of Socrates’ wonder being called out by this relation between 
“seeming” opposites is fleshed-out in his account of Simmias as both ‘big’ and ‘small’ at 102a-e.  
141 Burger 1984 p 27. 
142 Ibid. 
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pleasure and pain. Humans, in their act of naming, set out a unique form for each thing;  
they subsequently desire that the world be in accord with their naming. When the world 
does not present itself in accord with these distinctions, we find it to be absurd (ἄτοπος), 
or out of place. Phaedo is puzzled because he discovered, in attending to his experience, 
the wondrous fact of the connection between pleasure and pain without being able to 
articulate this experience. Phaedo, working in names – what people call pleasure and 
pain – cannot make sense of his experience, and retreats from this puzzlement, calling it 
ἄτοπος and ἄτεχνος – not to be accessed by τέχνη; Socrates experiences wonder, and 
composes both a λόγος and a μῦθος about the experience.143  
 Phaedo and Socrates’ different reactions stem from the way they encounter the 
world and form λόγοι in relation to their experience – specifically to their experience of 
blending and the desire for purity. It is also clear that the question of naming – which is 
raised in Socrates’ account of what people “call” pleasure and pain, and is central to his 
account of his second sailing (cf 102b and 103b) – and the place of the λόγοι that we tell 
concerning the nature and cause of anything, will prove central to an account of what the 
self is when understood as a unity, a one, formed “out of” two, body and soul; we will 
                                                
143 “While it seeks to explain why pleasure follows on the withdrawal of pain, the Aesopian 
mythos presupposes that each is nonproblematic in itself. The Socratic account, in contrast, which 
considers how strangely these apparent opposites are related by “nature,” points to the 
problematic character of each in itself. The Aesopian mythos thus assumes what the Socratic 
account makes into a problem: What is the so-called pleasant or the painful? It is because it 
implicitly raises this question – at least once it is contrasted with the mythos – that Socrates’ 
account can be labeled a logos.” (Burger 1984, p 27). For a good account of “the relation between 
philosophical λόγος (rational account) and poetic μῦθος (myth or story),” as he puts it, see 
Roochnik 2001.  
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find that Socrates wants us to understand this formation of one “out of” two in a non-
mythological and non-materialistic sense.144  
 
2.2 The Will to Purity 
 
 Central to the conception of φρόνησις which the “true philosophers” conceive 
themselves to be working toward is the concept of purity – εἰλικρινής or καθαρός. 
These two words, which seem to be used interchangeably in the passages before us, play 
an interesting role in the argument of the “true philosophers.” I argue that Socrates’ 
‘mythical’ account of the purity of pleasure from pain is instructive in understanding how 
the purity desired by the “true philosopher” is itself a projection. In that account, the 
purity of pleasure from pain was revealed to be a projection of the human will that they 
be clearly and unambiguously pure of one another, which is projected onto an 
anthropomorphized form of the feelings themselves. It will become clear that the concept 
of purity that dominates the interlocutors’ understanding is the result of a projection of 
the human will to purity and transcendence; it is the result of their fear of death and of 
their desire to live forever that the soul appears as a discrete, quasi-physical entity which 
can flee to another τόπος, unharmed, when one dies. The source of the ‘wondrous hold’ 
this conception of the ψυχή has on them is precisely this fear of death and desire for 
“salvation,” not a clear, rational understanding. That is, desire for “purity” and 
                                                
144 We have already encountered, right at the outset of the dialogue, this issue of λόγος in 
determining unity and identity in the account of the Athenians “saying” that the ship that left the 
day Socrates was convicted is “the same” ship that Theseus sailed on. (58a-b) Further, 
immediately after speaking about pleasure and pain, Socrates says he encounters the “same” 
dream in many different “aspects” (φαινόμενον) at 60e. The “sameness” that identifies it as the 
“same” is, as Burger puts it, “determined by one and the same logos it commands.” (Burger 1984, 
p 28) 
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transcendence explains the rising power of organizations such as the Mystery Cults, who 
propose to purify their followers of evil – without the difficult work of introspection and 
temperance – in the same movement that they guarantee them salvation and a place 
among the blessed for eternity, so to speak.  
 
 At 65e, Socrates subtly asks us to call into question the conception of a ‘pure’ 
soul in contact with ‘pure’ forms, as we saw above. Socrates chooses as examples for this 
contact “Bigness, Health, and Strength,” which give us pause and ask us to re-think the 
place of the body in knowledge. He then says ἑνὶ λόγῳ “all the rest,” implying that the 
unity of what “each happens to be” is, in some sense, in λόγος (65e).145 Socrates suggests 
that the person who can come to “recognize” or “learn to know” (γνῶναι) each thing is 
the one who best prepares himself to think through, as exactly as possible, each of the 
things that he or she “looks at” (σκοπεῖ) (65e).  
 With Simmias’ agreement to this, Socrates asks if the man who best prepares 
himself is the one who most “purely” (καθαρώτατα) approaches each thing, and who 
uses “pure” (εἰλικρινεῖ) thought itself, to “hunt down” each of the beings that is “pure” 
(εἰλικρινὲς) and itself by itself (65e-66a).146 “Purity” takes on a three-fold aspect: to 
purely approach pure things themselves is to use pure διάνοια itself. That is, we, as 
individual thinkers, achieve purity in our search for truth by turning away from the 
evidence of the senses. We turn away from objects in the physical world that are 
accessible to the senses and exist in an impure state (everything that we might say is 
                                                
145 Cf Burger 1984, p 41-42. 
146 The variety of uses of “purity” also reminds us that the purity of the soul from the body is 
intimately connected to the purity of the “Forms” from sensible particulars, and thus we see again 
that the conception of the χωρισμός that such purity implies is connected in the two cases. 
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“big” in the world is also, from some other perspective “small” – cf 102a ff.) and turn to 
that which exists purely, itself by itself. The means we employ to this end must be 
themselves pure – pure διάνοια without the admixture of the senses. There is a 
preparation of the mechanism of knowledge to the intended object of the knowledge, and 
through this, the individual using the mechanism becomes herself purified.  
 Unfortunately, on this conception, purity is an impossibility for embodied beings. 
These passages are full of religious imagery, and play upon the religious conception of 
the ψυχή that took hold of the Athenian imagination in the 5th and 4th centuries, and 
specifically, which have a hold on Simmias and Cebes. Socrates plays upon this desire 
for purity and personal immortality147 – just as he explicitly points to the fear of death in 
his interlocutors – in order to encourage his listeners to begin to develop a conception of 
knowledge and of φρόνησις which will turn their soul away from the “things of this 
world.” This does not mean turning to a spiritual τόπος, but rather to what might be 
called the “spiritual” dimensions of human existence – specifically, to care of the ψυχή. 
In order to accomplish this, however, Socrates must turn the souls of his listeners by 
working within the conceptions which have some resonance with what they already 
believe. This is why it is essential that we attend to the zeitgeist in which Plato has 
composed these dialogues; Plato is attempting to transform the Greek understanding of 
the ψυχή, and of ἀρετή.  
 
 
                                                
147 On the failing of the first argument for the immortality of the soul, Davis writes: “[Cebes] 
senses the inadequacy of the first argument; it had not sufficiently preserved the individual soul, 
the self.” (1980, p 568, emphasis added) I will argue that none of the arguments in the dialogue 
are able to accomplish this.  
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2.3 Opposites, Τόπος, and the Persistent Fear of Death 
 
 At 70a, after Socrates has argued that the “true-born philosopher” prepares for 
death by purifying himself of the body, Cebes says that, while the “rest” has been 
beautifully stated, the part concerned with the soul (περὶ τῆς ψυχήs) “induces a lot of 
distrust (ἀπιστίαν) in human beings.” (70a) He asks Socrates to prove that the soul will 
not “scatter like breath or smoke” when the person dies, but will “be somewhere (πού)” 
(ibid, emphasis added). It is clear that the conception of the soul as continuing to exist 
after death is, in Simmias and Cebes’ minds, intimately tied to the physicality and quasi-
materiality of the ψυχή as existing in a τόπος.  
 There is an implicit connection here between being and presence: If something is, 
then it is somewhere. The interlocutors are unable to conceive of the existence of the 
ψυχή without conceiving of it as a rarified substance – like breath or smoke – which 
exists in a location. One of Plato’s central concerns is to drive readers to overcome this 
limitation, and to develop a conception of being other than physical presence. This 
conception is essential to understanding how the body and soul are “blended” in a non-
physical sense, and indeed, to understand the being of the ψυχή itself. It is Plato’s 
intention that we develop a way of understanding how the body and soul are separable 
without thinking of the soul as a ghostly presence hovering somewhere inside the body. 
Thus, the concept of blending we will work toward developing will be more akin to the 
way one and one ‘come together’ to form two.148  
                                                
148 The situation of the relation between being and presence arises explicitly in the passage where 
Socrates confesses his perplexity about how one and one come together to form two. There, he 
(playfully, as I will argue) states that he does not know if the two ones “coming close to each 
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 Socrates’ first argument toward overcoming the distrust (ἀπιστίαν) Cebes spoke 
of is the argument from opposites. He introduces this argument by asking Cebes what 
they should do (or make: ποιῶμεν); he asks Cebes if he wants them to tell a more 
thorough story or myth (διαμυθολογῶμεν – 70b) to see if their account of the 
philosophical life is a “likely” (εἰκὸς) story (70a).149 We will see that the “likelihood” of 
the story Socrates proceeds to tell, in the form of an argument, is based in Cebes’ fore-
conception of death, and his completely unexamined conception of the nature of the 
ψυχή. It seems likely to Cebes because what he already believes is being mirrored back 
to him through the way his own answers to Socrates’ questions drive the discussion 
forward. Socrates thus attempts to reveal the inconsistencies and contradictions in Cebes’ 
understanding.  
 Socrates begins his story with a problematic mixing of traditions:  
And let’s investigate (σκεψώμεθα) it in some such way as this: Either the souls 
of human beings who’ve met their end are in Hades or they are not. Now there’s 
a certain ancient (παλαιός) account (λόγος), one that we hold in memory 
(μεμνήμεθα), that souls are There having arrived from here, and that they arrive 
here again and come to be (γίγνεσθαι) from the dead. And if this is so, and the 
living come to be again out of those who’ve died, could anything else be the case 
but that our souls are There? If they weren’t somewhere, they couldn’t come to 
be again; and it’d be sufficient proof (ἱκανόν τεκμήριον) that this is so, if in 
could in fact become clear that the living come to be from nowhere else but from 
the dead. But if this isn’t so, we’d need another account (λόγου). (70c-d) 
 
                                                                                                                                            
other” is the cause of their becoming two. (97a) In Chapter 7, I will show that the soul is 
separable from the body only in λόγος. 
149 Cf Timaeus 29d. Also, see Sallis 1999, p 55. Hackforth takes διαμυθολογῶμεν to simply 
mean “talk things over.” He bases his interpretation on his personal conviction that Socrates is in 
earnest in these arguments, and thus Plato must not have intended us to think of his accounts as a 
μῦθος as opposed to a λόγος (1955, p 58). Hackforth takes the purpose of the arguments to be “a 
scientific proof.” Burnet says – of the appearance of μυθολογείν at 61e – that “Socrates regards 
all definite statements with regard to the next life as μῦθοι i.e. as not λόγοι.” (1911) He does not, 
however, take the proof of continued existence to be in question, merely the nature of the 
afterlife.  
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There are several notable issues in this passage: 1. Socrates begins his story with a 
presentation of the traditional account of souls traveling to Hades after death – an account 
that can be seen in Homer, and is understood as the basic conception of the afterlife in 
Greek mythology. However, he immediately introduces the Pythagorean concept of 
reincarnation without commenting on the tension and contradiction between these 
traditions. It seems that he is trying to evoke in Cebes the recognition that this unresolved 
tension points to deep conflicts within Cebes’ own unexamined ideas about the nature of 
the afterlife.150  
 2. Connected to Socrates’ blending of traditions, and Cebes’ lack of attention to 
the problematic nature of this tension, is Socrates’ comment that this is an account which 
is ancient (παλαιός), and which we hold in memory (μεμνήμεθα). The fact that Cebes 
has not undertaken the process of examination that would reveal this tension draws our 
attention once again to the way we hold a λόγος, and to the kind of hold that a traditional, 
unexamined λόγος can have on us. This, again, reminds us to be on our guard against 
too-readily accepting traditional conceptions of the soul without careful examination.151  
 3. Socrates subtly raises the question of whether or not it is possible to become 
clear about such an issue. He says that we would have sufficient proof of the fact that 
souls continue to exist in Hades “if it could be made clear (εἰ τῷ ὄντι φανερὸν)” that the 
“living come to be from nowhere else than from the dead.” (70d) In this formulation, 
Socrates points toward the possibility of the impossibility of achieving certainty in this 
                                                
150 Whether or not Cebes actually holds that the personal soul is immortal is not primarily the 
issue here. That is, Cebes might, in fact, have held serious doubts about the religious traditions 
which claim the soul’s immortality, as was fashionable among the intelligencia of Athens. The 
important point is that he has not undergone the work of thinking through the ontology of the 
soul, which is what Socrates is trying to reveal to him, and to us, toward the end of being the 
gadfly spurring us to develop a vocabulary for articulating the nature of the self.  
151 As Plato explicitly warns us at 92d. 
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issue – perhaps because of the difficulty inherent in anything becoming evident 
(φανερὸν) to the living regarding what happens with the dead. This possibility of 
agnosticism – of maintaining a stance of wonder and uncertainty with regard to the divine 
– is raised at several points in the dialogue, notably at 85c, where Simmias says that “to 
know anything sure about such matters in our life now is something impossible or 
altogether hard. . .” (emphasis added). Further, Socrates, after spinning his elaborate myth 
about the fate of the soul in the true Earth, implies that holding to the details of any 
account of the afterlife “isn’t fitting for a man with any mind (οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι).” 
(114d) We also note that Socrates simply states, without argument, that reincarnation is 
impossible unless the soul exists “somewhere,” and further, that this somewhere must be 
Hades and nowhere else.  
 4. It is important to note that the passage draws on the Pythagorean theme of 
reincarnation. Simmias and Cebes are both, of course, Pythagoreans, but they are 
Pythagoreans of a type common to their generation in Athens; specifically, they are not 
concerned with the ethical teachings of Pythagoreanism, but have great interest in the 
mathematical cosmology of Pythagoras as taught by Philolaus.152 Further, Phaedo is 
                                                
152 See Kahn 2001: “A late but credible tradition reports that the early Pythagoreans were divided 
into two schools, the akousmatikoi, characterized by their faithful adherence to the akousmata or 
ritual observances, and the mathematikoi, who were concerned with more scientific philosophy.” 
(p 72) See also Burkert 1972, p 192ff. On this point, see also Gadamer: “(Simmias and Cebes) 
stand for that particular sort of mathematical investigation, theory of music, and cosmological 
knowledge which has, as not the least of its sources, Pythagorean teachings. And beyond this, as 
we shall see, they are quite at home in the natural science, biology, and medicine of their day. 
Now one should keep in mind that in the Apology Plato represents Socrates, not as an expert in 
modern science at all but, on the contrary, as one who himself repeatedly asserts his own 
ignorance of science and who restricts himself to the moral problems of mankind and to self-
knowledge.” (1980, p 23) Gadamer goes on to say that  Plato’s choice of Pythagoreans for the 
discussion with Socrates on the day of his death “is obviously meant to show that Plato saw it as 
his own task to unite the moral introspection for which Socrates stood with the scientific 
knowledge represented by Pythagoreanism.” (ibid., emphasis added) In my discussion of the 
second sailing, I will argue that this conclusion is far from obvious; I will show that such 
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telling the story of Socrates’ death to Echecrates, who is said to be a Pythagorean 
himself, in the town of Philus, which is a Peloponnesian city associated with 
Pythagoreans. Pythagoras’ spirit was also known to his followers as Aὐτός; considering 
that αὐτός is the first word of the dialogue in which Phaedo tells a Pythagorean a story of 
Socrates’ conversation with two Pythagoreans, in a town associated with Pythagoreans, it 
is fair to say that Pythagoras’ spirit “hangs heavy over the Phaedo.”153  
 With this in mind, it is interesting that while Simmias and Cebes are 
“Pythagoreans,” they are unaware of the Pythagorean prohibition against suicide (61d).154 
It seems that although they are Pythagoreans in terms of their “metaphysical” beliefs, 
they remain unaware of the ethical dimensions of their own tradition. That is, Simmias 
and Cebes seem to be concerned with doctrines of the type Philolaus expresses in his 
book “On Nature,” and not with the ἄκουσματα which demand radical and esoteric 
asceticism. Specifically, they appear to be concerned with explanations of what is “in the 
heavens and beneath the earth”; they are interested in the mathematical dimensions of 
                                                                                                                                            
“scientific knowledge,” understood in the wrong way, also poses the threat of misology and 
blindness to the questions of “moral introspection.” 
153 Brann 1998, p 3. 
154 Socrates expresses surprise that they are unaware of this since they have both “spent time with 
Philolaus.” (61d) According to Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “Philolaus of Croton, in 
southern Italy, was a Greek philosopher/scientist, who lived from ca. 470 to ca. 385 BC and was 
thus a contemporary of Socrates. He is one of the three most prominent figures in the 
Pythagorean tradition . . . He wrote one book, On Nature, which was probably the first book to be 
written by a Pythagorean.” There is a substantial discussion of the short conversation on suicide 
in Miles 2001. He concludes that: “. . .it appears that Plato is wrestling here, as most everywhere 
in the Phaedo, with the tensions between his Socratic inheritance and his own 
Pythagorean/Orphic religious entanglements, struggling to reconcile them through a philosophical 
synthesis that still eludes him.” (p 257) It is unfortunate that the fact that such synthesis is simply 
not carried out in the dialogue, which he acknowledges, does not lead Miles to ask what else 
might be at work. As I have argued, Plato has been influenced by Pytheagoren thought, but there 
is no reason to immediately assume that he would carry out a defense of their religious doctrine in 
so clumsy a manner. It is far more likely – and true to the text – that Socrates is offering these 
arguments to appeal to his interlocutors’ “religious entanglements.” On suicide, see also Dorter 
1982, p 16ff., Gallop 1999, p 76ff, Hackforth 1955.  
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Pythagorean theory, not with issues of the best life for human beings. Indeed, 
immediately before beginning his account of the traditional belief in reincarnation, 
Socrates implicitly refers to this distinction between concern for ethical matters and 
concern for metaphysical stories about “nature,” by referring to what “comic poets” 
might say about him discussing death (70b-c). The reference is, of course, to 
Aristophanes. As Socrates tells us in the Apology, Aristophanes accuses Socrates of 
engaging in metaphysical investigations. Plato clearly wants us to keep in mind that 
Socrates is in fact not interested in such metaphysical speculation, and is further 
uninterested in materialistic explanations of phenomena. Socrates is apparently trying to 
turn Simmias and Cebes toward concern with ethical matters – with matters concerning 
the choice of the best life – in his presentation of the arguments for the immortality of the 
soul. It is important to note the distinction between ethical and metaphysical concerns, as 
framed by Plato’s characterization of Simmias and Cebes being unaware of the 
Pythagorean prohibition against suicide; I will argue that this distinction, in relation to 
how Socrates’ second sailing focuses him on concerns for the best form of life, is 
essential to understanding the conception of the soul as that which is the ‘subject’ and 
‘object’ of care of the self presented in the dialogue.  
 5. Socrates’ initial formulation of the process of reincarnation already presents the 
essential problem which plagues the argument: It is unclear what subject (ὑποκείμενον) 
underlies the process from death to re-birth. The argument from opposites, at 70c and 
following, teaches that everything comes to be from its opposite. Later in the dialogue 
Socrates argues that this argument is about particulars coming to be from their opposite 
(103b-c). Thus, it attempts to show that the living thing comes to be from the dead thing. 
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When Socrates presents his account – which he said would be a kind of μῦθος –it 
remains unclear what thing makes the journey from the underworld to this world. The 
living individual is both body and soul. If the individual dies, and the soul lives on to be 
reincarnated, then a new living individual would be created, but not “from the dead;” in 
this case the individual, me, would not persist beyond death. Rather, a new individual 
would be created from a “new” body being “joined-together” with a soul which never 
died, but simply changed its place, its τόπος, from this world to Hades, and back again. 
Nothing, in this case, would be generated from its “opposite.” The fact that Socrates says 
that the soul “comes to be” γίγνεσθαι from the dead further underscores this problem.155 
The living individual would “come from” a soul that persisted in the other τόπος and a 
“new” body. Burger explains this problem as follows:  
In presenting the strategy of the argument, Socrates anticipates its systematic 
confusion of two alternatives: either the psyche is an enduring subject that 
undergoes a genesis from one place to another, from Hades to the body and back 
again, or there is a genesis of one thing, the living, into another, the dead, and 
back again but with no enduring subject that persists through change. (p 55) 
 
This confusion again raises the as-yet-unasked question about the nature of death, and,  
the nature of the individual as both body and soul. There is a radical suppression here of 
the role of the body in the “joined-together” condition of the individual living thing. With 
this suppression, there is a further willful ignorance of the possibility that life does not 
arise from its opposite, death, but rather that life arises from life; in this connection, it is 
                                                
155 Hackforth claims that the use of γίγνεσθαι cannot imply the coming into being of the soul 
from the dead, and thus is used simply in the sense of ‘being born,’ i.e. into a  body. (1955, p 59) 
Nonetheless, the use of the term is suggestive of the problems of an account which takes the soul 
to simply travel from one τόπος to another, and thus of which there would be no ‘coming to be.’  
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notable that there is no mention of ἔρος in this discussion of the generation of life, just as 
there is no thematization of the role of the body in the dialogue.156 
 In this discussion, the conception of the body and soul as separable and the 
identification of the “self” with a soul persisting beyond death are linked to the idea of 
the soul being present after death in another τόπος. Simmias and Cebes’ conception of 
death as separation of soul and body is intimately connected to the idea of the invisible 
soul existing in another τόπος. Death is nothing transformative – it is simply the 
occasion for the ψυχή to travel to Hades.157 Simmias and Cebes – as we will see when we 
examine their counter-arguments at 85c-88b – are committed to a ‘spiritual materialism’; 
that is, they are unable to conceive the reality of the soul, as distinguishable in λόγος 
from the body, without thinking of that soul existing in a place, and thus as existing in 
terms of physical presence in that place, and thus having being in terms of that physical 
presence.158  
 The most extreme expression of this position comes at 81c-d, where Socrates 
connects Cebes’ conception of the soul to the existence of ghosts, saying that souls that 
remain in this τόπος become visible to human beings, wandering around graveyards as 
“shadowy apparitions.” Surely, this is an ironic play on the limitations in Simmias’ and 
Cebes’ conceptions of the separable being of the soul as essentially presence. 
                                                
156 I will argue, in Chapter 8, that there is a conspicuous lack of an account the role of the body in 
the Phaedo. This fact is highlighted by the physicality of the fate of the soul after death in 
Socrates’ myth of the True Earth (cf 113dff). Unfortunately, I will not have time to do a thorough 
examination of this difficult and troubling passage. For good discussions of the myth, see Burger 
1984, and Brill 2009. 
157 At Apology 40c, Socrates suggests that death is a change of place: Death is “said to be a 
change and migration of the soul from this to another place (κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολή τις 
τυγχάνει οὖσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον).” Socrates 
implies doubt by referring to what the many “say” death is. 
158 For a clear discussion of the logical relation between movement, existence in a τόπος, and 
having limit or shape, see Kenneth Sayre’s discussion of the Parmenides (1983, p 53).  
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 It is important to note, further, that in Socrates’ re-telling of the traditional, 
pseudo-Pythagorean conception of reincarnation, the problem of determining what is the 
ὑποκείμενον that underlies the transition from death to life in the argument from 
opposites mirrors the confusion that drives Socrates toward the second sailing in his 
autobiographical account. That is, as we mentioned above, the question of how the ‘one’ 
that is the soul and the ‘one’ that is the body come together to form a new ‘one’ that is the 
living individual is raised, in the abstract, in his autobiography. There, he specifically 
raises the issue of the ὑποκείμενον in this process; he says: “I seem to be far from 
thinking, I suppose, that I know the cause (αἰτία) concerning any of these things I who 
don’t even allow myself to assert that whenever anyone adds a one to a one, the one 
added to or the one that was added has become two, or that the one that was added and 
the one to which it was added become two by the addition of the one to the other.” (96e-
97a) He goes on to express the same confusion concerning how two can also be caused 
by splitting a one into two (97a-b).  
 I will examine this passage in detail later in the dissertation. For now, it is 
sufficient to note that the question of which ‘one’ is the underlying one which becomes 
two is precisely the question raised concerning the transition from life to death; is the 
soul the ‘one’ that, when added to the body becomes the two that is the self – which is 
both body and soul? Further, how are we to understand the ‘one’ that is the self 
generating two by splitting into body and soul? These confusions cause Socrates to turn 
to the λόγοι, to the way people speak about such matters; we will find that we, in 
following his lead, are given much to consider when we think of this difficulty of relating 
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the soul and the body, and of the composite nature of the self, in terms of how people 
‘hold’ these entities in speech and in thinking, and in the stories told about their nature.  
  
2.4 Composition and the Ψυχή 
 
 After Socrates has elicited Simmias and Cebes’ agreement, for a moment,159 that 
the soul continues exist in another τόπος after death, Cebes raises the issue of the theory 
of recollection, stating that it confirms their conclusions (at 72e – I will turn to a 
discussion of this passage later). It is at the conclusion of the argument from recollection 
that Simmias and Cebes express doubt that the soul will continue to exist after death 
despite their claim to conviction that it existed before birth (77b-c, as I discussed in 
Chapter 2). Socrates immediately identifies the source of this doubt to be their “childish” 
fear of death, and proceeds to give another argument for the incorruptibility of the soul, 
which has come to be called the “Affinity Argument” (78b-84b).  
 In this argument, Socrates likens the soul to the simple, invisible, and 
incorruptible forms; Simmias and Cebes have already expressed their affirmation of the 
existence of the forms, in the argument from recollection and elsewhere. Socrates then 
likens the body to the visible and constantly changing τόπος of physical, perceptible 
things. He bases this argument on the likeness of the body to composite (σύνθετος), and 
thus corruptible beings, and the soul’s likeness to simple, and thus non-corruptible 
beings. I will not discuss this argument in detail, but merely note some of the points of 
                                                
159 We saw in Chapter 2 why we have reason to doubt their sincerity in affirming the their 
conviction in the conclusions of the argument from opposites.  
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the argument which dovetail with the issues that I have raised in my analysis of the 
dialogue thus far.  
 Before we begin to discuss this argument, it is prudent to heed the warnings 
within the dialogue about the level of certainty with which we will be able to accept its 
conclusions. Beginning his argument, Socrates says they must ask themselves “something 
like” the following: “What sort of thing is apt to suffer this affection – being scattered – 
and what sort of thing do we fear might suffer this?” (78b, emphasis added) By adding, 
seemingly superfluously, the consideration of our fears, Socrates draws our attention to 
the fact that emotions can affect philosophical investigation. This hints at another way to 
understand how it is not merely the body, and its desires, that affect our ability to 
investigate into the being of things, but also our own hopes and fears; in this case it 
seems, as seen above, that the desire for continued existence after death can influence our 
consideration of the “the things the argument is about.” It is this fear, driven by the 
traditional conception of ψυχή as our “life’s breath,” and thus as susceptible to being 
“blown away,” that leads Socrates to phrase the Affinity Argument in terms of a physical 
conception of composition and decomposition.160 
 Further, when Socrates has established that the Unseen is non-composite 
(ἀσύνθετος), and thus is not apt to suffer dispersion, he asks Cebes “is something of 
ourselves body and something else soul?” (79b) Cebes replies that we are “nothing but” 
                                                
160 See also, Gadamer: “. . . he returns his two partners in the discussion to the level of the dogma 
of the common man, which holds death to be the escaping of one’s life breath and hence 
something to be feared as the dissolution of oneself. This devolution of the discussion indicates 
nothing less than that the two friends with whom he is speaking have not yet really grasped the 
meaning of ψυχή as that concept is worked out in the doctrine of recollection.” (1980, p 27) I do 
not agree with Gadamer in that I do not take the “doctrine” of recollection to be unambiguously 
Plato’s teaching, as he appears to; neither do I think a fully worked out concept of the ψυχή 
appears in that argument.   
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these two elements. Note that Socrates says that “we” are both body and soul. Continuing 
the argument, Socrates asks if the soul is “a visible or an unseen thing?” (ibid.) Cebes 
replies that it is “Unseen, at least by human beings.” (ibid. emphasis added). Cebes is 
presumably thinking of the traditional conception of souls existing in Hades as shadows 
or wraiths of living people, visible to the Gods and other dead souls – and even to 
Odysseus and other living beings who travel the waterways to reach Hades, the unseen. 
This is a revealing moment for Cebes; we see that his answers in the arguments are 
guided by this desire to continue to live as he is, as an individual, in some physical, 
visible form beyond death. 
 Socrates begins his argument by asking, “Now, is what is composed (συντεθέντι) 
and is composite (συνθέτῳ) by nature apt to suffer this: to be divided up (διαιρεθῆναι) 
in just the way it was composed? And if anything turns out to be non-composite, isn’t it 
alone, if anything apt not to suffer this?” (78c) Socrates here links incorruptibility to the 
“non-composite” nature of things. It is immediately clear that this argument seems to be 
based in a physical understanding of “dispersion,” which is precisely the conception he 
has just mocked several lines earlier, when he speaks of the fear for the dispersion of the 
soul as greater if the person dies when it’s windy (77e).161 This physicality appears in 
several places in the Affinity Argument; for example, at 80e Socrates argues that the soul 
can be set free “pure” if it “drags” nothing of the body along with it into the afterlife. At 
81c the soul can be made to be physically perceptible in this world, thus granted 
visibility, the mark of the bodily, by being made “heavy” through communion with the 
body and fear of Hades.  
                                                
161 We will see this unconsciously assumed physicality of the soul again in the case of Simmias’ 
conception of the soul as a harmony, and with Socrates’ attack on it. 
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 Socrates goes on to argue that the soul, since it is “more like” (συγγενέστερον, 
ὁμοιότερον) the invisible and unseen “forms,” is more likely to never suffer dispersion, 
since it is more likely to be non-composite (79b). In order to argue this, as mentioned 
above, he asks Cebes if “something of ourselves [is] body and something else soul?” 
(79b) In so doing, he states clearly that we are composite. In arguing that the soul is 
“more likely” to not suffer dispersion, he is not able to show that we will continue to exist 
after death; rather, he again raises the issue that we have already encountered several 
times in the dialogue: What are we? Are “we” the soul alone? Or, are we this complex 
and “joined together” entity?  
 Simmias and Cebes consistently fail to ask themselves this question, as they fail 
to ask the nature of the ψυχή – which they sometimes assume is “part” of them, and 
other times assume is their essence and true identity; it is clearly Plato’s intent that we, as 
his readers, not fail to ask this question ourselves. Here we begin to see why Plato would 
present these ideas if it is not, in fact, his teaching that an immortal soul exists, and that 
the philosopher practices dying by ‘turning’ away from the body and toward this soul – 
as I have argued it is not. It is only in presenting this myriad of conceptions – conceptions 
that are active and salient, yet whose unexamined diversity lies hidden – that Plato can 
draw into the light their conflicts, and draw us toward self-examination, and the 
harmonization of our λόγοι concerning the soul. 
 
 Plato is trying to raise a constellation of issues in the minds of his students which 
are central to the dialogue and to which we must pay careful attention at every stage of 
our argument: What would be the nature of a disembodied pure thinking thing? In asking 
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this question, we can see a number of reasons within the dialogue – many of which have 
been discussed above – that indicate that human life would be radically different if we 
had access to this purity. The conception of the philosophical life which takes us to be 
divided between the divine and the mortal seeks to identify itself solely with a 
hypothetical divine part of us which has pure access to truth. This conception places 
φρόνησις beyond our reach as embodied beings by ignoring the composite, temporal 
nature of human existence; it becomes impossible to develop a skilled, philosophical 
mode of life if we mistake our embodied nature. It is a recognition of the limitations of 
human knowledge that gives rise to the epistemology that Phaedo is working toward, not 
a supposed recognition of a pure access to truth, in this life or any other.  
 Following the dialogue carefully, we see the difficulties of thinking of human 
existence as simply divided in this way between the pure, non-composite and eternal soul 
on the one hand and the impure, composite and constantly changing body; in so doing, 
we begin to ask ourselves another essential question: What is the source of the diversity 
of drives and desires, thoughts and emotions that we experience? When we approach the 
dialogue with this question in mind, we discover that the dialogue is not merely an attack 
on the “true-born philosophers’” conception of the body as evil and external to an eternal 
soul which would satisfy our desire for personal immortality; the dialogue also has much 
to offer us positively, in the way of better ontology of the ψυχή – an ontology that is 
structured in terms of λόγος, as I will demonstrate.  
 That is, when we approach the dialogue with the questions of self-knowledge and 
the ethical life of the soul, we begin to see that there is a conception of the ψυχή rooted 
in the stories we tell, and the λόγοι by which we gather ourselves to ourselves. This 
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account reveals the ψυχή to be non-material, separate (χωριστός) from the body, but not 
a quasi-physical spiritual substance that continues to exist in a τόπος after death.  We 
must first break free of these traditional dogmas – dogmas that largely define Plato’s own 
time,  Socrates interlocutors, and much scholarship on Plato’s works alike – and free of 
the dichotomies these dogmas trap us within. We then open the possibility of asking 
again the basic question: What is the source of unity which makes a self of the Typhonic 
diversity of desires and aversions, hopes and memories that constitute our experience?  
 Plato presents us with a variety of traditional accounts of the soul in which it is 
conceived as a separate entity in order invoke in us the question of the relation between 
soul and body, and to come to awareness of the essentially embodied nature of human 
experience. What meaning is there in speaking of embodiment unless there has been a 
prior separation of soul and body? Only when these aspects of our selves have been 
pulled apart can the full import of their synthesis be realized. Analogously, only when the 
source of the intelligibility of our world has been projected into an unseen “beyond” can 
the claim that this source is integral to this world have meaning.  
 
 As we find ourselves confronted with the question of the self again, we find that 
the issue of what we are – the issue of what would be the “object” of self knowledge and 
the “subject” of ethical demands – is raised in connection, once again, with the issue of 
what would make a “one,” a “this,” out of a multiplicity. As we continue to investigate 
this issue in the abstract, as it appears in the Phaedo and elsewhere, it will be important to 
keep in mind what has been said here concerning the multiplicity experienced in the self. 
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What does it mean to be “composite”? What does it mean to “hold together” a 
multiplicity into a “one”?  
 This issue has surfaced at several important points in the dialogue, and we will 
find it to be central to the second sailing, and to the understanding of how self-knowledge 
presents us with a unified self as object of ‘care of the soul’ despite the internal 
multiplicity of the soul. We saw that the very first word – αὐτός – presents us with 
several dimensions of this issue; how does the name “Phaedo” “hold together” the 
multiplicity that this name names? How does the Athenians’ λόγος that the ship is the 
“same” ship, the αὐτός, the one ship that Theseus sailed on ‘make’ it so? How does the 
λόγος ‘beneath’ the many phenomena in which Socrates’ dream appeared to him make 
them all ‘one’ dream?162  
 Again, it appears that the issue of λόγος is central, and we can immediately see 
why; as noted in the discussion of the first word of the dialogue, it is precisely the nature 
of λόγος to hold together multiplicities. We will have more to say concerning the nature 
of λόγος as holding together the self, and as providing coherence to the multiplicities 
within the self, and within experience, when we turn to the second sailing; there, we will 
begin to lay the groundwork for an account of the αἰτία of this diversity and this unity 
that is our experience.163  
                                                
162 For a good discussion of this dream, and dreams in the dialogues more generally, see Roochnik 
2001. He notes: “There is thus an internal tension at work here similar to that found in the 
Theaetetus. In that dialogue, Socrates dreams of a world composed of logical “atoms” and their 
“molecular” composites. But if the world were as thoroughly analyzable as his dream would have 
it, it would not need a dream to describe it. Similarly, if the world were as beautifully and 
hopefully rational as the concluding story of the Phaedo shows it to be, if the μῦθος were true, it 
would be unnecessary to tell it.” (p 257) See also Tigner 1970.  
163 Indeed, we will find that even what we might take to be ‘single’ perceptual experiences appear 
to participate in this ‘problem’ of unity once we turn to issues of temporality and the diversity of 
qualities which are present in any perceptible object; e.g. we see some ‘one’ thing as Simmias, a 
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§3. Conclusions 
 
 In this chapter I have argued that by attending to the way Plato presents the 
context of Socrates’ arguments concerning the nature and immortality of the soul, we see 
that the explicit arguments are not to be taken at face value. Specifically, I argued that 
interpreting the Phaedo as a text dedicated to making the conception of the soul that 
seemed true to its author also seem true to its audience is a misguided approach since this 
motivation for a text is specifically said to be unphilosophical in the dialogue itself. 
Taking the comments of the dialogue itself as a guide, it is reasonable to conjecture that 
Plato’s intent was to raise the issue of the existence and nature of the soul in his readers, 
and by raising this question, to guide his audience toward developing the virtue that 
arises from self-knowledge and care of the soul. It remains to be seen how the abstract 
philosophical work of inquiring into the nature of the soul is connected to virtuous living, 
but we have seen that there is a connection between self-care, care of the soul, and 
ἀρετή, as demonstrated in Chapter 1.  
 In attending to the deeper levels of the text, I have shown that we cannot take as 
Plato’s doctrine the “true-born philosopher’s” claim that the philosophical life is one 
spent ignoring the pleasures “of the body,” nor that the body is the source of all evils. 
This has proven to be a projection of the responsibility for our own desires onto the body 
conceived as a pseudo-foreign entity, which we would then do best to ‘turn away from.’ 
We have begun to see that the source of the myriad conflicting desires is not the presence 
                                                                                                                                            
man, big, little, courageous, etc, and this recognition of multiplicity in the one thing “summon the 
intellect” Republic 523b. 
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of some foreign entity, but rather the multiplicity within our own identity. This does not 
mean that the warnings about the dangers of life dedicated to ‘base’ pleasures in the 
dialogue are simply ironic; it does, however, mean that the distinction between body and 
soul, with their respective pleasures, is far too blunt a tool to determine what temptations 
we should and should not resist. 
 If we cannot project our desires for vicious actions onto a foreign entity called the 
body, and claim that this body, and not us, is the source of all “factions” in the world, 
then we must face the fact that there are factions within ourselves. If we cannot claim that 
our erotic desire is the result of a cosmic force or divine Eros inflicting itself upon us, 
then we must inquire into our selves to find the source of that desire. In the face of this, 
we are driven to wonder, with Socrates in the Phaedrus: “whether I happen to be some 
wild animal more multiply twisted (πολυπλοκώτερον) and filled with desire 
(ἐπιτεθυμμένον) than Typhon. . .” (230a) Socrates tells Phaedrus that he is not interested 
in inquiring into the historical accuracy of myths and other “alien” (ἀλλότρια) things 
until he has achieved self-knowledge, as the Delphic maxim bids (Phaedrus 229e). The 
search for the source of the unity and harmony of the self will be at the heart of much of 
the work done in the next chapters.  
 
 I demonstrated that Socrates mirrors back to his interlocutors their unquestioned 
assumptions about the soul; specifically, he tries to reveal to them the reification of the 
soul inherent in their conception of its nature. I have shown that this traditional, reified 
conception of the soul which has a “wondrous” hold on the interlocutors – though it is not 
the only such conception that has this power over them, as we will see – is derived from 
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the conception of the ψυχή developed in the Mystery cults and Pythagoreanism as an 
evolution of the concept as found in Homer in Hesiod (as argued in Chapter 1). The next 
chapters will largely be dedicated to developing a conception of knowledge and 
φρόνησις from the perspective of embodied beings – specifically, from the perspective 
of beings who do not deny their condition as limited and finite by identifying themselves 
with a mythical pure self or pure soul entombed in a body. This perspective will reveal 
the complex nature of the ψυχή in a new light, and represent the first steps toward 
developing a vocabulary for articulating a philosophical concept of the ψυχή outside the 
limits of tradition. This ontology is based in an understanding of the activity of the ψυχή 
as presented in the Phaedo and other dialogues. This account of the soul will turn on the 
realization of how the soul attaches itself to unities, ‘ones,’ which are χωριστός to the 
physical objects which seem to be the ‘real’ beings in the world – as we will see 
especially in Socrates’ attack on materialism and in his re-conception of ἁρμονία.  
  This essential activity of the soul is initially and for the most part caught within 
the confines of the “cave,” as it were; it is through the process of working toward self-
understanding and developing a vocabulary for understanding our experience that we 
wrest this activity from the domination of the conceptions of the πόλις and begin to think 
for ourselves; this process, I will argue, is not a precursor to ethical living, but is, in fact, 
central to harmonizing the soul and living the best possible life: The philosophical life 
dedicated to uncovering truth rather than acquiring honor or worldly possessions. That is, 
only when we achieve the self-knowledge that comes from the proper ontology of the 
soul – based in a clear articulation of the proper activity of the soul – can we begin to live 
the examined life which has control over its own, now-rationally-articulated, goals and 
 150 
values. Understanding the place of λόγος in the activity of the soul – an activity that lies 
at the center of the αἰτίαι of our experience – will be the central purpose of the remaining 
chapters.   
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Chapter 4 
Perception, Unity, and the Activity of the Soul 
“Itself Through Itself” 
 
§1 Striving  
 
 In this chapter, I show that the path Plato inaugurates for us in the Phaedo leads 
toward understanding the nature of the soul grounded in an awareness of its activity. The 
understanding of and conscious engagement with this activity will be revealed to be the 
proper ground for self understanding; it is on the basis of this understanding and 
engagement that development of unity and harmony in the self becomes possible. An 
understanding of this unity must be grounded in an understanding of how the self 
becomes an object for knowledge. As such, the cash value of one of the dimensions of 
Plato’s account of knowledge – especially in Socrates’ account of his second sailing – 
will be coming to understand the nature of the unities which knowledge attaches itself to. 
I will clarify the place of λόγος in the formation and recognition of these unities, in order 
that the possibility of self-knowledge can be grounded in a proper understanding of the 
soul’s activity of knowing. That is, the soul’s activity of gathering things into unities, in 
accord with λόγος, must be clarified in order to understand how the soul gathers itself to 
itself in λόγος. 
 In this introductory section, I will offer some general, preliminary remarks to give 
a sense of the issues that are at play in my reading of these sections of the Phaedo.  
 152 
 
1.1 Perception and Sensory Knowledge 
   
 One of the issues addressed in the last chapter is the repeated argument, initially 
presented in the mouths of the “true-born philosophers,” that the only knowledge possible 
for a body is sensory knowledge.164 This leads to an account of the impossibility of pure 
knowledge of pure forms (by the pure soul) for embodied beings. On this account, all that 
can be “known” by embodied beings are the physical things which can be encountered 
with the senses, and not the intelligible basis of these things. I argued that the limitations 
this places on human knowledge – specifically, the explicit argument that φρόνησις and 
ἐπιστήμη are impossible for embodied beings (66bff) – raises the question of what can 
be known by finite embodied beings, and calls us to develop an understanding of how we 
know what we think we know. That is, Plato’s presentation of the strict epistemological 
limitations argued for by the “true-born philosophers” causes the reader to engage in the 
self analysis of inquiring into what we think we know, how our doxa is operative in our 
lives, and into the process by which we come to this “knowledge.” Reading the Phaedo 
                                                
164 There is much debate about the place of sensory knowledge in Plato; recently, there has been a 
refreshing trend to work against tradition and see that the dialogues do not simply claim that no 
knowledge can be had through the senses, as I will argue below (see also footnote 20 to Chapter 3 
above). On this trend, Balskly disapprovingly writes: “It is a measure of the success of 
empiricism that modern commentators take a very different approach to these passages than their 
neoplatonist forebears did. In what follows I shall argue that, if they made too much of 'Socrates' ' 
anti-empiricism, we make too little of it.” (1996, p 123) Balskly misses the irony of the passages 
in which Socrates expresses that the philosopher can only come to knowledge “without the 
body,” and claims that Plato had good reasons to conclude that sense-perception has no place in 
learning. He then says: “These reasons are, I believe, wrong and I think that Plato may had 
occasion to reconsider them later in his career.” (ibid.) He is right that Plato did not hold these 
beliefs about the senses “later” in his career, and that the Phaedo presents (intentionally) bad 
arguments for this conclusion; however, a close reading of the Phaedo, as I will carry out here 
and in the following Chapters, shows that he did not believe them at the time of writing the 
Phaedo either.  
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acts as a spur – to students in the Academy and to readers today – to develop an 
epistemology. Further, this account of perception makes a clear distinction between the 
spheres of activity proper the body and soul; that is, the body is active in sensation, and 
the “pure” soul is active only in relation to the forms. My account of the activity of the 
soul “itself through itself” in the Theaetetus, as well as a reading of the relation of 
sensation and διάνοια in the account of the two sticks as equal in the Phaedo, will call 
this distinction into question, and with it, one of the central pillars of what has come to be 
known as “Platonic metaphysics.”  
 
 Specifically, I will argue that embodied, living humans are not limited to only 
knowledge gained “through the senses,” and I will further argue that sensory experience 
reveals much more than physical things. This will become clear from a reading of 
Socrates’ λόγος concerning how we come to know two equal sticks as equal (74aff.), and 
his account of his “confused” method of explaining the αἰτία of things (96aff). I will turn 
to a brief reading of some relevant passages in the Theaetetus to help develop a 
conception of the activity of the soul in forming the intelligible unities which we discover 
in experience; I will demonstrate that Plato is driving us to consider how we are active in 
the apparently passive act of perception. 
 In looking at these arguments we will see that Plato is pushing us to consider our 
sensory world as in fact made up not of static physical things, but rather of things ‘seen’ 
in their striving. The intelligibility of the world which we “joined together” embodied 
beings inhabit reveals itself as things striving for their good, in accord with their εἶδος. 
That striving appears to us embodied beings in terms of the λόγοι “through” which or 
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“by” which we hold these objects together into coherent beings, and into a coherent 
world. In this light, we will be able to understand Socrates’ claim that we will be blinded 
to the being of beings if we ignore the way λόγος and νοῦς order and structure the 
world; we are blinded to the being of beings when we are blinded to the good of beings 
(98b-100a).  
 
1.2 The Being of Human Beings, Λόγος, and Life as a “Whole” 
 
 Plato’s account of perception will reveal that in perception we interact not with a 
fully self-coherent, isolated entity, but rather with something underway and striving, and 
something always inherently relational in its being. Things will be revealed as intelligible 
not only in terms of their physical presence, but also in terms of their projects, and the 
λόγοι through which we account for their τέλη and their essences. This observation will 
have significant consequences for understanding the nature of the self, and the ψυχή, in 
terms of our own projects, and the conscious awareness of these projects, or lack thereof. 
The nature of the ψυχή – as something other than a quasi-physical ghostly presence – 
will be revealed when we attend to the activity of the ψυχή, which is revealed in 
perception. By looking to the Theaetetus, it will become clear that it is the ψυχή “itself 
through itself” that holds together the multiplicities of bare perception into the beings 
with which we interact. 
 It is through λόγος that the ψυχή gathers beings together into individuals and 
into coherent situations. Further, when we reflectively turn this activity of the soul toward 
the self, toward the ψυχή itself, we discover that what we take to be the “self” is 
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determined by the activity of the soul holding together the self in terms of the λόγοι 
through which we gather ourselves to ourselves. It is in this activity that we attempt to 
take a conscious perspective of examination toward our selves, toward our own life, 
gathered together and understood as a whole. In this reflective activity of self-
examination – which I argue is in principle incompletable, and thus only reaches a 
tenuous termination in our deaths – we find the distinctively human work of becoming 
ethical beings.  
 
 Socrates insists that to understand the αἰτία of his sitting in the prison we cannot 
simply give an account of the physical presence of his “bones and sinews. (ὀστῶν καὶ 
νεύρων)” (98c-d) These bones and sinews are also the parts of the body that Socrates 
claims last for some time in the slowly decomposing corpse after death (ὀστᾶ τε καὶ 
νεῦρα, 80c-d). Additionally, Socrates claims that he is not the corpse that they will see 
after he has drunk the poison; rather, he says, he will escape them and be gone (115c-d). 
The “essence” of what is named “Socrates,” then, appears to have the same structure as 
the objects revealed in perception. That is, it is not only perceptible objects in the world 
that are understood as striving. I will argue that in dealing with human situations, and 
indeed with humans themselves – including our own selves – we are dealing with things 
that have their being in terms of striving, and in terms of projects; we are not simply what 
we are. In order to understand ourselves we have to understand the λόγοι in terms of 
which we account for our own behavior.  
 With this understanding in hand, we will be better able to understand how the 
hatred of λόγος is the worst πάθη that a person can undergo. Just like misunderstanding 
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how we are to trust people, misunderstanding how to put our trust (πίστις) in arguments 
can lead to the feeling that there is nothing certain to be found by turning to λόγος; we 
then attempt to go straight to the things themselves – to ἔργον instead of  λόγος – and 
are blinded in the process. 
 
 I will now turn to a brief discussion of the Theaetetus in order to better understand 
Plato’s questions concerning unity and multiplicity – the “one and the many” – as they 
bear upon the understanding of how knowledge attaches itself to unities through the 
gathering activity of λόγος. Our central goal will be to look to this dialogue to help 
develop an ontology of the soul based in this activity, and to understand how the activity 
of the soul “itself through itself” is related to perception – e.g. the perception of two 
sticks as “equal.”  
 
§2 The Theatetus on Λόγος and Unity 
 
 There are many dangers to looking to other dialogues to come to conclusions 
about a dialogue one is reading – I do not need to rehearse them here. However, it is both 
desirable and inevitable that we find resonances between the questions raised in different 
dialogues. One concern arises when turning to dialogues that are widely considered to be 
“later” dialogues to shed light on Plato’s earlier works. Some would argue that it is a 
mistake to think that paths of thinking developed in the Theaetetus can be brought to bear 
on the issues raised in the Phaedo, which is considered to have been written much earlier 
in Plato’s career – according to the standard accounts of the chronology of the Platonic 
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corpus. However, I argue with Benardete, Sallis, and many other recent commentators 
that the only chronology that we should carefully attend to is the dramatic chronology 
indicated within the dialogues themselves.165 With that in mind, a group of dialogues 
appears which should be kept in mind when reading the Phaedo since their dramatic date 
is set around Socrates’ trial and execution; those dialogues are, in order: Theaetetus, 
Euthyphro, Sophist, Statesman, Apology, Crito, Phaedo.166 Still, the huge variety of 
contexts and interlocutors with whom Socrates converses in these dialogues keep us from 
too quickly importing conclusions about Plato’s “doctrine” from Socrates’ questions in 
those dialogues.  
 Another aspect of the danger in reading across dialogues is that turning to brief 
sections of a dialogue, taken out of context, can mislead us. In looking at the Theaetetus, 
we will be following the work of commentators who take proper care in keeping the 
context of the arguments in mind.  
 In any case, turning briefly to the Theaetetus will help us better understand the 
way the issue of unity and multiplicity is implicated by anything we might encounter, 
which will help us understand the multiplicity of the self. Further, this digression will 
                                                
165 See Howland (1991), Benardete (1986a, esp. p ix), Hyland (2004). Zuckert undertakes the 
admirable and daunting task of interpreting the whole of the dialogues by interpreting each in 
terms of its dramatic date (2009).  
166 See Benardete’s introduction to his translation of the Theaetetus, (Benardete 1986a pg ix). See 
also Crospey (1995), p ix. Crospey also adds the Cratylus to the list, after the Euthyphro, but the 
dramatic date of that dialogue is notoriously diffcult to determine (see David Sedley’s 
introduction to his translation of the text for a discussion of the problems). I take very seriously 
Blondell’s attacks on treating this series of dialogues as a single “true hermeneutic object” or as a 
single “artistic whole.” (2002, p 7). However, I am not arguing that we should only read these 
texts together as forming a single whole; rather, with Benardete, I am arguing that we should 
consider these dialogues as background and context when considering the Phaedo. I feel that I am 
not putting “too much weight on ‘plot’” – which Blondell warns us against – in looking to the 
Theaetetus to flesh-out issues concerning the one and the many in the Phaedo.  
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help clarify the place of the activity of the ψυχή in gathering these multiplicities into the 
unities which we experience.  
 
2.1 The Theaetetus on Parts, Wholes,  
and the Activity of the Ψυχή 
 
 In the Theaetetus, at 201aff., Socrates proves to Theaetetus that knowledge and 
true opinion are not the same. He does this in a way that evokes the trial Socrates –  
unbeknownst to Theaetetus – is about to face; by using the example of judges, he shows 
Theaetetus that people can be justly persuaded of some opinion, and even if that opinion 
is true, it could still not amount to knowledge. Theaetetus then adds that he was mistaken 
when he said he heard someone say that knowledge was true belief; what was said, he 
now remembers, is that knowledge is true belief with a λόγος. He says, “ . . .and of 
whatever there is not λόγος (καὶ ὧν μὲν μή ἐστι λόγος), these things are not knowable 
(ἐπιστητά) – that’s just the word he used – and whatever admitted of λόγος (ἃ δ᾽ ἔχει) 
are knowable.” (201d) With this in hand, Socrates begins to examine what it means to 
have a λόγος. The conversation will help clarify what is at stake in our discussion of the 
way naming and λόγος grant unity to apparently multiple and diverse phenomena, such 
as Phaedo “himself,” Theseus’ ship, Socrates’ dream, and the “two” that is formed when 
a one and a one are “brought together.”  
 
 The context in which this discussion of λόγος arises in the Theaetetus will also 
give us an opportunity to understand the place of the soul in the gathering together of 
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these unities. We will see, when we turn to a discussion of ἁρμονία in the Phaedo, that it 
is the activity of the soul which “holds together” multiplicities under a λόγος as 
described in the Theaetetus is the same as that activity which “holds together” the dyad in 
what John Russon calls the “space of comparison.”167 Again, in discovering this activity 
we will clarify the nature of the forms, how being blinded to the good of beings blinds us 
to understanding their αἰτία; this will, in turn, bring to light a conception of being 
presented in the Phaedo that is neither materialistic nor based in physical presence.168 
With this in hand, I will develop a theory of the activity and nature of the ψυχή.  
 
 Socrates begins by recounting a dream he had (201d); the dream says that 
knowledge is true belief plus a λόγος, and λόγος means breaking the object of 
knowledge down into its constituent parts (201e). Thus, the simple elements (στοιχεῖα), 
having no parts, can’t be known; nor can we say of them ‘this’ or even ascribe being or 
non-being to them – all we can do is name them. Socrates’ re-telling adds crucial 
                                                
167 Russon and Sallis 2000, p 71ff.  
168 Gilbert Ryle presents a convincing argument for taking the discussion of parts and wholes in 
the Theaetetus as a discussion which should not be too quickly “settled” with reference to the 
forms – a mistake which he accuses Cornford of: “The problem discussed in the Theaetetus is 
What is Knowledge? Socrates makes it clear that what is wanted is not a list of things that people 
know or a catalogue of sciences and arts, but an elucidation of the concept of knowledge - not 
What is known? but What is it to know? Attention to this simple point might have saved Cornford 
from saying that the implicit conclusion of the dialogue is that "true knowledge has for its objects 
things of a different order - not sensible things, but intelligible Forms and truths about them." 
Even if Plato had had the Eide fixes that his commentators father on to him, he could not have 
been so silly as to suppose that a mention of these alleged knowables could be the answer to the 
question What is it for someone to know something? However pious a man was, he could not 
think that the assertion, "Only God can be really loved" would be an elucidation of the concept of 
love.” (1990, p 22-23) Toward the end of his article, which is a good discussion of some of the 
issues raised in these passages which dovetail with 20th Century analytic concerns with “logical 
atomism,” Ryle adds: “It is likely to be asked: What then of the Theory of Forms? Is not this after 
all is said and done, to be read between the lines of this arid grammar-chopping? Surely Plato's 
interest in that Theory must have dominated his interest in these cruces of logical grammar? Well, 
I find no internal evidence that Plato was in this dialogue bothering his head at all about that 
somewhat over-ripe Theory.” (p 44) 
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elements to Theaetetus’ definition – though Theaetetus claims it “was the same in every 
respect” to what he had in mind (202c). Specifically, Theaetetus had said nothing about 
why certain things might not be able to have a λόγος given about them, and thus be 
unknowable. Socrates adds to the definition the conception of a λόγος as being an 
‘accounting’ given in terms of breaking the object of knowledge down into its elements 
(201eff). There is no λόγος of the simple elements themselves, since they cannot be 
broken down, and thus there could be no knowledge of them. Socrates then refutes 
Theatetus’ definition of knowledge (as true belief with a λόγος) on the basis of the 
stipulations that he himself introduced (202e). As such, we have to wonder why Socrates 
chooses to tell this dream story version of true belief plus a λόγος; that is to say, it is not 
entirely clear why he would add the stipulation that ‘atomic’ elements are unknowable to 
Theaetetus’s definition, and then use precisely that stipulation to refute him. Thus, the 
immediate question at hand is: Why is Socrates drawing our attention to this problem of 
the elements? What are we to learn about knowledge in light of this discussion?  
 For our purposes here, we will be attending to this account of λόγος as it relates 
to the problem of parts and wholes, and thus to the question of unity and multiplicity 
which will carry us into a discussion of the activity of the soul ‘itself through itself’ 
which draws multiplicities into the unities of experience. Ultimately, this will help us 
understand how the soul perceives equality in the two sticks in the Phaedo, and will help 
us understand the importance of the passages concerning ἁρμονία in the Phaedo.  
 
  One thing that should strike us as questionable is the dream’s assertion that these 
elements are sufficiently simple that they admit, not only of no division, but of no 
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predication whatsoever; we cannot say of the element that it is a “this,” or that it ‘is’ or 
‘is not’ (201eff.). This is a strong claim. It is unclear why anything should be considered 
so simple that it cannot even be spoken of in these ways. Further, it is difficult to 
maintain that despite this radical simplicity, it can still be named. It is a strange claim, 
and should give us pause. In any case, we come out of the dream theory into its refutation 
concerned with how anything could be as simple as these elements are said to be.  
 
2.2 The Sum of its Parts 
 
 In the refutation, Socrates chooses letters as his example of elements.169 
Specifically, he speaks of Sigma and Omega, as elements that make up a syllable, SO. 
The argument turns on a rather heated debate where Theaetetus puts up a good fight by 
maintaining that the whole is more than the sum of its parts (203c-206c); specifically, the 
issue that Socrates raises is the question of whether or not a complex thing is reducible to 
the aggregate of its parts, or if the complex thing is in fact a separate entity arising out of 
the parts, but not reducible to it. He asks, “Do we mean by the syllable [the] elements . . . 
or some single look (ἰδέα) that has come to be when they are put together?” (203c) 
Theaetetus first answers that the syllable is nothing more than all of the parts.  
Socrates quickly shows that this would make all knowledge impossible, since the 
impossibility of knowing each of the elements (since they are indivisible) would mean 
that we couldn’t know all of them, and thus the syllable would be unknowable as well. 
(ibid.)  
                                                
169 Socrates is playing on the word στοιχεῖον, which can mean both ‘element’ and ‘letter.’  
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 With Theaetetus’ agreement to this argument, he says that they should turn to the 
idea that “the syllable comes to be (γιγνομένη) one look (ἰδέα) out of those several 
elements that fit together (συναρμοττόντων) and it similarly holds no less in letters than 
in anything else.” (204a)170 Socrates then says, in a crucial move, that if the harmonized 
unity is some single idea that has “come to be” “out of” the elements, and is “other” than 
the elements, then “there must be no parts of it.” (204a) Theaetetus is understandably 
puzzled by this assertion, and challenges it. Socrates runs him through a refutation 
troubled by semantic play and erroneous conclusions in an attempt to persuade 
Theaetetus that his account of knowledge as true belief plus a λόγος, based in an analysis 
of the elements of what is known, is faulty. Socrates then concludes with the dilemma 
that if a whole has parts, then it must be the parts, and nothing else, and if it has no parts, 
then it is just as unknowable as the elements in its simplicity (205d). Let us look at this 
argument. 
 In order to demonstrate this conclusion, Socrates turns to some examples of 
wholes which have parts and, he claims, are just the aggregate of the parts. The first 
example he chooses is the number six. He asks: “For example, whenever we say one, 
two, three, four, five, six, and we say twice three or thrice two, or four and two, or three 
and two and one – in all these cases are we saying the same or other?” Theaetetus 
answers, simply, “The same.” (204b-c) Socrates concludes that the “same” that we are 
speaking is six, which is just all such accountings of six, and nothing other than this all. 
However, his use of the number six is a troubling example that seems to point in the 
                                                
170 It is important that we note the use of the term συναρμόζω which is connected to ἁρμονία – 
harmony; we will be turning to the arguments that the soul is a “harmony” when we have a better 
understanding of multiplicity and unity. It also interesting to note the ambiguity in the phrase 
“comes to be” (γιγνομένη), which mirrors Socrates’ wondering, in the Phaedo, at how two ones 
when “brought close to one another” “make” two.  
 163 
opposite direction, even though he gets the answer he needs from the budding 
mathematician.  
 First, how are we to confirm that, if someone says “one, two, three, four, five, six” 
he means six? Why not 21? We have to know ahead of time what is meant by the speaker 
to treat “one, two, three, four, five, six” as six – we already have to know the context of 
the speech to understand its meaning. Each number is complete in a way Sigma and 
Omega are not complete (we will return to this point below); while complete at each 
number, this process of counting is also never complete, so how do we know he is 
stopping at six, and not just resting? In order to follow the speech we have to have a 
sense that what is indicated is the whole, the completed six, and we have to have this 
whole in view before the speaker begins counting. It is our knowing, ahead of time, the 
nature of the whole that allows us to make sense of the speech. The intelligibility of the 
phenomena is only possible on the basis of a προδοκέω, a fore-having. Socrates draws 
our attention to this problem by including the process in the question: “we say twice three 
or thrice two. . .” (204b emphasis added). However, then he returns us to the problem by 
asking “or four and two, or three and two and one. . .” The same problem arises when we 
ask: How do we know to take the sum of the numbers and not treat them as two or three 
groups? That is, how do we know the speaker doesn’t mean a group of four and a group 
of two? We will see that this is the same problem that is indicated in Socrates wondering, 
in the Phaedo, if the cause of one and one making two is that the two ones were brought 
“close to each other.” (97a) In each case, what is needed to understand how the activity of 
the soul, having the whole in view beforehand, prior to the counting, makes 
understanding possible.  
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 Benardete has an excellent analysis of this passage in his commentary; on this 
point he says “The soul of the teller which is invisibly present in the telling does this 
gathering.”171 Here we see Benardete subtly bring together some of the issues we have 
been wrestling with, and will continue to wrestle with. Specifically, he points to the place 
of the ψυχή, and to λόγος, as central to the act of gathering multiplicities into unities. 
Benardete continues, “Theaetetus is too adept at mathematics to hear what Socrates says 
in any but a mathematical way. His beautiful speech, in which he recognized the soul as a 
whole in itself, has run away. He would never have come to recognize it at all, if Socrates 
had not enslaved him to the illiberality of precise speech”172 We will now turn back to an 
account of Theaetetus’ “beautiful speech” on the soul – a speech which has been 
unfortunately forgotten by him; this beautiful λόγος of the soul plays a central role in 
how he should offer his answers to Socrates’ questions. Specifically, we will find 
Theaetetus’ forgotten speech to be central to the understanding of unity, multiplicity, and 
the role the form as the harmonious unity which arises from the aggregate, and which is 
greater than the sum of its parts. I will show that this account of the activity of the soul is 
necessary for understanding knowledge – which is unsurprising in context of the 
Theaetetus – and thus, self-knowledge.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
171 Benardete 1986, I.174, emphasis added. 
172 Ibid. 
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2.3 The Soul “Itself through Itself”  
and the Determination of “Being and Benefit” 
 
 When speaking of Theaetetus’ “beautiful speech” about the soul, Benardete is 
referring to one of the most important passages in the dialogue. This passage forms the 
final refutation of the equation of knowledge with perception, and it immediately 
precedes Theaetetus’ offering his next definition of knowledge, that is, that knowledge is 
“opinion”; it is this definition which leads the discussion along the path from knowledge 
as opinion, through true opinion, to true opinion plus a λόγος. In this passage, the place 
of the ψυχή in the gathering of multiplicities into intelligible wholes begins to become 
clear. The account given of the gathering activity of the ψυχή here in the Theaetetus will 
have great weight for our understanding of the way the soul is implicated in the activity 
of thinking and naming which Socrates puzzles over in his autobiography, and in his 
account of his second sailing in the Phaedo. As such, it is prudent to spend some time 
analyzing this passage.  
 
 At 183d, Theodorous tires of Socrates’ philosophical questioning. Theaetetus, 
demonstrating his vitality and his eagerness to engage in dialectic, asks that Socrates 
continue his analysis by examining those “who assert that all is at rest.” Socrates says that 
he had met Parmenides as a youth (a clear reference to the dialogue Parmenides), and 
that he is in awe of him (183d). Socrates refuses to engage in an analysis of Parmenides’ 
argument that all is at rest for fear that it would take too long, and preclude the maieutic 
enterprise of birthing Theaetetus of his ideas about the nature of knowledge. In the 
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interest of this midwifery, Socrates returns to Theaetetus’ definition of knowledge as 
perception at 184b. 
 Socrates begins by asking Theaetetus if it is the eyes by which we see (ᾧ ὁρῶμεν 
τοῦτο εἶναι ὀφθαλμούς), indicated by referring to the sense organ in the dative case, or 
if it is rather through (διά) the eyes that we see (184c). He is asking if the eyes are the 
agent which does the seeing, or if there is rather some other subject which does the 
seeing through, by means of, the eyes. Theaetetus again demonstrates his acuity by 
answering that it is through the eyes that we see (ibid.).173  
 Socrates is pleased with the answer, saying “That’s because it is surely dreadful 
(δεινὸν), my boy, if many kinds of perceptions sit in us as if in wooden horses, but all 
these do not come together into some single look (ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν), 
regardless of whether it’s the soul or whatever one must call it, by which we perceive 
through these as if they’re tools all the perceived and perceptible things.” (184d)174 Thus, 
by some activity, the objects of each of the senses are gathered together into intelligible 
unities. Socrates goes on to explain why, as he says, he is being a “stickler” 
(διακριβοῦμαι – 184d) and seeking what he is afraid is “illiberal” (ἀνελεύθερον) 
                                                
173 For an excellent discussion of these passages, see Burnyeat 1976.  
174 The introduction of the power of the soul is significant in the discussion of perception in the 
dialogue. As McDowell puts it: “Up to this point, the mind has not figured in any account of 
perception given in the dialogue.” (1973, p 185) Cf Republic 523bff, where Socrates argues that 
the activity of the “intellect” (νόησις) is “summoned” (παρακαλέω) by perceptions which “go 
over to the opposite sensation – e.g. from Bigness to Smallness, as in perceiving your ring finger. 
I will discuss this below, in connection to the similar passage in the Phaedo at 102bff. Each of 
these passages serves to clarify the activity of the soul – and specifically, of νοῦς – that is 
detectable in any act of perception, but which is most obtrusive in perceptions of the kind 
mentioned in the Republic and the Phaedo in which sensation (alone) “produces nothing healthy.” 
(Republic 523b) I will argue that the act of νοῦς by which we are able to see objects as unitary, 
intelligible wholes shot-through with meaning – even objects of perception which participate in 
“opposite” εἶδει – is understandable only on the basis of understanding of how the soul possesses 
these categories before-hand. This will become more clear when we turn to the account of seeing 
the sticks as equal in the Phaedo.  
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precision (ἀκριβείας) in their speech (184c). He seeks to establish that it is not by the 
eyes that we perceive, but rather that it is through the eyes that the soul perceives the 
being and unity of things that are perceptible. He seeks to establish this point so that he 
can make a claim about what the activity of the soul is itself through itself. Without this 
unifying activity of the ψυχή, we would be left with the δεινὸν conclusion that the self 
does not perceive, only the individual organs of sense.175 Ultimately, on the basis of this 
distinction, Socrates seeks to demonstrate that knowledge – gained by the soul itself 
through itself – and perception are, finally, different (190d-e).  
 Choosing to question Theaetetus instead of to “meddle on his behalf” (184e), 
Socrates proceeds to establish that the “tools” through which we perceive the “hot things, 
stiff things, light things, and sweet things” belong to the body (ibid.). Secondly, Socrates 
notes that whatever is perceived by one sense cannot be perceived by another sense 
(184e-185a). We cannot perceive the sweetness of a sugar cube by the eyes, only the 
whiteness of it. This move is critical for Socrates larger argument, which will identify the 
work of the soul as that which allows for the experience of unified objects, as opposed to 
“bundles” of perceptible qualities.  
 Next, Socrates says that since we cannot hear what we see, or see what we hear, 
“Therefore, if you think anything about both [seeing and hearing] together (περὶ 
ἀμφοτέρων διανοῇ), you couldn’t be perceiving anything about both together through 
the one organ (ὀργάνου), or in turn through the other.” (185a) Socrates then elicits 
Theaetetus’ agreement that sound and color both are, that “each of them is other than the 
                                                
175 Cf Burnyeat: “. . . the message of the model is that the horse is insensate; the power of 
perception belongs exclusively to the warriors within. The warriors, that is to say the senses, carry 
on their perceptual activity in such a way that neither the horse itself nor any part of it can be 
credited with the perceiving that takes place inside its hulk.” (1976, p 30) 
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other and the same as itself,” and “that both together are two, but each is one.” (185a-b) 
Theaetetus agrees to all of this, but is less certain when answering Socrates’ question if 
he has the “power (δυνατὸς) to examine whether the pair are unlike or like each other,” 
answering a tentative “maybe” (ἴσως – 185b). Socrates then rules out any of the organs 
of sense as that with which we are able to make these judgments; in this connection, he 
establishes that it is not by any of the powers of perception that such judgments are made 
(185b-c). So, it is neither by the eyes nor by the power of sight that we judge that sound 
exists, nor by sight or the eyes that we determine that seeing and hearing are different (or 
the same). Socrates also now introduces the possibility of a δύναμις, a power, which is 
conceptually different from the organ of sense.176 There is, on the one hand, the eye – the 
organ through which we see – and on the other hand there is the power of sight which is 
exercised (by the soul or “whatever one must call it”) by means of the organ of sense.  
 Socrates then asks Theaetetus to name the organs through which this common 
power works: “But now what is the power (δύναμις) through that reveals to you what’s 
common to all things as well as to these, to which you attach the names “is” and “is not” 
and whatever we were just now asking that applies to them? What sort of organs will you 
allot to all these, through which whatever is perceptive in us perceives each sort?” (185c) 
Theaetetus – showing himself to be one of the most remarkable interlocutors in the 
Socratic cannon – does not answer Socrates on the terms of the question as posed; that is 
to say, Theaetetus neither suggests a possible organ through which he is able to make 
                                                
176 The concept of δύναμις is central to the logic of the Theaetetus as a whole. This can be seen 
from the frame-dialogue, in which Euclides and Terpsion – two Megarians who, according to 
Aristotle, deny the reality of δύναμις – wonder at how Socrates was able to predict how 
Theaetetus would turn out as an adult after meeting him as a youth. Unfortunately, we cannot 
delve too deeply into that issue here. Suffice it to say that understanding δύναμις would allow us 
to understand the different powers and activities of the soul without resorting the bad ontology of 
dividing the soul into reified “parts.” 
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these judgments, nor does he answer “I don’t know,” as we might expect. Rather, 
Theaetetus responds: “You mean being and not-being, and likeness and unlikeness, and 
what’s the same and other, and also about one and the rest of number having to do with 
them. And you are evidently asking about the odd and the even, and as many other things 
as follow along with these, through which of the things that belong to the body we 
perceive them with the soul.” (185d) Here, he has already identified the soul as the agent 
in such perceptions.  
 Socrates applauds his answer, and Theaetetus continues: “Well by Zeus, Socrates, 
I at least would have no way to say (ἔγωγε οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν), except that it seems to 
me there’s absolutely no such special organ for these things as there is for those others 
(οὐδὲν τούτοις ὄργανον ἴδιον ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις), but the soul itself, through itself 
(αὐτὴ δι᾽ αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ) appears to me to observe the common things involved in all 
things (τὰ κοινά μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν).” (185d-e) Socrates praises 
Theaetetus for this answer by underscoring the distinction between soul and body: 
“Because you are beautiful, Theaetetus, and not ugly as Theodorus was saying, for one 
who speaks beautifully is beautiful and good.” (185e)  
 Significantly, Socrates then admits to having some opinions of his own, and 
repeats Theaetetus’ phrase “the soul itself through itself,” telling Theaetetus “you did me 
a favor and freed me from a very long speech, if it appears to you that the soul itself 
through itself examines some things, and some things through the powers of the body. 
For this, which was my opinion too, I wanted it to get to be your opinion as well.” (185e) 
Socrates admission that he holds such an opinion is especially significant in the 
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Theaetetus since he has just claimed that he is merely a “midwife” of philosophy, and is 
barren of ideas.177  
 Socrates then begins a list of things that the soul itself through itself examines. 
They include being and nonbeing, similar and dissimilar, the same and other; Theaetetus 
answers that it is the soul itself by itself “desires,” or “stretches itself out toward,” 
(ἐπορέγεται)178 each of these. Socrates then asks about beauty and ugliness, good and 
bad. Theaetetus answers, “It’s my opinion that it’s the being of these things in their 
mutual relations (ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα πρὸς ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν) which the 
soul most especially examines, calculating in itself (ἀναλογιζομένη ἐν ἑαυτῇ) the past 
and the present things relative to the future.” (186a-b, emphasis added) Socrates stops 
Theaetetus, saying “Hold it (ἔχε δή)” (186b) This “Hold it” is interesting; it could 
indicate that Theaetetus has gone too fast in his thinking, and made a leap that Socrates 
feels is unwarranted,  which would explain why Socrates then proceeds by returning to a 
case of sensation through the body (specifically softness and stiffness). Or, the “Hold it” 
could indicate that Socrates wants Theaetetus to hold onto this realization, or hold 
himself in the condition of the realization that he has just made – to hold onto the idea 
that Socrates has delivered him of with regard to the work of the ψυχή, and not let it be 
taken away as a “wind-egg,” a still-born idea. 
 In either case, Socrates proceeds, in the penultimate step that he needs to finally 
refute the equation of knowledge with perception, to establish another distinction 
between that which the soul “reaches out toward” through the body and that which the 
                                                
177 Cf Sedley 2004, p 109. 
178 We will see the importance of the term ὀρέγω in the discussion of the Equality Argument in 
the Phaedo. See also the opening line of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: “πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ 
εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει.” (980a) 
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soul examines itself through itself. The experiences which “stretch to the soul through the 
body (ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει)” are there by nature 
(φύσει) (186c); on the other hand, calculations (he uses the term Theatetus introduced - 
ἀναλογίσματα) “with regard to being and benefit (πρός τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν) 
come about, to whomever they do come about, with difficulty and in much time through 
a lot of work and education (πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας)” (ibid, emphasis added). This 
passage indicates that these calculations – that have to do with recollection of forms – do 
not come about naturally, by some immediate perception; rather, our παιδεία influences 
and even makes possible the ability to see what particulars participate in such forms as 
goodness and beauty and even being (οὐσίαν). Our education and the culture in which 
we are raised influences our judgments about the beautiful and the good, and seemingly 
about any judgments that the soul makes itself through itself. Παιδεία, then, is a process 
of cultivating and developing the basic activity of the soul – an activity which can be seen 
to be present in any act of perception. The being of the beings revealed in even a simple 
act of perception are said to be dependent on how we have been educated; also, the 
‘benefit’ of anything we might encounter is determined by the activity of the soul based 
in the kind of “work and education” we have undergone.  
 Rather than an atemporal contact with the forms, Plato is presenting us with a 
growing, changing process of education as the basis for knowledge and for the basic 
activity of the soul. We begin to understand why both the Theaetetus and the Phaedo 
begin and end with images of death and of a setting sun; these images call to mind the 
finitude and temporality of the life – ideally, a philosophical life – in which occurs the 
παιδεία and development necessary for the soul to make judgments concerning the 
 172 
“being and benefit” of the things we encounter. Knowledge and virtue happen in the 
context of embodied, finite human existence; they can only be understood when we face 
this truth, and do not forget ourselves and pretend to divinity.  
 
 In Chapter 2, I argued that the Phaedo – and to some extent every dialogue – can 
be read as a document defending Socrates’ choice of what he took to be the best life. That 
is, the Phaedo must be understood as, in part, a defense of the decision to devote one’s 
life to an examination and transformation of the self through a dedication to philosophy. I 
argued that the education and turning of the soul can be understood as a process of 
development from trust in things to trust in λόγοι. At that time, it was unclear what sort 
of transformation would take place in one’s life if one engaged in this ‘turn to the λόγοι.’ 
With the understanding that we have developed by looking to the Theaetetus, it has 
become clear that trusting in λόγοι is in fact not directed toward a fundamentally 
different object than everyday, uneducated life. Rather, we have begun to see that in 
attending to what we encounter in everyday life – everything from simple objects like a 
knife or a chair to complex political situations like the conflict with Sparta – we are 
already engaged in λόγοι. The very being of any of these things, of anything we can 
encounter or make an object of concern, is made accessible to us as a result of our 
education, and as the result of our own personal history. What we see as having being, 
and what we see as benefiting us is not something that comes purely or directly to us 
through the senses; rather, what we take to be the being of any being, and what we take to 
be of benefit to us, is the result of the activity of the soul. The soul, working through the 
senses, provides intelligibility to the world on the basis of our education (παιδεία) and 
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the way we have engaged with things in the past (πραγμάτων). To know the activity of 
the soul, then, is to know ourselves, and to engage with the fundamental ordering 
principle of our individual world.  
 
2.4 The One and the Many 
 
 Returning now to the main thread of our digression into the Theaetetus, we recall 
that Benardete notes Theaetetus’ apparent failure to “Hold it,” as Socrates asks. 
Theaetetus is not able to bring his insight about the soul to bear when answering 
Socrates’ questions, later in the dialogue, concerning the possibility that a whole is 
something more than the sum of its parts. As quoted above, in relation to Socrates’ 
example of counting at 204b-c, Benardete notes,  
The soul of the teller which is invisibly present in the telling does this gathering. 
Theaetetus is too adept at mathematics to hear what Socrates says in any but a 
mathematical way. His beautiful speech, in which he recognized the soul as a 
whole in itself, has run away. He would never have come to recognize it at all, if 
Socrates had not enslaved him to the illiberality of precise speech.179  
 
In arguing that Theaetetus is unaware of the place of his own “invisibly present” soul in 
his understanding of Socrates’ speeches, Benardete shows how this gathering can happen 
unbeknownst to the person doing to the gathering; that is, the gathering can happen 
“unconsciously.” This gathering provides the principle of completion which provides the 
context in which the parts get their meaning as parts of a whole.180 Thus, as we will see 
                                                
179 Benardete 1986 I.174. 
180 It is in understanding how this gathering takes place – and in understanding how this gathering 
happens in accordance with λόγος – that we will be in a position to answer Watanabe’s question 
when he approaches these sections of the Theaetetus, which he claims contain “(possibly the 
most) important lessons Plato gives us.” (1987, p 343) In his words, the puzzle of the passage is 
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further in looking at Socrates’ other examples, it seems that the whole does not get its 
meaning from being a summation of the parts; rather, it begins to appear that the parts 
only have meaning as parts in the context of the whole – a context provided invisibly by 
the gathering action of the “rational” soul. This will appear as precisely the structure of a 
harmony, as will become clear in our discussion of the arguments concerning ἁρμονία 
in the Phaedo. Further, we find here the suggestion that the context provided for the 
intelligibility of any thing, and of any λόγος, includes the person’s habits, history, and 
character; for Theaetetus, it is his mathematical training and skill that are the source and 
cause of his inability to hear what Socrates says “in any but a mathematical way.” Also, 
we see that Socrates’ demanding process of elenchos is able reveal this aspect of the soul 
to Theaetetus, evoking his beautiful λόγος, but he is unable to hold onto it!  
 
 Benardete notes the difference between counting, and the enumeration of 
syllables. In counting, as we said, the process is complete at every number, and yet also 
incompleteable and infinite: “Five is as much a whole as six, and four as five, and so on; 
at each summation there is completion . . . The sound so, on the other hand, determines 
from the initial hearing the phonetic shape of its every bit, apart from which it is not a 
syllable. Indeed, one can go further and say that the vocative Socrates as a whole controls 
                                                                                                                                            
as follows: “[Socrates] says the elements can be named but have no logos though they are 
perceptible, while the things composed of them can be known, stated and thought with true belief. 
To interpret these words, you have to know what the 'elements' are and what the 'composition' 
means, and this in turn requires that you at least have a grip on the motivation and purpose of this 
whole theory. And here you will be left with few hints. On a superficial reading the Dream seems 
to have begun too abruptly and, maybe, too dogmatically.” (ibid) In my reading, by showing how 
this discussion flows out of Theaetetus’ “beautiful speech” about the soul, I hope to make it clear 
that this Dream account, and the issues Socrates raises in dealing with this account, dovetail 
perfectly with what has come before in the dialogue, and with our concerns in reading the 
Phaedo.  
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the enunciation of its first syllable, but six has no effect on the counting of two.”181 
Benardete is beginning to sketch an account where the whole is ontologically prior to the 
parts. Obviously, this account will be important to us when we examine Socrates’ 
argument against Simmias’ account of the soul as a harmony at 94bff, where Socrates 
argues that the parts control the whole. 
 Benardete continues his account of the passage:  
Wholes become most manifest as whole when something is missing from them 
(cf 186a4), but numbers are never caught short. . . Theaetetus, therefore, cannot 
avoid agreeing that the whole and the all are the same, for at any moment the 
number is a total, and just as in a whole nothing is missing.  
 What then is the problem of whole and part? If S and O are each a part of 
the whole speech (λόγος) SO, and no part can be a part unless it takes part in a 
whole, then S takes its character as a part of the speech from the whole speech 
SO, and likewise O. S and O therefore, have each as its own speech the whole 
speech. . .182 
  
It begins to become clear that any given part of a whole takes its being from the whole of 
which it is a part. Thus, the relations to the other parts, and to the whole as something 
ontologically distinct from the parts, are not external to the part as part. When we 
understand something as a part of a whole we find that the place of the part in the order 
of the whole is internal to the being of the thing understood qua part. Thus, the whole, as 
whole is something more than a tallying of ‘all’ the parts, and, as we will see, determines 
the nature and the order of the parts.183 Benardete is pointing to how the λόγος of each 
part already includes that whole, and thus the being of each part qua part includes 
                                                
181 Ibid. I.174. 
182 Ibid. I.175. 
183 In the introduction to his translation of the Theaetetus, Joe Sachs speaks of Jacob Klein’s study 
of this dialogue in his book Plato’s Trilogy: “The evidence gathered by Klein points to a structure 
in which being is not a genus of which motion and rest are species, nor an aggregate of which the 
two of them are independent parts, but a whole in which each constituent is what it is only by its 
togetherness with the other.” (2004, p 2) 
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relations to “external” things – to the other parts, and to the whole.184 With Benardete, we 
begin to see that it is the “invisibly present” ψυχή of the one forming, or hearing, the 
λόγος in which two things are held together in a relation that ‘creates’ the whole by 
which the parts are understood, by gathering the phenomenon into a whole in accord 
with the λόγοι which the soul holds in view in its fore-having.185 
 
 Socrates’ next example is equally troubling. He asks “The number of the plethron 
(100 feet) and the plethron are the same. Aren’t they?” (204d) Is the number of a span of 
distance the same as that distance? It seems that they are not in fact the same. The span is 
complete, a single unbroken unit without any parts; the measurement of the span 
produces those divisions; the divisions do not precede the measuring which is a dividing. 
Aristotle makes just this point when he argues against Zeno’s paradoxes.186 
 Socrates moves on to consider an army; he asks “And further, the number of the 
army and the army, and similarly for all things of the sort? For all the number is all that 
                                                
184 See the discussion of this point in Russon 2009, Ch. 1. Russon argues, for example, that “. . . 
the basic “unit” of our hearing is not the individual chord but the relationship of the chords. . .” (p 
14) There, Russon uses the example of music, of rhythm, and of perception of visible patterns to 
show that perception of form is an act of the individual, but is not thereby rendered an arbitrary 
choice on the part of the individual; these forms answer to cultural preconditioning, to our habits, 
and ultimately to meaning. We will return to this point in our discussion of materialism and the 
αἰτίαi of experience. 
185 We will soon begin to see how this is not a simple creation ex nihilo, nor are all such creations 
equal; all such holdings must ultimately answer to the multiple articulations, the joints, in the 
matter the λόγος is about. This point will be made decisively clear when we turn to the ethical 
consequences of our gatherings – which is where we are headed with this discussion. This point 
will be made more explicit when we attend to Socrates’ account of how ‘one’ and ‘one’ “come 
together” to form ‘two.’ That is, this account does not mean that false judgment is impossible. In 
this light, it is quite clear why Plato turns, both in the Theaetetus and in the following discussion 
in the Sophist to discuss the possibility of false judgment. Our analysis here is unfortunately 
restricted to an account of the activity of the soul in knowing, and in interacting with the 
intelligibility of our world; thus, we cannot fully deal with the issue which Plato seems to say is 
raised by this account, specifically, the issue of ψευδής speech.  
186 See Aristotle’s Physics, 239a – 241b  
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each of them is?” (204d) Is an army simply a number of men, just standing around? 
Clearly not. This is a point commentators have not failed to notice, but it is difficult to 
say what it is that is missing from an account of an army that states that it is a number of 
men. The most common point made is that ‘order’ is missing from the account; thus the 
whole army is not just a lot of men, it is a lot of men ordered in a certain way; this is a 
point that can apply to the later discussion of the enumeration of the parts of a wagon at 
207a ff. – parts which simply do not make a wagon if they are not put together in the 
right way.  
However, “order” has widely different meanings in the case of a wagon and that 
of an army. Surely the parts of any whole have to be organized in some way in relation to 
one another; in the case of an army, in order for it to be an army, it has to be a collection 
of men who are organized in certain ways and trained in certain ways, and directed 
towards certain things – they have to have a common aim. It seems that in the case of an 
ordered group of people, one has to give an account not just of the people needed, but of 
the skills of each in relation to the position they hold within the group. Thus we see that 
the enumeration of elements in this case seems to have to extend down into an account of 
the different elements themselves in terms of their elements; the elements of an army are 
themselves complexes, both physical and non-physical. Thus, the soldiers have to be 
analyzed as having certain physical aspects, as well as skills, intentions, and specific 
histories; all of which are necessary to the account of each soldier as a soldier in terms of 
the goal of the army. The analysis of each soldier will be different if the army is purely 
defensive than if it is an aggressive force bent on genocide and pillaging and destroying 
the enemy.  
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This observation raises the issue that elements within complexes can be seen as 
wholes composed of parts within themselves; that is, the delineation of what is an 
element and what is complex seems to depend not merely on the nature of the thing but 
also on the level of generality at which we are working. For example, at another level of 
generality, we can say that it takes at least two armies to make a war.187 
 
 It is important that what we take away from this discussion is an understanding of 
how knowledge attaches itself to wholes. Those wholes are not simply dictated by the 
things we experience, but are also determined by the contexts in which we approach the 
things; for example, I experience a car as a unitary whole until something breaks, and I 
have to take it apart.188 What we will see is that the way we hold things in our experience, 
                                                
187 This is the central point of the article by Mitchell Miller, “Unity and Λόγος.” Miller makes the 
distinction between the part, the whole, and “nature” of the whole. He says that any complex is 
just an aggregate of parts, as Socrates claims explicitly, but the parts do not constitute the οὐσία, 
the being – what Miller calls the ‘nature’ – of the whole. Rather, it is this nature, which in itself is 
simple and unitary, that determines the order in which the parts are organized. He says further 
that the object of knowledge is not the whole, but this unitary nature. That is, what we know 
when we know an army is an army in its unitary nature. It is the nature of the army which 
determines what parts it must have. I argue that these observations – which show the object of 
thought to not be a simple, atomic, self-identical entity, but rather to be constituted by an act of 
the subject, and to be multiple, diverse, and shot-through with relations – can help us understand 
problems that some commentators on the Theaetetus have had with the account of falsehood. E.g. 
it can help us solve what Lyle Angene has called “the problem of the fugacity of the object of 
thought.” (1978, p 361ff) Angene treats the passages of the Theaetetus concerned with falsehood 
to be primarily dealing with the problem of what it means for something be an “object of 
thought.” (p 363) See also Cornford 1957, p 113ff, for another discussion of how the dialogue 
seems to give a problematic “psychological rather than logical” account of “what it means to 
think of an object.” Mistakenly treating objects of thought as isolated, atomic beings with no 
internal, essential relation to the world, or to the knower who is, in fact, central in identifying 
their being, causes many problems for these commentators. When we see how the object of 
thought arises as a unitary nature beyond its parts, we can understand these problems, and thus 
develop a more sophisticated account of falsehood.  
188 Cf Benardete 1986, pg 177: “The wheelwright must know the hundred pieces [of the wagon], 
but the wheelwright’s superior – whoever knows what kind of wagon circumstances require – 
does not need to know anywhere near that number.” Thus, I am arguing, with Benardete, that the 
extraordinarily strict requirements that Socrates puts in place for “knowledge” at 207aff are to be 
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by the acts of our ‘invisibly present’ souls, determines the way the good, the goal or 
τέλος of the thing in question is understood; the second sailing will show that revealing 
the being of things we encounter necessitates understanding the good of a thing. We 
might think that the question of the good of a thing, the τέλος of a thing, or the context in 
which we approach a thing, is external to considering the nature of the thing itself by 
itself. We are beginning to see that this conception of perception as an atomic thing being 
apprehended and considered by a pure disembodied and de-contextualized mind is not 
true to the conception of knowledge that Plato is presenting us with in the Phaedo. 
 We can begin to see the importance of this observation when we turn to the two 
examples Socrates chooses to show that in learning we attend first to the elements before 
we learn the wholes in the Theaetetus – specifically, the experience of learning to read 
and write, and learning music. When we think about these examples, we will see that the 
opposite of what Socrates says appears to be the truth. Socrates says that in learning 
music, as in learning to read and write, what we learn is initially the individual letters and 
                                                                                                                                            
taken somewhat ironically, and as a provocation for thought. Thus, I am arguing against Wheeler 
(1984) when he argues that due to the incredible constraints “Plato” (not Socrates) puts on 
knowledge, only forms can be the object of knowledge: “Since “knows” creates a transparent 
context and all aspects of an object are known if any are, we cannot be acquainted with objects 
which have an unsystematic and indefinite number of aspects. . . So, no sensible object can be the 
object of knowledge.” (p 363) I am interested in reading the Theaetetus as concerned with the 
activity of knowledge – especially insofar as this activity is definitive of the human soul. Thus, 
rather than focusing on how the text might delineate the objects of knowledge, I read the text, 
with Benardete and Ryle among others, as posing provocative questions about how knowledge 
occurs (cf. 196eff.). As Ryle puts it: “Notice that Socrates is not saying that we cannot, but rather 
that we can and do know facts about colours and noises. But knowing facts about colours and 
noises is not the same thing as seeing colours and hearing noises. Commentators who love to find 
Plato being rude about sense-perception, construe his denial of the equation between knowing and 
sensing as such a piece of rudeness. It is no such thing.” (1990, p 23) The sensible object can be 
an object of knowledge, certainly (cf Davis 1980, p 569); the Theaetetus seeks to explicate 
precisely how knowing an object and sensing an object are different activities.  
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the individual notes. He argues that this shows that “the genus of the elements admits of a 
knowledge more vivid and authoritative than that of the syllable.” (206b)  
 
 However, if we think about learning to read, what we discover is that everyone 
who learns how to read comes to the task from already knowing how to speak. We know 
the words and the meaning of the words before we come to have any idea that these 
words are “actually” “made up of” letters. When we approach this, we find that the idea 
of words being composed out of letters is already somewhat misleading in that it places 
the written word above the spoken word – we certainly have reason to expect that Plato 
would be hesitant to give the written word such primacy. The same observation can be 
made of learning music. In becoming musical, what we learn is to listen to and appreciate 
songs, melodies, and music as such. It is only later, well after we have developed a taste 
for certain harmonies and structures of music through hearing them and dancing to them 
that we come into the “lyre-player’s studio,” as Socrates puts it, to break down our 
understanding of melodies into chords, and further into individual notes; this process is 
analogous to our time learning to write when we already have a grasp of the language. 
There can be little doubt that this process will alter and improve our understanding of 
music and of language, but Socrates is wrong when he claims that these examples show 
that knowledge of elements is primary.  
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§3 Conclusions 
 
 Having seen the problems outlined in the dialogue with treating the ψυχή as a 
quasi-physical, reified entity which travels to another topos after death (that is, if it does 
not float around graveyards scaring people), we have now turned to understanding the 
soul on the basis of its activity. In addition to the way the soul – as the living, animating 
force of the body – holds the body together against the decomposition that occurs after 
the departure of the ψυχή, we have found that there is an important sense in which the 
soul gathers and holds together the unities that we experience in perception and thought. 
We have found that knowledge – including self-knowledge – attaches itself to these 
harmonious unities determined by the activity of the ψυχή in accord with λόγος.  
 In drawing the multiplicities of phenomena into intelligible unities, it is the soul 
“itself through itself” that determines the “being and benefit” of everything it encounters. 
Thus, we have found that the activity of the soul is seriously implicated in the 
intelligibility of the world. When we turn to the second sailing passage in the Phaedo, I 
will show that the determination of the being and benefit of beings which are rendered 
intelligible in their being is possible only on the basis of an identification of the good of 
that being. That is, as I will show, any act of intellection in which the subject 
“understands” what it encounters relies upon an act of the soul which draws the 
multiplicity of phenomena it encounters into an intelligible, unified πρᾶγμα on the basis 
of an assumption about the good of what is encountered. Plato is asking us to consider 
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how this gathering is essential to the constitution of the world we inhabit and to take 
seriously the fact that for the most part this activity is rooted in unexamined assumptions 
about being and the good.  
 
 Further, it has begun to become clear that the individual is implicated in this 
process – specifically, we have found that the παιδεία of the individual is essential in 
determining the “being and benefit” of phenomena. Thus we argued – with Benardete and 
Ryle – that while sensory perception is not knowledge, there can be knowledge of 
sensory objects and of human situations; we can know that this is a wagon, and that this 
act is courageous. The status of that knowledge is, however, of a different order than 
simple perception since the activity of the soul is “summoned” (as it is in looking at a 
finger that is both big and small) to determine the being of what is perceived; that is, the 
self is not passively receiving perceptual information – e.g. “this is white” – but is rather 
making an active judgment – e.g. “this is sugar” – which draws upon the education, 
personal history of the individual, and especially upon the λόγοι that have a “hold” on 
the individual. With this in hand, we can begin to see the limitations of the “true-born 
philosopher’s” account that knowledge is only possible for disembodied beings, since the 
only awareness embodied beings are capable of is simple sensory perception. In the next 
chapter, by looking at the account of perceiving two sticks as “equal,” we will continue to 
explore the way that embodied knowledge implicates the activity of the soul, and goes 
beyond simple passive reception of perceptual images. This will, of course, help us 
develop a better understanding of how knowledge functions for embodied human beings, 
and thus how self-knowledge is possible. We will also be continuing to develop an 
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ontology of the soul, rooted in an understanding of the soul’s activity; this ontology will 
be the necessary ground for any philosophical self-understanding.  
 That is, to know the self is to know the principles upon which this – initially 
unconscious – gathering and this judgment of being and benefit takes place.  
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Chapter 5 
Recollection and the Activity of the Soul 
 
§1 Equality 
 
 In this section, I will present an extended interpretation of the argument from 
recollection and, specifically, Socrates’ example of the knowledge of equality itself. My 
initial goal is to clarify what Socrates means when he says we sense that things “strive” 
(βούλομαι, or ὀρέγω), at 74d and 75a. Socrates is arguing that the things of this world 
“fall short of” (ἐνδεής) the beings by which they get their names. In order to make this 
argument, he turns to the experience of things as “equal” to one another. For example, in 
order to have this experience of two sticks being equal to one another, we must already 
possess a conception of what equality itself is (74e-75a). Socrates shows that we cannot 
simply derive that conception from experiences of equal things (by, for example, a 
process of abstraction), since we already have to possess the conception of equality in 
order to experience the things in the world as equal in the first place (75a-c). Thus, 
Socrates argues, we must have existed prior to birth, and in that prenatal existence, we 
must have come into “contact” with the forms, such as equality itself, and thus the soul is 
immortal.  
 There are strong reasons for doubting the interpretation of this passage which 
mythologizes the origins of knowledge by hypothesizing a time of learning before 
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birth.189 In order to offer an alternate interpretation of the theory of recollection, it is 
necessary to simply keep in mind some of the issues that have arisen already in our 
interpretation of the dialogue. Specifically, I demonstrated that the dialogue warns that 
one’s προδοκέω can have a “wondrous” hold on one. Socrates repeatedly claims that 
being ignorant of one’s own ignorance is a dangerous obstacle to philosophy. We are cut 
off from the possibility of discovering the truth if we do not acknowledge the fallibility of 
our opinions. Further, we have seen that many of these unexamined concepts are 
operative in our experience without our being aware of them – just as a Homeric 
conception of justice is operative in the people of Athens, and as Protagoras’ doctrine is 
seen to be operative in Theaetetus, Protagoras being the “father” of the opinion of which 
Socrates’ midwifery will deliver him. With this in mind, it is easy to see how a theory of 
recollection might be developed which conceives ἀνάμνησις to be a process of 
uncovering the structures of valuation and conceptualization that we have taken over 
from the οἱ πολλοι, from the poets, and from our “indoctrination” in the ideas of the 
                                                
189 See Dimas 2003: “In addition to presupposing that the forms exist, this claim presupposes also 
that our souls knew them in a disembodied state, which would seem to be completely eliminating 
the chances of demonstrating the pre-existence of the soul in a non question-begging way. Even 
worse, the assumption that the soul knew the forms in a disembodied state does not bring any 
closer the conclusion that we form concepts by recollecting. Having known the form of the Equal 
before our birth and forgotten it is no guarantee that our coming to form the concept of equality in 
this life is the result of recollecting that previous knowledge. Even though our souls may possess 
a forgotten knowledge of the forms, we may still be forming concepts on the basis of perception 
alone without recollecting that past knowledge.” (p 188) On this point, see also Ackrill 1973 
“There may be a lurking danger for Plato's program. For if reminding is to explain concept- 
formation, can a precondition for reminding be recognition or something akin to it?" (p 183). 
Dimas (in agreement with Ackrill) is arguing against what he describes as an “influential account 
defended by several adherents of the traditional interpretation, the philosophical aim of the 
recollection passage in the Phaedo is to account for concept-formation and thus explain our 
ability to engage in conceptual thought in addition to simply perceiving.” (p 186) He lists 
Cornford, Bostock, and Gulley as proponents of this view.  
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polis.190 In order to substantiate this suggestion, however, a close reading of the passages 
concerning recollection are in order.  
 
1.1 Prelude to the Argument 
 
 There are many puzzling elements regarding the way the argument from 
recollection arises in the Phaedo. At 72d, Socrates concludes the argument from 
opposites that we discussed briefly in Chapter 2. There, it became clear that Simmias and 
Cebes found the argument to be unconvincing. Cebes does not offer an attack, nor 
comment of any kind, on the argument (in order to not upset Socrates on his final day, we 
suspect – cf. 84d); rather, he immediately offers another argument, which he finds more 
convincing, and which he feels leads to the same conclusion – the argument from 
recollection (ἀνάμνησις). Cebes is mistaken to believe that these two arguments are 
simply in accord, as they present different conceptions of the soul, and of the possibility 
of learning.191 Socrates has been working out the implications of the “true-born 
philosophers’” conception of philosophy; we have already seen that they deny the 
                                                
190 This possibility has been considered before. See Dimas 2003: “If Plato is independently 
convinced that the forms exist and can be known by human souls anyway, exactly what is the 
philosophical gain of insisting that perception makes us recollect a knowledge our souls had of 
them before they were born into a body? Why not say more simply that with perception as 
stepping stones we can both form concepts and (some or all of us) discover these entities and 
attain knowledge of them, partially or fully, during this life? Unless we find answers to these 
questions, the recollection thesis in the Phaedo would seem hopelessly ad hoc, motivated simply 
by the fact that it is able to deliver the further thesis that our souls pre-existed their bodily birth.” 
(p 193-194) 
191 Cf Gadamer, 1980, p 26: “As if these two proofs could actually compliment each other! For 
certainly it cannot be overlooked that “soul” in the one means something quite different from 
“soul” in the other. The Pythagoreans do not think at all in terms of the Socratic “soul” which 
knows itself.” For a contrasting view, see Piper 2005. He argues, wrongly in my opinion, that the 
arguments leading up to Simmias and Cebes’ objections amount to a single “composite 
argument.” He fails to notice that the arguments present widely different conceptions of the 
nature of the “soul.”  
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possibility of learning while embodied. What we will find in the argument from equality 
is that the body is, in fact, not an impediment to learning the nature of the Equal itself; 
rather, it is precisely through examining our perceptions of sticks as equal that we come 
to recollect the nature of equality itself.192  
 Cebes, “interrupting” and taking up the argument again (ὑπολαβών) says,  
And besides, Socrates . . . this also goes along with the argument you are in the 
habit of making often (ὃν σὺ εἴωθας θαμὰ λέγειν) which – if it’s true – says 
that our learning happens to be nothing other than recollection (οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ 
ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὖσα); and according to this argument, I suppose (που) 
it’s necessary (ἀνάγκη) that we’ve learned at some previous time what we now 
recollect. But this is impossible if our soul was not somewhere before being born 
in this human form (ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει) here. So in this way too the soul seems to 
be something deathless. (72e-73a emphasis added)  
 
 
Socrates is said to be in the “habit” (εἴωθας) of making this λόγος often (θαμὰ).193 
Also, attending to the phrasing of this initial presentation of the argument, it is Socrates’ 
habitual argument that all learning is recollection. It is, however, Cebes’ interpretation 
which claims that the argument from recollection necessitates that the original acts of 
learning take place in a time before birth in which the soul was necessarily somewhere. 
Cebes, after briefly stating Socrates’ habitual λόγος that learning “happens to be 
recollection” (ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὖσα), supposes that this theory necessitates the pre-
                                                
192 Cf Burger 1984: “. . . while [Cebes] might think that the teaching of the genuine philosophers 
is supported by the [recollection] argument, it is in fact completely undermined by it. Whereas 
they speak of death, or the separation of psyche from body, as the condition for the acquisition of 
phronesis, the recollection argument supposedly accounts for the possibility of learning 
throughout life, when the psyche is united with the body, and particularly as a result of 
perception.” (p 70) Cf Davis 1980: “The argument does not claim, as Kebes suggests, that all 
learning is recollection. On the contrary, it seems to assume the possibility of acquiring some 
knowledge through the senses (75a). When we compare two sticks, for example, to see if they are 
equal in length, we invariably find that sensible sticks fall short of true equality. To know that 
means two things. It means that we have some knowledge of these particular sticks. That our 
senses can provide us with. And it also means to know that which they fall short of. That is not 
possible by means of the senses.” (p 569) 
193 The use of the term εἴωθας is interesting, as it is central to the discussion of recollection of 
dissimilar things in the equality example.  
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existence of the soul – specifically, he supposes the theory necessitates that we were 
capable of an initial act of learning before entering the human εἶδος. 
 Simmias then interjects that he cannot remember the “demonstrations” 
(ἀποδείξεις) for this – that is, he cannot remember what it was that showed-forth this 
fact that learning is ἀνάμνησις (73a). He asks Cebes to remind (ὑπόμνησον) him, to put 
him in mind of that which shows-forth, which demonstrates this fact about learning 
(ibid).  
 Cebes responds by telling Simmias that when human beings are questioned – 
especially about mathematical diagrams, which is an explicit reference to the Meno 
(which we will turn to in a moment) – they “tell everything as it is (αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν 
πάντα ᾗ ἔχει)” (73a). Simmias remains unpersuaded, and says he needs to “undergo the 
very thing the account is about (δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος)” (73b). Instead of 
asking Simmias the proper questions and allowing him to undergo learning as 
recollection, Cebes attempted to tell him the truth of the matter in the form of repeating a 
theory he has heard before. Simmias tells Socrates that as a result of what Cebes has told 
him, he has almost been persuaded, and remembered, but he does not say that he has 
learned. Socrates is apparently unsatisfied with this, and begins to question Simmias.  
 Before we turn to Socrates’ questioning and the argument from recollection itself, 
it is prudent to make a digression to discuss the presentation of the recollection theory in 
the Meno.194 In this digression, it will become clear that this playful introduction to the 
                                                
194 It should be noted that many commentators take the theory of recollection in the Meno to be 
importantly different in content from that in the Phaedo. Specifically, as Sharples argues: “. . .the 
Theory of Forms as found in the Phaedo and Republic is not developed in the Meno and should 
not be read back into that dialogue.” (1999, p 353) See also Sharples 1991, p 147-149. Others 
take the recollection thesis as a proof for the existence of the Forms. E.g. see Jacquette 1996: 
“Socrates' purpose in examining Meno's slave is to demonstrate that even if knowledge cannot be 
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argument is, in fact, central to the proper understanding of the work of recollection. That 
is, it will become clear that the account of learning Plato is presenting is not typified by 
immediate, pure, direct access to a transcendent truth, but rather is presented as a process 
of uncovering the truths of what is always already present in our experience.195  
 
 
1.2.1 Digression on the Meno: Context 
 
 When turning to the Theaetetus above, I stated my reservations about turning to 
other dialogues to come to conclusions about the dialogue at hand. However, as I argued 
there, the dramatic date of a dialogue can serve as a marker to help understand the ideas 
presented in one dialogic context in a larger horizon. Further, it is prudent to investigate 
indications within dialogues which explicitly point to other works in the corpus; we have 
seen how the discussion of recollection in the Phaedo points to the Meno. It is important 
that we not turn to other dialogues in order to come to conclusions which we will then 
import into our reading of the Phaedo, or worse, to form an account of Plato’s belief 
system at some hypothetical period of his development.  However, if we cautiously turn 
to another work to deepen our understanding of what is at stake in posing certain 
questions, we can avoid many of those dangers, and enrich our sensitivity to the dialogue 
at hand.196 
                                                                                                                                            
acquired, the soul is in permanent possession of knowledge of the Forms, and so has no need to 
acquire it.” (1996, p 128) 
195 Cf Sallis 1996, p 86. 
196 See Klein (1965) for an example of the ‘reverse’ of this practice here. Klein turns to the 
Phaedo to help clarify the concept of ἀνάμνησις as it appears in the Meno, as he says: “even at 
the risk of isolating these themes from the dramatic context in which they appear.” (p 109) 
 190 
 The Meno is a complicated dialogue, and the presentation of the theory of 
recollection happens within the context of a larger conversation. Our account of the 
equation of learning with ἀνάμνησις must take account of the dialogue as a whole. 
While we cannot fully do justice to this context in this dissertation, I will try to present 
some sense of that whole in my discussion.  
 The presentation of the theory comes as a reaction to “Meno’s paradox,” which he 
presents at 80d. There, he claims that learning is impossible since we cannot search for 
what we do not know, since, not knowing it, we won’t be able to recognize it if we find 
it; further, if we do not know it, we won’t know what to seek in the first place. Meno does 
not present this paradox in a vacuum, but rather in reaction to Socrates revealing Meno’s 
ignorance concerning virtue.  
 Socrates repeatedly refutes Meno’s definitions of virtue, and Meno says he feels 
as if he has been stunned by the torpedo fish (80a). He exclaims that after having given, 
thousands of times, “a great many speeches about virtue, and before many people, and 
done very well, in my own opinion anyway; yet now I am altogether (παράπαν) unable 
to say what [virtue] is.” (80b)197 Socrates, at this embarrassing admission, offers to lead 
an investigation into the nature of virtue, “and look together for whatever it is.” (80d) 
Meno’s response is not to begin this search, but rather to attempt to derail the possibility 
of any human learning (ibid.). Meno attempts to evade the ego-damaging insight of his 
own ignorance, and in so doing evades the possibility of benefiting himself by seeking 
this knowledge.  
                                                
197 All translations come from Plato’s Meno, George Anastaplo and Laurence Berns translators, 
Focus Philosophical Library, 2004.   
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 In this response we can see the abstracted and academic distance from which 
Meno raises his questions about virtue and learning, and thus the divorce in him between 
λόγος and εργον.198 This becomes clear because ‘Meno’s paradox’ is in conflict with his 
“open” (in a certain sense) and questioning bearing toward Socrates throughout the 
dialogue.199 Rather than believing genuinely that learning is impossible, he is constantly 
asking Socrates to give him new facts and theories to fill what Klein has called his 
“enormous storehouse of knowledge.”200 The impossibility of learning is just one more 
theory that Meno has learned and shoved into this ‘storehouse of knowledge’ without any 
kind of examination, and now it sits inert, next to the theory he received from 
Empedocles that color is an effluvium from things. Considering Meno’s presentation of 
the paradox, on the one hand, claiming that learning is impossible,  and his activity on the 
other, as he seeks to learn new theories, one has reason to wonder what good it would do 
Meno for Socrates to give him another theory of virtue to pile on top of his other theories; 
it would seem to do as little good as proving to this inquisitive fellow that learning is 
possible.201  
                                                
198 Much of my analysis of the Meno will be drawn from Gonzalez’s fine discussion of the text in 
Dialectic and Dialogue. On this point, on Meno’s stance, he notes: “. . .it suggests that Meno’s 
question is not inspired by any practical dilemma, but is ‘academic,’ that is ‘sophistic.’ . . .there is 
no real thirst for knowledge behind his question.” (1998, p 154) Thus, as Gonzalez notes, there is 
reason to disagree with the reading of Seeskin: “There is, however, no reason to think that in 
asking about how virtue is acquired, Meno is anything but sincere.” (1987, p 118) It is essential to 
my reading that Socrates takes Meno to be insincere, and specifically caters what he says to 
inspire Meno toward genuine questioning into virtue – that is, to turn his soul toward virtue, and 
not merely toward knowledge of it from an ‘academic’ distance, nor toward the sophistic 
appearance of such knowledge.  
199 Cf Sallis 1996: “But Meno is oblivious to this conflict between what he says and his saying of 
it.” (p 78)  
200 Klein 1965. See also Sallis, 1996, p 77, and: “Meno’s memory consists only of traces left by 
what others have said.” (p 95) 
201 It has been suggested that Meno is specifically trying to coax Socrates into giving a Gorgias-
like speech on virtue, perhaps so that he can copy it. See Arieti 1991, Sayre 1995. 
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 If Socrates’ task is to turn Meno’s soul, we should expect something very 
different than the presentation of theories in an eristic play designed to refute Meno on 
his own ground – a refutation which would please Meno and leave him completely 
unchanged. It is, indeed, something very different that we get. In order to understand why 
Socrates has a “habit” of often presenting this theory of recollection (as is said in the 
Phaedo), we must understand that the recollection thesis is anything but another 
epistemological theory for Meno’s storehouse, or for the storehouse of the history of 
philosophy, or for that of Simmias and Cebes.  
 I will argue that Socrates’ answer is presented as ethical advice; this advice is 
intended specifically to spur Meno (also Simmias and Cebes in the Phaedo, and by 
extension, Plato’s readers) to begin questioning and inquiring into what they already 
know.202 When we turn to the second sailing passage in the Phaedo, we will find that this 
process begins in attending to the λόγοι through which we present the world to ourselves. 
The theory of recollection, rather than being intended to simply reveal Plato’s “belief,” is 
presented by Socrates to spur Meno to begin questioning in a new way; specifically, in 
preface, it is intended to get Meno to begin to examine himself, rather than to play with 
theories kept at a safe distance from his life – for example, beneath the earth or in the 
                                                
202 Cf I. N. Robins 1997: “Socrates' arguments for recollection in the Phaedo differ in several 
respects from the demonstration with the slave-boy in the Meno. Some differences lie in the 
relations of Meno and Simmias to the arguments. Meno listens to Socrates' argument and 
observes the experiment of recollection in another, his slave-boy. He appears to assent to 
Socrates' conclusion, but does not apply the thesis to himself. For in persisting with his original 
question, whether virtue can be taught (Meno 86c4-d2), he reveals that he does not see the 
implications of treating learning as recollection. For he accepts the argument that since there are 
no teachers of virtue, it cannot be taught. But the absence of teachers in the conventional sense is 
irrelevant to learning as recollection. Nor does he apply to himself Socrates' inference from the 
recollection-thesis – an inference that begins to answer the question what virtue is – that we shall 
be better, braver and less lazy if we persist in seeking and if we do not believe that we cannot find 
and ought not to seek what we do not know (Meno 86b I-c2).” (p 438, emphasis added) See also 
Wilkes 1979, p 146-147.   
 193 
heavens. This consideration will raise another question, which will inform our discussion 
of the second sailing passage in the Phaedo, about the limitations inherent in Meno’s 
conception of λόγος as propositional knowledge.  
   
 The dominant theme of the Meno is, of course, the knowledge of virtue. In answer 
to Meno’s initial question – which opens the dialogue – of whether or not virtue is 
teachable, Socrates makes the outrageous statement: “I happen to not know at all 
(παράπαν) what that thing virtue itself is” (71a), let alone whether or not it is 
teachable.203 He says that not knowing what virtue is (τί ἐστὶ), how could he possibly 
know what kind of thing (ὁποῖόν τι) it is – that is, whether or not it is the kind of thing 
that is teachable. Socrates then makes the following analogy: He asks, “Or does it seem 
possible to you that someone who has no cognizance (γιγνώσκει) of Meno at all 
(παράπαν), who he is, could know (οἶδα) whether he is handsome or rich or well-born, 
or the opposite of these?” (71b) This is obviously a strange and problematic analogy. 
Surely Socrates has some acquaintance with virtue, and so could say something about it, 
even if he cannot articulate fully, παράπαν, what it is. Surely, then, there is some marked 
difference between Socrates’ relation to virtue and someone’s relation to Meno who has 
no idea who he is. What is Socrates pointing us toward when he makes this strange 
analogy between knowing a person a knowing virtue? 
 This is not an idle question, as the analogy between knowing a person and 
knowing an ειδος is raised subtly at several places in the dialogues. I argued in Chapter 1 
that the word αὐτός (57a) is significant in its place as the first word of the Phaedo. 
                                                
203 On the ambiguity in the translation of παράπαν in this clause, see Gonzalez 1998, p 331, note 
4. See also Klein, 1965, p 45. 
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Aὐτός is the same word used throughout the dialogues to refer to Goodness itself or 
Beauty itself. There, it is used to refer to Phaedo himself, and to subtly present the issue 
of Phaedo’s “sameness” with himself over time. Additionally, the Theaetetus opens with 
Euclides and Terpsion (two Megarians, who Aristotle describes as not believing in 
potentiality) wondering at how Socrates was able to predict how Theaetetus would turn 
out later in life having only met him as a youth (142b-c). With the prevalence in that 
dialogue of the question of stability maintaining itself beneath the flux of experience, we 
are forced to wonder, with Euclides and Terpsion: What was it in Theaetetus which 
maintained itself through the changes of his growing into manhood, and thus allowed 
Socrates to predict the virtue with which he would live and die? An ειδος in some sense 
provides the underlying stability which maintains identity through flux, and thus allows 
for knowledge. That which is named by a proper name, such as “Phaedo,” in some sense 
presents the same stability.204  
 We cannot work this issue out fully here, but in order to understand Socrates’ 
analogy in the Meno between knowing a person and knowing an ειδος, we need to attend 
to what it means to know someone.205 What do we know when we know a person? On the 
one hand, what we learn is a collection of facts about a person: She comes from San 
                                                
204 We recall Burger’s comment: “To say that things receive their names from the εἶδει in which 
they participate might seem to suggest, as its paradigmatic illustration, the individual person 
designated by his proper name. The proper name operates like the Athenian λόγος that each year 
declares the sacred ship, despite its being worn away part by part, to be the very “ship of 
Theseus” . . .” (Burger 1984, pg 161). 
205 Cf Sallis 1996: “. . . Meno himself . . . does not know who he is. This is the question especially 
of the first half of the dialogue, in the dimension of ergon, and we see how at the very beginning 
this question, ‘Who is Meno?,’ not only is posed but also is more or less explicitly linked to 
problem of whole and parts in such a way as to suggest that Meno is one who is oblivious to this 
issue.” (p 66). In this dissertation, I have focused on the issue of the relation between self-
knowledge and the self/ψυχή as mediating force which draws parts together into intelligible 
wholes. Sallis is here identifying this complex of issues as at the heart of the first half of the 
Meno. 
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Antonio, she went to college in Austin, she is a vegetarian, etc. It can even be said that 
without learning these facts, we never really get to know a person. However, getting to 
know someone is in no way limited to the gathering of these facts. These facts could just 
as easily be learned without ever even meeting a person – just as we say, incorrectly, that 
we ‘get to know’ a person by reading their biography. The fact is that all these statements 
can do is tell us ὁποῖόν τι, what kind of a person someone is, and can never give us the τί 
ἐστὶ, who they are in themselves. These propositions which tell ὁποῖόν τί  are the kind of 
information we could pass on to someone else, but we can never give someone a feel of 
what it is like to know someone they have not actually met.206  
                                                
206 As Gonzalez puts it: “Socrates then asserts the priority of the question concerning what 
something is (τί ἐστὶ) over the question concerning what kind of a thing (ὁποῖόν τι) it is. . . What 
is the meaning of the sharp distinction he makes between what (ti) a thing is and what kind of 
thing (poion) it is? He explains that one cannot know whether Meno is handsome, rich, well-born, 
or he opposite if one does not know altogether who Meno is. . . The point seems to be that before 
one can know Meno’s properties, one must know Meno himself.” (1998, p 155) Gonzalez goes on 
to argue that this is a strange formulation, since it is seemingly only through learning properties – 
of Meno or of virtue – that we come to know the thing itself. Thus, he argues, “the poion-question 
seems here to be the condition for answering the ti-question.” (ibid.) His conclusion is that 
Socrates must mean that we have to become personally acquainted with Meno in order to know if 
any of the things we have heard about him, describing his properties, are true: “This acquaintance 
with Meno serves as the ground for knowing his properties and is clearly distinct from knowing 
his properties . . . The example of knowing Meno also in this case parallels the later example of 
knowing the road to Larissa. . .” (1998, p 156) Also, see p 157 for his account of how knowing a 
person is not reducible to propositional knowledge. I will argue that it is precisely acquaintance 
with virtue that Socrates is insisting we develop, as the cultivation of our own souls, rather than 
taking refuge in λόγοι. There is, however, a great deal of debate about this interpretation. 
Nehamas 1992, p 300, Fine 1992, 225ff, and Dimas 1996 argue that there is no distinction being 
made between “knowledge by acquaintance” and “knowledge by description.” Bluck argues that 
there is such a distinction, claiming that “knowledge by acquaintance” is nonpropositional, as I 
will argue below, but that it also entails the ability to give a λόγος (1956, p 528). He describes 
acquaintance as “an intuitively acquired teleological understanding.” (ibid.) His paper is a reply 
to the argument by Cross, 1954, who claims that there is no “knowledge by acquaintance” at 
work in Plato, or in the Meno. See also Bluck’s “Knowledge by Acquaintance' in Plato's 
Theaetetus,” (1963). Bedu-Addo argues that knowledge is, for Plato, knowledge by acquaintance 
“in Russell’s sense, with non-sensible realities.” He argues that “though one cannot know what a 
thing is like (ποῖόν τι) who does not know what it is (τί ἐστὶ), the actual process of recollecting 
what a thing is begins with the "stirring up" of innate true opinions about what it is like (ποῖόν 
τι)” (1983, p 230) Thus, he argues that sense-experience is essential to the process of recollection.  
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 This, of course, mirrors the example Socrates uses of the journey to Larissa (97a-
b). No matter how accurate a map we follow, even if it allows us to get there on the first 
try, we still do not have the experience of traveling a road that we have traveled before. 
No matter how good the map, we still have the anxiety of traveling a road for the first 
time; no matter how good the description of a person, we still have the anxiety of meeting 
them for the first time. In the Meno, Socrates calls Anytus “daimonic” for making this 
mistake, and claiming to know the sophists without ever having any dealings with them 
(92b). Anytus says that he can “easily” still know “what these people are (οἵ εἰσιν), 
whether I am without experience of them or not.” (92c) Anytus claims to know the τί 
ἐστὶ of the sophists without having any experience of them, and Socrates wonders at this, 
and says that Anytus must be a diviner to have this knowledge without any experience of 
them (ibid).207  
 This distinction between getting to know someone and learning facts about them 
further allows us to see why the poet Theognis is not in fact contradicting himself, as 
Socrates claims he is at 95dff. In the first passage Socrates quotes, Theognis speaks of 
living with good people, drinking and eating with them, and so “from good men you will 
be taught good things.” (95d). In the second passage Socrates quotes, Theognis claims 
that “by teaching you will never make the bad man good.” (95e). Considering the 
distinction between actually getting to know a person and hearing propositional claims 
about them – and the fact that this was presented as an analogy for the knowledge of 
virtue – we can see how Socrates is somewhat misleading Meno in indicating that there is 
a real contradiction in the poem. Specifically, Plato is pushing his audience to understand 
                                                
207 Cf Sallis 1996, p 99. He identifies Anytus’ failing as his having “opinions about the whole 
which remain oblivious to the parts. . .” (ibid.)  
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an important distinction between two kinds of learning: On the one hand, there is the kind 
of learning that takes place in what we think of as “schools”; in this paradigm, there is a 
teacher with knowledge, and the teacher passes this knowledge along to the students as if 
they were empty jugs waiting to be filled by the instructor. On the other hand, there is a 
kind of learning which takes place when we live with something or someone – as 
Theognis says, it is by living with, and sharing food and drink with good people, that we 
will be ‘led by their example,’ so to speak. Socrates is misleading Meno, in claiming 
Theognis contradicts himself, in order to mirror back to Meno his own failure to make 
this distinction. 
 The point of Socrates’ analogy between knowing a person and knowing virtue 
seems to be, then, that the kind of knowledge one can get from descriptions is only able 
to touch the ὁποῖόν τι, the what kind of a thing a thing is, and cannot give, in λόγος, the 
τί ἐστὶ.208 This inability to be simply stated in propositional speech does not mean, 
certainly, that the thing spoken about has no ειδος. Further, it is important to note that 
any statements that are made about a thing are not thereby rendered false; rather, they are 
revealed as incomplete. Claims and descriptions in λόγος, as limited to being claims 
about the ὁποῖόν τι, are not false. Meno’s definition of virtue as seeking what is good 
and being able to get it is not false, it is simply empty in its inability to capture the τί ἐστὶ 
of virtue; neither is defining Justice as giving to each its due false, per se, only too far 
abstracted to capture the τί ἐστὶ of a living, collected knowledge of what Justice itself by 
itself, is. As Gonzalez notes, these propositional claims, as limited to the ὁποῖόν τι, tell 
                                                
208 Cf Francisco Gonzalez 1998, Chapter 6. On the definitions offered by the slave-boy, he says: 
“However, this defect of the two definitions, namely, that they both state only poion ti and not ti 
esti, can be remedied by the actual process of inquiry.” (p 169) 
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us of the relational qualities of a thing, what kind of a thing it is – whether or not it is 
teachable, whether or not it is the kind of thing that always comes along with color, or 
always limits a solid – and they do not tell us τί ἐστὶ. 
 In claiming to offer us the truth of virtue or a person, however, these claims pose 
a serious danger to genuine philosophy – a danger that is presented in Meno’s character. 
We can rest content in possessing these claims about virtue, and this possession can blind 
us to the need to engage in genuine philosophical inquiry – which is always self-inquiry. 
This is, most certainly, Meno’s problem. Having given many fine speeches about virtue, 
having at his disposal endless claims about what kind of a thing virtue is, he feels no need 
to search for what it, in itself, is. He is ignorant of his own ignorance because he knows 
so much.209 He is, as Aristotle warns us in Book 2, Chapter 4, of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
at 1105b10: “taking refuge (καταφεύγοντες) in λόγος,” believing that he is 
philosophizing, but is actually “doing something similar to those who will listen to the 
doctors carefully but do none of the things they order.” 
 In keeping at this distance from the matter of virtue itself – i.e. the cultivation of 
his own soul – Meno cuts himself off from the real issue at hand. As such, as we 
mentioned earlier, Socrates does not need to give Meno another theory of virtue, but to 
try and awaken him to the truth of virtue – that is, to the fact that it is only in self-inquiry, 
in the experience of seeking for virtue, that one can hope to experience, first-hand, the τί 
                                                
209 Sallis’ interpretation of the Meno aims to show that the dialogue is a “concrete presentation of 
that side of Socrates’ practice by which he is attached to the city.” (1996, p 64) He argues that 
one form of this service to the city is exposing the ignorance of ignorance. On Meno’s ignorance 
of his ignorance, see 71bff, and Sallis’ comments on p 67, esp. in note 3.  
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ἐστὶ of virtue.210 This mirrors the example of the slave-boy. The slave-boy is asked to tell 
Socrates the length of the side of the double square (82d-e). In asking this, Socrates asks 
him to say the square root of 8, a number which is αλογον, irrational. Socrates asks him 
to say the ἄρρητος, the unsayable.211 This is not just a trick on Socrates’ part, but a 
carefully chosen example to get Meno, and us, to realize this very important point about 
learning and about virtue: There simply is no λόγος that can be given which will capture 
the τί ἐστὶ of virtue, which is revealed only in the process of genuine seeking. This search 
is a process which cannot begin if we are closed off to our own ignorance by the many 
and fine λόγοι we possess about virtue. In asking Meno, and other interlocutors, to give 
him, in λόγος, the τί ἐστὶ of virtue, Socrates is asking for what my argument here claims 
cannot be given. This is not simply an eristic trick. Rather, it is an attempt on Socrates’ 
part to awaken his listeners to a failing in the way they approach learning; he attempts to 
reveal to them their own ignorance not in terms of an inability to state simply in λόγος 
what they know, as it is often interpreted. Rather, it is an attempt to turn their souls 
toward another kind of seeking that goes beyond discovering “true” statements about 
virtue.212  
                                                
210 Cf Gonzalez 1998: “[Socrates is trying to get] Meno genuinely to inquire for the first time in 
his life, not because inquiry is a means to an adequate definition of virtue, but because inquiry is 
itself an essential part of being virtuous.” (p 163) 
211 Sallis notes “that in the problem which Socrates poses the given side and the side sought are 
incommensurable and that, consequently, an answer in terms of the length of the given side 
cannot (in Greek mathematics) be given; the side sought can only be drawn or shown. . . The 
geometrical problem mirrors the more general character of the entire discussion; it is a matter of 
showing, of exhibiting the myth of recollection.” (1969, p 92) See also Klein, 1965, p 99.  
212 Many commentators strongly defend the notion that the Meno is calling for propositional 
knowledge as the definitive understanding of virtue that Socrates claims we should seek. See, for 
example, Fine 1992, p 220, note 24, et al. On the other hand, see Gonzalez 1998 p 157ff. Also, 
Grene 1966, argues that knowledge by acquaintance, which she agrees is active in the Meno, 
“transforms the person himself who attains knowledge.” (p 21) Thus, acquaintance with virtue 
“would be indistinguishable from becoming virtuous.” (Gonzalez, 1998, p 158) 
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 For Meno, this would mean turning his attention from propositions and theories 
about virtue, and to the conceptions of virtue that are embodied in his own life. Socrates 
argues, at 77c and following, that all people seek what they see as Good. I will spend 
some time on this passage, since this observation – one dimension of the Platonic 
principle that to know the good is to seek the good – will be central to our understanding 
of Socrates’ attack on materialism in his autobiography.  
 At 77b, Meno presents his third attempt at defining ἀρετή. Continuing his 
tendency toward the accumulation of knowledge, he quotes an unknown poet who writes 
that virtue is “both to rejoice and to be capable in beautiful things (χαίρειν τε καλοῖσι 
καὶ δύνασθαι).” Meno alters this slightly, claiming it is to desire (ἐπιθυμοῦντα) 
beautiful things and “to be capable of providing them for oneself.” (77b) Socrates argues 
that this is true of all people. First, he equates the beautiful (καλός) with the good 
(ἀγαθός). He then claims that anyone who seeks something bad is seeking something 
harmful to themselves (77d), and since no one would knowingly seek to harm themselves 
(78a), no one knowingly seeks the bad. Thus, desiring and seeking the good cannot be 
ἀρετή, since all people by nature desire the good. We can thus discover what a person 
understands the good to be by looking at their actions. That is, while people often say one 
thing and do another, one conclusion of this argument Socrates makes is that their true 
conception of the good is to be found in their actions, not in their speech – in their ἔργον 
rather than their λόγος. This is because while a person might say that doing X is harmful 
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to them, if we find them doing X, their words must have been disingenuous, since no one 
knowingly seeks what is harmful to them (78a).213 
 We can see from this that while Meno’s speeches about virtue are kept at a 
distance from his deeds, he, too, embodies a conception of virtue; Meno, like all people, 
has a conception of what is Good, what is choiceworthy, and he embodies this conception 
in his pursuits. The posing of the paradox – his λόγος – is revealed as abstract and dead 
for him precisely in its contrast to his εργον – his living engagement with the world 
which testifies to his faith in learning, in spite of what he might say.214 This opens up 
another sense in which we can understand what Klein is referring to when he speaks of 
Meno’s “storehouse of knowledge.” Not only is his memory a repository for every theory 
he has heard from Gorgias and the other sophists, but his character testifies to an 
accumulation of conceptions of the Good which he embodies; we can see that what he 
should say is not that learning is impossible, but rather that what he considers good is the 
accumulation of propositional knowledge (trivia, we might say). His conception of the 
choiceworthy is evidenced by his relish of Socrates’ definition of color as an effluvium 
(76d), and by his comportment toward λόγοι in the entire dialogue. For example, at 77a, 
after praising Socrates’ definition of color as an effluvium, Meno says that he would 
                                                
213 In the final Chapters, I will argue that the central meaning of Socrates’ call for us to harmonize 
our λόγοι in the Phaedo is not the development of some sort of coherence theory of truth, but 
rather that we harmonize the λόγοι through which we organize our world into an intelligible 
structure in which we are called to act. Thus, the harmonization carried out in response to the 
“hypothetical method” in the Phaedo is a harmonization of our souls.  
214 Thus, I argue that in order to understand the presentation of the paradox, it is essential to 
understand Meno’s character – for Sallis, as we noted above, his lack of self-awareness is key to 
this character. Thus, I am disagreeing with accounts such as that by Franklin, who claims that 
“Plato notices a problem with his philosophical method. The problem concerns the ability of the 
method to sustain real learning, and so to produce knowledge. This problem is represented in the 
dialogue by Meno's paradox. Plato solves the problem with a theory that recasts all learning as the 
recollection of things we knew before we were born.” (2001, p 413) 
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“stay around” Socrates if he would promise to tell him about “many other such things.” 
Socrates identifies why Meno is so pleased by such definitions, telling him it is because 
they are “in accordance with the way in which you have been habituated (συνήθειαν).” 
(76d) Thus, it is not only specific λόγοι with which we become habituated or 
indoctrinated, but also “styles” of λόγοι, of argumentation. This will become important 
when we examine how a habit of accepting materialist arguments is at play in Socrates’ 
autobiography. 
 
 In the Theaetetus, Socrates identifies Protagoras as the “father” of Theaetetus’ 
conception that knowledge equals perception – an opinion that Theaetetus had taken over 
‘unconsciously’ from what he had heard people say, and which was birthed as a wind-egg 
through Socrates’ midwifery (151e-152aff.); in the Greater Alcibiades, Socrates 
implicitly names Homer as the father of Alcibiades’ conception of Justice (112a-b), 
which caused him to see justice and injustice in the world even from the time he was 
playing children’s games (110b); in a similar way, Socrates is here pointing out to Meno, 
and to us, that everyone has a conception of the Good which he or she has inherited; each 
person pursues, consciously or not, this conception of the Good. Insofar as this 
conception is unexamined, it operates at an unconscious level – as the sense of Justice 
operates in a child crying foul in a game, and as the word “know” operates in Socrates 
discussion with Theaetetus about whether or not they “know” what it means to Know, 
which he calls attention to at Theaetetus 196dff. In any case, whether we are aware or 
not, these conceptions are operative in our lives. 
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 The process by which we become, to use a strong word, ‘indoctrinated’ by the 
conceptions of the polis, just as we take over our language from the οἱ πολλοι,215 is the 
initial process of learning by which we do not merely acquire a set of theories (like 
getting birds for our aviary in the Theaetetus); rather, it is this process by which we 
become who we are – in the sense that it is in this process that we acquire the conceptual 
structures by which our world is ordered, and evaluate our experience. In the Meno, this 
process is embodied in the character of Anytus; at 92e, Anytus names all Athenians as the 
true teachers of virtue. In a sense he is correct, in that his own conception of virtue has 
been taken over, unexamined, from the οἱ πολλοι. With this in mind, we can begin to see 
how learning is always self-inquiry for Plato, and begin to strip the myth from the theory 
of recollection; that is to say, it is the initial process of learning that takes place as we 
grow up that is properly called learning, and what people usually call “learning” is 
actually the process of recollection whereby we examine and call into conscious 
awareness what we have already learned at some previous time – a time that, with 
reference to the characters of Meno and Anytus, and to the Theaetetus and the Alcibiades, 
we can understand to take place in this life.216  
                                                
215 This connection between the process of learning our first language and learning the conception 
of virtue dominant in our culture is intimated in the Alcibiades at 111a. The acquiring of a first 
language is certainly a case that should cause us to re-examine our usual conceptions of learning 
and teaching.  
216 Many commentators understand Socrates’ presentation of recollection in the Meno and Phaedo 
to be taken literally. See Rowe, 1993, p 11. Most take this to be a theory of Plato’s “middle 
period,” and to be abandoned later in his career. E.g. Gulley 1954, p 200ff, Hackforth 1955, p 77, 
Cornford 1957, p 5 and 28, Irwin 1955, p 315, et al. My account will save Plato from the charge 
of “naïve” nativism of which he is accused. As Rawson says of Cowie’s interpretation: “she and 
others agree that Plato’s nativism, as expressed in Platonic recollection, is in that sense quite 
naïve: namely that many or all true propositions are already in our minds since birth, because we 
already knew them in a previous form of life, and can know them again by recollecting (or in a 
process closely analogous to recollection).” (2006, p 139) Several commentators take Plato to 
claim, un-ironically, that everyone is born with true propositions already “in their head,” but that 
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 Socrates famously claims in the Apology that the “unexamined life is not worth 
living”; he further reveals that what is dangerous is not ignorance as much as failure to 
recognize one’s own ignorance. In secondary literature, this fatal self-ignorance is usually 
characterized as the inability to articulate these conceptions in simple propositions. As 
such, in being unable to give a definition of courage or justice or virtue, we are often 
thought to lack real knowledge.217 However, the reading of the Meno that I have 
presented gives us strong reasons to believe that the inability to fully articulate our 
conception of virtue is not the essence of the failing that Socrates is interested in; rather 
than trying to get Meno to come up with more numerous and eristically powerful 
definitions of virtue, he wants Meno to turn inward to an examination of the conception 
of virtue which he embodies, and by this process of self-cultivation, to become 
acquainted with the process of virtue itself. It is precisely in undergoing the process of 
self-inquiry that Meno can come into contact with the τί ἐστὶ of virtue. Thus, the process 
of seeking is in itself valuable, and is not valuable solely in terms of any λόγος to which 
it might give rise regarding what virtue is. This is made clear when Socrates tells Meno, 
concerning the mythological aspects of his story about ἀνάμνησις and the immortality of 
the soul: 
                                                                                                                                            
we have forgotten them; e.g. Vlastos 1965, p 164.  
217 Again, Bluck argues that the ability to give a propositional account of virtue is not the essence 
of virtue – which he characterizes as acquaintance with virtue, and as non-propositional – but that 
this acquaintance gives one the ability to give an “explanatory account” of virtue. (1956, p 528) It 
should be noted that his account of the nature of “acquaintance” differs from my own, in that he 
takes the model for acquaintance to be “pure” contact with the forms, which I criticized in 
Chapter 3, “That Plato's own theory was of some kind of episteme by direct 'acquaintance' 
(connaitre) of simple Forms is a reasonable inference from what is said in the Phaedo about the 
soul in a state of purity beholding pure Form.” (p 527) I argue that such episteme of the forms is 
impossible for human beings, and thus we need a different conception of how we can become 
acquainted with virtue while maintaining Bluck’s insistence that this acquaintance will be 
transformative of the soul.  
 205 
And for the rest of the points I would not assert myself altogether confidently on 
behalf of my argument; but that in supposing one ought to seek what one does 
not know we would be better, more able to be brave and less lazy than if we 
supposed that which we do not know we are neither capable of discovering nor 
ought to seek – on behalf of that I would surely battle, so far as I am able, both in 
word and in deed. (86b-c) 
 
Socrates asserts that it is precisely in the seeking that we become better and braver – more 
virtuous. We can achieve virtue provided we seek after that which we do not know, 
which requires that we recognize our failings, and see them as spurs to action.  
 This observation reveals another aspect of Meno’s problem that is figured in the 
image he makes of Socrates as the torpedo-fish: Meno sees Socrates as a predator who 
numbs his prey into inaction, rather than as the gadfly who spurs people into action.218 In 
this equation of ἀπορία with numbness, the real danger of Meno’s approach to 
philosophical questioning is made clear. Socrates is not trying to show Meno the 
inadequacy of any particular definition of virtue; rather, he is trying to spur him to turn 
away from playing idly with “external” λόγοι, and “taking refuge” in them, toward an 
examination of his own soul, to the conception of virtue that lies unexamined there, and 
to the kind of λόγοι that are “written in his soul.” 
 
 
 
 
                                                
218 Cf Sallis 1996, p 64, and Klein 1965, p 91. Socrates jokes that Meno is trying to get him to 
make an image of him in return, but Socrates refuses. Klein remarks: "When, according to 
Socrates himself, it seems to be Socrates' turn to present an image of Meno, he refuses to play the 
game. Why? Is it not, because there is no need for any image? Meno's soul, in Meno's lifetime, 
will presumably be stripped 'naked' by Socrates: Meno will be shown as what he is, for all to see." 
(1965, p 90) 
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1.2.2 Digression on the Meno: Recollection 
 
 With this brief discussion of its context, I will now turn to the theory of 
recollection in the Meno. The account of philosophical work I have just outlined in my 
reading of the Meno poses the danger of presenting philosophy as nothing more than the 
exposition of our already-held beliefs. It remains to be seen how this process of self-
inquiry relates to the critical project of philosophy, whereby we call into question the 
ideas we have taken over from the οἱ πολλοι and our wise teachers. This is, of course, 
precisely the problem that Socrates intends his account of ἀνάμνησις to address. Put 
simply, unless in the process of self-inquiry we have access to the truths of virtue – that 
is, not only access to the beliefs that we already have taken over about virtue, but also to 
virtue itself – then either philosophy is useless to bring about change, or it must examine 
something other than the self, and be something other than ἀνάμνησις. One way to 
phrase this issue is to ask: If the second sailing is a turn to λόγοι, how does the 
philosopher move beyond the λόγοι which she examines to reach truth? 
 
 Meno responds to his stunning not by immediately taking up Socrates’ offer that, 
in recognition of their ignorance about the nature of virtue, they should seek it together; 
rather, he challenges Socrates by saying, “And in what way will you seek, Socrates, for 
that which you know nothing at all (παράπαν) about what it is?” (80d) Socrates first 
points out how “eristic” this argument is – that is, how unproductive it is in finding the 
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truth of virtue.219 Socrates begins to answer him by repeating something he claims to have 
heard from “both men and women wise about things divine,” but then he stops himself, 
and seems to begin considering something (81a). Meno, impatient to add another theory 
to his storehouse, interrupts Socrates’ thinking and asks, “What is it, and who are those 
that say it?” (ibid.) Apparently, Meno is as interested in who speaks as in the truth of 
what is said.220 Socrates then proceeds to give an account of the ‘theory of recollection’ 
specifically in answer to the paradox. It is important to keep this context in mind when 
interpreting his account of recollection. 
 There are many different ways to approach this crucial passage; I will focus on 
one aspect of the presentation of the theory of recollection: Socrates claims that all nature 
is συγγενοῦς, akin. He says that he has heard this account from priests, priestesses, and 
poets who have taken care (μεμέληκε) to be able to give an account in λόγος of those 
things they have “taken in hand” (μεταχειρίζονται) (81a).221 Socrates claims to have 
learned from them that, since “all nature is akin (συγγενοῦς) and the soul has learned all 
things, there is nothing to prevent someone who recollects (which people call learning) 
                                                
219 Cf Klein’s discussion of this paradox: “According to this view, everything “unknown” is 
separated and isolated form everything else. This view ignores the way the “unknown” generally 
presents itself as “unknown,” circumscribed by questions that arise “naturally” whenever we 
become aware of some inconsistency or lack of connection between the “known” pieces of our 
experience. It is true, our familiarity with these “pieces” tends to obscure their intrinsic 
incompleteness as well as their mutual relationship. An attempt to refute the argument directly 
would inevitably confront us again with the problem of the “whole” and its “parts,” . . .” (1965, p 
92) See also Sallis’ discussion, 1996, p 78, which follows Klein’s interpretation. My own analysis 
of Socrates’ response will focus on the essential interconnectedness of things. I would also like to 
add that our own ignorance often appears based in our active engagement with the world, and 
thus often arises from a failing in the way our souls gather the world into its intelligible order.  
220 Cf Klein 1965, p 93. 
221 For an account of this passage that takes Socrates to be presenting an actual myth that he (or 
Plato) heard, see Sharples 1991, p 147-148 and 1999, p 355. I take Plato to be using the priests 
and priestesses as a device to further distance himself from the account, and Socrates is using it 
perhaps to appeal to Meno’s sense of respect for authority.  
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one thing only from discovering all other things, so long as he is brave and does not grow 
tired of seeking.” (81d)  
 The obvious line to take on this passage is to emphasize ἀνάμνησις and point out 
that it is the fact that we have learned all things in a past life that makes learning possible. 
However, this does nothing to show how the learning that went on before we were born 
was immune to Meno’s paradox. On that reading, in answer to the question, “how is 
learning possible” Socrates has answered, “we already learned everything, so there is no 
paradox.”222  There is a lot of wisdom in this playful answer, but it does not directly deal 
with the paradox. The key to the account of learning in the theory of recollection in the 
Meno is kinship (συγγενοῦς).  
 We will emphasize kinship, the συγγενοῦς, the grown-together-ed-ness of the 
soul with what is known. This term, συγγενοῦς, is what will primarily occupy us. It can 
mean ‘kinship,’ as well as an inborn, connate, natural power or ability, and can also 
denote ‘being of the same kind.’ This term will be our focus because neither having been 
really ‘close’ to the truth before birth, nor having all truths be akin to one another, will 
allow us learning unless we have some kind of a συγγενοῦς, or inborn, access to that 
web of truth. It is in identifying how this natural connectedness with the truth places us in 
what Sallis calls a “mediating” position between full knowledge and total ignorance that 
                                                
222 Cf Sallis 1996: “. . . it hardly suffices to appeal to the immortality (repeated rebirths) of the 
soul . . . Aside from the intense questionableness that permeates the entire issue of immortality, 
such an account would, in effect, simply transfer the problem from this life to previous lives. . .” 
(p 82) 
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we will come to understand how the “theory of recollection” seeks to answer the 
paradox.223  
 What, then, are we to understand to be the nature of this συγγενοῦς, inborn 
ability to know, specifically, virtue? Put simply, it is because we are the kind of being 
which can be virtuous. We are akin to virtue because virtue is one of our possibilities in 
the world. Learning is understood as recollection because it is the development of our 
natural striving for knowledge, and as such is the development of the essential 
characteristic of the ζῷον λογον. Learning – and, I will argue, specifically the 
development of self-knowledge – is a movement toward our τέλος. Human learning is 
like a plant growing toward the sun.224   
 
 It is by developing our συγγενοῦς, inborn, possibilities in the world that we come 
into contact with truth; we can better understand this by looking at the example of the 
slave-boy, and his relation to the geometrical problem Socrates poses to him (82bff.). It is 
the slave-boy’s συγγενοῦς spatiality, his innate being as a spatial being that allowed him 
                                                
223 Sallis 1996, p 80ff. Sallis writes: “Things which are akin belong together . . . they can be 
gathered together without violence being done to them, gathered together even in such a fashion 
that  what they are is made manifest in and through the gathering.” (p 81)  
224 As Sallis puts it: “. . .the Meno especially brings to light the appropriate comportment of man 
as one of mediating between part and whole; it exhibits such mediating as that which enables man 
to be what he properly is. Since that which allows man to be what he properly is constitutes 
nothing less than human virtue itself . . .” (1996, p 64) Insofar as it is the activity of the soul to 
gather parts into intelligible wholes, consciously examining the λόγοι through which we engage 
in this “mediating” activity – which Sallis identifies as central to the Meno and the Phaedo – is to 
engage ourselves with the virtuous condition of our souls. While the relation of parts and wholes 
initially appears as an ontological or epistemological issue only, Sallis is here correctly 
identifying the ethical aspect of any such inquiry by identifying how the development of the 
excellence of the essential and defining work of being human is at issue in these texts. It is our 
nature and the proper self-relation necessary for our natural development that is being revealed in 
these conversations. This stance of man as “mediating” force must, of course, be central to any 
discussion of the second sailing. Cf Sallis 1996, p 41-43.  
 210 
to recollect in answering Socrates’ questions.225 Socrates could simply have told the 
slave-boy the answer, but we all know that something would be lost if he did not guide 
the boy to come to the understanding himself. In a certain sense, of course, Socrates leads 
the boy along with his questions; nevertheless, the boy’s answers are his own – they are 
the product of his own thinking and his own consideration of the spatial relations between 
the images Socrates physically drew in the sand. These are relations which he, as a spatial 
being, is immediately, naturally, συγγενοῦς aware of and thus has access to.226 Further, 
Socrates insists that, at the end of his questioning, the slave-boy has not yet achieved real 
knowledge – he has the kind of ‘knowledge’ that is not yet tied-down, and could wander 
away from him like the statues of Daedalus (97d-e).  
 He will not have real knowledge until “someone were to ask him these same 
questions many times and in different ways.” (85c) Then, he will “understand, he himself 
taking up the knowledge out of himself.” (85d) What the boy needs is not to be told the 
answer in the form of a proposition, and being able to regurgitate that proposition is 
explicitly said by Socrates not to be understanding. What he needs is to begin tirelessly 
searching, working in geometry in order to draw out into realization the possibility of 
being ‘geometrical,’ so to speak, that is one of his inborn possibilities as a spatial being. 
The boy, as spatial, can understand spatial relations and thus can understand geometry. 
The process of learning that he undergoes is the realization of one of his natural 
possibilities based in the kind of being he is. Analogously, it is our συγγενοῦς possibility 
                                                
225 It is also critical that the slave-boy is able to understand Greek. Cf 82b. 
226 This echoes and parallels what Socrates helps Glaucon to realize in book 7 of the Republic: 
We cannot put or ‘pour’ knowledge into someone’s soul, or put sight into their eyes (518b). Also 
see Symposium 175d. 
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of being virtuous, or seeking the Good (as Socrates, again, argues that at some level all 
human beings do) that allows us to recollect –  i.e. to know by embodying – virtue.  
 In the process of self-inquiry we come into contact with the truth of the soul, not 
just with the accounts of soul that we might have accepted in the past. We come face to 
face with what it takes to overcome temptation and fear, and the truth of virtue that the 
overcoming of these forces embodies. That work on the self, on the soul, by its very 
nature allows the philosophical life to be more than a working out of our presuppositions 
and allows it to be critical of these preconceptions because the truths of virtue are the 
truths of the soul. Virtue is one possibility for the ordering of our soul, and we are able to 
come into contact with that truth insofar as we take our work in philosophy to be other 
than playing in λόγοι kept at a comfortable distance from the self, as Meno understands 
it. The work of comparing λόγοι in pursuit of victory in eristic contests – designed to 
present the appearance of virtue – will never access this συγγενοῦς possibility of virtue; 
thus, surprisingly, such a conception of philosophy, while at first seeming to be the only 
possibility for philosophy to be critical, in fact closes off the challenges that appear in the 
philosophical life which seeks the truth of virtue in self-inquiry. That is, as we return to 
the Phaedo, we will see that self-care is the development of the reflective stance of self-
examination which is the “recollection” of our definitively human συγγενοῦς possibility. 
 
 With these observations in mind, we see that Meno’s failing, in keeping his 
theoretical work at a distance from his living εργον, is not just any failing; it is a failing 
which cuts him off from the critical insights made possible by the process of self-inquiry. 
Meno’s love for λόγοι reveals itself to be a particularly dangerous form of misology; 
 212 
specifically, it is a form of misology which does not recognize itself as such due to the 
way it “takes refuge” in arguments. For Meno, philosophy will always be the search for 
λόγοι to justify his current understanding of virtue, and will never achieve access to the 
truth of virtue; that truth is here understood not as a propositional truth which can be 
achieved through objective logic, nor as a truth that our soul had access to in a time 
before our birth, but rather, it is understood as accessible because this truth is a 
συγγενοῦς possible way of being of the kind of being that we are. Thus, our access to 
self-criticism, and thus the change that is the path to virtue, is contingent upon us not 
being like Meno. 
 
 Despite what has been seen here concerning the inadequacy of Meno’s conception 
of λόγος, we are not “free” of dealing in λόγος as a result of this discussion. When we 
attempt to turn away from theoria to praxis, we find that in seeking to understand our 
deeds, our works, and our occupations, we discover not just our souls or ourselves as 
radically isolated individuals; rather, we discover a world of things and other people – we 
discover a situation. This situation is presented to us, gathered around us, in and through 
λόγος. Reflecting on this situation discovers a world gathered around us; it discovers 
things gathered and laid out before us on which, and in which, we find ourselves called to 
act. This gathering and laying out happens through λόγος. To think that we are free of 
λόγος by turning simply to εργον cannot be a final answer, as we will see in turning to 
the second sailing. We might ideally be able to turn directly to an apprehension of beings 
in their being; however, we will find that Socrates insists that we not forget the human 
condition of being between knowledge and ignorance, as Sallis puts it, and at a distance 
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from the truth of beings. Rather than being free of λόγος, by attending to the advice that 
Socrates seems to be giving Meno we see the question of the nature and place of λόγος 
raised in the text, and thus framed by the dialogue itself.  
 In the Meno, when discussing the difference between knowledge and true belief, 
Socrates states that what is necessary to ‘tie down’ belief is precisely a λόγος (97e). 
Considering this in light of the fact that the slave-boy is said not to need to be told the 
answer as a proposition in order to tie down his understanding of the geometrical 
problem, we must obviously begin to think of a non-propositional conception of λόγος. 
The slave-boy does not need the “kind” of λόγος that propositionally states the answer; 
he needs the “kind” of λόγος that is synonymous with the matter appearing to him in a 
new way. 
 Heeding the advice, and polemical warning, about the conception of λόγος of 
which Meno is guilty does not free us from dealing with λόγος; rather, it raises the 
question of λόγος for us from within the dialogue. If this reading of the Meno is correct, 
we must take very seriously the limitations of any conception of λόγος which would 
distance it from the  kind of ‘writing in the soul’ discussed in the Phaedrus. We are 
driven to hypothesize another kind of λόγος, the “brother of this one and genuine,” from 
within the consideration of the search for virtue in the Meno. Thus, when thinking with 
the Meno, we have to take seriously the limitation pointed to in the Seventh Letter, where 
λόγος is said to be unable to reach the τί ἐστὶ (342a-343b). Thus, considering the place 
of the phenomenon of λόγος as it appears completely intertwined with human life and 
human ἔργα, we are driven to wonder how it might be possible to overcome these 
limitations; or, failing that, we are to consider how to understand the human work of 
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philosophy as working within these limitations – without resorting to the sophistry of 
taking refuge in the eristic play of λόγοι, understood as “arguments.” I will contend that 
the presentation of the power and place of λόγος in human life presented in Socrates’ 
account of his second sailing in the Phaedo answers this call for a richer conception of 
λόγος. 
  
1.3 Equality, Recollection, and Eros 
 
 Returning to the account of recollection in the Phaedo, we note that upon eliciting 
Simmias’ agreement that the knowledge of equality must have been acquired before 
birth, Socrates tells Simmias that their “present argument isn’t about the Equal any more 
than it’s about the Beautiful Itself and the Good Itself and the Just and the Holy and, as I 
say, about all those things upon which we set the seal ‘that which is,’ in the questions we 
ask as well as in the answers we give.” (75d)227 This immediately raises the question: 
Why did Plato choose equality as his example?  
 Commentators have noted that this is weighted example which gives rise to 
problems. For example, Dorter argues that equal sticks fall short of equality itself "not in 
the degree of equality, but in the degree of clarity, precision and certitude with which 
they are capable of manifesting equality, i.e., of appearing equal."228 Surely two sticks are 
not “fully” equal, and thus this account makes sense. However, this account does not 
seem to be as generalizable to all instances of form, which the argument requires. For 
                                                
227 We note, in advance, that Socrates locates the identification of the Being of anything about 
which we say ‘itself’ in the act of questioning and answering.  
228 1972, p 206-7. 
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example, at 75c-d, Socrates says that the “same” is true of “the Greater and the Less.” As 
Ketchum notes: “One can be as certain that a given mountain is greater than a given ant 
hill as one can be of anything.”229 Thus, it does not seem that “clarity” is at issue. We 
might further wonder how a sunset can fall short of ‘sunsetness,’ or how a human being 
strives to be, but falls short of, human being itself. How is a human being not “fully” a 
human being in the way these two sticks are not fully equal? In any case, it is clear that 
debates such as these arise given the specific, and provocative, choice of equality in this 
passage.230  
 It is important for us to see that the choice of equality is not arbitrary, even 
beyond our assumption that Plato never chooses such things arbitrarily. To that end, it is 
interesting to note that, in his description of recollection, Socrates plays in a cryptic way 
on the issue of similarity. We are immediately driven to think about the relation between 
similarity and equality.  
 In his elucidation of ἀνάμνησις, Socrates uses examples of recollecting Cebes. 
He says that we can certainly recollect him from a picture or an image of him, but also 
that we can recollect him by seeing his lyre or his cloak. As Burger puts it, Socrates 
“seems to go out of his way to observe that recollection can be aroused by a reminder that 
is unlike that to which it points, as well as by that which is like it.”231 This is a troubling 
passage, indeed. Socrates needs to demonstrate that recollection takes place when 
aroused by things similar to that which is recollected. It is, however, not clear why 
                                                
229 1979, p 243.  
230 See also Gallop 1999, p 127-130. I will be ignoring the famous problem of ‘self-predication’ in 
this discussion, as it has received more than enough attention. Until it is clarified in what way 
forms are transcendent it is out of place to wonder at whether or not the form of equality is itself 
equal, or if the form of Greater is great, or greater than anything.  
231 Burger 1984, p 73. 
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Socrates introduces the stipulation (at 74a and 74c-d) that this recollection can also occur 
from dissimilar things.232  
 The specific example Socrates uses to (seemingly superfluously) introduce the 
possibility of recollection from dissimilar things subtly introduces an erotic element into 
the consideration of recollection.233 He says, “Don’t you know, then, that lovers (οἱ 
ἐρασταί), when they see a lyre or cloak or anything else that their boyfriend was in the 
habit of using, are affected in this way: They recognize the lyre and they grasp in thought 
the form of the boy (ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδὸς) whose lyre it was. 
And that’s recollection. Just so, somebody who’s seen Simmias often recollects Cebes.” 
                                                
232 I find the suggestion of Ketchum, Gosling and Burnet to not attend to the specifics of the text. 
Ketchum writes: “The present interpretation is, I think, strengthened by the fact that it solves a 
problem that has troubled commentators. Twice Plato warns the reader that it makes no 
difference, for the purposes of the argument, whether or not equal sticks, which remind us of 
equality, are like or unlike equality (74c11-d2, 76al-4). Since it seems clear from the "striving to 
be such as" metaphor that Plato does regard being reminded of a Form by its instances as a case 
of being reminded by similars, the warning seems out of place. The solution is that Plato does not 
regard being reminded of equality by equal sticks as a straightforward case of being reminded by 
a similar. An equal stick is both equal (to something) and unequal (to something). So equal sticks, 
though like equality, are also unlike equality. Being reminded of the equal itself by seeing equal 
sticks is a case of being reminded of something by a thing that is both similar and dissimilar to it. 
Though it is a case of being reminded of something by a similar, it can also be described as a case 
of being reminded by a dissimilar. The fact that Plato issues this warning immediately after 
arguing, on the present interpretation, that equal sticks are both equal and unequal is, I think, 
evidence for that interpretation.” (1979, p 248) Surely he is right insofar as one is speaking about 
the example of the painting of Simmias in its relation to Simmias, but it certainly does not explain 
the lengths to which Socrates goes to show how recollection actually functions in human life. Cf 
Gosling 1965, p 126, Burnet 1911, p 74.  
233 Cf Davis 1980: “The cloak is not obviously a cause of recollecting anything. It is not obviously 
an image. That is especially clear since what it reminds us of, in Socrates' example a beloved boy, 
is not really like it at all. What then is the connection between the two? It is clearly the 
unmentioned lover. At 75b Socrates uses the language of love to suggest that an image yearns to 
be like that of which it is an image. While the cloak certainly does not yearn to be like the be 
loved boy, there is a yearning involved. In this case the disposition to connect two things is not 
present in the things themselves, but in the one who connects them, in the lover.” (p 571) 
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(73d). It is said, then, that eros can call to mind (διάνοια) an absent object beyond our 
immediate perception.234 
 This shows, among other things, that the personal history and emotional state of 
the person doing the recollecting has a substantial effect on the act of recollection.235 
                                                
234 Sallis notes: “The connection between eros and recollection, playfully alluded to here, is 
developed extensively in the Phaedrus.” (1996, p 88) We are reminded of the Phaedrus, where it 
is argued that it is the erotic desire for the beautiful as ἐκφανέστατον (250d) – as that intelligible 
form which most brightly shines in the sensible world – that draws the mind ‘upward’ to 
contemplation of the intelligible forms. Cf Sallis 1996, p 153ff. I am thus disagreeing with Akrill, 
and with the standard claim, that the example Socrates gives that is of the most significance is the 
picture of Simmias which causes us to recollect Simmias himself (73e9-10). The claim is that this 
example is of central importance due to the fact that this is the example which most resembles 
recollecting the forms from encountering a particular that participates in that form, and thus 
resembles the form just as the picture resembles Simmias. However, this argument simply 
assumes an answer to the issues that Socrates is calling to attention with these examples, and in so 
doing, ignores the examples themselves. Cf Ackrill 1973. See also Morgan 1984: “In the course 
of his description of recollection (73c 1-74a8) Socrates gives a series of examples of cases of 
anamnesis, all of the general form that someone perceives x and recalls y. The final example has 
someone perceiving a picture of Simmias and recalling Simmias. The application of Socrates' 
account of recollection to the knowledge of Forms follows the same general pattern: someone 
perceives equal sticks or stones and recalls the Form of the Equal. This, Plato says, is a case of 
recollection by similars. Hence, if the order of the examples is meant to draw Simmias (and us) 
closer and closer to the final case as one of recollection by similars, then surely the case of 
Simmias' picture and Simmias is meant to parallel, in the closest possible way, that of the equal 
sticks and the Form of the Equal.” (p 244) Morgan goes so far in ignoring the specifics of Plato’s 
examples as to claim that Plato should have used a “wax or stone statue,” “rather than a picture,” 
as his final example – that is, in order to make Morgan’s own interpretation more clear; thus, 
rather than doubt his own ideas about the forms, Morgan suggests that Plato should have written 
the text differently so that it would fit better with later (mis)interpretations of the text to which 
Morgan adheres. Robins 1997 (p 440ff) disagrees with Ackrill’s interpretation of this passage by 
pointing to the significance of the other examples; however he, too concludes: “It is clear that the 
example of recollecting Simmias on seeing a picture of Simmias comes closest to the recollection 
of the Equal and other Ideas. Just as each Idea shares a name with the corresponding perceived 
objects, so Simmias and his picture are both called Simmias.” (p 441) Rather than treating any 
one example as “closest” to the experience Socrates wants us to consider, I argue that all of the 
examples are intended to raise in the reader’s mind the question of, and thus concern with, the 
activity of the self in constituting perceptual experience. Cf Davis 1980: “. . . it is clear that the 
things of this world are not images in the sense that pictures are images. Pictures by themselves 
point beyond themselves. Sticks are more like the example of the cloak; they point beyond 
themselves without immediately appearing to do so. The problem is the compatibility of these 
two kinds of recollection. The yearning, so necessary to an object's pointing beyond itself, comes 
from different sources in each case.” (p 571)  
235 This observation certainly problematizes Hackforth’s claim, when discussing the argument 
from recollection, that “there is, of course, no suggestion that we can recollect past experience at 
all.” (1955 p 77) The standard line taken on this passage is to emphasize that only philosophers 
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That is, it is not the case that all people will recollect X when they see Y, as if there was 
some universal, objective connection between X and Y that determines recollection. 
Rather, if Y is someone to whom I have an erotic attachment, and X is a lyre that even 
looks like the lyre that my lover plays, that lover will be called immediately to my mind; 
the presence of this lyre will not have that effect on anyone who does not share my erotic 
attraction to that person. Only someone who knows Simmias and Cebes to be frequent 
companions could recollect the one upon seeing the other. This observation, of course, 
fills out the claim made above – in connection with the activity of the soul as identifying 
the “being and benefit” (πρός τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν) of anything sensed in the 
Theaetetus (186c) – that it is on the basis of education and engagement with things that 
we determine the being of anything we encounter. Our soul engages in the activity of 
recollection of our boyfriend when we see his lyre on the basis of our engagement with 
him.236 This can stand as a rather severe form of ethical advice which should be drawn 
from a reading of the dialogues: Be careful what we engage ourselves with! For it is out 
of the habits that we develop in our engagements and our education that we will be made 
able to  access the very being of things. Further, it is from out of these habits that the soul 
will determine what is of benefit.  
                                                                                                                                            
can engage in “true” recollection, since that requires comparing particulars to forms, and only 
philosophers have knowledge of the forms. See Franklin 2005, who phrases the traditional 
interpretation thusly: “Recollection is supposed to explain the advanced understanding displayed 
by Socrates and Simmias (74b2-4). Furthermore, it seems to be a necessary condition on 
recollection that one who recollects also perform a comparison of sensible particulars to Forms 
(74a5-7).” (p 289) Franklin argues that the passage is, rather, intended to explain all learning, not 
just the “sophisticated” learning proper to philosophy. He seeks to demonstrate “the continuity of 
ordinary and philosophical learning.” (p 289) 
236 Cf Davis 1980, p 571-573. By pointing us to the work of the soul in identifying the “yearning” 
present in Socrates’ examples, Davis draws attention to the deeper import of this passage: “. . . all 
images contain elements of yearning which originate not in the image but in the imager.” (p 572, 
emphasis added) To miss this point of Socrates’ examples is to forget “. . .the self which is very 
much present in any act of recollection.” (ibid.) 
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 Further, the phrasing: ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος is suggestive. Into our 
thought we receive the εἶδος, the form, of the person evoked by the experience. While 
λαμβάνω certainly has the sense of taking, and even seizing by force, here, it also seems 
to indicate an event in which the person recollecting is largely passive; that is, as is clear 
when we attend to the experience that Socrates is calling us to consider, there is a sense in 
which we do not choose to receive the “image,” the εἶδος, of our lover into our minds. 
Rather, upon seeing the lyre we receive the image, without willing it, into our thought. 
The paradigmatic case with which Socrates introduces his account of recollection begins 
with the everyday, human acts of recalling. Further, the use of the term εἶδος to describe 
the image of the lover which appears in our διάνοια reminds us of the subtle connections 
between knowing an εἶδος and knowing a person that we have seen arise repeatedly in 
this discussion, and in our digression into the Meno. 
 From these facets of the seemingly superfluous addition of Socrates’ example of 
recollection of the lover from a lyre or a cloak, it is clear that recollection does not 
happen in a vacuum. Recollection is a human phenomenon that occurs in the context of 
interpersonal and political life. The nature of the specifically erotic example that Socrates 
chooses from the infinite number of available choices signals that Plato wants us to 
consider the place of the erotic desiring body in the act of recollection – a point that will 
be underscored when we understand the place of physical perception in the presentation 
of the argument concerning sticks and stones.  
 In all situations in which something becomes intelligible, a “whole” must be 
manifest through which the parts of the situation appear as having meaning. As Sallis 
argues: “Just as the equal itself, as the whole in which equal sticks, stones, etc. are 
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gathered up, must be somehow manifest in advance so likewise with all other such 
wholes. Yet, they cannot be immediately manifest; their manifestness must also involve a 
concealment.”237 In the last chapter, I argued that one essential aspect of this concealment 
is a self-concealment; that is, it is the invisibly present soul which does the gathering, 
according to Benardete’s reading of the Theaetetus. To become involved with the soul is 
to become involved with the gathering of beings into their intelligibility. To examine 
one’s self is to examine the intelligibility of the world. To put this gathering into order 
such that beings can become manifest in the truth of their being is to put the soul in order. 
Sallis continues: “Recollection is the movement of the soul correlative to that movement 
of manifestation in which a whole becomes manifest through an image.”238 In the 
Phaedo, the image that performs this mediating force is shown to be the λόγοι through 
which we gather things into their intelligibility – including our own selves. Here, in this 
passage in the Phaedo, we see further how these λόγοι are drawn not simply from some 
pre-natal contact with the forms, but from our own personal history and political and 
erotic engagements – from our παιδεία. Sallis continues: “In this fundamental sense, 
recollection is a mediation between whole and parts. As such, recollection is founded 
upon the capacity of man, with his peculiar mixture of knowledge and ignorance, to 
apprehend an image as an image, that is, to apprehend the original that shows through it. 
                                                
237 1996, p 90. 
238 1996, p 91. On the ability to see an image as an image, see Klein 1965, p 114. Klein identifies 
this power as εἰκασία. He goes on to articulate the connection between εἰκασία and πίστις (p 
115). A philosopher must be aware of the mediation of λόγος, aware of the second sailing which 
tells us that λόγοι are images. Seeing the λόγοι as images is a necessary precursor to the ‘upward 
way’ of dialectic, and inquiry into the truth of beings.  
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Recollection is founded on the non-immediate manifestness of the original wholes to the 
human soul.”239  
 
2.4 What it Takes to Recollect Equality 
 
 In addition to cloaks and lyres – dissimilar things from which something can be 
recollected – Socrates also presents the example of a portrait of Cebes. This example is 
more central to Socrates’ primary argument in this passage; specifically, Socrates needs 
to demonstrate the fact that the cause of recollection need not be equal to that which is 
recollected in order to maintain the ontological separabilty of the forms. By introducing 
recollection from similar things, he raises the issue of the inferiority of what causes the 
recollection to what is recollected; it is this inferiority that is crucial to Socrates’ 
argument that equality itself must be recollected, from before we were born, he claims.240 
Thus we see that evaluation, the ability to make claims to what is better and what worse, 
and thus comparison in terms of the good, is central to the logic that Socrates is evoking 
when he points to inferiority. Socrates states: “But at least whenever somebody’s 
recollecting something from similar things, isn’t it necessary (ἀναγκαῖον) for him to 
                                                
239 1996, p 91.  
240 On the inferiority and difference between the equality of the sticks and the equality of the 
equal itself, Ketchum writes: “There is good reason for expecting Plato to explain both the 
meaning and the truth of this claim in the Phaedo itself. For in the Euthyphro (6e) it is assumed 
plausibly and without argument that holy deeds are such as the holy itself. The idea is fairly 
clearly that something is such as the holy if and only if it satisfies the definition of the holy. Since 
Plato denies in the Phaedo that equal sticks can be such the equal (74el), it seems he owes his 
reader an explanation.” (1979, p 244) However, Ketchum assumes that Socrates is unironic when 
he demands a definition of the piety which will satisfy any interlocutor, or satisfy Socrates 
himself. As such, it is not clear that even in the Euthyphro, Socrates was committed to saying that 
the “presence” of piety in any pious action was enough to satisfy the claim that “pious deeds are 
such as the holy itself.”  
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undergo this as well: to note whether or not, with respect to similarity, this thing 
somehow falls short of (ἐλλείπει) what he’s recollected?” (74a, emphasis added) It is 
thus said to be necessary that we – the specific individual beings that we are, with our 
own erotic attachments and histories – engage in an act of comparison whenever we 
recollect from similar things. Specifically, it becomes clear that to recognize two things 
as equal is to engage in an act of comparison in light of better and worse, and thus, it 
presupposes an awareness of the good.241 The activity of the soul which holds a unit in-
view does so in the light of the perceived benefit of the object; that is, the being of 
anything encountered is tied up with an account of the good of that being. This 
observation will be central to understanding Socrates’ second sailing.  
 
 The ability to recognize equals also implies the ability to hold two things as both 
the same and different; we have to see the two things as the same in order to claim that 
they are equal, but we have to simultaneously hold them apart as two different things in 
order to have two things to compare and call ‘equal.’242 Burger notes that this fact about 
                                                
241 See also Republic 479aff.  
242 This relational quality must be central to Socrates’ choice of equality, as opposed to Beauty 
itself, or Courage itself, or any non-relational form. Cf Ketchum, who noted the difference 
between relational and non-relational forms (1979, p 245). This distinction is discussed in 
Gallop’s extended discussion of this passage (1999, p 113ff). The classic discussion of relations 
vs. qualities in the Phaedo is Castaneda 1972. He argues: “Contrary to the monolithic consensus 
among Plato scholars, in the Phaedo Plato did distinguish, and soundly, between and qualities, 
and dealt with genuine puzzles that arise in attempting to understand the nature of relational 
facts.” He does an in depth reading and re-interpretation of 102bff. – i.e. the “Simmias is both big 
and small” example, and decides that Plato does make a clear distinction between relations and 
properties. He is thus disagreeing with Cornford (1957, p 283ff), and many others, who claim that 
Plato treated the claim: “that a man partakes in tallness in the same way that he partakes of 
beauty,” (ibid.) See Castaneda’s debate with Gallop in Gallop 1978, 1999, et al. I disagree with 
the terms of the debate: I think that Plato was obviously aware of the difference between relations 
and qualities, and in that sense I agree with Castaneda. On the other hand, I do not agree with 
much of Castaneda’s interpretation of this specific passage. I feel that the problems that Socrates 
leaves his interlocutors (and us) with are intentional provocations to think more clearly about 
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equality makes it a strange example for Socrates to use: “Since equality seems to require 
at least two relata, how can there be ‘the equal itself’?”243 She notes that Socrates does not 
immediately insist that there is such an entity, but asks Simmias if there is such a being, 
and Simmias agrees, swearing by Zeus that they will claim there is such a being, adding: 
“wondrously so!” (74b) Indeed, it is wondrous that such a thing exists, but it is not clear 
that Simmias wonders about this adequately; it is important that we do not block our own 
experience of wonder at this existence by referring too quickly to a pre-established 
understanding of the “Theory of Forms.”244 Socrates seems to underscore this difficulty – 
the difficulty that the Equal itself seems to require a strange doubleness within itself – by 
subtly and inexplicably switching to the plural; that is, Socrates switches from speaking 
of The Equal itself (αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον) to speaking of The Equals themselves (αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα)  
at 74c, asking: “Is it possible that the Equals Themselves at times appeared to you to be 
                                                                                                                                            
participation, are intentionally incomplete, and not intended to “solve” these problems, as I will 
discuss in Chapter 8. That is, I am sure he chose a relation intentionally, as it helps express his 
point that no particular that is short is not also tall, and vice versa. Cf Republic 523aff, where 
relational qualities are said to “summon διάνοια.” The fact that Socrates does not explicitly deal 
with a problem he (to my mind) obviously points out does not mean Plato himself was unable to 
deal with that problem.  
243 Burger 1984, pg 74. 
244 Cf Roochnik 2001: “In the asking of this question—what is the equal itself?, what is justice?, 
what is beauty?—does the human subject somehow impose or project or construct a conception 
of reality, or is a window opened to being in itself? It is unclear. Only this is known: the “what is 
it” question is sparked by a dissatisfaction with the multiplicity of particular examples of the 
equal, the beautiful, and the just, and reflects a desire, an orexis (appetite, longing, yearning), to 
capture some unity in order to stabilize the flux of experience. But to desire X does not imply that 
X is real (except qua object of desire), and so it is far from certain whether such entities have an 
objective existence independent of human cognition, or whether human beings construct them 
through the use of abstract nouns coupled with intensive pronouns. In this context, consider again 
Socrates’ use of oregetai. He tells us that imperfectly equal things like sticks and stones “strive to 
be like the equal, but fall short” (75b1–2). This is strange: how can sticks and stones strive for 
anything? Recall that earlier in the dialogue Socrates used the same verb to describe the 
philosopher as one who “strives for being” (65c9). In other words, the verb associated (at 65c) 
with the subjective disposition of the philosopher is applied to objects at 75b. Does Socrates 
anthropomorphize? Does he project his subjective state on to putatively non-human objects? The 
reader is invited to wonder about the status of these “itselfs” that inform our experience.” (p 252-
253) 
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unequals or Equality to be Inequality?”245 What might the Equals Themselves be? How 
are they related to The Equal itself? How are any of them related to particular equal 
things? Simmias does not wonder enough to ask these questions. In any case, let these 
problems be enough for us to assume that Plato wanted us to think through the issue of 
equality carefully.  
 
 We have seen that any recognition of equality involves comparison, and 
comparison in light of the good. This comparison includes, as I noted above, the ability to 
hold two things together as the same while maintaining their difference; this ability will 
be central to our understanding of Socrates’ perplexity at how ‘one and one come 
together to form two’ in his autobiography. It also requires introducing the qua. As 
Russon states in his essay on the Phaedo entitled “We Sense That They Strive”: “If 
comparison thus means to hold them together as the same and different, then it must be 
the case that there is a respect in which they are not the same, which means their 
sameness can only be in some respect; that is, they are only equal qua . . . : Indeed only 
unequals can be equals.”246 As Socrates says, “Look at the matter this way: Isn’t it the 
                                                
245 For a discussion of the scholarly debate on the move to plurality here, much of which seems to 
me to miss the point by taking the nature of the existence of transcendental forms for granted, see 
Appoloni (1989). The most famous discussion is, of course, Mills 1957. See also Haynes 1964 p 
17ff. Haynes provides a reasonable refutation of Mills’ claim that the move to plurality implies 
that equality must be self-predicable. These discussion do not take this strange move to plurality 
as an opportunity to re-think the nature of the forms. Rather, they take it as a logical or 
philological puzzle to be solved within the paradigm established as the Platonic Theory of the 
Forms. Cf Wedin 1977, Hackforth 1955 (p 69).  
246 Russon 2000, pg 72 boldface added. This point can be seen clearly in Socrates’ initial claim 
that there is a necessary act of comparison that takes place when someone recollects based in 
similarity; there, he says that it is “with respect to similarity (κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα) that this 
thing falls short. . . ” (74a, emphasis added) Socrates claims that the individual recollecting 
“undergoes” (προσπάσχειν) the experience of comparing that which causes the recollection to 
the thing recollected in terms of, qua the specific quality which is the source of the recollection. 
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case that equal stones and sticks, while being the same, sometimes appear equal from one 
point of view and from another not?” (74b) Thus, the act of seeing the two sticks as equal 
can only be from a certain perspective, and for certain purposes – two sticks can be equal 
qua fuel for a fire and unequal qua building material.247 Thus, again, the specific 
perspective and intentions of the individual doing the comparing are central to the act of 
“holding together” that takes place in any recognition of equality, and indeed, any act of 
recollection in which beings become manifest.248 
 We will find that the act of “holding together” is critical to understanding the way 
ψυχή organizes experience in light of λόγος. We cannot, then, understand the 
phenomenon of equality – that is, of any two things appearing as ‘equal’ qua some 
purpose – without understanding the place of the activity of the soul of the individual 
making the determination. The “subject” (and, as we will see, λόγος) is implicated, then, 
in the determination of any quality. With this realization, it becomes clear why Plato saw 
the position of Protagoras – that ‘man is the measure of all things’ – so dangerously 
seductive as to serve as emblem for the misological tendencies of people who take to 
philosophical thinking in the wrong way.  
                                                
247 With this observation – the introduction of the qua – we can add something to the debate about 
what “attribute” makes the equal itself different from the equal sticks. Mills says: “what is the 
attribute which Plato asserts to belong to equal sticks and stones but not to belong to auta ta isa. 
Hitherto it has been almost universally assumed that the attribute in question is that of seeming to 
one man equal but to another man unequal; however, N. R. Murphy (The Interpretation of Plato's 
Republic - p. iii-n. 1) has suggested that [this phrase] at 74b 8-9 means 'equal to one thing but not 
to another', and on this interpretation the attribute would be that of 'seeming equal to one thing 
but not to another thing'.” (1957, p 129) I argue that both of these meanings are at work in the 
passage, and in Plato’s analysis of the difference between sensible particulars and the intelligible 
forms with which the soul makes sense of them.  
248 Thus, I am disagreeing with the standard claim that, as Ketchum puts it, the way equal things 
fall short of equality is that: “Equal sticks may be both equal and unequal; equal to one thing and 
unequal to another.” (1979, p 244) Cf Mills 1957, Owen 1957. Introducing the qua, and attending 
to what Socrates says at 74b concerning “point of view,” shows this interpretation to be false.  
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 In order for thinking in terms of equality to be understood, it is necessary to 
advance, as Russon argues, “beyond the notion of isolated atoms and to occupy a space 
of community, a space of which the units to be compared are members.”249 In taking two 
sticks to be equal, then, we have to understand that the act of comparison involves a 
space of thinking in which the two units are held together as a dyad. This space of 
comparison is essential to the dyad. “The shared community is how the two make one 
dyad.”250 The shared community is an act of ‘mind,’ it is we who hold the two together 
and thus create the dyad – an act which, as we have seen, is at some level determined by 
our own situatedness, including our erotic attachments.251 Further, we will find that it is 
an act of λόγος which gives us the space of comparison in which the two things are taken 
qua some quality, and held together as a dyad. It is in virtue of some story we tell about 
the things, some act of gathering the two things together and laying them out in front of 
us qua some quality that they can appear as the same, and/or as a dyad. We will be 
blinded to this fact, and to the essence of equality and the dyad, if we think sameness 
simply resides in the thing itself. We have to turn to the λόγοι in which the two are 
presented as a dyad to share in Socrates’ wonder at the phenomenon of two becoming 
one, and to follow the path that Socrates marks toward understanding its cause. As we 
have seen, an understanding of the good – illustrated by the necessity to hold things 
                                                
249 Russon 2000, p 71, emphasis added. 
250 Russon 2000, p 72. 
251 We have noted that Sallis identifies this activity of the soul as essential to human being, and 
thus to the definitive virtue of being a human; in drawing beings into manifestness in light of 
wholes (which are, in some sense, in view beforehand, like equality), we engage in the essentially 
human activity which places us in the mediating position between knowledge and ignorance. 
Sallis turns to an account of this activity, as it is presented in these passages in the Phaedo, in 
order to explain the way all things are said to be συγγενοῦς in the Meno. See Sallis 1996, esp. p 
80-91.  
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together as a dyad defined in its being by the axes of better and worse – is central to 
understanding the cause that Socrates identifies in his second sailing.  
 Initially, the sticks simply ‘are what they are’ – i.e. two inert sticks presenting 
themselves to sensory experience. Upon reflection, however, we find that the articulation 
of the experience of the two sticks as ‘equal’ (or as big, brown, beautiful, useful) requires 
that we recognize these other dimensions of the experience of them; while initially they 
‘are what they are,’ and while this is true, it becomes clear that the sticks are more than 
what they are. It becomes clear that they strive – i.e. that they occupy a context which is 
far more rich than can be revealed by the account which takes their being to be primarily 
‘atomic’ entities unrelated to the context in which they are experienced, and which thus 
takes their ‘coming-to-be and passing away’ as an event to be described in the purely 
materialistic terms of the ‘first sailing.’ 
 
2.5 Better and Worse 
 
 In order for us to be able to think in terms of equality, we also have to be able to 
recognize that the comparison happens in the context of imperfection. If two things are 
perfectly equal in every way, there will not be two things, but one. In holding the two 
things together as “the same,” and at the same time holding them apart as two things to be 
compared, we hold them as equal qua some standard of measure which we choose in 
comparing them; again, the two sticks might be equal in size or color (from one point of 
view), or they might be equal in usefulness for starting a fire etc. Russon states, “The qua 
itself – the quality – that is featured in the comparison must be a reality that both share, 
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but is exhausted by neither . . . a comparison can only be effected in a space governed by 
the axes of greater and lesser, better and worse.”252  
 We remember, of course, that Socrates (later in the dialogue) offers his “confused 
method” of stating the αἰτία of things – for example, of how two ones, when “they come 
close to one another” (97a), become a dyad – precisely because he felt that materialistic 
explanations obscure the good. Russon states: “Comparison, we might say, is the mode of 
existence within the space of question and answer illuminated by the good.”253 We see 
here how Plato’s choice of equality as an example directs us to think of how better and 
worse – that is, thinking in light of the good – are necessary components to naming (the 
cause of) anything in terms of its participation in a “form” which it cannot “exhaust.”254 
When we turn to the second sailing, we will not merely be looking for the “relational 
qualities” of a thing, but to its “essence”; it is the αἰτία of a thing being what it is that 
Socrates ventures to “answer” with his confused talk of participation in a form. We will 
                                                
252 Russon 2000, p 72.  
253 Ibid. 
254 This fact – that the particulars are said to “fall short” of the forms for which they strive – has 
occasioned much debate. See Gosling: “This passage, in which Socrates undertakes to show that 
what we usually call knowledge is in fact recollection, is notorious in discussions of the Theory 
of Forms. For here more clearly than anywhere else Plato seems to say that particulars are 
imperfect imitations of forms, that they never really have the properties they seem to have. The 
apparent instances of equality and beauty strain after but forever fail to attain to perfection in 
those properties for which they strive. Our women are never quite beautiful, our democrats never 
quite equal, our incomes never really big.” (1965, p 151) Gosling disagrees with this common 
interpretation: “The peculiarity is this: that while talk of similarity and inadequacy is prevalent, 
the actual argument that ts isa and auto to ison are different contains no hint at all of any 
imperfection in the equality of ta isa; there is no suggestion that any given pair of sticks is never 
quite equal.” (p 152, emphasis added) However, while she is right to say that things are equal and 
beautiful, she fails to see that qualification inherent in any such claim about a particular; she fails 
to see the importance of the qua. Since these sticks are equal, but only qua color or size, and not 
qua sturdiness, their relation can never exhaust what it means to be equal, any more than the very 
real beauty of a woman can exhaust what we mean with the word “beautiful,” which we apply to 
songs, sunsets, and souls, as well as to bodies. Gosling mounts a commendable attack on this 
position, but fails to see the importance of the choice of equality as the example, and thus fails to 
see that two particulars which had perfect equality would no longer be two things.  
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have as our central issue the question of the λόγοι with which we present ourselves to 
ourselves as a unitary identity; thus, we will be asking how we are equal to ourselves. We 
will be interested in the standard, the qua in terms of which we compare ourselves to the 
stories we tell ourselves of what we are, and of what we could be in the future, and of 
what we were in the past. What standard do we employ? This question will appear as the 
central Platonic question: What is the best life? Will our heroic image be Achilles or 
Odysseus? Will it be Theseus, or will it be Socrates?255  
  
2.6 Multiplicity and Internal Difference 
 
 In order to understand this question of unity, and of the source (αἰτία) of that 
unitary identity, we have to understand the nature of the multiplicity with which we are 
faced; this issue of unity over multiplicity has arisen in several places in the dialogue. I 
have argued that the faulty arguments for the immortality of the soul present how not to 
think of human multiplicity – specifically, as simple duality between divine and mortal, 
ψυχή and body.256 We have repeatedly seen how λόγος is central to the act of gathering 
multiplicity into a unity; here, we see how the notion of the qua is central to holding 
things together in a comparison as equal, i.e. as a (unitary) dyad. Clarifying the place of 
the act of the soul in granting unity through λόγος, including the act of naming, will be 
                                                
255 Gadamer notes: “As Nietzsche has so aptly put it, this figure of the dying Socrates became the 
new ideal to which the noblest of the Greek youth dedicated themselves instead of to that older 
heroic ideal, Achilles.” (1980, p 22) Cf Davis 1980: “Throughout the Phaedo Socrates' apparent 
praise of death is, beneath it all, a praise of a certain kind of life. In that sense he is competing 
with the poets.” (p 567, emphasis added) As Oliver Goldsmith put it: "People seldom improve 
when they have no other model but themselves to copy." 
256 In the next chapter I will discuss the account of internal conflict in the Republic, and show that 
Plato presents the ‘tri-partite soul’ as equally incapable of accounting for the phenomenon of the 
multiplicity of the self.  
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central to our project of developing a richer conception of λόγος than that which we saw 
is characteristic of Meno, who understands λόγος to be simple propositional statements. 
As Sallis argues, it is precisely his inability to recognize the importance of the problem of 
parts and wholes that defines Meno’s ignorance of his own ignorance, and his lack of 
self-knowledge.  
 
 Russon argues that in order for us to understand how a thing can be held together 
with another thing and compared qua some quality, we have to see how the thing holds 
that difference “within itself.”257  
 He begins: “Those that differ must hold themselves apart as determinate, separate 
identities if they are to be different; that is, to differ, they must be. They must, then, be 
themselves – indeed, be equal to themselves. . . but if they themselves differ from each 
other, then their very identities are already involved in relations with those from which 
they differ.”258 Being clear on this point is important for us because the interrelatedness of 
the being of “things” with each other and with the space of the “shared community” will 
be essential to understanding how turning to the λόγοι reveals the being of “things” in 
the light of the good. Russon continues,  
To differ from another is already to be different within oneself, that is, to already 
have in oneself the relation to the other from which one is differing. In other 
words, then, the dyad is only possible if each member both is and is different, 
which means equal with itself and different from itself: Thus the relations of 
equality that hold between the members also hold within each member. This 
means, first, that being, sameness, and difference are inseparable and, second, 
that to be is to set oneself into comparison with others. In other words, to differ – 
and, therefore, to defer the closing of one’s identity to the measuring up to one’s 
others – are intrinsic to each of the members of the comparison. The compared 
                                                
257 Russon 2000, p 72. 
258 Ibid. 
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things themselves evoke their others and their spaces of comparison from within 
themselves. To be is to invite comparison, to invite imitation.259  
 
Again, what we are trying to understand is how the Phaedo reveals phenomena as 
presenting us with a multiplicity, even when they appear unitary. This will allow us to 
better understand the act of λόγος which presents them as a unity in accord with the 
structure of μέθεξις (participation) in an εἶδος. In this analysis, we will come to see how 
the being of anything only appears in the light of the good. I have demonstrated that to 
understand a thing in terms of equality, we must go beyond thinking in terms of a 
metaphysical universe composed of discreet atomic entities. In the passage above, 
Russon argues further that the relationship to other beings is internal to any thing, any 
“this.” The identity of any thing is deferred to the extent that it is always open to new 
formations of relations to other things – including incorporating the ‘judgments’ of 
others. These relations do not simply alter the space of community in which things exist 
and gain their meaning; rather, the very identity of things already takes into account what 
might initially be thought to be “external” situations of relation, comparison, and 
imitation.260 This observation is essential to understanding why the paradigmatic example 
                                                
259 Ibid. p 72-73 
260 It should be clear that I am reading Socrates’ account of recollection the Phaedo as an account 
of how knowledge and judgment happen in an “everyday” context. That is, I do not suppose 
Socrates to intend us to think of the process he describes here as a matter only for philosophers, 
or specialists who have clear ‘vision of the forms.’ The kind of perception that Socrates refers to 
seems to indicate that forms are relevant to understanding every act of perception, and not just 
acts of perception informed by philosophically sophisticated understandings of concepts like 
equality. While the philosopher is one who takes the cue from the “striving” character of things to 
actively investigate the nature of equality, or justice, etc, anyone who makes sense of their 
experience does so in light of the forms. Thus, I am disagreeing with the basic standpoint of 
papers such as that of Bedu-Addo on these passages (1991). Specifically, I do not think Plato 
intended “knowledge of the forms” to make sense experience irrelevant, but rather to inform 
sense-experience such that true judgments can be made. Thus, there is some sense to Bedu-
Addo’s generation of two “types” of recollection – the type proper to people who are learning, on 
the one hand, and the type proper to philosophers who, he supposes have “Achieved complete 
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Socrates chooses of a ‘thing’ which cannot be explained by the ‘first sailing,’ and thus 
necessitates the turn to the λόγος, is a complex, political, human situation – his sitting in 
prison – and not an atomic being. How does one delimit a complex human situation into 
“this” situation? Further, how does one gather something as complex as a human life 
into “this” life? It seems that any decision we make about the unity of such an object of 
concern and care will be shot through with relations beyond measure. Thus, any attempt 
to ‘name’ the being of a being, to delimit it as the being that it is, and thus draw it into 
manifestness as the being that it is, will be to define that being not in isolation, but 
precisely in its relations of sameness and difference to (every) other being.261  
 
§4 Conclusions 
 
 According to the “true-born philosopher’s” account of philosophy, all that can be 
known by a body are the sensible particulars which are constantly in flux, and these 
cannot properly be said to be objects of knowledge. According to this epistemological 
position, there is a radical disjunction between the knowledge possible while we are 
embodied and ‘true’ knowledge, which is only possible for a disembodied soul. What we 
have seen in this chapter is that Plato is presenting us with a quite different account of 
knowledge; as Sallis argues, humans live precisely between the full knowledge of a pure 
soul in contact with pure forms and the total ignorance of being involved in total 
                                                                                                                                            
recollection of Forms.” (p 30) However, I do not see that there is so radical a distinction to be 
made between philosophers and non-philosophers, and I further do not think that “complete 
recollection of Forms” is possible for human beings, and should certainly not stand as the 
distinguishing mark of the philosopher.  
261 Cf Theaetetus 208cff, where Socrates tests the hypothesis that to give a λόγος is “to have 
some sign to say by means of which that which is asked about differs from all things.”  
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unintelligible flux. By attending to perception, we find that it is not an activity simply ‘of 
the body.’ Rather, we have discovered that the act of perception involves an activity of 
the soul, through the body. It is precisely the soul’s activity that allows us to perceive 
objects, unitary and whole, and not just a bundle of perceptions existing in us like 
soldiers in a wooden horse. In connection with this, we have begun to see that the being 
of the objects revealed by perception are not simply physical, material objects, but are 
rather better understood as beings discovered in their striving.  
 I have also shown that perception – for example, the perception of these two 
sticks as ‘equal’ – involves not only an unconscious synthesis in order to hold the objects 
together as unitary individuals, but also a world and a context in which the perceived 
object derives its meaning. This led us to the understanding that the Phaedo is arguing for 
a “metaphysical universe larger than that of isolated entities.”262 Objects of perception – 
wagon, wall, army, 6 – only make sense in the “space of comparison” in which the soul 
holds them in the activity of understanding. Just as the speech “1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6” makes 
sense only if the “invisibly present” soul of the hearer knows ahead of time that the 
speech is intended to denote “6,” so, too, does a part of a wagon, or the wall around 
Athens, only appear as the sensible object it is in light of an understanding of the context 
in which it appears. That context, the “whole,” must be “somehow manifest in advance.” 
However, this manifestness must also involve concealment.263 
 An essential aspect of this context has appeared in terms of the “striving” that 
appears in the identification of any situation as necessary to achieve a set of goals – e.g. 
these two sticks are “equal” in terms of my needs for kindling. The perception of the two 
                                                
262 Russon 2000, p 72. 
263 Sallis 1996, p 90. 
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sticks has appeared to not simply detect “what they are,” in the sense of detecting the 
bare physical presence, the materiality, of the sticks; rather, in perception, what is 
revealed is a situation; with reference to the account of recollection at 73d, we found that 
whether or not recollection takes place depends in part on personal involvement in the 
situation – for example, erotic attachments. Recollection is a human phenomenon that 
occurs in the context of interpersonal and political life.  
 This situation, as I have demonstrated, involves identifying a ‘space of 
comparison’ within which the stick is identified as that which it is – i.e. identity is 
revealed to be contextual and relational. This identification necessitates being able to 
determine the being of the object in terms of the good – i.e., judgment of “better” and 
“worse” is implied in identification of any object or any situation as striving. This 
identification also reveals the necessity of the qua – i.e., identifying any thing by name 
(as a wagon, or an army, or as equal, big, or good) is identifying it in terms of, qua, some 
particular quality of the thing.  
 By looking to the Theaetetus, we discovered that the work – the essential activity 
– of the ψυχή is holding together the sensory “data” into coherent, sensible things 
existing in a context in which they can be understood. We saw that the unity which arises 
from this activity of the ψυχή – that which is named with reference to the forms – is 
more than the sum of its parts. We will now turn to the account of the soul as a harmony 
in the Phaedo to begin to understand how it is these unities – identified by the ψυχή in 
terms of λόγος, in terms of the names we give and the stories we tell – which are the 
essential “parts” of the human world in which we live, and not atomic physical entities, 
materialistically understood.  
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Chapter 6 
Aρμονία 
 
§1 Bodies and Harmonies 
 
 We have discovered that the perception of anything as equal, or good, or as a 
‘this,’ is only possible due the activity of the self drawing the multiplicity of a 
phenomenon together into a unitary ‘this,’ in accord with λόγος. In so doing, the self 
determines the ‘being and benefit’ of everything it encounters. Plato has shown us that 
this determination happens in accord with the λόγοι that the individual making the 
judgment accepts as true; further, this determination involves their own erotic, social, and 
interpersonal history, as well as the broader metaphysical context in which we apprehend 
anything – be it a wagon, an army, or two equal sticks. These judgments about the being 
of phenomena are possible on the grounds of the soul’s power to draw together, gather up 
and hold, a multiplicity into a unitary ‘this.’ In this chapter, we will find that the activity 
of the soul in drawing the multiplicity of phenomenal field into ‘beings’ is identical to the 
structure of identifying a harmony as a unitary ‘this’ beyond a simple conglomeration of 
parts. That is, to identify any being as the being that it is requires being attuned to the 
harmony between the ‘parts’ of that being – whether it be a wagon or a courageous act.  
 In this connection, we will also continue to examine the significance of the fact 
that the self views itself as a unitary ‘this.’ This view holds sway when we attend to our 
life as an object of concern, attempt to care for our soul, or simply say “I.” This 
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identification of the self has the structure of a (more or  less) harmonious ‘this’ which 
arises out of the multiplicity we encounter when we attend to our own identity. Thus, we 
will continue to explore the activity of the self in gathering itself to itself as a unity, in 
accord with λόγος.  
 
 In this chapter, I will spend some time examining the details of Simmias’ 
argument against the immortality of the soul. Simmias presents the λόγος that the soul is 
a harmony – a λόγος which, as we have seen, Echecrates says has always had a 
“wondrous hold” on him. The introduction of Cebes’ and Simmias’ counter-arguments is 
a central, important turning point in the dialogue. Before presenting Socrates’ response to 
these arguments, Plato calls attention to them by returning to the frame-dialogue between 
Phaedo and Echecrates long after Socrates’ execution. They express their feeling of 
ἀναταράξαι at being “thrown down” upon hearing these λόγοι after having been so 
convinced by Socrates’ earlier arguments (88c). It is at this moment that we get the 
“digression” on misology which we discussed earlier – a “digression” which has been 
called “the existential center of the dialogue.”264 As such, we must keep in mind that 
Socrates’ response to these λόγοι will have some bearing on the danger of misology – 
said to be the most dangerous πάθη a person can undergo, and devastating to the life of 
philosophy.  
 One of the factors that we discovered when looking at the danger of misology was 
the issue of trust (πίστις). I showed that central to the danger of misology was holding to 
λόγοι in the wrong way – as Socrates says, without the proper τέχνη of λόγος. The 
                                                
264 Piper 2005.  
 237 
παιδεία that the Phaedo intends to engage in – and the specific lessons we are to draw 
from Socrates’ response to Simmias and Cebes – will have some bearing on how we hold 
to λόγος; thus, we will be attentive to how these responses frame the issue of the place of 
λόγος in the activity of the soul in order to fill out our understanding of the place and 
importance of λόγος for the self-care and self-knowledge that, I have argued, is the 
ultimate goal of the philosophical life, of Socrates’ questioning, and of the dialogues 
themselves. Thus we will be attentive to a way of holding to λόγος and being serious 
about λόγος which is distinctive of the mature philosopher, and which is lacking in the 
sophist, the ἀντιλογικός, and the misologist. Of course, central to this discussion will be 
an awareness of the danger posed by the hold that unexamined, traditional λόγοι have on 
us.  
 Indeed, in this chapter I will show that the way one holds a λόγος, and the 
reasons why one is convinced of the truth of a λόγος, is an explicit theme of Socrates’ 
response to Simmias (as well as to Cebes). This should not be surprising to us, since we 
have taken proper care in being attentive to the way Plato has prepared the ground for us 
to receive these arguments which, while being explicitly about the immortality of the 
soul, are indeed about so much more.  
 In this vein, we are further reminded that, as I argued in Chapter 2, we come into 
these responses ready to hear about a philosophical process, a life, which develops and 
grows from youth to maturity; that is, in these pages we are attuned to listen for 
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something other than a philosophical doctrine with access to eternal and unchanging 
truth.265  
 I will show that Socrates’ defense points to an ontological difference between 
harmony as a physical and composite joining of physical parts, to an ‘other’ sense of 
ἁρμονία as the relation between λόγοι that we hold to be true. This sense of harmony 
will crucially foreshadow how we are to understand the practice of philosophy as 
described in the second sailing, where Socrates describes a process by which we can 
begin to deal with cognitive dissonance and internal dissent by making sure that our 
beliefs are “consonant” (συμφωνεῖν) with one another (100a).  
 I will also argue that the presentation of the soul as a harmony is never fully 
refuted by Socrates’ response. The specifically materialistic form in which Simmias 
presents this theory is shown to be faulty. However, other conceptions of the soul as a 
harmony arise which Plato wants the reader to seriously consider, whether or not this is 
supposed to be his final “teaching,” or a doctrine to be taken over by the reader. I will 
show that the arguments presented in these passages reveal the soul to be fundamentally 
embodied, just as the living body of a ζῶον is fundamentally ensouled. As such, I will 
show that Socrates’ arguments, in pointing to ontological difference, are not able to prove 
personal immortality of the individual soul – as I will argue is the case with regard to his 
‘final’ argument in response to Cebes.266  
                                                
265 Cf Burger 1984: Socrates’ response to Cebes “turns out to be the unfolding of a techne that 
generates trust in logos, and Socrates’ own intellectual development a reflection of the necessary 
progression of philosophic thought itself.” (p 135) 
266 This fact – that Socrates’ arguments are able to show that the soul as such, the form of the soul 
continues to exist after death, but not the individual soul – is true of many of the arguments he 
makes. E.g. see Davis’ comments on the first argument: “[Cebes] senses the inadequacy of the 
first argument; it had not sufficiently preserved the individual soul, the self.” (1980, p 568, 
emphasis added) 
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 In connection with the discussion of self-mastery at 93aff., which argues for an 
internal multiplicity and dissonance, I will turn to consideration of the theory of the tri-
partite soul in the Republic. I will show that the context in which this theory is presented 
indicates that it is not a final answer to the question of the diversity and conflict 
experienced in the self. This theory was not intended to be taken to be Plato’s teaching on 
the nature of the soul. In its specific inadequacies, this theory will point to a “longer 
road” to an understanding of the ψυχή, and of its internal complexity. I argue that this 
longer path is, in part, being followed out in the Phaedo.  
 
1.1 Introduction to the Images of the Soul  
 
 The introduction of Simmias and Cebes’ attacks on Socrates’ arguments for the 
immortality of the soul has become quite a famous moment in the Platonic corpus. A long 
moment of silence – presumably fraught with the “simply absurd” πάθος Phaedo 
described, pleasure mixed together with pain – follows Socrates’ seeming proof, based on 
the likeness of the soul to the incomposite forms, that the philosopher shall have no fear 
that the soul shall be scattered with the winds upon death (84a-b). Into this silence, 
Simmias and Cebes are heard whispering to one another. When Socrates notices this, he 
prompts them to continue the conversation by expressing doubt that his proofs have, in 
fact, settled the matter. Socrates says: “What is it? You think there is something lacking 
in the previous argument, do you? Certainly, in many ways it’s still open to suspicions 
and counter-attacks – if that is, somebody is going to go through it sufficiently (ἱκανῶς 
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διεξιέναι).” (84c) Socrates confirms that he wants the discussion to move to a higher 
level – to criticize what has been said in order to continue thinking through the matters at 
hand – by saying that he does not want to change the subject: “Now, if you two are 
considering something else, I have nothing to say. But if you’re perplexed (ἀπορεῖτον) 
about all this, don’t hesitate to speak up yourselves and go through it if it appears to you 
that it could’ve been said better.” (ibid.) Socrates thus indicates his desire to continue 
inquiring into the subject of the nature of the ψυχή, and the possibility of its immortality; 
specifically, he invites Simmias and Cebes – and by extension, readers of the dialogue – 
to cast doubt on the strength of the arguments he has offered by “going through” 
(διεξιέναι) what has been said thoroughly. Simmias and Cebes, of course, do not choose 
to thoroughly examine and go through what has been said, but rather offer other λόγοι 
about, and images of, the soul that disagree with the account Socrates has been 
formulating.  
 Simmias and Cebes have been resisting the temptation to offer these new accounts 
due to their fear that it will unpleasant for Socrates to hear an account of the soul as 
death-bound on the day of his execution. (84d) In response to this, Socrates offers his 
famous image of the swan, singing most beautifully when it senses that it must die. Like 
the swans, Socrates claims to be a servant of Apollo, and as such to be a prophet singing 
of the good things in Hades.267 The mistake that Simmias and Cebes make – mistaking 
Socrates’ calm as a façade attempting to cover a deeper fear of death which they should 
not disturb with their counter-arguments – is similar in structure to the mistake that 
                                                
267 There might be a note of irony in the reference to the Appolonian power of prophecy. In the 
Apology (20eff) Socrates reports a delphic (thus, Appolonian) ‘prophecy’ which proclaims 
Socrates to be the wisest man; it might be ironic in that this claim to highest wisdom only comes 
as result of his knowledge of his own ignorance, while in the Phaedo he is claiming knowledge of 
what no living man can know.  
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people make when hearing the swan song. In both cases, people project their own fear of 
death, and through that projection, misinterpret what they experience: “But humans, 
because of their fear of death, tell lies against the swans and say they sing out in pain, 
wailing for their death.” (85a, emphasis added) Socrates assures them that this is not the 
case; he will not be disturbed by an attack on the arguments for the immortality of the 
soul. Simmias and Cebes should feel free to say anything they want, “as long as the 
Athenian Eleven allow it.” Socrates reaffirms that he views death as not being 
misfortune. (84e) Considering that he has just plainly stated that the previous arguments 
leave room for doubt about the nature and immortality of the soul, we once again are 
driven to ask why he is so calm facing death. His mention of the political powers which 
control the prison also reminds us that he is engaging in this conversation against the 
advice of the jailer, and despite the fact that the conversation may increase the physical 
suffering of his death. We are left to wonder how his discourse on the soul can be thought 
to be a threat to the polis, and thus why it might be disallowed by the Eleven.  
 In the preface to his argument, Simmias foreshadows the second sailing.268 
Simmias begins by saying that it is difficult (παγχάλεπον), if not impossible 
(ἀδύνατον), to “know anything sure (σαφὲς) about such matters in our life now.” (85c, 
emphasis mine) However, he claims that it is only a “soft” or “effeminate” (μαλθακοῦ) 
man who does not investigate such matters “from all sides” and not back down until he is 
“worn out (ἀπείπῃ) with investigating.” (ibid.) The courageous man must “learn or 
discover what’s the case (ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἢ εὑρεῖν ἤ), or, if that’s impossible 
(ἀδύνατον), he must sail through life in the midst of danger, seizing on the best and least 
                                                
268 This connection is also noticed by Ross 1982.  
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refutable (δυσεξελεγκτότατον) of human accounts (ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων), at any rate, 
and letting himself be carried upon it as on a raft – unless, that is, he could journey more 
safely and less dangerously on a more stable carrier, some divine account (λόγου 
θείου).” (85c-d)269 Socrates, then, would seem to be echoing Simmias in giving the 
account he does of the second sailing. Of course, in that passage, the metaphor is slightly 
altered by Socrates, providing oars to direct the course of the ‘raft’ upon which we sail 
through the dangers of life – which is subtly different from Simmias’ image of floating 
without power or direction of our own. We will return to this point in the next chapter.  
  
1.2 Soul as a Tuning and Personal Immortality 
 
 Simmias begins his account by specifically referencing Socrates’ last argument in 
isolation – the “Affinity Argument” which states that the soul is “most like” the 
incomposite and incorruptible forms, and thus “less likely” to suffer decomposition in 
death; he seems to ignore the other arguments offered. He begins by stating that someone 
could give the “same account” (τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον) about “a tuning and a lyre and its 
strings” that Socrates gave about the soul. Specifically, it could be said that it – both the 
tuning and the soul – is something “invisible and bodiless and something altogether 
beautiful” while the physical lyre and its strings are “bodies and body-like and composite, 
and are earthlike and akin to the deathbound.” (86a) Socrates has just argued that the soul 
                                                
269 We note that Simmias, in the last two passages quoted, uses the term ἀδύνατον to refer to the 
“impossibility” of discovering clear knowledge in “such matters.” He is literally wondering if it is 
in our power to know such things with certainty. Considering our account of the activity of the 
soul – that is of the “power,” the δύναμις of the ψυχή – we note that Simmias is wondering if 
the ψυχή possesses the δύναμις to achieve certainty in matters concerning the afterlife. Thus, the 
dialogue is posing the question: What is it within the power of the soul to know? 
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is “more like” the divine and deathless, and thus less “likely” to suffer decomposition and 
to perish with the body. Simmias argues that the same case could be made for the tuning 
of a lyre, but Simmias implies that it is obvious that the tuning does not continue to exist 
“somewhere” (86c) after the instrument is destroyed.270 Simmias does not argue for this 
position, but simply asserts it as prima facie obvious. As such – in claiming that it is 
undeniable that the tuning of the lyre (and by analogy, the soul) would perish when we 
cut the strings and smash the instrument (or the body) – Simmias fails to make a 
distinction between the particular instance of a tuning necessarily imperfectly present in 
any particular lyre, and the ‘ideal’ tuning of a lyre.  
 At this point, Simmias has levied an argument against Socrates’ most recent 
argument that is quite damning if we accept his “obvious” premise that the tuning is 
destroyed when we cut the strings, but Socrates does not directly respond to this attack. 
He does not reformulate or restate the Affinity Argument in order to show why Simmias’ 
attack is not fatal. Instead, he goes on – after asking to hear Cebes’ objection, and after 
the digression concerning the danger of misology – to elicit Simmias’ agreement that the 
soul cannot be a tuning on other grounds; specifically, Socrates argues that the 
conception of the soul as a tuning is inconsistent with (Simmias’ conception of) the 
Recollection Argument – which is not the same as responding to his attack on the 
Affinity Argument. That is, in his argument, Simmias claims that the soul is not merely 
like a tuning – in being invisible and “more like” the divine – but rather that the soul is a 
tuning.271 It is this stipulation – which is not essential to his attack on the logic of the 
                                                
270 This passage reminds us of the connection between being and presence in a τόπος that we 
discussed in Chapter 3, and which, I argue, Plato is driving us to overcome.  
271 Ronna Burger shows this to be an error on Simmias’ part. She argues that soul as harmony is 
an image, but that Simmias “quickly forgets its status as an image, transforming it into an analysis 
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Affinity Argument – that Socrates chooses to contest. That is, Socrates does not go on to 
show that the tuning of a lyre can continue to exist, nor to claim that there is a dis-
analogy between the argument concerning a lyre and the Affinity Argument. Instead, by 
getting Simmias to agree that the soul as a tuning is inconsistent with one of Simmias’ 
other beliefs – which he claims he holds more dear, as we will see – Socrates dismisses 
his argument by dismissing only that the soul is a tuning, not addressing the possibility 
that it is “like” a tuning.272  
 Considering this fact – that Socrates does not directly attack Simmias’ argument – 
what are we to read in Socrates’ “usual keen look” and his smile in response to Simmias’ 
argument? (86d) This  argument should be analyzed with special care for several reasons: 
1. Socrates does not attack this aspect of the argument directly, 2. he smiles in response, 
3. he says that what Simmias’ is saying “is certainly just,” 4. Socrates asks for others to 
respond to the argument (a rarity in the dialogues, to say the least), and 5. Socrates then 
‘buys time’ – possibly to compose his response – by asking that Cebes offer his objection 
before he answers Simmias. (86d-e) 
                                                                                                                                            
of the physiology of the psyche.” (1984, p 105) Considering the Pythagorean overtones to the 
dialogue, and the fact that, as Aristotle says, the Pythagoreans considered the whole universe to 
be, in some sense, ἁρμονία και ἄριθμος (Metaphysics 986a), it is tempting to hypothesize a 
Pythagorean origin to this theory. However, the specific interpretation that Simmias presents of 
this theory is materialistic – presenting a “medical” sense of ἁρμονία as a balance between hot 
and cold and wet and dry (cf Symposium 188a) – and is thus at odds with the Pythagorean 
teaching of the transmigration of souls (For a fuller discussion of this point, see Burnet 1920, p 
295-297 and Hackforth 1955, p 101-103). Simmias’ conception of harmony misunderstands the 
sense in which all things are a harmony and an ἄριθμος. It is to this misunderstanding that 
Socrates responds in his attack, as I will show. As such, the sense in which this harmony here 
participates in the universal proper tuning, and unalterable relation between notes, is at play in 
Socrates’ refutation; thus, as I will show, it is immediately clear that Socrates’ refutation of 
Simmias’ (and Cebes’) presentation of images of the ψυχή is not merely concerned with the 
nature of the soul, but is rather concerned with the proper understanding of μέθεξις, the 
χωρισμός between the sensible and the intelligible, and as Socrates says, of Cebes’ λόγος, that in 
order to address it, he must “concern himself with the cause concerning generation and 
destruction as a whole.” (95e) 
272 Cf Burger 1984, p 123. 
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 Simmias, getting caught up in his image, argues that the soul is a tuning which 
arises out of the proper balance and measured harmony of the “parts” of the body – we 
will see that his identification of these “parts” is revelatory to the source of his 
inspiration. He states:  
. . . you’ve gathered that we take (ὑπολαμβάνομεν) the soul to be just this sort 
of thing – that while our body is strung and held together (συνεχομένου) by 
warm and cold and dry and wet and the like, our soul is, as it were, a blend and 
tuning of these very things, whenever, that is, they are blended with one another 
in a measured and beautiful (καλῶς καὶ μετρίως) way. If, then, the soul turns 
out to be some sort of tuning, it’s clear that whenever our body is relaxed or 
strained without measure (ἀμέτρως) by diseases and other evils, it’s a necessity 
that the soul perish right away, even though she’s most divine (θειοτάτην) – just 
as do other ‘tunings’ in sounds and in all the works of craftsmen – while the 
remains of each body stick around for a long time until they’re burned or rot. 
(86b-c emphasis added)  
 
Simmias identifies the harmony of the soul to be a harmonious ordering of physical 
elements conceived as forming opposing pairs – hot and cold, wet and dry “and the like.” 
This idea obviously has roots in Pre-Socratic physical philosophy – to which Socrates 
will respond in his autobiography. However, Simmias shows himself to be largely 
ignorant of any details; he merely repeats a general account that he assumes is accepted 
by the unspecified “we” that he refers to. In addition to pointing out the unphilosophical 
way in which Simmias has come to accept this λόγος, it is precisely the materialism 
inherent in the image that Socrates chooses to respond to in his more direct attacks on this 
conception of soul as harmony. In so doing, he will provide Simmias, and us, with the 
opportunity to think of the nature and importance of an other conception of harmony, one 
not based in simply physical tensions and oppositions. 
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 In any case, we see that Socrates does not “directly” respond to the attack on his 
flawed Affinity Argument. In order to do so, Socrates would have to show that the tuning 
could, in some sense, continue to exist after the destruction of the lyre. In order to do this, 
he would have to make an ontological distinction between this tuning here, and the ideal 
harmony of a perfect tuning for a lyre. It is this ideal tuning to which the musician 
“looks” when tuning an instrument, which cannot be perfectly instantiated in any 
physical instrument, and which is not destroyed with the cutting of any set of strings. It 
would presumably have been quite easy to get Simmias to agree to this, since he has 
emphatically endorsed the existence of the forms. We will see that Socrates accomplishes 
precisely this ontological shift subtly in his attack on Simmias’ account of the tuning (by 
pointing to non-physical conceptions of ἁρμονία) and in his final argument for the 
immortality of the soul (by pointing to the forms as causes). However, Socrates does not 
respond to Simmias explicitly with this line of argument because, as we will see, to do so 
would only prove the continued existence of the form of the soul as such, and not any 
individual, personal ψυχή. I will show, in discussing the final argument for the 
immortality of the soul, that this is all Socrates is able to prove, and not personal 
immortality. That is, the turn to the ideal form of the tuning of a lyre which is not made 
explicitly by Simmias, and toward which Socrates merely gestures, will prove only that 
the harmonies and ratios inherent in the proper ideal tuning continue to exist after the 
strings of this lyre are cut; this turn is insufficient to prove that this imperfect tuning 
present here in these strings continues to exist after the strings are cut and the instrument 
destroyed.  
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 Moreover, while not himself making the distinction between a particular tuning, 
and the principle of tuning itself, Socrates does provide us with – both in his account of a 
non-physical harmony and in his later invocation of the forms – the tools necessary to 
make this distinction, and to contemplate the importance and nature of the distinction for 
ourselves. Again, it is critical that we at least attempt to read the dialogue without 
importing later accounts of the nature of this ontological distinction by referring to what 
we have come to know as Plato’s “Theory of the Forms.” Considering the Pythagorean 
sources of this λόγος – as Aristotle says, and as the frame of this dialogue indicates – we 
would do well to attend to the relation between this tuning here and the principle and 
proper measure of ideal tuning when trying to access the origins of this ontological 
distinction.  
 
§2 Socrates’ Response to Simmias 
 
 I will now turn to an account of Socrates’ response to Simmias’ image of the soul 
as a harmony.  
 
2.1 Living Bodies and Lifeless Corpses 
 
 After buying time by hearing Cebes’ counterargument, and after the digression 
into misology, Socrates begins his response to the two interlocutors by recounting their 
λόγοι in case he hasn’t “remembered.” (91c) It is unlikely that this is the true purpose of 
Socrates’ re-telling of their arguments; it is more likely that he subtly changes the terms 
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of the argument in his reformulation. Indeed, with respect to Simmias’ argument, he 
erases the aspect in which it was an attack on the logic of the Affinity Argument. 
Socrates instead says that Simmias is “terrified” that if the soul is “in the form of a tuning 
(ἐν ἁρμονίας εἴδει οὖσα)” it will perish “before” the decomposition of the body, despite 
being more divine than the body, as will a tuning at the decomposition of the lyre. 
(91d)273 
 In emphasizing the “before,” Socrates is pointing to the fact that Simmias, in his 
argument, seems unable to make the distinction between the body as a living entity 
bearing an animating ψυχή and the lifeless corpse. This is a distinction that Plato will 
insist we consider at 115d, where Socrates chides Crito for his lack of attention to this 
distinction; Simmias and Crito seem to make the mistake of treating the physical corpse 
as still “Socrates’ body,” not recognizing that some sort of ontological change takes place 
at death, at the departure of the ψυχή. They seem to believe – since the body will last 
longer than the soul – that the body remains what it was in life, minus the presence of the 
soul. Socrates insists we consider the fact that when the soul “leaves” the body, it does 
not leave the body intact; It is not Socrates’ body minus the ghostly presence of another 
thing. It is not as if we have removed the spirits from a bottle and have left the bottle 
itself unchanged. Full or empty, the bottle is what it is, and will change and suffer the 
same fate regardless of the presence of the spirits inside it. The body is not like this; as 
soon as the soul is “removed,” the body changes, and begins immediately to decay.  
                                                
273 Socrates draws our attention to the fact that Simmias’ argument operates based on an image by 
referring directly to the image of a tuning while, when discussing Cebes’ attack, he does not 
mention the image of the cloak-maker. Socrates must consider Simmias’ image to be central to 
his argument, while considering Cebes’ image to be incidental to the attack he levies against the 
soul as immortal. (91d) 
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 This clearly implies that soul and body are not two simply distinct entities 
cohabitating in the same space, each with an individual nature to be defined in separation 
from the other.274 Upon departing, the soul does not simply leave the body as it was, but 
“takes something away,” fundamentally changing the body in its very being – from living 
body to meat, to a corpse. The soul and body, then, are ontologically intertwined for all 
the distinction that we are tempted to – and at a certain level of thinking must – make 
between them. The body is not a corpse plus a soul, but is rather an ensouled body: A 
living thing, a ζῶον. Thus, the converse must be considered as well. Whether or not it 
need be taken as Plato’s “final teaching,” he wants us to consider that possibility that the 
soul is not “entombed” in a simply distinct body, but is rather an embodied soul. Again: It 
is a living thing. To understand the soul is not to understand something simply distinct 
from the active and living body of an animal, but rather to attend to the animate principle 
of a physical body. To understand the soul is not to attend to something otherworldly – as 
the “true-born philosophers” contend; rather, to understand the soul is always to attend to 
the active principle of a living thing.275 
 This ζῶον, this living thing, is something distinct from the sum of its parts – even 
in their proper “balance” and “beautiful measure.” This unity is the self – and it is always 
a particular self, a “this.” This unity is the object of self-knowledge, and, as we have 
seen, this unity is also the active subject of knowing. That is, the soul’s activity “itself 
                                                
274 As Gans says in his comments in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: “The concept and its worldly 
being are two sides, separate but united like soul and body. The body is the same life as the soul, 
and yet both can be named as lying outside each other. A soul without a body would be nothing 
living, and vice versa. . . It is not only harmony, but complete interpenetration.” (2002, p 11) 
275 Jaeger 1943, p 43: “The only way to understand the soul of which Socrates speaks is to take it 
together with the body as two different sides of one human nature. In his thought, there is no 
opposition between physical and psychical man; the old conception of physis which stems form 
natural philosophy now takes in the spirit too, and thereby is essentially changed.” 
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through itself” is the act of determining the being and beauty and harmony of the things 
that are sensed – discovered as not simple physical presence, but rather as “striving” 
toward their good, their τέλος. This unity granted by the vision of the good (as I will 
show in my discussion of the second sailing) is the object of knowledge, identified and 
named by the soul; it is this unity that we identify when we reveal the being of a thing. To 
know the being of a thing, we must not reduce our understanding of it to an analysis of its 
physical parts (as I will argue is the point of much of Socrates’ autobiography.) It is this 
unity that is identified – beyond the physical parts and any harmony that must exist 
between them in order for organic life to be possible – when we identify a ζῶον, an 
ensouled body, e.g. Socrates himself.  
 One of Socrates’ most striking examples in his autobiography is his own self. To 
know Socrates, to know the cause of him sitting in prison, is not to give an account of his 
bones and sinews – his physical parts. Rather, it is to know the good, the end, toward 
which he has looked when he made the decision to remain in the jail – even in the face of 
Crito’s offer of safe escape. The process by which Socrates came to determine the proper 
course of action necessarily includes his own account of the situation he is in. It is his 
account of the being of his situation that makes the ethical demand upon him that he obey 
the laws and remain. This decision reveals the unity and being of the situation he 
“senses.” It is, as we have seen, the activity of the soul “itself through itself” that makes 
the determination of the “being and benefit” of his situation. To know the cause of 
Socrates sitting in prison is to know the operation and activity of his soul. For Socrates to 
know himself, then, is for him to understand the basis on which –  i.e. the account he can 
give, the λόγος in terms of which – he has gathered the situation into a unity and 
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determined its “being and benefit.” To know himself, he must know himself as the ζῶον 
λόγον – as that being which takes its own being and good to be an issue for it. He knows 
himself as an instance of the animal which takes part in determining its own τέλος 
through conscious reflection and rationality.  
 
 While these observations are getting ahead of themselves, hopefully it is 
beginning to become more clear to the reader how these comments arise out of a reading 
of Socrates’ responses to Simmias and Cebes; more importantly, I hope it is beginning to 
become clear how they speak directly to the questions that arose in a careful reading of 
the first parts of the dialogue – which, among many other things, ask us to consider the 
place of λόγος in unity and in self-knowledge. That is, after leading his friends into the 
heart of the labyrinth, and at the physical and “existential” center of the dialogue, 
revealing to them the Minotaur of misology, Socrates begins to lead them (us) back out; 
in so doing, he is weaving together the threads that have been laid out before us in the 
λόγοι into a coherent image of the soul as the elusive simultaneous subject and object of 
self-reflection, self-knowledge, and care of the self. Thus, we are beginning to fill out the 
conception of how the dialogues, through the figure of Socrates “grown young and 
beautiful,” present the “turn inward,” as Hegel has put it; it is this that Werner Jaeger 
determined to be the central historical import of the dialogues, which he calls the 
“spiritual” contribution of Greek culture to the creation of “the concept of a personality 
fully self-conscious and responsible to itself.”276 
  
                                                
276 1943, p 6. 
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2.2 Charlatans and Demonstrations 
 
 Socrates wastes no time in dismissing Simmias’ argument. He immediately points 
out that, on the assumption that the recollection argument actually proves the existence of 
the soul before birth, Simmias cannot hold that the soul is a harmony and still maintain 
his belief in recollection. (92a) That is, since the soul could not arise from the harmony of 
the elements of the body if it pre-existed the body, Simmias has to decide between his 
belief in the argument from recollection – understood to prove this pre-existence – and 
his λόγος that the soul is a tuning.277 Socrates tells him that it is improper for his 
argument about tuning to fail to “sing in accord” with his other beliefs, and thus he must 
choose.278 In his explanation of why he chooses the recollection argument, Simmias says 
the soul as a tuning only has a certain “attractiveness” (εὐπρεπείας) and likelihood 
(εἰκότος), and lacks a clear demonstration (ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως). He states that this is 
precisely why it has such a hold on so many people (as we saw it significantly had on 
Echecrates).  
                                                
277 Socrates – in addition to pressing Simmias to think of a way to understand how learning is 
recollection without endorsing the mythical pre-existence of the soul, as I will show – is 
apparently also trying to get him to re-think the nature of harmony; at 92b he says plainly, without 
explanation, that a harmony is not “the sort of thing [Simmias] compares (ἀπεικάζεις) it to.” 
Unfortunately, Simmias does not ask him what he means. With Burger, I lament that Simmias 
does not take the opportunity to “argue that perhaps harmony is not a composite pragma, or that 
the psyche is a harmony, but not of corporeal elements.” (1984, p 123) 
278 Bedu-Addo misses the point of this argument. In the context of discussing the “method of 
hypothesis,” he says: “We are, in effect, to ensure the consequences of the hypothesis - whether 
they are purely logical consequences or the results of its applications to particular cases - are all 
consistently tenable; that is to say, we are to test the hypothesis by means of the Socratic elenchus 
in much the same manner as Simmias' logos, namely, that 'the soul is an attunement' is tested at 
92a-94e. If the hypothesis leads to conflicting or absurd consequences, as in the case of Simmias' 
logos, we should naturally abandon it and start all over again with another hypothesis; for the first 
has been refuted.” (1969, p 120) However, it is clear that the results of Simmias’ logos do not 
conflict with one another, but rather with other λόγοι that Simmias holds to.  
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 Insofar as it is essential to understand how the Phaedo is giving us the advice that 
we should know ourselves, we must pay special attention to this passage for several 
reasons: To know ourselves is to know the soul; I have argued that the soul is to be 
known in terms of its activity in granting the intelligibility of the things we perceive; I 
have shown that this activity, in determining the “being and benefit” of things, occurs 
based in the individual’s particular “education” and “engagement” (πραγμάτων) with 
things; thus, the soul’s activity, itself through itself, which is the object of self-
knowledge, includes the concepts and categories with which we determine the being, 
meaning, and value of things. To know the self is, at least in part, to examine the 
presuppositions and categories by which we order our experience. Simmias’ speech 
gives an account of how the philosophical man should regard which presuppositions to 
maintain and which to reject. I will show that, like Theaetetus, his “beautiful speech” is 
not carried out in his behavior.  
 Simmias states that:  
I know that arguments that make their demonstrations (ἀποδείξεις) through 
likelihoods (εἰκότων) are imposters (εἰκότων), and if one doesn’t have one’s 
guard up against them, they do quite a good job of deceiving us, both in 
geometry and in everything else. But the recollection and learning argument was 
established through a hypothesis worthy of being accepted. For it was 
established, I suppose, that our soul is even before arriving in the body, just as 
certainly as that Being she belongs with has the title ‘that which is.’ And this 
being, I persuade myself, I’ve accepted for adequate and right reasons. Then 
because of all this, it’s necessary for me, as it seems, to allow neither myself nor 
anyone else to say that soul is a tuning. (92 d-e) 
 
There are many indications within his speech that he is not being true to the principle he 
endorses here, and that even he underestimates how good a job of deceiving us these 
attractive λόγοι can do. He says that he “supposes” that the “recollection and learning 
argument” established the pre-existence of the soul, and that he has “persuaded” himself 
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that he has accepted this for the right reasons. Socrates will later tell him, and us, to re-
examine everything that has been said; Simmias here, with this “I suppose,” indicates that 
he has an inkling that the argument needs such a reexamination. He, unfortunately, does 
not engage in such an examination, but assumes that he has accepted the pre-existence of 
the soul on the basis of demonstration; in fact, I have shown that he has accepted based in 
a likeness – the likeness of the soul to the ‘beings.’ This is indicated in Simmias’ speech 
when he says that the soul “belongs with” Being – a clear reference to the Likeness 
Argument. This thesis – that learning is recollection and thus must be recollection of 
something learned before birth – is obviously attractive to Simmias, but he has accepted 
it without demonstration. He gives this away simply by his own uncertainty: If he had 
understood the issue via a clear proof or demonstration he would not have to “persuade” 
himself of the validity of the demonstration— it would be immediately clear to him that 
such was the case.  
 As Burger says: “Simmias has affirmed the recollection argument on the basis of 
an unexamined assumption concerning the existence and nature of “the beings”. . .”279 
This shows that saying, and even believing, that one should only accept λόγοι on the 
basis of demonstrations and not how appealing or plausible they may seem to you, 
unfortunately, does not guarantee that the beliefs that are operative in your soul’s activity, 
ordering and informing your world, are based in such a demonstration. The image 
Simmias uses of the vagabond charlatan (ἀλαζών) is useful in this regard: One can know 
that such charlatans exist, warn others about them, and yet still fall prey to an especially 
charming and attractive one!  
                                                
279 1984, p 123.  
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 One way to think about what is needed, in light of this situation, is for Simmias to 
engage in an inquiry into the coherence of the beliefs he holds – an inquiry that would 
have begun Simmias on a difficult and revealing path of self inquiry when he discovered 
the tension between his belief in the “beings” and the pre-existence of the soul and his 
belief in the soul as a tuning. This is one aspect of the method Socrates will describe as 
his second sailing. That is, instead of simply rejecting the theory that the soul is a 
harmony, Simmias should have begun to examine the nature and importance of the 
coherence of the beliefs with which he orders his world, and determines the “being and 
benefit” of things he encounters; it is precisely this process that Socrates inaugurates as 
his “second sailing.” 
   
2.3 Physical and Non-Physical Harmonies 
 
 Socrates has thus, with one “argument,” gotten Simmias to reject the soul as a 
tuning, and to insist that he will let no one else affirm it either! However, if this were 
supposed to be satisfactory to readers – if we were supposed to take the matter as settled 
– it is odd that Socrates goes on to give additional arguments against Simmias which lead 
us to develop a different conception of harmony. We will see that the conception of 
harmony evident in Simmias’ λόγος – that the soul arises from a harmonious relation 
between ‘parts’ of the body – is completely different from the conception of harmony in 
this stage of Socrates’ refutation – that is, harmony as a virtuous condition of the soul.  
 Socrates’ arguments in this section are not intended to simply disprove Simmias’ 
argument and to argue for the immortality of the soul. Simmias is already completely 
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convinced that he was wrong; apparently Socrates does not share his confidence that the 
threat has been resolved; as Burger puts it: “Some implication of Simmias’ image was, 
after all, apparently devastating enough to stop Socrates in his tracks when he first heard 
it. . .”280 We will see what the true intent of these arguments are, and why Plato considers 
it valuable to develop a more sophisticated understanding of harmony.  
 Socrates begins his new line of questioning by asking if a harmony “or any other 
form of composition is apt to be in some other condition than whatever the condition is of 
the things from which its composed?” (93a) Simmias does not ask for clarification of this 
rather vague statement, but affirms that there is “No way” this could be the case. Socrates 
next asks if the harmony can “do (ποιεῖν) or suffer (πάσχειν) anything else beyond what 
those things may do or suffer?” (ibid.) Simmias agrees to this – wrongly, as I will argue – 
and Socrates draws the conclusion that the harmony follows (ἕπεσθαι) the parts, and does 
not lead (ἡγεῖσθαι) them.  
 From this, Socrates is able to conclude that a harmony cannot make movements or 
sounds contrary (ἐναντιωθῆναι) to the parts of which it is composed. (93a) Then, (after 
a digression into virtue as the true harmony of the soul, which I will turn to in a moment) 
Socrates gets Simmias to affirm that since the soul is able to resist thirst and hunger and 
the desires and drives of the body, that it must run contrary to the body, and thus to the 
parts of which it is composed: “And I suppose we see the soul running contrary 
(ἐναντιουμένην) to what belongs to the body (κατὰ τὸ σῶμα) in a thousand other ways, 
don’t we?” (94b) Reminding Simmias that they agreed that the harmony cannot “govern” 
(ἡγεμονεύειν) the parts of which it is made, Socrates concludes that the soul cannot be in 
                                                
280 1984, p 126. 
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the form of a tuning, since it governs and opposes – stands up against (ἐναντιουμένην) – 
the demands of the body.   
 
 However, this is a faulty analysis of the nature of a harmony. In fact, we will find 
that each of Simmias’ answers are in fact incorrect, and do not understand the unity that 
arises out of the parts as a whole which is more than the sum of its parts – just as we saw 
in the argument about the nature of giving a λόγος in the Theaetetus.281 Socrates asks 
Simmias to harmonize his thesis that the soul is a harmony with the argument from 
recollection – that is, with the argument which Socrates makes on the basis of his 
observations concerning our ability to see equality, which we analyzed as the activity of 
the soul ‘itself through itself.’ We will find, significantly, that thinking through what 
Simmias should have answered to each of Socrates’ questions leads to the ability to 
harmonize the two arguments perfectly. 
 The image of the lyre immediately evokes the saying of Heracleitus: “They do not 
understand how differing with itself it agrees with itself: a backturning harmony like the 
bow or the lyre.”282 The palintropos harmonia is a unity that arises out of the parts of 
which it is composed. This unity is the source and location of the being of the thing, of 
the “this” that we call a lyre or a bow. The bow is not simply a string, nor is it a piece of 
wood. Rather, it is these elements placed in a specific relation of opposition to one 
                                                
281 Cf Russon: “The arguments about why a soul cannot be a harmony are quite bad. This is not 
Socrates’ fault, of course. It is Simmias’ poor answers that lead the discussion astray.” (2000, p 
73) 
282 When turning to the interlude in the argument we are addressing at 93b-94b, where Socrates 
argues that the harmony of the soul is virtue, is not present in all souls, and is thus not based in 
material elements, we will turn briefly to Eryximachus’ speech in the Symposium. There, he gives 
an account of health as the harmony produced by the properly balanced elements which compose 
the body. Quoting Heraclitus, Eryximachus disagrees with Heracleitus and claims that opposing 
elements cannot be in harmony.  
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another in order to create a bow. The bow itself is the cause and the goal when the 
tension between the string and wood is created. On its own, the wood would be straight; 
on its own, the string would return to being slack. However, when tied together in the 
proper way – a way which must have the nature of a bow in sight – neither is able to do 
what it would naturally do. The wood is held in an unnatural curve and the string is held 
in an unnatural state of tension. As Russon puts it: “An opposition between the elements 
is built into their relation, and this is the feature that lets the bow be a bow.”283  
 It is the result of this opposition between the elements that the bow is able to fire 
an arrow, and it is in virtue of the same sort of tension that the lyre is able to play music. 
Only when the strings of the lyre are chosen for the proper length and width, and strung 
to exactly the correct tightness, does beautiful music becomes possible – a possibility that 
does not exist with the strings and body alone. That is, it is not the wood nor the strings, 
nor even their simple “combination,” but only a specific form of their opposition that 
makes music, or the firing of an arrow, possible. “The bow is not the wood plus the 
string, but is precisely the self-identity achieved through establishing their 
antagonism.”284 The identity of a lyre is not reducible to its parts; it has its own nature 
above and beyond the simple addition of wood and string into a conglomerate. It is this 
unity that arises from the specific tension and opposition that we know when we 
recognize a thing as a “lyre.”285 
                                                
283 2000, p 75. 
284 Ibid. 
285 We recall that this structure – in which the whole is something more than the parts, 
ontologically prior to the parts, and thus provides the context for the meaning of the parts – is 
identical to what we discovered in Chapter 4 while discussing how knowledge attaches itself to 
intelligible unities in the Theaetetus. The “invisibly present” soul of the individual identifies this 
unity by gathering the phenomenon together into a “one,” a “this,” in accord with λόγος. 
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 If we keep this unity in mind, it becomes clear that Simmias has not fully realized 
the importance of what he said was the “beautiful measure” that the parts of the body 
must have in relation to their opposites in order for life to be possible. If he had realized 
the nature of this unity arising from opposition which is present in his own image of the 
soul, he would have answered Socrates’ questions differently. Specifically, Socrates asks 
if the harmony is “apt to be in any condition other than the condition of its parts 
(προσήκειν ἄλλως πως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἔχῃ ἐξ ὧν ἂν συγκέηται;)?” (93a) 
Socrates is asking if the harmony can “hold itself” (ἔχειν), or be in a state, other than the 
elements. From our analysis of the harmony of the bow or the lyre, we can see that the 
bow is in a state of natural rest, while the elements themselves are being stretched into an 
unnatural position. Socrates next asks if the harmony can do (ποιεῖν) or suffer (πάσχειν) 
anything other than its elements. Again, we find that Simmias did not attend to the nature 
of the harmony; we see immediately that the bow and the lyre certainly can do things that 
the parts in themselves cannot – specifically fire arrows and play music. From these 
observations, it seems clear that the harmony does not, in fact, “follow” the elements, but 
rather leads them. If the elements had their way, the string would be slack, as would the 
wood. It is the harmony which directs the elements and keeps them in unnatural 
conditions.  
 Socrates, of course, concludes that since the soul opposes the demands and desires 
of the parts of the body, it cannot be a harmony. However, as we have seen, it is precisely 
the nature of a harmony to oppose the “desires” (i.e. the natural inclinations) of the 
elements out of which it is composed. Thus, we cannot deduce from the fact that the soul 
resists the inclinations of the body that it is not a harmony. As soon as we are able to see 
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the unified nature of the harmony as a being in itself, above and beyond the sum of its 
parts, we are able to understand how the nature of a bow, a lyre, or a soul can be 
ontologically distinct from the body. However, despite this ontological distinction, the 
harmony is still dependent upon the elements out of which it is composed for its 
existence. This aspect of Simmias’ argument is never addressed or refuted by Socrates. 
As we have seen, Socrates argues that the harmony argument is incompatible with the 
pre-existence of the soul, and he erroneously argues that the soul’s opposition to the 
inclinations of the body do not allow for the soul to be conceived as a harmony.  
 Simmias’ fails to understand the unitary nature of the harmony which arises out of 
the physical parts. This is not entirely Simmias’ fault, however. In his speech at 85eff, 
Simmias refers to the harmony as arising out of the composition of the parts; as such, he 
seems to refer to the harmony as a unitary entity. However, in his response at 92b, 
Socrates changes the terms of the argument, stating that “the tuning is a composite thing 
(ἁρμονία συγκειμένη).” Simmias fails to notice this shift. As we have seen, while 
subtle, this change in language makes all the difference in understanding the nature of a 
harmony, and thus the possibility of the soul itself being a harmony.  
 
 In looking at the arguments concerning harmony, we have discovered that the self 
might yet be understood to be a unitary this arising as a harmony, but it is unclear what 
the components of this harmony are, if they are not the physical parts of the body. 
Whether or not this is Plato’s final teaching is beside the point: He wants us to seriously 
consider the how the self might be conceived as a harmony which is not reducible to the 
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level of understanding of the nature of a ἁρμονία that Simmias displays.286 We must, 
then, follow the clues provided in order to better understand the nature of a harmony, and 
thus to develop the provisional conception of the self as a harmony that Plato demands.  
 
 In the argument concerning harmony, Socrates subtly presents the idea that a 
different conception of harmony – which could possibly help us understand the self as 
harmony – can be developed based in an account of how our λόγοι should harmonize 
with one another. This harmonization, of course, mirrors precisely the method of 
investigation Socrates describes as his ‘second sailing.’ Having failed to discover the 
truth of beings in materialistic explanations, Socrates turns to the λόγος, and in 
describing the practical meaning of this turn, he says that one should seek that each of the 
λόγοι which they believe should harmonize with each other. One dimension of Simmias’ 
failing in his account of harmony is in treating the harmony as ontologically identical 
with the physical parts of the body. In response to this failing, Socrates calls for him to 
develop a conception of harmony which mirrors the harmony that should ideally exist 
among the λόγοι that we give credit to. Thus, we see that there is a deep resonance 
between the (possible) account of the soul that arises from a reading of the harmony 
argument, and the account of the possibility of knowledge presented in the second sailing 
– that is, of the limited knowledge proper to embodied beings without direct access to the 
truth of beings. 
 It is important to note this resonance between self and knowledge. I have argued 
that the Phaedo is, in part, a provocation for the reader to develop self-knowledge. This 
                                                
286 Timaeus offers such an account at 35aff. There, he argues that the soul is a harmony of 
mathematical ratios, rather than of physical parts. 
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knowledge must be based both in a proper ontology of the self, and a proper 
epistemology; put simply, “self-knowledge” must be grounded in an understanding of 
“self” and “knowledge.” In analyzing the way knowledge grasps unities, we discovered a 
deep connection between the ontology of the soul and the nature of knowledge; in short, 
knowledge is the activity of the soul, ‘itself through itself,’ which determines the “being 
and benefit” of what we encounter, of what can be known. An understanding of 
knowledge, then, cannot be developed outside an understanding of the self, of the activity 
of the soul; an understanding of the self cannot be developed outside a developed 
epistemology. The import of the resonance between the harmony that should ideally exist 
between what we know, on the one hand, and the harmony which might present the 
virtuous unity of the self, on the other, will only become fully clear when we have 
analyzed the second sailing passage. However, for now, let it be noted that such a 
resonance exists. This resonance – and its importance for our own self-understanding – 
can only be revealed when we read these passages in light of the work of we have done 
on the earlier parts of the dialogue.  
 
 We have also seen that Simmias’ failing lies precisely in his inability to 
understand how the harmony is a unity which arises from the parts, but which is not 
reducible to the parts. This is precisely what we discovered in our reading of the 
Theaetetus. In that reading, we discovered that a unity arising out of the parts is, in fact, 
the object of knowledge – it is what can be known. When we give an account, a λόγος, 
of anything – for example, a bow or a lyre – we are giving an account of the ‘one,’ the 
‘this,’ that arises from the proper, measured and beautiful arrangement of parts. As we 
 263 
saw there, it is this unity that the soul grasps when, ‘itself through itself,’ it determines 
the “being and benefit” of the things it encounters. Here, in our discussion of the Phaedo, 
we are filling-out our understanding of how the self can be the object of such knowledge 
– i.e. how self-knowledge is possible.  
 From the beginning we have been attuned to the connection between self-
knowledge and virtue; in the next section, I will show that the harmony of the self is 
explicitly said to be virtue. Thus, we can begin to see how the self gathers itself to itself 
in the act of self-knowing; that is, in knowing anything, we determine its being by 
gathering it together, naming it as the ‘one’ that it is, in accord with λόγος. This 
determination names the unified, harmonious whole which arises form the parts. The self 
is such a whole. To know the self is to give an account of one’s life, one’s entire life, 
gathering it together and naming it in accord with the λόγος we give of its being and 
benefit – i.e. of what it is, and what is best for it, of what is the best life. As I will show, 
to ignore the λόγοι through which we gather the life into a unified whole is to ignore the 
good of that life.  
 In the next chapter I will show how this stance toward one’s own life as a whole – 
which we understand to be essential for self-knowledge, and thus virtue – is fulfilled not 
in isolated act of knowing or apprehending the self. Rather, I will show that it is achieved 
in the activity of living a philosophical life. It is this life which seeks harmony and 
understanding on the basis of the harmonization of the λόγοι through which we 
understand our lives and our world, and what we are called to do. Further, I will 
demonstrate the importance of the fact that Socrates is facing death – as are we all – as he 
works through the importance of understanding the harmonious unity of a life well lived. 
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Thus, will we be able to understand how self-care, self-craft, and the achievement of an 
examined philosophical life is named “the practice of dying.” 
 Now, let us turn to a fuller explanation of how the harmony argument points to an 
“other” conception of harmony, and how this conception involves Plato’s understanding 
of ἀρετή.  
  
 2.3 A “New” Conception of Harmony? 
 
 As I suggested above, Socrates’ suggestion for an “other” conception of harmony 
can be deduced from his comments to Simmias. He tells Simmias that a “tuning is not the 
sort of thing you liken it to.” Instead, Socrates adds, “the lyre and the strings and the 
sounds (φθόγγοι) come into being earlier, while they’re still untuned (ἀνάρμοστοι), and 
the tuning is the last of all to be composed and the first to perish.” (92b-c) Socrates adds 
the sounds to Simmias’ image. As Burger puts it, “He thereby separates from the 
instrument itself the noise produced by it and, at the same time, separates from that noise 
the harmonic order imposed upon it.”287 This separation establishes the possibility that 
while the ψυχή is dependent upon the body – as the sounds are upon the wood and 
strings – the harmonious nature of the ψυχή is something else. It would still be the case 
that a body would be a necessary condition for the harmonious soul, but it would in no 
way be a sufficient condition; not all souls are harmonies in this sense, as Socrates 
proceeds to argue.  
                                                
287 1984, p 124.  
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 Simmias’ inability to distinguish these two senses – his failure to hear the 
alteration of his original thesis by Socrates’ addition of the “sounds” – leads him to 
conclude, on the basis of the argument about harmony as virtue (93b-e), that the soul 
cannot be a tuning. In this distinction we are able to see that Socrates is calling for us to 
recognize the way in which the eternal order which the musician looks to in order to tune 
his instrument is distinct from the particular tuning of any particular instrument. This 
eternal tuning comes into being before the physicality of the lyre, and is in fact the formal 
cause of the construction of any lyre. That is, it is only by looking to this order, to these 
harmonies, that the maker of the lyre is able to construct the physical instrument. This 
formal tuning will continue to exist after the decomposition of any particular lyre. 
Further, any particular lyre can be more or less tuned, but the eternal tuning does not 
admit of degrees (this conclusion will be of great import to Socrates’ argument at 93bff). 
Simmias fails to see that while in one sense all souls are harmonies, and that this 
harmony that is the personal soul necessitates the existence of the body, there is another 
sense of harmony as virtue. This ‘eternal order’ is that to which the being with λόγος 
looks when ordering itself to be in accord with that image of its own possibilities. The 
being with λόγος seeks to “tune” itself to be in harmony with this order. This order does 
not require the medium of a physical body, and thus can survive death. This is, however, 
insufficient to prove personal immortality.  
 
 Two alternate senses of what a “harmony” could be arise in Socrates’ response to 
Simmias. The first, as we have mentioned, is the state of harmony between λόγοι. We 
will return to this sense when we discuss Socrates’ injunction to develop a coherent 
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account of beings in the second sailing passage. The second sense that Socrates 
articulates is harmony as virtue, which we will now turn to.  
 Socrates interrupts his argument that the soul must lead the body – and thus 
cannot be a tuning, which always follow and do not lead the parts of which they are 
composed – with a distinct argument against Simmias’ λόγος. This argument works by 
playing upon another traditional λόγος about the soul which seemingly has a “wondrous 
hold” on Simmias – specifically, the image of virtue as a harmonious condition of the 
soul.288  
 Socrates begins this argument by asking, without preface, “Well then, isn’t each 
tuning by nature a tuning insofar as its been tuned?” (93a) Simmias is understandably 
confused by this apparent non-sequitor, and Socrates clarifies: “Wouldn’t it be more so 
and more fully a tuning, if – allowing that this could happen – it could be tuned more so 
and more fully, and less so and less fully a tuning if it were tuned less so and less fully?” 
(93a-b) Simmias agrees that this must be the case, and Socrates insists that the soul 
cannot then be a tuning, since no soul is “even in the slightest degree, more fully and 
more so [a soul] than another, or less fully and less so this very thing – a soul”. (ibid) In 
his initial presentation, Simmias stated that the soul arises from the bodies’ parts strung 
together in just the right proportion, implying that they can be “relaxed or strained” 
beyond the “beautiful measure” which would lead to “diseases and other evils.” (86b-c) 
                                                
288 Cf Sophist 227dff. There, the stranger argues that there are two different kinds of badness in 
the soul (δύο μὲν εἴδη κακίας περὶ ψυχὴν ῥητέον) which are analogous to evils in the body 
(227d). Ignorance, which is akin to ugliness, and wickedness (πονηρία), which is akin to 
sickness. In descibing wickedness, he says that it arises from a discord (στάσις) in the elements 
of the soul which are naturally akin (φύσει συγγενοῦς) (228a). Describing this condition, he 
says: “Well then; do we not see that in the souls of worthless men opinions are opposed to 
desires, anger to pleasures, reason to pain, and all such things to one another?” (ibid.) Thus, just 
as harmony in the body gives rise to health and life, harmony in the elements of the soul gives 
rise to virtue. 
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Nevertheless, he is unable to conceive of any way that one soul could be better tuned than 
any other, since, this factor – being more or less relaxed or strained – would make no soul 
any more a soul than any other.  
 Socrates capitalizes on this answer by referring to another traditional image or 
harmony in the soul – virtue. He asks: “Is one soul said (λέγεται) to have both mind 
(νοῦν) and virtue and to be good, while another has both mindlessness and wickedness 
(μοχθηρίαν) and is bad? And is what’s said true?” (ibid. emphasis added) Simmias 
agrees, and Socrates continues to argue that since this goodness and badness are some 
“other tuning and lack of tuning,” (93c) those who agree that some souls are good and 
others are bad will have to claim that since all souls are equally a tuning, “one soul 
couldn’t partake of vice or virtue any more fully than another, if in fact vice is to be lack 
of tuning and virtue tuning.” (93e) Socrates unfortunately leaves the conception of virtue 
as harmony undeveloped, since Simmias chooses not to press him on the issue.  
 Simmias has been, once again, trapped by his attachment to traditional accounts, 
and cannot ‘choose’ which of these theories he wants to believe. He has not yet 
undergone the process of examining his beliefs – he has not yet begun the quintessential 
philosophical work of examining his life – to ensure that they accord with one another. It 
is precisely this work that Socrates calls for implicitly here, and explicitly in the second 
sailing passage. That is, Plato has woven together the image of a harmony and an image 
of the practice of self-craft that would seek to develop the virtue of harmony within the 
self specifically by harmonizing our λόγοι. By placing the discussion of virtue, as a 
harmonious condition of the soul, into a discussion about the proper nature of ἁρμονία, 
and further by making the argumentative strength of these λόγοι rest on the necessity that 
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the λόγοι we ascribe to harmonize with one another, Plato has drawn our attention to the 
intersection of virtue, λόγος, and ἁρμονία in a way that sets the stage for the second 
sailing.  
 Thus, when we turn to the second sailing, we must keep in mind the way the 
discussion of harmony frames the issue of the harmonization of λόγοι. Specifically, as I 
will demonstrate, the Phaedo demands that we understand the work of harmonizing our 
λόγοι to be connected to the work of harmonizing our souls. Thus, Socrates concludes 
his argument stating that if we continue to affirm that “the soul is some sort of tuning,” 
we will be agreeing “neither with Homer, the Divine Poet, nor with ourselves.” (94d-95a, 
emphasis added) In unfolding the way the Phaedo presents this connection between the 
development of the proper stance toward λόγος and the development of harmony, and 
thus virtue, in the soul, we will come to understand how misology is the worst evil a 
person can experience. (89d)  
    
§3 The Republic 
 
 The multiplicity and inner conflict of the self, marked by cognitive dissonance 
and a disharmonious mode of living, is addressed in many Platonic dialogues. Most 
notably, of course, in the Republic Socrates argues that the conflict within the self is 
‘mirrored’ by the conflict between classes in society; we will see that, speaking more 
precisely, Socrates suggests that the conflict within the self is the cause of the conflicts in 
society. An examination of the different roles that need to be played within the just 
society then gives rise to the famous ‘tri-partite theory of the soul.’ We will now turn to 
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this account. I will argue that this ‘theory,’ like so many other tenets of what has come to 
be “Platonism,” was never intended to be taken over by the reader and assumed to be 
“Plato’s doctrine,” not even merely at the time of the writing of the Republic. Rather, we 
will see how Socrates, in calling for the “longer road” of inquiry into the nature of the 
conflict within the soul, chose to present the tri-partite soul as a provocation to a specific 
audience, at a specific time, in order to begin them questioning into the path toward 
developing a harmonious, philosophical mode of living. Again, I read the Phaedo as 
providing valuable clues as to what that “longer road” must look like.  
 
 In the Phaedo, at 94d, Socrates quotes the Odyssey to demonstrate that the body 
is in conflict with the soul. At 441b of the Republic, Socrates quotes the same line to 
show that the soul is in conflict with itself. At the opening of book XX, Odysseus has 
finally returned home, in disguise, and he lies awake at night considering how he is going 
to manage to kill all the suitors (as well as his own housemaids) and not himself be killed 
in battle, or in retaliation. He is tempted and driven by anger to immediately wade in and 
start killing the women who dally with the suitors. He knows, however, that this is not a 
good strategy, so, “He struck his breast and reproached his heart with this word (μύθῳ): 
‘Bear up, my heart, for at other times you’ve borne things even more fit for a dog.” 
(Quoted at Phaedo 94d)289 This is a situation which is especially characteristic of 
                                                
289 In the Republic, the line is quoted twice; first, at 390d, it is used as an example of poetry that is 
acceptable for the youth. At 441b, the quote is simply rendered: “He smote his breast and 
reproached his heart with word. . .” The passage, in full (in Samuel Butler’s translation), reads: “. 
. .Ulysses lay wakefully brooding upon the way in which he should kill the suitors; and by and 
by, the women who had been in the habit of misconducting themselves with them, left the house 
giggling and laughing with one another. This made Ulysses very angry, and he doubted whether 
to get up and kill every single one of them then and there, or to let them sleep one more and last 
time with the suitors. His heart growled within him, and as a bitch with puppies growls and shows 
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Odysseus. Achilles would simply have come in and sung his rage at the end of his 
swinging sword. Odysseus – the inventor of the Trojan horse – waits, and plans his 
moves carefully. As we see in this passage, however, this is not something that simply 
‘comes naturally’ to him; he must courageously resist the temptation of rash action and 
temperately endure his rising anger in order to win the day. Odysseus ‘tosses and turns’ 
and struggles within himself, and in this image we find what Socrates calls us to 
remember when we consider the nature of the soul.  
 Socrates uses this passage three times in the dialogues to demonstrate the 
possibility of self-mastery. As we know, Socrates proposes that self-mastery is possible 
because there are three different “parts” of the soul; these parts can come into conflict 
with one another, and one can dominate the others. When the rational part of the soul 
rules the spirited and appetitive parts, there is a proper ordering of the soul, and this state 
of the soul is called “justice.” We will now turn to an analysis of this account of the soul. 
I will argue that, rather than solving the problems of self-identity and harmony that have 
arisen in our discussion of the Phaedo, the discussion of the soul in the Republic demands 
a deeper analysis of the self, and in fact, demands that the reader themselves engage in 
self-inquiry in order to answer the call of the text, rather than simply accepting any of the 
λόγοι Socrates offers in either dialogue as a dogma to be memorized and repeated.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
her teeth when she sees a stranger, so did his heart growl with anger at the evil deeds that were 
being done: but he beat his breast and said, ‘Heart, be still, you had worse than this to bear on the 
day when the terrible Cyclops ate your brave companions; yet you bore it in silence till your 
cunning got you safe out of the cave, though you made sure of being killed.’ Thus he chided with 
his heart, and checked it into endurance, but he tossed about as one who turns a paunch full of 
blood and fat in front of a hot fire, doing it first on one side and then on the other, that he may get 
it cooked as soon as possible, even so did he turn himself about from side to side, thinking all the 
time how, single handed as he was, he should contrive to kill so large a body of men as the 
wicked suitors." (Odyssey, XX) 
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3.1 Soul and State, and the “Longer Road” 
 
  In Book 4, Socrates has demonstrated, to the satisfaction of Glaucon and 
Adeimantus, that the just state must be composed of three different classes (γένος) of 
citizen, each ‘minding his own business’ and doing only the work of his or her class. The 
three classes are the guardians – who rule the society, make decisions concerning war and 
education and manage the affairs of the state – the auxiliaries – who obey the guardians, 
fight the battles and enforce the laws of the polis – and the money-making class – the 
craftspeople and laborers who do the manual work necessary to keep everyone fed, 
clothed, housed, etc. “ . . . the money-making, auxiliary, and guardian classes doing 
what’s appropriate, each of them minding its own business in the city – would be justice 
and would make the city just.” (434c)  
 Glaucon is convinced of this conclusion, but Socrates urges caution, reminding 
Glaucon that their goal was not to discover the proper structure of society, but rather to 
find the nature of justice such that it could be argued that being just is choiceworthy in 
itself for an individual, aside from any benefits that it might accrue to the just person.290 
With this in mind, Socrates cautions Glaucon, in response to his claim that justice is this 
‘minding one’s business’ and “no other” by saying: “Let’s not assert it so positively just 
yet. But, if this form is applied to human beings singly and also agreed by us to be justice 
                                                
290 We are reminded here of our earlier discussion concerning Phaedo 69a, where Socrates insists 
that true virtue is not “exchanging pleasures for pleasures and pains for pains.” There, we saw 
that it is necessary to give an account of the value of virtue other than claiming that it gives rich 
rewards of pleasure, either in this life or the next.  
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there, then we’ll concede it.” Socrates then provocatively adds: “What else will there be 
for us to say?” (434d) 
 Socrates, answering to Glaucon and Adeimantus’ desire to hear a defense of 
justice, claimed that it would be easier to examine justice in something “larger” than a 
human being. (368cff). Using the analogy of looking at letters, which are easier to see 
when larger, he claims that there must be “more” justice in a city than in an individual, 
thus it will be easier to see. This is a problematic claim, to say the least. It does, however, 
have the effect of calling to the reader’s mind the connection between “justice” as a 
characteristic of the soul and the “just” society. The Republic is centrally concerned with 
personal justice – not public justice, i.e. not justice as a quality of states or communities. 
The discussion of the just state is initially presented as a device to discover what justice is 
as a characteristic of an individual. In order to begin speaking about justice as a 
characteristic of a state, Socrates needs an excuse to turn to the examination of the polis. 
He accomplishes this by claiming that we can see justice better if we look to something 
larger – to the state. Whether or not it is easier to ‘see’ justice in a society, Socrates 
assumes, as Eva Brann puts it, that “a political community is the soul writ large. . .”291 We 
see this movement – the movement from soul to state – quite clearly in Socrates’ 
presentation of the tri-partite theory of the soul. Socrates argues that the three structures 
in the city come from nowhere else than from the “same forms and dispositions” in “each 
of us.” (435e) He says that it would be “ridiculous” to think that the spiritedness didn’t 
come into the cities from those private men who are just the ones imputed with having 
this character. . .” (ibid.).   
                                                
291 2004, p 250. 
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 Whatever else the dialogue accomplishes, then, Plato wants us to consider the 
connection between the soul of the individual and the “soul” of the community. We are 
asked to consider to what extent our membership in a community defines us as 
individuals, and, concomitantly, to what extent the nature of the community is formed by 
the character of the citizens. The dialogue thus offers an account of a reciprocal relation 
between soul and state. Certainly the state must be concerned with how its nomoi form 
the souls of the citizens, but the dialogue also offers an account of how the character of 
the citizens reciprocally inform the νόμοι of the polis. 
 In our discussion of the Phaedo, we have been concerned with how the λόγοι 
which are dominant in a community can mediate the self’s conception of itself, and of the 
nature of virtue, courage, justice, and the best life. We have seen how these λόγοι can 
have a dangerous hold on us – a hold which is a threat to developing the self-awareness 
and harmony that comes from living a philosophical life.292 We saw that this danger can 
come from the hold that a poet’s conception of Socrates’ activity can have over a 
community, as well as from the hold that a traditional λόγος concerning the nature of 
death can have over a discussion of the nature of the soul. In the image of the Republic, 
we find that such λόγοι can imprison us, and keep us turned away from the truth of our 
                                                
292 Bluck disagrees that virtue is a harmonious condition of soul for philosophers. He agrees that 
harmony between ‘parts of the soul’ constitutes virtue “for the majority of mankind,” but that for 
the philosopher, there is a “higher, supreme form of virtue, through direct apprehension of the 
Form of the Good itself.” (1955, p 3) However, he also argues that the “true-born philosophers” 
represent Plato’s own belief about this philosophical virtue; thus, since such a vision of the Good 
itself is precluded from embodied beings, perhaps we are all “ordinary worldly men,” and should 
be included in the “majority of mankind” seeking harmony in an embodied state. See also note 35 
in Chapter 2. On the other hand, see Sallis 1996: “. . .the good of the city consists in being one 
instead of many and that correspondingly, the good for the individual man in the city is that he 
become one.” (p 410) 
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being, and toward the shadow-play created by those λόγοι.  The censorship outlined in 
the description of the city in speech happens in full awareness of this danger.  
 
 After “completing” the analysis of justice in the state on the basis of the proper 
relation between the three classes of citizens, Socrates turns the discussion to the three 
parts within individuals. Socrates asks if two things which are called the same, whether 
larger or smaller, will differ with regard to that which they are called the same; Glaucon 
states that they will be called the same, and Socrates concludes that, despite the radical 
differences between an individual and a state, which Socrates has reduced to size: “the 
just man will not be any different from the just city with respect to the form of justice. . .” 
(435a-b) I showed, with regard to the argument from equality in the Phaedo, that one 
necessary aspect of thinking in terms of forms is the ability to think in terms of the qua. 
Here, we see that Socrates is asking Glaucon to engage in this form of thinking, and to 
take the state and the individual soul to be the same qua justice. However, the 
explanation Socrates gives of this sameness is highly suspect from the perspective of the 
Phaedo.  
 Socrates repeats that the state is just when each of the three classes of natures 
(ὅτε ἐν αὐτῇ τριττὰ γένη φύσεων) minds its own business. (435b) He then adds that 
the single individual  has “these same forms in his soul (τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἴδη ἐν τῇ 
αὑτοῦ ψυχῇ ἔχοντα)” since he has the “same affections” (τὰ αὐτὰ πάθη) as those in 
the city. (435c) The reason Socrates presents to show that justice is the same in the state 
and in the soul is that the “same” pathe, and the “same” εἴδη exist in the soul of each 
individual as in the state – i.e. the same structural analysis in the case of soul and state is 
 275 
said to be the reason justice in the soul is the same as justice in the state. As I will show 
in my discussion of the second sailing, Socrates offers what he calls his “safe answer” to 
the cause of any thing; he says that he will only listen if someone says that the beautiful is 
beautiful by participation in beauty. He will not listen if they claim that this beauty is the 
result of any color or structure or form in the beautiful thing. Here, in the Republic, we 
find Socrates insisting that two things both participate equally in the form of justice; 
however, here, his explanation of that similarity is the structural similarity in the state 
and in the soul.293 It is the result of this specifically structural analysis that the explicit 
psychological account in the Republic treats the different powers of the soul as 
(structural) “parts.”294  
 
 Thus, the Republic refuses to let us rest content with the cause to which Socrates 
attributes the fact that we judge both states and individuals to be equal qua justice. In so 
doing, it raises the question of participation in a form without answering it. I have argued 
that it is essential to realize the way the λόγοι which have a hold on us go ahead of us 
and answer the questions we might pose before we begin the questioning process; it is 
necessary that we have a conception of “equality” before we can see the sticks as equal. 
Just so, it is necessary that we have some conception of “justice” before we can see a 
                                                
293 Cf Rice 1998: "Socrates argues that if his analogy between the city and the soul of the 
individual is to be helpful, cities and individuals must be morphologically similar; that is, must 
have the same basic structure, or form." (p 58) 
294 Laurence Cooper argues that the structural language of dividing the soul into ‘parts’ derives, in 
part, from how “physical language pervades our everyday speech, as when one speaks of "large" 
appetites or "explosive" anger or "powerful" and "penetrating" intellect. If we typically fail to 
appreciate that such language is borrowed from the physical realm, that only proves how 
automatic and, probably, how necessary is our recourse to physical metaphor when speaking of 
psychological phenomena.” (2001, p 344) 
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polis or an individual as just.295 In the Republic, Socrates and his friends have claimed to 
discover the nature of justice by finding it in an image they create of a just state. 
However, we find that they set out with a conception of justice already in hand, and it 
was this conception that guided Glaucon and Adeimantus’ answers – a fact which 
Socrates notes explicitly at 433a. Specifically, at 370a, as they are just beginning the 
inquiry into the nature of the just state, Adeimantus agrees that each person in the state 
should do their own job only, “minding his own business for himself.” With this as a 
founding principle of the properly ordered state, presented without examination at the 
inauguration of their city in speech, is it any wonder that they discover the just order of 
that state to be found in their founding decision?296 Thus, rather than discovering justice 
as such, it would seem that they have uncovered the results of their own conception of 
justice, just as we uncovered the results of Simmias’ conception of philosophy as a pure, 
disembodied search for pure truth in the Phaedo.  
 We will return to this point in our discussion of the second sailing, but for now let 
us note that we have (additional) reasons to be highly suspicious of Socrates’ move from 
the state to the soul.297 However, guided in the discussion by Glaucon’s agreement, 
Socrates proceeds with the analogy – but not without reservation.  
                                                
295 Cf Alcibiades I 100b. There Socrates argues that Alcibiades has always operated with an 
unexamined conception of justice, even since he was a child crying foul upon catching a cheater 
when playing dice.  
296 Cf Sallis 1975, p 364: “Thus, in a sense, the entire inquiry has been circular. They set out to 
construct the city in order to discover justice in it. But justice could only be discovered in it if it is 
a just city that is constructed, only if, in building it, they put justice in it. Yet, in order to do this, 
they must already, in some sense, know what justice is.” 
297 For a good analysis of some of the problems with the analogy of soul and state, and an account 
which agrees that the tri-partite theory of the soul is not Plato’s, or Socrates’ belief, see Smith 
1999. He argues “that Plato is not wholly committed to an analogy of soul and state that would 
require either a tripartite state or a tripartite soul for the analogy to hold. It follows that the heart 
of the analogy is not to be found in the comparison of the Kallipolis and its three parts to the soul 
 277 
 Glaucon – perhaps too quickly, I have suggested – agrees that the same three εἴδη 
exist in the soul as in the state, and that this similarity will account for the possibility of 
justice and injustice in both. Socrates then ironically interjects – seemingly disappointed 
that Glaucon has given so quick and thoughtless an answer: “Now it’s a slight question 
about the soul we’ve stumbled upon, you surprising man. Does it have these three forms 
in it or not?” (435c) Socrates’ repeating of the question makes us take pause, and 
consider carefully before affirming that there are, in fact, these “same three” forms in the 
soul, and certainly before claiming to have discovered that this is “Plato’s doctrine.” 
Glaucon agrees that it is not a slight question – despite having answered so quickly a 
moment before – and says that maybe it is true that “fine things are hard.” (ibid.) Socrates 
agrees tentatively, but adds: “But know well, Glaucon, that in my opinion we’ll never get 
a precise (ἀκριβῶς) grasp of it on the basis of procedures (μεθόδων) such as we are now 
using in the argument. There is another longer and further (πλείων) road (ὁδὸς) leading 
to it. But perhaps we can do it in a way worthy of what’s been said and considered 
before.” (435d-e) This is a difficult and troubling passage, and there is no way to do it 
justice in this dissertation.298 For one, it is not immediately clear what Socrates is 
referring to when he says “what’s been said and considered before.” While the explicit 
reference is to the earlier parts of their conversation, it could equally well refer to 
traditional accounts of soul in the religious tradition and in the philosophy of the so-
called “Pre-Socratics.” In any case, in our analysis of self-mastery as being based in the 
relation between “parts” of the soul, we will keep in mind that Socrates says that this 
method is insufficient to achieve “precise” knowledge of the conflict within the soul.   
                                                                                                                                            
conceived as tripartite, but rather must be supposed to reside in some other connection between 
the ways in which Justice characterizes states and souls. . .” (p 31) 
298 Cf Cooper 2001, p 343ff. 
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 Thus, we will attend to the warning in the text and be on the lookout for the 
“longer road” that will reveal to us why this account of conflict between “parts” of the 
soul is imprecise, and give us a sense of the “fuller” method that one should employ 
when contemplating this not “slight” question about the soul. We have already seen that 
there is ample reason to believe that Plato did not take himself to be “solving” the 
problems of internal dissent and the multiplicity of the self at the explicit level of the 
discussion in the Republic.299 Our task will be simply to attend to the specific ways in 
which the text indicates how the lack of precision is inherent in the method of inquiry 
they choose; our intent will be to gain insight into how the “longer road” of inquiry 
alluded to here might be partially carried out in the investigation into the ψυχή in the 
Phaedo.  
 
3.2 The Ontological Grounds of Self-Mastery 
  
 Having gotten Glaucon’s agreement that the “same three” forms must be in each 
of us as exists in the ideal state – claiming they could come into the state from nowhere 
else than from within the character of its citizens – and warning that their method will not 
be precise enough to get to the truth of the soul, Socrates proceeds to argue for the 
existence of different parts of the soul in a way that is reminiscent of his argument for the 
opposition of soul and body in the Phaedo. Despite the approach of most commentators – 
who claim that Plato ‘changed his mind’ about internal conflict between the time he 
                                                
299 Laurence D.  Cooper argues: “For all its virtues, however, we are mistaken to believe that the 
tripartite model is sufficient to convey, or that it was meant to convey, all the elements of the 
dialogue's psychological teaching. What is needed is an interpretation that takes fuller account of 
the soul's forces, and not just its "parts" (which are metaphorical anyway).” (2001, p 341) 
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wrote the Phaedo and the time he wrote the Republic – the fact that two such accountings 
for the internal conflicts in the self exist is enough to cause us to pay special attention to 
the indications within each of these texts which seem to cast the explicit conclusions of 
Socrates’ arguments in a dubious light. Thus, we should be driven to go beyond the letter 
of the text and seek our own answers to these issues.  
 Socrates begins by claiming it is “not hard” to know that the classes come to be 
from different characters of individuals, and this is the reason different societies have 
different reputations; e.g. the Thracians are known as θυμοειδές, the Athenians known 
as lovers of learning (φιλομαθές) and Phoenicians being known as lovers of money 
(φιλοχρήματον) (435e-436a). We are immediately inclined to wonder if there aren’t 
people of all ‘types’ in each of these places, and thus to doubt if these attributions come 
from stereotypes rather than a knowledge that is “easy to know.” 
 In any case, Socrates continues to what he takes to be difficult to know:  
But this now is hard (χαλεπόν). Do we act in each of these ways as a result of 
the same part of ourselves, or are there three parts and with a different one we act 
in each of the different ways? Do we learn with one, become spirited with 
another of the parts within us, and desire the pleasures of nourishment and 
generation and all their kin with a third; or do we act with the soul as a whole (ἢ 
ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ) in each of them once we are started (ὅταν ὁρμήσωμεν)?This will 
be hard to determine (διορίσασθαι) in a way worthy of the argument (ἀξίως 
λόγου). (436a-b) 
 
Socrates warns us twice in the same speech that these distinctions within the soul will not 
be easy to determine – to διορίζω, to divide and draw a boundary between parts. In our 
account of the Phaedo, of course, we have shown that these conflicts can exist between 
two conceptions of the same thing – be it death or virtue – and thus the conflicts must be 
far more numerous and complicated that the argument in the Republic accounts for. The 
more precise method of the “longer road” might then be thought to be one which takes 
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full account of the difficulty of the act of division and demarcation (διορίζω) which 
would draw precise boundaries within the soul. That is, when we see one of Socrates 
interlocutors forced into self-contradiction on one of (what Socrates takes to be) the 
essential questions of life – such as the nature of justice or virtue – we find that the 
internal conflicts which give rise to cognitive dissonance and a disharmonious mode of 
living are far more numerous those demarcated by the tri-partite theory of the soul. 
Socrates’ second sailing is designed to reveal how philosophical inquiry – and thus the 
philosophical mode of life Socrates champions as his defense in the Phaedo – can address 
these more numerous and dangerous conflicts.  
 
 Another sense in which the account of three simply discrete, autonomous ‘parts’ 
of the soul might fall short of precision is implied in Socrates strange phrasing when he 
asks if the whole soul (ἢ ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ) might be active “one we get started (ὅταν 
ὁρμήσωμεν).” The implication seems to be that once we are set in motion the whole soul 
might begin to be active. So, we might think of a person whose initial impetus for action 
comes from the appetitive part of his soul, but then he has to employ the ‘other parts’ of 
the soul in order to carry out his ‘base’ desire. So, out of hunger a person might ‘decide’ 
to steal food – but it might take courage and heart (θυμός) to go through with the plan, 
and intelligence to make the plan and get away with it. In any case, Socrates’ implication 
makes us question the interrelation of these ‘parts’ from the outset, and makes us 
consider the possibility of acting with a unified soul. That is, posing the question: “What 
does it mean for the soul to have ‘parts?’” immediately raises the question of what it 
would mean for the soul to be, and/or to act as a unity.  
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 Socrates begins his argument that the soul has these “same” three parts by 
introducing the principle of non-contradiction, insisting that nothing can be do or suffer 
opposites with respect to the same part, in relation to the same thing, and at the same 
time. He says that if they “should ever find that happening in these things, [they’ll] know 
they weren’t the same but many (οὐ ταὐτὸν ἦν ἀλλὰ πλείω).” (436b) This strict 
phrasing – that if a thing suffers or does opposites in this way, it is not αὐτὸν, itself – 
seems to imply that the soul will have no unity but be a simple plurality. However, the 
examples Socrates turns to in order to explicate his point – a human being and a top – 
while they certainly have parts, must surely be spoken of as having unity and as being 
“themselves.”  
 Socrates says that they will let no one fool them by saying that a man who stands 
still but moves his arms and his head is both moving and at rest, since it is with respect to 
different parts that he is still and moving (436c). Next, Socrates considers the spinning 
top. Someone might give the even more “charming” (χαριεντίζοιτο) example of a top 
spinning perfectly on its axis, he says, claiming it is both at rest and in motion; unlike the 
example of the human being, we cannot make sense of this by referring to physical parts. 
Instead, we have to conceive of ‘parts’ in an analogical or metaphorical sense. Socrates 
says that the top has within it “a straight as well as a circumference” and it is with respect 
to the circumference that they move, and with respect to the straight they stand still 
(436d-e).300 We will have to keep this in mind when we try and determine how the soul is 
thought to have parts, and how we are to think of the role of the one giving the λόγος in 
                                                
300 Aristotle, in Book 6 Chapter 9 of the Physics, in the context of countering Zeno’s paradoxes, 
argues that a spinning sphere is not both in motion and at rest with respect to the circumference, 
just as “the educated human being and the human being” are not the same, except incidentally.  
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the difficult work of delimiting (διορίζω) these parts. We will find that the soul of the 
one giving the λόγος is as active in this division and delimitation as is the soul of the 
person determining that ‘this’ one and ‘this’ one “make two.” Further, we have been 
attuned to a non-materialistic conception of the being of the ψυχή by our earlier 
discussion of the Phaedo in general, and the argument concerning non-physical 
harmonies in particular; here in the Republic, in attending to the example of the spinning 
top, we are asked to consider a non-materialistic conception of parts. 
 
 With these reflections, Socrates reaffirms the law of non-contradiction, and says 
that in order that they not have to go through many such examples, they will affirm that 
nothing can, with respect to the same part, in relation to the same thing, and at the same 
time “be, do, or suffer opposites.” (437a) He then adds that if this should ever “appear 
otherwise, all our conclusions based on it will be undone.” (ibid.) With this strangely 
tentative conclusion to a seemingly unassailable logical principle, Socrates proceeds to 
establish the multiplicity of the soul.  
  
 Socrates begins by establishing that “acceptance and refusal, longing to take 
something to rejecting it, embracing to thrusting away” are opposites (437b). He then 
states that want for drink and food are a form of desire (after a long ‘digression’ 
contending that thirst “itself” is simply for drink “itself” and not any specific type of 
drink). Next he asks if something “draws [the soul] back when it is thirsting” that must 
“be something different in it from that which thirsts and leads it like a beast to drink?” 
(439b) Glaucon, of course, agrees to all of this. Thus, Socrates asks, “Isn’t there 
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something in their soul bidding them to drink and something forbidding them to do so, 
something different that masters that which bids?” Glaucon agrees, and Socrates 
continues, “Doesn’t that which forbids such things come into being – when it comes into 
being – from calculation (ἐκ λογισμοῦ), what leads and draws (ἄγοντα καὶ ἕλκοντα) is 
present due to affections and diseases (διὰ παθημάτων τε καὶ νοσημάτων)?” This 
claim sets up – without argument – the basic structure of desire that we saw in the “true-
born philosophers.” That is, Socrates asks if it is correct to assume that in all desire the 
self is passive and suffers from a disease-like condition, and if it is also the case that it is 
only in resisting these diseased desires that the self is active, and this activity is best 
considered as calculation.  
 Why should we assume that all instances of the soul “leading and drawing” 
(ἄγοντα καὶ ἕλκοντα) come from a desire in which the self is passive, undergoing a 
πάθη, and/or is diseased? Even more significantly, why should we assume that the 
rational, calculating ‘part’ of the soul does not have a motive force which can ‘lead’ or 
‘drag’ the whole soul toward action?301 Glaucon tentatively agrees, and on this shaky 
foundation, they proceed with the argument.  
 I argue that they have already assumed the simple division between the ‘parts’ of 
the soul based on a faulty assumption about the discrete nature of the powers of the soul. 
To claim that each power of the soul maps onto a ‘part,’ and to assume that each ‘part’ is 
                                                
301 Bloom writes: “Primarily, what Socrates chooses to forget in his incomplete picture of 
spiritedness as merely reason’s trusty tool is the fact that in some sense reason in the soul is a 
desire. . . He was enabled to do this by asserting that reason in the soul is merely calculation, as it 
is in the city. A dry, calculating reason, concerned with directing the desires to a fulfillment 
consonant with the common good, is distinct from desire and need not conflict with spiritedness; 
but a reason erotically striving to know the first causes of all things, with a life of its own, 
indifferent to the needs of the here and now, is one of the most powerful desires and far removed 
from the city’s primary concerns.” (1968, p 376) 
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self-identical and never in conflict within itself, and to assume that no power – e.g. the 
power of calculating or desiring – can be present in more than one ‘part,’ simplifies the 
matter and allows Socrates to complete the analogy to the structure of the city in speech. 
This is, however, a troubling oversimplification, and in its un-argued inadequacies, it is 
an account which points to a longer road.302 
 In any case, they continue, and Socrates affirms on this scant evidence that there 
are (at least) two parts of the soul. He says they will “not be irrational (οὐ δὴ ἀλόγως)” 
in “naming the part of the soul with which it calculates, the calculating (τὸ μὲν ᾧ 
λογίζεται λογιστικὸν προσαγορεύοντες τῆς ψυχῆς), and the other part with which it 
loves, hungers, thirsts and is agitated by the other desires, the irrational and desiring, 
companion of certain replenishments and pleasures.” (439d) In the language Socrates 
uses it is clear that Socrates and his companions are reifying the powers of the soul into a 
‘thing,’ a “part”: the act of calculation, λογίζεται, is referred to ‘that which’ calculates, 
the calculating, the λογιστικὸν. The explicit claim is that it is not ἀλόγως to “call” 
(προσαγορεύοντες) that which calculates the calculating (ibid.). On this basis, they deny 
calculation to any other “part,” any other εἶδος within the soul.303 Socrates concludes: 
                                                
302 Cf. Bobonich 1994, and Irwin 1995, p 217-222. They both argue that argue that “Plato's  
conception of the parts of the soul” mistakenly attributes to them a kind of agency which  
belongs properly only to the individual of which they are parts. I, of course, do not agree that this 
is a problem with “Plato’s theory,” but rather is precisely the insight Socrates is driving us to 
realize on our own. On the other hand, some take the parts to be actually ontologically distinct, 
and precisely three in number; e.g. see Hoffman 2003: “. . . such a theory pays a steep price 
insofar as it divides the self into parts that are capable of acting independently. But this is a price 
we know that Plato is willing to pay, once he divides the soul into reason, spirit, and appetite.” (p 
174) 
303 Cf Lesses 1987: “Why should we think that parts of the soul other than reason also have the 
capacity to form opinions and beliefs? Other commentators have reviewed some of the evidence. 
First of all Plato does not restrict the motivations of the non-rational parts to brute biological 
cravings. His examples involve desires that are more complex than this. Leontius' desire to see 
the corpses, for instance, is not a simple physiological urge even though its source is the 
appetitive part and its causal origin might be physiological. In addition, Plato sometimes 
 285 
“Therefore, let these two forms (εἴδη) in the soul be distinguished (ὡρίσθω).” (439e) 
Since I am suggesting that the text demands that we not so quickly agree with Glaucon’s 
answers, and specifically that we need to be suspicious of the claim that these “parts” of 
the soul are to be so easily distinguished and delimited (διορίζω) from one another, it 
would seem that the “longer road” calls for an examination of the possibility of the 
blending of the εἴδη (perhaps analogous to the discussion of blending carried out in the 
Sophist). 
 Socrates – immediately after claiming that these two εἴδη can be distinguished – 
then adds: “Now is the part that contains spirit and with which we are spirited a third, or 
would it have the same nature (ὁμοφυές) as one of these others?” (ibid.) In this 
movement – by immediately turning to distinguish this particular third form in the soul – 
Socrates gives away a logical flaw in his procedure. Obviously, he is being guided in his 
questions about the parts within the soul by their earlier analysis of the state; while there 
is nothing essentially logically wrong with this, it makes it quite clear that Socrates – 
based on the method he has established by which one distinguishes a “part” in the soul on 
the basis of distinguishing anything that the soul does or suffers – could have turned to 
any of the activities of the soul and declared that there were four, five, or any number of 
parts in the soul. Nothing dictates his turning to spiritedness at this time other than his 
desire to make a λόγος “worthy of what has come before;” specifically, to make a λόγος  
                                                                                                                                            
describes the non-rational parts as sources of belief. In one text, he says that appetite and spirit 
can have beliefs (doxazein) which conflict with those of reason (602e-603a). And Plato also takes 
the appetitive part to be able, in principle, to hold the same opinion (homodoxasi) as the rational 
part that the latter should rule (442d2). It is at least plausible to think Plato endorses the view that 
some beliefs ought to be ascribed to the non-rational parts. On occasion, Plato does call the non-
rational parts of the soul "irrational" (alogiston, 439d, 604d). But should we take Plato to mean 
that neither appetite spirit can hold beliefs at all? It is better, I shall argue below, to render Plato's 
description here as something along the lines of "foolish". . .” (p 149) 
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worthy of the account of the three classes in Glaucon’s ideal polis (a point which is 
highlighted by Socrates reminding Glaucon of those three classes at 440e-441a).  
 The problematic nature of their method is further underscored by the example that 
Socrates uses to convince Glaucon that the spirited and desiring parts of the soul are to be 
distinguished, and that the spirited part is to be understood as the “loyal dog” of the 
calculating part. Socrates reminds us of the story of Leonitus, who when passing by a 
huge pile of corpses, “desired to look, but at the same time he was disgusted and made 
himself turn away; and for a while he struggled and covered his face. But finally, 
overpowered by the desire, he opened his eyes wide, ran toward the corpses and said: 
‘Look, you damned wretches, take your fill of the fair sight.” (439e-440a) Socrates says 
that this speech “certainly indicates that anger sometimes makes war against the desires 
as one thing against something else.” (440a) This is a troubling and provocative example. 
Might we not say the same thing about “the desires” warring against one another? Might 
a person experience struggle between fatigue and a desire for food or sex?304 It would 
seem that even a cursory examination of this example leads to a far more complicated 
picture of the interrelation of emotion, desire, calculation, reason, and a thousand other 
powers of the soul than the tri-partite theory can account for. This is hardly a surprising 
discovery, however, since Socrates began this account by saying that it would be 
insufficiently precise to discover the truths of the ψυχή.305  
                                                
304 Several commentators have noted this fact. See, e.g. the discussion in Smith 1999, esp. p 36-
37. See also Penner 1971, Tiles 1977, et al. 
305 Jacob Howland (1993) argues that one possible reason for this simplification lies in the nature 
of the τέχνη of politics that Socrates is trying to inaugurate Glaucon and Adeimantus into: “A 
difficulty is raised by the soul’s unfinished, erotic nature and capacity to take on many different 
looks: if politics is to be a techne, must its object not be knowable as a certain kind of being with 
a fixed and intelligible structure? . . . Socrates’ technical metaphors do not ultimately provide a 
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 In fact, at 441c, when Socrates refers to Odysseus beating his breast for the 
second time – the same passage referred to in the Phaedo – Socrates implies that Homer 
had thought the spirited part was divided against itself, and thus itself a multiplicity; he 
says that this passage has Odysseus “rebuking that which is irrationally spirited as though 
it were a different part.” (441c) If we are able to accept this division – which Socrates 
does not explicitly refute – then where does this process of identifying ‘parts’ of the soul 
find an end? At 443d, Socrates implies that there might be more than three parts of the 
soul. He says that if “there are some other parts in between” the three, that the 
philosopher “binds them together and becomes entirely one from many, moderate and 
harmonized.” (443d)306 
 
 What we take away from this short discussion of the tri-partite theory of the soul 
is, first and foremost, that it is not to be taken at face value as Plato’s doctrine about the 
nature of the ψυχή. The specific inadequacies of the theory – which are partially 
explained with reference to the context of the discussion of the ideal city in speech, and 
partly by Glaucon’s faulty answers – point to a “longer road” of inquiry into the nature of 
                                                                                                                                            
coherent picture of the soul. As we shall see, however, even the inconsistency of these metaphors 
serves indirectly to illuminate that paradoxical complexity of the human psyche.” (p 93)  
306 Cf Cooper 2001: “. . .whereas the problem of intrapsychic faction seems in book 4 to be 
limited to faction between the various parts, which limits the possibilities of faction to only three, 
in book 9 the possibility arises of faction within the parts, which opens an infinity of factional 
possibilities. (Only the desiring part is flatly said to be subject to internal conflict, but there are 
indications that the spirited part, too, is subject to its own internal factionalism; as for the 
reasoning part, although I am not aware of any explicit reference to conflict within it, the dialogue 
nevertheless offers numerous examples of contradictory thinking.” (p 343) He notes that one 
example of the way book 9 presents this possibility is in Socrates’ presentation of the image of 
the spirited part of the soul as "the lion-like and snake-like part." For more on the possible 
conflict within the spirited part, see Craig 1994. David Roochnik describes Book 9’s more 
sophisticated account of internal multiplicity within the soul as like a Hegelian Aufhebung of the 
account in Book 4 (1997).   
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the soul; this “longer road” would be specifically concerned with internal dissent and 
conflict within the soul, and would have to take account of far greater complexity than 
referring to three “parts” can possibly explain. Given that Socrates uses the same 
reference to demonstrate the existence of this conflict in the Phaedo and the Republic – 
Odysseus reproaching his heart in the Odyssey – we have reason to look to the Phaedo as 
a text concerned (at least in part) with offering a more complex explanation of this 
conflict than that in the ‘shorter road’ of the Republic’s tri-partite theory. Further, by 
looking to the Republic, we have seen that the context for dealing with this internal 
conflict is explicitly ethical, just as it is in the Phaedo. Thus, we have confirmation that 
Plato’s concern with the ontology of the soul is deeply concerned with the ethical goal of 
developing a harmonious soul. As such, we will now turn to a discussion of the second 
sailing, in which Socrates calls for the far more complex work of harmonization of our 
λόγοι in a context which seems to imply that this is the definitive work of the 
philosophical life, thus of the best life, and thus is the primary ethical work of the 
philosopher.  
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Chapter 7 
The Turn to the Λόγος 
 
§1 Socrates’ Response to Cebes 
  
 Socrates has convinced Simmias that he can’t hold the belief that the soul is a 
harmony and simultaneously affirm his attachment to the λόγος that says that all learning 
is recollection, nor to the traditional λόγος that claims that virtue is a harmonious 
condition of the soul. If they continue to claim that the soul is “some sort of tuning,” he 
says they will not be “in agreement with themselves.” (95a)307 Socrates then turns to what 
he calls the “husband” of this argument (95a). Cebes expresses his complete trust that 
Socrates will be able to vanquish this opponent, since it had seemed so “absurd,” so 
ἄτοπος, “out of place,” that Socrates was able to defeat Simmias’ argument with his 
“first assault.” (95a-b) These lines clearly indicate that we should be attentive to 
connections between Socrates’ response to Simmias and that offered to Cebes, which 
culminates in the second sailing and the call for the harmony of “being in agreement with 
ourselves.”  
 I will now turn to Socrates’ response to Cebes, and finally, to the second sailing 
passage itself.  
                                                
307 This formulation – not being in agreement with ourselves – is a clear statement of the central 
theme of this dissertation – specifically, cognitive dissonance and internal disharmony. The use of 
this phrase immediately preceding Socrates’ turn to the λόγος must be kept in mind.  
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1.1 Absolute Certainty and Fear of Death 
 
 Socrates begins by recounting what he takes to be Cebes’ objection. At 87a Cebes 
claims that it has been “elegantly” (χαριέντως) argued and even “completely adequately 
demonstrated” (πάνυ ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδεῖχθαι) that the soul existed before we were born 
 – if, he notes, he is not putting it too strongly (εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν). However, 
“that she will still be somewhere after we’ve died – this does not seem to me to have been 
so demonstrated.” (87a) He agrees that the soul is “stronger and more long-lasting” 
(ἰσχυρότερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον) than the body, but that his soul should continue 
to exist “somewhere” after he dies, that is yet to be proven. Though he is convinced of 
the superiority of the soul, and convinced that it can in fact exist without a body, he is 
still not convinced to the point of absolute certainty that any individual soul will continue 
to exist after its next death.308  
 Even if the soul is stronger and more enduring than the body, it still might be 
worn out over time, and eventually meet its end. Socrates has shown (most recently with 
the argument likening the soul to the forms) that the soul is superior to, and more 
enduring than, the body; with his own introduction of the recollection argument, Cebes 
has shown that he also agrees that the soul pre-existed the body. However, this 
superiority and pre-existence does not logically grant indestructibility. As I noted in 
Chapter 2, even if he dismisses (without verbal objection) Socrates’ first argument from 
                                                
308 We note that – as was made clear in Chapter 2 – this is precisely the point Socrates attempted 
to prove with his argument concerning the cycle of opposites, which should have greater 
argumentative weight with a “Pythagorean.” 
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opposites, it is odd that Cebes could be convinced of the pre-existence of the soul and of 
its superiority to the body and yet still not have the confidence to face death without fear. 
In fact, in his speech, Cebes gives voice to the λόγος, personifying it: “’Why then,’ the 
argument might say, ‘are you still distrustful, since you see that after the human being has 
died his weaker part still is?” (87a-b) However, Cebes’ reply to the λόγος makes it clear 
that it is absolute proof, unerring logical demonstration of the soul’s indestructibility that 
he is seeking.309 
 To make his argument, he uses the famous image of the cloak-maker: Just 
because the weaver of a cloak is “stronger and more long-lasting” than a cloak does not 
mean that the weaver is certain to last longer that the last cloak he weaves before he dies. 
(87bff) The interlocutors agreed that, since the weaker body exists for some time after 
death (an argument which revealed an error in their conception of the body), the stronger 
soul must continue to exist also; Cebes counters that the same could be said for the 
weaver and his cloak. Since the weaker cloak still exists, the stronger weaver must be 
safe and sound somewhere, since a man surely must last longer than a cloak (ibid.). He 
completes the analogy by saying that it might be the case that the body is constantly 
wearing away (κατατριβόμενον) – even during life (87e) – and the soul is forced to 
constantly “reweave” (ἀνυφαίνοι) the body to keep it alive. It is possible, then, that the 
soul could “have on her last weave” when she perishes, thus expiring before the body.  
                                                
309 See Bedu-Addo 1979 for a conflicting reading which takes absolute certainty to be Socrates’ 
own goal: “Since Socrates obviously does not consider himself a simpleton, and is indeed 
portrayed throughout the dialogue as being quite unperturbed by the prospect of his own 
impending death, we may safely assume that he thinks he knows that the soul is immortal, and 
can give an account of this.” (p 11) 
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 It might be argued that this is a far more “laughable” image than that of the soul 
as a harmony, which Simmias presented.310 Further, it does not seem that Cebes has any 
reason to believe that the soul is worn away by reweaving the body. However, the logic it 
presents is clear – Socrates has failed to show that every single individual soul will 
continue to exist after its next death – even if it is granted that it survived death in the 
past. Cebes has taken fear to new level; while his argument is logically sound, the fact 
that he demands such a level of certainty exposes a deep fear of death. Cebes demands 
that a level of certainty be present in the argument which cannot possibly be granted by 
anything less than divine discourse. Once again, given the agreement that Socrates lacks 
this absolute certainty, we are called to wonder why Socrates faces death so calmly.311  
 
 When, after the digression into misology and his response to Simmias, Socrates 
reformulates Cebes’ objection, he calls explicit attention to the fear that is revealed in 
Cebes’ desire for absolute, logically unassailable certainty of his own continued existence 
after death. Socrates begins by saying that for Cebes, life is “like a disease (νόσος)” 
(95d): “She lives this life wearing herself out in misery.” (ibid) Just as the soul arose 
from the work and interactions of the body in Simmias’ λόγος, here, the body only exists 
as a result of the work of the soul, “weaving” it together into life. Again, we see a 
tendency to prioritize one or “the other” constituent of the self, which reveals the lack of 
awareness of the nature of the whole. An account of the unity of the whole, not reducible 
to ‘parts,’ is necessary to understand the priority of the living being, the ζῶον, and to 
                                                
310 Cf Burger 1984, p 109. 
311 “. . .in the absence of that [certain] demonstration, Cebes concludes, anyone who feels 
confident about death displays his utter foolishness. But Cebes thus betrays his lack of 
understanding of Socrates’ confidence in the face of death, which has nothing to do with an 
illusory belief about the character of the psyche as natural phenomenon.” (Burger, 1984, p 111) 
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reveal the true nature of the ψυχή. Further, on Cebes’ account, of course, there is no 
explanation for why the soul would undergo this work of weaving and re-weaving the 
body, leading inevitably to its own death.  
 Clearly identifying the theme of fear, Socrates continues: “Now you say it makes 
no difference at all, as far as each of us being terrified goes, whether she enters once into 
a body or many times; being terrified befits anyone who doesn’t know that she is 
something deathless and who can’t give an account – unless he is mindless (ἀνόητος).” 
(95d) Socrates is here keying on the fact that, for Cebes, the proper response to awareness 
of death is terror – φοβέω, to be “put to flight,” to run away, just as Crito has asked 
Socrates to flee his sentence. Why does Socrates not flee? Is it because he has certainty of 
going “There,” and thus experiences no fear? Or is it, rather, that he feels the fear, but has 
the courage to face death in the knowledge that he has lived well, and thus prepared 
himself for death by living the life of the philosopher? 
 Socrates often uses fighting and standing his ground as analogies to describe his 
work as a philosopher.312 At Apology 28dff Socrates says that his work has been to 
remain at his post as stationed by the god – who, he claims, “ordered me, as I thought and 
believed, to live the life of a philosopher, to examine myself and others.” (28e) In the 
Phaedo, at 89a, Phaedo describes how, after they have undergone the experience of being 
“thrown down” by the objections of Simmias and Cebes, Socrates “as if we were men 
who had fled and been laid low, rallied us and turned us about to follow him and consider 
the argument with him.” Socrates goes on, at 89c, to use the image of Heracles calling on 
                                                
312 He says he is “fighting for the just” at Apology 32a; Socrates says he “would surely battle, in 
word and deed,” that we will be “better” and “braver” if we believe we can find the truth, and 
continue to seek it” at Meno 86 b-c; Cf Republic 335e, 427e, 453a, 534c, et al. For a good account 
of Socrates’ philosophy as agonistic and militaristic, see Weiss 2006, p 1-27, (esp. p 2-3).  
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Iaolus to describe how they must fight against the dual arguments. These are images of 
situations in which there is surely not absolute certainty of victory; rather, these images 
call for us to be courageous and enter battle despite experiencing fear. This requires 
keeping the fear in mind; that is, to be courageous in this way – which Plato indicates is 
central to the life of the philosopher – is to face the fear of death, and not to deny it with 
supposed access to a certainty that would erase that fear, and render courage unnecessary. 
To live the life of the philosopher is to prepare for death by living in light of our own 
finitude. Μελέτη θάνατος.313 
 
1.2 Silence and Death 
 
 Cebes agrees to Socrates’ reformulation; before continuing, however, Socrates 
spends a “long time” quietly considering how to respond (95e). It is, of course, 
impossible to know what Socrates is considering, nor what Plato intended by having 
Socrates take this pause; whatever the intent, the pause calls to mind the inner life of 
Socrates. In the Symposium, Socrates is said to have a habit of standing and considering 
something quietly within himself. Here Socrates takes a moment for quiet reflection, and 
the reader, too, is asked to turn from the text for a moment and consider what is at stake 
                                                
313 We note here that the first definition for μελετάω in the Lidell Scott is: “take thought or care 
for” and thus “to attend to, to study.” The many are wrong when they think they know why the 
philosopher is ripe, ready, and worthy of death. She is ready because she has given it thought, has 
studied it, and has lived knowing it is coming, never forgetting herself; she knows herself to be 
mortal.  
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in the arguments as well as in the situation described in the narrative, and what 
significance these issues have for our own lives.314 
  The companions have perhaps, for a moment, been so caught up in the 
conversation, and so enthralled by Socrates’ “wondrous” (88e, 95a) response to Simmias, 
that they have forgotten what is to take place in a very short while. In this silence, 
foreshadowing the final silence to come, we can hear the return of their ἀτεχνῶς ἄτοπόν 
πάθος (59a) – their mix of pleasure and pain. We are reminded that we will soon be 
losing our guide and the singer of charms who will chase away our fear; we are reminded 
that we will soon be left on our own. In addition to the inner life of Socrates, then, we are 
reminded to attend to our own private thinking, to the activity of our own soul, especially 
in matters of courage and fear, choice of life, and readiness for death: How ready do we 
readers stand to face death?  
 Phaedo might not be able to fully recall everything that took place (103a), thus his 
retelling is not complete, but due to his youth, we can be sure he has recalled the advice 
to one beginning his philosophical journey. At the same time, we are reminded of 
Socrates’ imminent death and presented with his intellectual autobiography; it seems we 
must consider how the λόγοι (and deeds) which follow this brief silence, and which 
precede the final silence, will form, in some sense, Socrates’ final defense of his choice 
of life, and thus of the life of philosophy. Thus, as well as advice to someone beginning 
his philosophical education, we also expect to hear something of a defense of the purpose 
                                                
314 Sallis 1996: “It is as though, confronted by his own death, Socrates looks into himself, back 
into his own past. . .” (p 39) Sallis here notes that the speech that is to come arises from the 
silence engendered by awareness of our own death.  
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of such an undertaking. We expect to learn how living the life of philosophy, the 
examined life, prepares us to face death with courage. 
 
1.3 Aἰτίαι 
 
 Finally, Socrates prefaces his response, saying: “What you’re searching for is no 
trivial business, Cebes. For we must busy ourselves with the cause concerning generation 
and destruction as a whole (ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν 
διαπραγματεύσασθαι.).” (95e) Whatever else the discussion yields, then, we will be 
attentive to the implications of the arguments not merely to the immortality of the soul – 
which is the explicit goal of the argument – but to the much-larger issue of coming-to-be 
(γενέσεως) and passing away (φθορᾶς) as a whole.  
 That is, the possible passing away of the soul will not be our only concern; the 
reader must be attuned to becoming and its relation to being. Socrates, of course, 
proceeds to tell the story of his own philosophical development in this context of a 
discussion of becoming as a whole. We are reminded that his own soul has undergone a 
process of development, and we are asked to consider the stable being that underlies 
these changes in his experience and life; we are reminded here, of course, of the 
questions raised by the opening word of the dialogue, αὐτός, and of our discussion of 
this opening in Chapter 1. There, we wondered at how Phaedo is the “same” at the time 
of telling the story recorded in the dialogue bearing his name as he was at the time of the 
events he recalls. We noticed that this question parallels the issue of the unity and identity 
of Theseus’ ship. It is implied that the unity lies in the Athenian λόγος which claims that 
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the ship returning to Athens the day before Socrates’ death is the “same” as the ship on 
which Theseus sailed to save the 14 from the Minotaur. We have raised many questions 
since that discussion about unity, λόγος, and the nature of the soul as that which 
underlies the flux of generation and destruction that attends our lives. We have found that 
it is the activity of the soul, in accord with the λόγοι which structure our understanding 
of the “being and benefit” of the things we encounter, which grants unity to phenomena, 
and significantly, to our own selves. Our reading of these final passages will focus upon 
how they shed light on the issues we have raised.  
 Socrates says that he will go through his own experiences (πάθη) concerning 
generation and corruption, and if anything that he says “appears useful” to his listeners, 
he instructs them to “use it for purposes of persuasion (πειθὼ) in the very matters you’re 
talking (λέγεις) about.” (96a) Following upon Socrates’ silence, and our consideration of 
his private, inner life, this phrase asks us to wonder if the issues his interlocutors have 
gathered – λέγειν – fully equate to Socrates’ own private concerns. Specifically, we 
wonder if Cebes’ concerns with absolute unassailable certainty in the immortality of the 
soul is truly what is on Socrates’ mind when he presents his final λόγοι. We are also 
reminded of the importance of persuasion (πείθω) and trust (πίστις) in λόγοι that has 
appeared in the dialogue, in the discussion of the nature of the self, and in the work 
Socrates called for of finding harmony in the λόγοι through which we understand our 
lives – we have also seen that these issues are highlighted by his response to Simmias, 
which immediately precedes this section of the dialogue.  
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 Socrates begins the tale of philosophical development in his youth, when, he says, 
he was “wondrously (θαυμαστῶς) desirous (ἐπεθύμησα) of that wisdom they call 
(καλοῦσι) ‘inquiry into nature’ (περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν).” (96a, emphasis added) The 
use of καλοῦσι could indicate that Socrates has doubts about whether or not what is 
called ‘inquiry into nature’ in fact addresses itself to φύσις; we will find that he indicates 
some such suspicion in describing his turn to the λόγοι.  
 Socrates says that this wisdom seemed ὑπερήφανος. (96a) This is a wonderful 
word, which can mean ‘magnificent,’ as it is usually translated, but centrally means 
“overweening,” “arrogant,” and carries the sense of being excessive, even brutal and 
insolent, hubristic. This wisdom, in its claim to record the truth about φύσις, is ὑπερ-
ήφανος, excessively bright.315 I argue that it is this excess, an excess in the stories told 
about nature, not nature itself, that threatens to blind Socrates, as he famously says at 
99d-e; thus, this turn to the λόγος is not a turn away from the nature of things, but rather 
from a certain (materialistic) understanding of φύσις. Let us look at how he describes the 
process by which he came to (almost) be soul-blinded.  
 One of the first things we notice is that Socrates is not immediately concerned 
with matters “in the heavens and beneath the earth.” His concerns are directly related to 
human life. As Michael Davis puts it in a paper titled, “Socrates’ Pre-Socratism”: 
Socrates does not begin with questions about the heavens and the earth. His first 
two questions, when stripped of their pre-Socratic trappings, become these: 
"What is life?" and "What is thinking?" He does not put the two together, but if 
we do we discover a third question: "What is the cause or nature of that kind of 
life that thinks?" or "What is man?" Hidden behind the questions which motivate 
the young Socrates is the same question which motivates Socrates on the day of 
his death, the nature and power of the human soul.316 
 
                                                
315 Sallis notes that it is these early investigations which “blinded” Socrates. (1996, p 39)  
316 1980, p 560. 
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Even in his “Pre-Socratic” phase, if you will, Socrates describes his own concerns as 
directed toward matters of human life and thinking. Specifically, he is concerned with 
how the power of thought is rooted in the soul, and he is interested in the process by 
which knowledge becomes possible. I have argued that one of the central dimensions of 
this epistemological investigation into the nature of the soul is the project of ontologically 
grounding self-knowledge: “The young Socrates attempts to acquire knowledge of 
himself by means of knowledge of the whole.” (ibid.) 
 
 At 96a-b he describes looking into several physical causes for thinking: Is it by 
the blood, air, fire, or the brain that we think? He moves from one λόγος to the next, and 
finds nothing certain. This is precisely the process which Socrates warns leads to 
misology. (80dff) People who spend time with λόγοι that at one time seem true, and at 
another false, begin to think that there is no certainty to be found in λόγος. Socrates, 
though, does what he recommends, and does not blame the λόγος, but rather himself. He 
decides that he is ἀφυής – naturally unfit for this sort of investigation.317 Socrates 
                                                
317 Aφυής is also a wonderful word. It seems to mean that one is “without nature,” but is rather 
precisely a claim to knowledge of the nature of an individual. At Republic 455b, Socrates uses the 
word to describe people’s naturally taking to learning or not, being able to discover a great deal 
with “slight” instruction vs. being slow to learn, even with a lot of education. Thus, in addition to 
the Theaetetus, another account from the corpus reminds us to pay special attention to learning 
when speaking of the human φύσις. In the Parmenides, this word is used to describe someone 
who, if they were ἀφυής, would think that if the forms are in fact truly separate from the world, 
truly unchanging and transcendent, set completely off from this world where we live, they could 
never be known. To be ἀφυής, in this context, is, again, to insist on our total separation, as 
humans, from the truth of things; however, in the Parmenides we are not set off from the flow of 
physical things, but rather, from the unchanging, unflowing truth, which, as totally transcendent, 
would appear inaccessible to the ἀφυής person. Again, then, the logic of things, their ἀρχή, their 
αἰτία, would be a mystery to us, were we without nature, ἀφυής. At Symposium 218a, the 
ἀφυής is said to be the only one who is not “snake-bitten” by philosophical λόγοι. In this 
instance, the person who is ‘without nature’ is immune to the occurrence of the snake-bite; he is 
in the presence of the wondrous, but he fails to wonder; he is in the presence of the enlightening, 
but is not enlightened. This image of the snake-bite reminds us of the sting of the torpedo fish or 
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phrases his claim to lack insight into φύσις in terms of his access to his own φύσις. We 
are thus able, on this basis, to see a connection between the proper τέχνη of λόγος and 
self-knowledge, the ontological grounding of which we have been working toward. This 
will allow us to reveal a further dimension of the connection between λόγος and ψυχή.  
 His proof that he is ἀφυής is that he thought he had “sure knowledge” of the 
αἰτία of human growth – we gain flesh by eating flesh, and gain bone when we eat 
bone.318 This theory is ridiculous, and attending to the growth of a baby only drinking 
mother’s milk, or the growth of a goat eating only grass shows this clearly.319 He asks 
Cebes if he was being “measured” (μετρίως) in believing and repeating this theory (96d). 
He asks Cebes if this opinion seems measured, if there is anything excessive in claiming 
to know the αἰτία of growth; Cebes thinks this seems reasonable – he is not yet aware of 
his own ignorance in these matters. It is Socrates’ search into these λόγοι which freed 
him from the ignorance of his ignorance.  
 Thus, Socrates’ initial example of the ‘blinding’ caused by investigating what is 
called φύσις is not of a fully negative experience; rather, it allowed Socrates to discover 
                                                                                                                                            
the bite of the gadfly – the gadfly spurs us into action, spurs our curiosity and our seeking, but the 
person who experiences this as merely a torpedo fish is, rather, numbed, and moved into inaction. 
In any case, in the Symposium, human φύσις is once again connected to learning.  
318 He also says that others agreed with him, and would apparently, then, have praised him for 
memorizing and repeating such theories. 
319 Cf Davis 1984: “. . .the first result of Socrates' initial inquiries is that his common sense 
knowledge of the nature of growth is destroyed. That knowledge tells us that we grow by eating 
and drinking. This common sense view is involved in that famous parental utterance "Eat your 
dinner." And, of course, it is true as far as it goes. But it does not account for some very important 
things, among them maturity and death. At a certain point eating no longer leads to growth, or at 
least to growth understood as healthy or natural. After that point there begins a gradual decline of 
life leading ultimately to death. If the common-sense understanding of growth were true we 
would continue to grow indefinitely.” (p 563) What this account seems to be lacking, then, is how 
human growth is underwritten by the human form, which is the ἀρχή originating, guiding, and 
limiting the process. This form would then appear to be the true αἰτία of growth.  
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his own ignorance.320 His experience with ἐπιθυμία for ὑπερήφανος wisdom – which 
had earned him the praise of others – revealed to him the limits of what can be achieved 
in λόγος, and thus allowed him to develop the τέχνη of λόγος that he says will save 
people from becoming misologists. That is, at 90b, Socrates tells us that without the 
proper τέχνη of λόγος, people often trust in the wrong kind of λόγος, which at first seem 
true and then later false, and so come to doubt all λόγοι. Socrates avoids this fate by 
turning to an inquiry of λόγοι themselves, and developing, in the second sailing, the 
proper τέχνη of λόγος.  
 
 We will turn to this τέχνη in a moment; in preface, I note that Socrates famously 
says that those who claim to go “straight to the beings” by investigating what they call 
φύσις are investigating in likenesses just as much as those who turn to the λόγοι in 
which beings are presented (100a). The difference is that the “scientist” who claims to go 
straight to the matter is unaware of the mediation of the λόγοι in accord with which their 
soul determines the “being and benefit” of the things they investigate. What Socrates’ 
turn to the λόγος indicates is that he is aware of this mediation, aware of the natural 
activity of the ψυχή in determining the being of the things we encounter.321 Socrates 
                                                
320 Sallis notes that the issue of philosophical “growth,” which reveals philosophy to be a process, 
a life, is raised in this passage: “Socrates’ own growth consisted in his coming to see that the 
common opinions regarding growth are questionable.” (1996, p 39) 
321 Cf Sallis 1996: “Both kinds of seeing [Anaxagorean teleology and the attempt to grasp things 
by the senses] end in failure and blindness – unless, as is the case with Socrates, the pursuit of 
such seeing somehow issues in that awareness of the danger. In other words, the pursuit of such 
seeing can open the possibility of another alternative only if it leads into a more acute awareness 
of ignorance. . . More precisely, what is required is an awakening to an ignorance intrinsic to 
oneself – an ignorance which is not an ignorance with regard to this or that but which, rather, is a 
constituent in man’s comportment to everything, an ignorance which, as a result, holds man at a 
distance from total and immediate revelation of beings, a distance which he can ignore only at 
great peril.” (p 42, emphasis added) Sallis later makes it clear that “On this way it is λόγος which 
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turns to the soul in an attempt to develop his natural capacity for learning; this 
development, this παιδεία, is only possible if we are able to become aware of the 
dangerous hold that traditional λόγοι have on us, and then begin to attempt to return to 
the matter at hand without the mediation of traditional accounts of the nature of things 
we investigate. Socrates says he turned away from what is revealed to the senses (99e); 
from our reading of the Theaetetus, we can conjecture this means he turned to the activity 
of the soul, working through λόγος, to discover the αἰτίαi of beings.  
 We have observed many examples of this in the dialogue. At 64b, Socrates says 
the οἱ πολλοι are unaware of their ignorance regarding the true nature of death. Also, 
several disharmonious λόγοι about the nature of the soul have a “wondrous hold” on the 
interlocutors – notably, as we have seen, the λόγοι that presents soul as a harmony and as 
a reified “thing” that travels to another topos at death; we will see that these views are 
tied-up with the danger of the stance which gathers the “real” to be that which has 
physical presence and which comes-to-be and passes-away according to physical 
mechanisms. Socrates warns that such λόγοι pose the danger of making us un-
philosophical, and not attending “to the way it is with the things (πράγματα) the 
argument is about.” (91a) Socrates’ techne of λόγος is not simply a turn away from 
φύσις, but rather an attempt to uncover the inconsistencies and problems in the 
traditional λόγοι which are called φύσεως ἱστορίαν. These λόγοι only produce the 
semblance of wisdom; however, they are ὑπερήφανος, and so blind us to that fact.  
                                                                                                                                            
serves as the medium in which the images of beings can be safely studied.” (ibid.) It seems that 
understanding this distance, and mediating force of the activity of the ψυχή in accord with 
λόγος, is central to understanding human being, and the way the self is active in organizing the 
manifest intelligibility of our world.  
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 The turn of the second sailing occurs in recognition of the nature of human 
learning, the way we grow into learning in our παιδεία. We determine the “being and 
benefit” of the things we encounter through the λόγοι we inherit. If we are unaware of 
the activity of our soul, gathering the bundles of perception into the beings of our world, 
we are then unable to recognize when it is not the “matter the argument is about,” but 
rather the λόγοι that we have come to believe which guide us. We become brutal and 
arrogant, ὑπερφυῶς in our “wisdom,” and refuse to accept the evidence of what is before 
us – e.g. that humans grow without eating bone. Ironically, it is this attempt to record the 
truths of φύσις that blinds us to the unfolding logic of natural beings. The turn to λόγοι 
is, then, the only possibility for a human to grow into her possibility of discovering the 
flow of φύσις. 
 
1.4 Unity, Form, and the Activity of the Soul 
 
 Cebes responds that Socrates’ belief that humans grow bone by eating bone and 
grew flesh by eating flesh seemed “measured,” and Socrates adds a list of other things he 
“used to” believe: One man is bigger than another “by a head,” and horses are bigger than 
others for the same reason; he says he “thought ten things were more than eight because 
two had been added to the eight; and I thought a two-foot length was longer than a one-
foot length because it exceeded it by half of itself.” (96e)322 Cebes, reasonably, wonders 
                                                
322 Michael Davis makes a series of very important observations on this passage: “This is a 
peculiar list, and worth dawdling over. Is there anything which ties these examples together? All 
three cases concern questions of comparative magnitudes. To compare the size of two things 
obviously requires that one be able to tell the two apart. The first example is somewhat more 
complicated because it involves the growth of one man. When a man grows he obviously 
undergoes a change, and yet to say that he grows is to say that he remains one man despite the 
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what has changed, and asks how these matters appear to Socrates now. Socrates utters an 
oath, “By Zeus . . . I seem to be far from thinking, I suppose (οἴεσθαι), that I know the 
cause (αἰτίαν) concerning any of these things. . .” (ibid.) He explains his confusion in 
these matters as stemming from a deeper confusion regarding “adding a one to a one.”323 
That is, Socrates says that he does not suppose (οἴεσθαι) that he knows the αἰτία 
concerning any of these ‘more complicated’ matters since he is unable to answer what he 
takes to be a more basic question – how one and one come together to form two – i.e. 
                                                                                                                                            
change. To compare the size of men or horses on the basis of the heads of men or of horses seems 
to involve making a unit of a head (much in the way we have made a unit out of a foot), but 
clearly that requires that we be able to identify the unity of the head, and that unity is dependent 
upon its being a part of a larger whole, a man or a horse. Again the question of relative size 
involves the ability to see things as ones. The final example involves the relative size of numbers. 
In the first instance two is taken to be the source of the greatness often relative to eight. It 
replaces head, and is so to speak taken as a unit, as a one. In the second instance the relative 
greatness of two cubits and one cubit is seen in terms of the former exceeding the latter by half. In 
this case it is only because the two is not a unit, i.e., because it can be halved, that the comparison 
can be made in this way. Just as a head could be a unit only by being understood as a part of 
something which itself had to be understood as one, here two is allowed to serve as both the 
measure and the measured, as both a one and as a many.” (1980, p 561) Here, we see Davis 
identifying the presence of many of the central issues we have drawn from the Phaedo, from our 
discussion of what is required to recognize equality, and from our digression into the Theaetetus. 
Davis notes that Klein’s “math book” (1968), especially Chapter 6, “The Concept of Arithmos,” 
was an influence on his analysis here. See Vlastos, 1971b, for someone who does not see the 
unifying theme behind the problems Socrates describes here.  
323 Vlastos, failing to see the deeper implications of these perplexities – failing to be at all 
perplexed by them himself – helpfully tells his readers how even “beginners” are able to solve 
these problems today: “In this discussion I have deliberately gone beyond what we get in the text, 
in order to bring out the further implications of Plato's basic insight. If he had had at his disposal 
techniques of analysis such as are available nowadays to beginners, he could have offered a 
general formula to cover all four of the puzzles in 96D8-E4, laying down the contextual 
definition, "where A, B, C are (positive) magnitudes or cardinals, A is greater than B if, and only 
if, there exists a C such that A = B + C," and then showing that this definition is satisfied in all 
four cases: In puzzles i and 2, A = the height of the first (man or horse); B = the height of the 
second; C = the length of a head. In puzzle 3 (the one discussed in the text above), A = io units; B 
= 8 units; C = 2 units. In puzzle 4, A = 2 yards; B = i yard; C = A/2 yards (= i yard). Had Plato 
been able to clean up the problem in this way, he would have spared his readers two blemishes in 
his present account which help explain why his sound insight may be so easily missed.” (1969, p 
315) 
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how a ‘two’ is generated – and how two is split into two ones – i.e. how two passes-
away, is ‘destroyed.’324 
 He is far from thinking he knows the cause of such matters: “I who don’t even 
allow myself to assert that whenever anyone adds a one to a one, the one added to or the 
one that was added has become two, or that the one that was added and the one two 
which it was added became two by the addition of the one to the other.” (ibid.) At this 
point in his explanation, we can already hear echoes of our discussion in Chapter 3 (§2.3) 
concerning the body and soul as “ones” which are, somehow, ‘added together’ to form 
the two-in-one that is the body. In that discussion, we wondered at the ὑποκείμενον that 
would underlie the transition from death to rebirth. If this stable ὑποκείμενον is, in fact, 
the soul, then we are asked to wonder: “Is the body the ‘one’ that is added to make the 
‘one’ of the soul into the ‘two’ that is the self, or, is the soul the ‘one’ that is added to the 
body, making the body into the ‘two’ that is the self?”325 We are also reminded, of 
course, of the divine attempt to join pleasure and pain. (60bff) Thus, the question is raised 
again here: What is the source of the unity of the self which is a whole – whether it be a 
‘two’ made of the body and soul, or a ‘three’ made of the appetitive, spirited, and 
                                                
324 It is thus not helpful to say, with Taylor, that this is simply a “conceptual” question: “besides 
his scientific examples Socrates cites such questions as 'Why is ten greater than eight? ' and ' 
When one unit is added to another, is it one of the units which becomes two, and, if so, which 
one, or do both units become two? ' The latter question, at least, is clearly a conceptual question, 
in that it has to be answered by considering the meanings of terms used in talking about numbers, 
and by considering the logical relations of propositions formed from those terms.” (1969, p 45) 
Taylor misses the deeper significance of asking about unity, and thus how unity is determined in 
the phenomenal world. 
325 Burger 1984: “In presenting the strategy of the argument, Socrates anticipates its systematic 
confusion of two alternatives: either the psyche is an enduring subject that undergoes a genesis 
from one place to another, from Hades to the body and back again, or there is a genesis of one 
thing, the living, into another, the dead, and back again but with no enduring subject that persists 
through change. (p 55) 
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rational ‘parts’ of the soul, or some more complicated harmony? What is the source of 
the unity of the object of self-knowledge? Whence the unity of the αὐτός?  
 Socrates is not interested in a μῦθος in answer to these questions – e.g. a myth 
concerning the joining of the soul to the body by some god or gods (e.g. Timaeus 
42dff)326 – any more than he is satisfied with the μῦθος concerning pleasure and pain. 
Socrates’ answers come in his turn to the λόγος. I am reminded here of Socrates’ 
comment to Phaedrus concerning the myth of Boreas and Oreithyia, responding to 
Phaedrus asking if Socrates took the myth to be “true” (ἀληθὲς). (229dff) Socrates 
replies that he has no interest in being one of the “wise” who would claim to know what 
“really happened” with regard to these traditional μυθολόγημα. Socrates says “[I would 
rather] examine (σκοπῶ) not them but myself, whether I happen to be some wild animal 
more multiply twisted (πολυπλοκώτερον) and filled with desire (ἐπιτεθυμμένον) than 
Typhon, or a gentler and simpler animal, having by nature a share in a certain lot that is 
divine and without arrogance (ἀτύφου).” (230a) Typhon was a mythical beast with a 
body composed from various parts of snakes and birds and beasts of many kinds. 
Socrates is here asking if he is himself a harmonious whole, or if his own multiplicity is 
that of the beast, filled with ἐπιθυμία and excessive pride. The dialogue closes with 
Socrates praying for a kind of harmony within himself, and with respect to the world 
around him. (279b-c) Socrates’ concern for the unity of his self does not seem to be 
                                                
326 Thus, I am disagreeing with the views of scholars such as James V. Robinson, who claim that 
the Timaeus is an unironic account of Plato’s beliefs about the soul. Robinson agrees that 
“whether the soul in its true nature is simple or composite” is an essential question (Robinson 
1990, p 103); however, he makes the mistake of treating the main speaker of any given dialogue 
as Plato’s ‘mouthpiece’ and so reads the account of the soul in the Timaeus as revealing Plato’s 
ontology of the soul.  
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answerable either by a materialistic account, nor by a cosmological or mythological 
account; rather, the unity he is seeking seems to be rooted in ethical concerns.  
  
 Socrates continues his account of what he does not claim to understand: “Here’s 
what I wonder about: When each of the two was separate from the other, then each was 
one and the pair were not two, but when they came close to each other, this then became 
the cause of their becoming two – the concourse that comes from their being placed close 
to each other.” (97a) It is not immediately clear why Socrates feels he has to be able to 
understand how one and one make two in order to understand human growth, or relations 
of size between people or horses. There is an order to these examples – from the growing 
taller of one person, to the discrepancy in how tall two people are, to the difference in the 
number of a group of things, to difference in length, and finally to simple arithmetic. 
Thus, there is a sense in which one needs to understand arithmetic in order to understand 
measurements of length, and thus to understand the height of people. In fact, the abstract 
relation between the addition of a two to an eight to make a ten gives us the tools to 
understand how a person can eat something other than bone to make bone; that is, in 
understanding how the eight “take” the two and “use” it to make more of itself, to make 
itself into ten, helps us understand how the human takes in something foreign and turns it 
into more human. However, this does not seem to be the (sole) point of the examples. In 
fact, it seems as if Socrates is trying to break the ὑπερήφανος wisdom of φύσεως 
ἱστορίαν down to its most basic (mis)understanding, and show how the examination of 
the unexamined ontological principles of simple addition, which ground any talk of 
length, and thus of growth, would lead its inquiry in another direction. This new direction 
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will be outlined by Socrates as turning to the λόγοι; he will show that it is necessary to 
take into account the “invisibly present soul” in order to understand the αἰτία of the unity 
of things. As Michael Davis puts it, “What unifies this list of perplexities growing out of 
Socrates' first sailing is the concern for whatever it is which makes things one.”327 Davis 
also identifies comparison as essential to the examples Socrates chooses; just as in our 
analysis of what it takes to see equality – specifically how it entails to hold two things 
together while also holding them apart qua some quality, and in light of the good – we 
will find that the soul of the one doing the comparison is critical.  
 In our analysis of the Theaetetus (Chapter 4, especially §2.2), we discovered the 
importance of accounting for the place of the soul in understanding how we can 
understand the speech “one, two, three, four, five, six” as meaning the “same thing” as 
“twice three or thrice two, or four and two, or three and two and one.” (Theaetetus 204b-
c) In that discussion, we saw that the question of unity, which Plato raises in many 
important places in the dialogues, requires the understanding of the activity of the soul in 
determining unity. Understanding how the soul is active in one and one coming together 
to form two is equally necessary, and is essential to combating the materialistic 
understanding of causation present in Socrates’ questioning if the cause lies in the ones 
coming “close to each other.” (97a) Consider the following diagram328: 
 
 .   .  .   .  .   .  .   .  .   . 
                                                
327 1980, p 562. Davis says that this idea was first suggested to him by Ronald Polansky’s lecture 
notes on the Phaedo.  
328 This example is drawn from John Russon’s analysis of the “rhythms” of experience in Bearing 
Witness to Epiphany, 2009, p 12-14. 
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It is easy to immediately see the pairing of the two dots that are close together as forming 
a unit, a pair, which is a two made up of two ones. However, it is also possible to see a 
unit formed by the more distant dots, and to see these two dots as pairs, as the following 
diagram will help illustrate: 
 .  [.  .]  [.  .]  [.  .]  [.  .]   . 
What this experiment indicates is the power and presence of the intentions and 
expectations of the viewer in determining when and if two ones which “come close to 
each other” form two.329 We saw earlier (Chapter 5, §2.4) that this ability to hold a unity 
together as a one, while simultaneously holding-in-view the internal multiplicity of the 
unitary whole, is essential to Socrates’ description of the ability of the soul to compare 
things in the world – for example, two sticks. The unity in-view is formed by the 
“invisibly present” soul of the viewer determining the “being and benefit” of the unit. It 
is the whole, as more than the sum of its parts, that knowledge attaches itself to. It is the 
whole that the soul identifies as the being in question in accord with the λόγοι present to 
                                                
329 Vlastos recognizes the absurdity of proximity as cause of two being two; however, he simply 
states that the two are two “by hypothesis,” but he fails to inquire into  the importance of the 
power behind hypothesizing: “For obviously, the things being talked about are two by hypothesis, 
and they would still be two regardless of whether they were jammed up together in a cupboard or 
situated in different galaxies a million light-years apart. How absurd then to offer their 
propinquity as the reason why they are two!” (1969, p 312). He footnotes J Moreau, who 
recognized the importance of the soul in this passage: “La cause de la production du 2, c'est a 
dire d'un objet de representation double, ce n'est donc pas le rapprochement ou la separation 
dans lespace, mais dans l'esprit.... Toutes les difficulte’s de cette sorte sont donc levees par 
l'idialisme mathematique, quifait de l'unite’ un act intellectual indivisible et du nombre une pure 
relation." (1939, p. 382) Vlastos criticizes Moreau for “having to” turn Plato into a “neo-Kantian 
idealist” in order to “bring off” his identification of the importance of the soul (l’esprit) in this 
passage, and in the Phaedo as a whole. (Vlastos 1969, p 313, note 60): “Plato is not proposing 
that a psychological cause be substituted for the physical one.” (ibid) Vlastos thus reveals his 
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature and power of soul. The main problem of his reading 
is that it completely ignores the rest of the dialogue. In his entire paper on 95e-105c, he barely 
mentions anything that occurs in the rest of the dialogue, does not mention the names or the 
character traits of any of the interlocutors, and simply treats Socrates as unironically “the Socrates 
who Plato makes his mouthpiece.” (p 297, note 14) 
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the soul – the λόγοι which are salient and cogent in determining the being and benefit of 
what it encounters.330 The power of the soul in perception and understanding should at 
this point be quite evident; it is toward a more careful analysis of the place of λόγος in 
this system that the dialogue now pushes us. This analysis will allow us to see the place 
of λόγος in the way the self gathers itself to itself in self-knowledge, and thus we will 
understand how working in λόγοι is the proper locus of self-care.  
  
 Socrates then says there is the same perplexity in how two can come to be by the 
“opposite” operation – the splitting (σχίσις) of a unit into two. (97a-b) He says that in 
this case, instead of bringing two ones close together to form a two, we “split a one 
apart,” and it is this splitting that causes the two to come to be. (97a-b) Thus, if the 
splitting were the “cause” of  one becoming two, then there could be opposite causes for 
the same effect, possibly violating the law of non-contradiction. In this example, we find 
that Socrates is not asking for an answer that responds to the simple rational order of 
arithmetic. He seems to be claiming that the ontological grounding of a unity that can be 
split to form a two is prior to simple arithmetic. That is, it is clear that Socrates is not 
referring to abstract numbers; specifically, he is not referring to the number “1” when he 
speaks of τὸ ἓν in this passage – if he were, then the splitting of ‘one’ would result in two 
fractions, two halves. However, in the case he describes, the whole that is any unit 
                                                
330 On the connection between the soul, knowledge, and generation and destruction, Michael 
Davis writes: “Socrates' insufficient understanding of the whole is traceable to his insufficient 
understanding of the soul. The old Socrates looks into himself at the beginning of this section and 
announces that they will have to extend their inquiry to include the causes of all coming to be and 
perishing. That is not simply because the soul is one kind of being which comes to be and 
perishes. It is rather because only in a cosmos containing soul does it make sense to speak of 
coming to be and perishing.” (1980, p 564 emphasis added) It is in understanding how soul, and 
specifically ψυχή as νοῦς, are central to any Socratic account of the nature of the whole that we 
see why the Anaxagorean claim the mind orders the cosmos was so appealing to young Socrates.  
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(including any given number, which is itself a whole unit) can be split, and the two (the 
two wholes, whether they be integers or fractions) which remain are in fact themselves 
ones, and thus there are now two ones where there was only one. This puzzles Socrates, 
and he concludes, rightly, that it cannot be the ‘physical’ mechanism of splitting a unit 
that makes two ones, any more than it can be the physical act of bringing two ones closer 
together that makes them become two.  
 As an example, consider slicing a loaf of bread into slices. Imagine we have cut 
the slices quite thick, and then someone comes along and cuts one of our thick slices into 
two thinner slices. Is each slice now a half a slice? In a sense, yes. However, this is only 
because there is an ambiguity in the term ‘slice’ that does not obtain to arithmetic 
numbers. That is, the judgment made by the soul of the individual, operating on the 
cultural standards of what thickness is proper to a “slice” of bread, is necessary to 
determine the nature of unity, one, and two in this situation. To one person, we might 
have created two slices of bread – to another, those are way too thin to be slices, and all 
we have are two half-slices. By not speaking of arithmetical units, Socrates once again 
calls our attention to the activity of the soul, to the internal life of the individual, as 
determinative of the coming-to-be of the one and the two. We will find that this account 
of the activity of the soul is exactly what is missing from the materialist story of the cause 
of Socrates’ sitting in prison.   
 
 Socrates compounds these problems by saying he does not claim to know how a 
“one” comes to be. (97b) With this question, Socrates is explicitly calling us to wonder at 
the nature of unity, and the place of unity in our understanding of epistemology. As I 
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argued above, knowledge attaches itself to these unities, and the “being and benefit” of 
these unities are determined by the characteristic activity of the soul. (Chapter 4, §2) 
Thus, in his “second sailing” in search of the cause of generation and destruction, 
Socrates is asking us to consider how the soul determines the unity of what it encounters.  
 
 On the relation between these perplexities and the theme of the body and ψυχή, 
Burger writes:  
The juxtaposition of two accounts of how two comes to be, through the division 
of an original unit or through the addition of originally separate units, was just 
the perplexity Socrates introduced in his opening description of pleasure and 
pain, which seemed to him wondrously related to one another. (60b-c) And that 
description furnished in turn the model for a double account of the relation 
between body and psyche. Does body become alive, then, by having psyche 
brought near to it, or does psyche become thereby embodied? And if both 
together become two by mere juxtaposition, how can they also become two by 
the separation of one from the other? In fact, as Socrates realizes in conclusion, 
he cannot yet persuade himself that he knows how one comes to be. For not only 
do there seem to be opposite causes that both produce two, but the same causes, 
and the same opposition, could also produce one: if body and psyche are really 
united, they make a single living animal, but if they are really separated, each is a 
single entity – the corpse, at least, is a unit, whether or not the psyche proceeds 
by itself on its journey to Hades.331 
 
By drawing our attention to the relation between the cause of unity and the possible unity 
of body and soul, Burger has allowed us to see how the activity of the soul can be 
implicated in naming the relation of body to soul, just as it is in the hypothetical division 
of the soul into three parts – a division which we revealed to be a product of a specific 
λόγος in the Republic. It is through λόγοι that we gather ourselves to ourselves as body 
and soul in tension with one another, or as a soul in tension with other ‘parts’ of itself, or 
as a unified animal understood as embodied soul.  
                                                
331 1984, p 138. 
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 As I argued in the early chapters, how we view ourselves has effects on the ethical 
demands which we see ourselves answering to; i.e. if we see ourselves as a pure soul 
inclined toward the good struggling with a shameful, impure body and ‘its’ desires – and 
if we see this as the “only cause of all war and strife (στάσεις) and battles” in the world 
(66c) – then we are inclined to view the ethical life as essentially a struggle with a 
foreign, intractable ‘enemy’ which always is and always will be inclined toward injustice. 
If, on the other hand, we view ourselves as composed of a tri-partite soul, we have the 
opportunity to see the ‘lower’ parts of the soul as susceptible to wise rule by the ‘higher’ 
parts; thus, a view of human harmony is possible, and ethics can be self-mastery and self-
habituation, rather than constant strife. These different ethical views arise from differing 
ontologies of the soul.332  
 I have argued that a sophisticated ontology of the soul would require answering to 
far more internal multiplicity than the tri-partite theory can account for; thus, while this 
theory is a marked advance over viewing the self as body and soul in tension and 
opposition, it calls for a “longer” method of investigation. The outcome of this longer 
investigation of the self is a view in which our own internal tensions and oppositions are 
called into the light. That is, these passages call for a self-examination in terms of 
internal multiplicity, tension, and cognitive dissonance. They ask us to recognize that it is 
our ownmost activity to determine the nature of the soul, and of our own selves, through 
the process of self-examination – the process by which we come to grips with the nature 
of the multiplicity of the soul, as demanded by this dialogue, and others. It is by the 
                                                
332 I will argue below that the account of the soul which I am arguing for here – one rooted in the 
powers and activity of the soul – helps us understand the ethics of the “Socratic paradoxes” which 
claim that virtue is knowledge, all virtue is one, and no one does wrong willingly.  
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activity of the soul, itself through itself, in accord with the λόγοι we have come to hold, 
and which have come to have a hold on us, that we determine the being of our own souls.  
 In this process of self-examination we do not simply discover a body and soul in 
tension, nor do we discover a tri-partite soul. Rather, with the guide of the texts, we 
discover that the λόγοι through which we govern our lives are in tensions that are 
multifarious. This discovery is central and internal to the work of asking the questions 
the Phaedo poses; one cannot be an active reader of the Phaedo and not come to face 
their own fears of death, their attachment to traditional λόγοι, and the diversity and 
multiplicity of their own salient ontologies of the self. We can only hope to face these 
facts about ourselves with courage and dedication to the truth.  
 We find ourselves playing different roles, and enacting different aspects of 
ourselves in different contexts and communities. We find that these communities and 
contexts have different salient λόγοι through which they demand that we gather 
ourselves to ourselves; we thus behave and respond to the world differently in these 
different contexts. In reading this text, we come to see that our self-understanding is not, 
yet, a unity. It is for this reason that the interlocutors unironically lament the loss of 
Socrates: It is with Socrates that they are their best selves. Plato laments with them, and 
his lamentation takes the form of chronicling the life of a Socrates grown “young and 
beautiful” so that we all may spend our time as our best selves, in concert with Socrates –  
in place of Theseus, Achilles, or Odysseus.333 It is in harmony with the myth and image 
of Socrates that Plato wants us to strive to become our best selves.  
                                                
333 Cf Davis 1980: “Throughout the Phaedo Socrates' apparent praise of death is, beneath it all, a 
praise of a certain kind of life. In that sense he is competing with the poets.” (p 567, emphasis 
added) 
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1.5 Anaxagoras, the Power of Νοῦς, and the Best Order 
  
 After chronicling these problems, Socrates claims that he does not know “why a 
one comes to be nor why, in a word (ἑνὶ λόγῳ),334 anything else comes to be or perishes 
or is by this way (μεθόδου) of proceeding.” (97b) Socrates says that it is this method that 
has perplexed him, and thus he will turn to an account of how he has developed his own 
method for understanding, according to his list: unity, coming to be and passing away, 
and being; this is method which he says he has “randomly smushed (εἰκῇ φύρω) 
together.” (ibid.) The use of the term φυράω reminds us of the blending of pleasure and 
pain, and the will to purity of the pure soul itself by itself that we saw in the “true-born 
philosophers.” (Cf Chapter 3, §2) There, the hope for purity appeared misguided, and we 
seemed to be left with a “second best” life, mixed and blended with the body. The use of 
this term calls us to wonder if the “second best” way of Socrates’ method in the second 
sailing will be connected to the issue of the soul being blended with the body; that is, I 
will argue that the second sailing is called for since we are embodied, finite human 
beings, and not pure souls with direct access to the truth of beings. It is as a result of this 
finitude and embodiment that we must access beings through the mediation of λόγος.  
 However, before turning to the account of this method, Socrates tells the tale of a 
hope for a ‘first sailing’ that was aroused in him when he heard of the speculations of 
                                                
334 As I noted in Chapter 3, §1.3, by adding “ἑνὶ λόγῳ,” Socrates seems to be reminding us of the 
place of λόγος in understanding unity, as well as coming to be and passing away.  
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Anaxagoras.335 He says that he felt he had found a teacher that was “after his own mind” 
(κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ - 97d) since Anaxagoras claimed mind was the cause of all things in 
his book: “Mind” (Νοῦς). According to Socrates’ retelling of this text, “it is in fact Mind 
that puts the world in order (διακοσμῶν) and is responsible for all things (πάντων 
αἴτιος).” (97c) Socrates found this “pleasing” (ἥσθην); this pleasure experienced by a 
youthful Socrates makes sense, for he says that he expected the book to say why 
everything in the cosmos was ordered “for the best (βέλτιστα).” (ibid.) On this account, 
having access to what is best would give anyone the ability to access what is.336 (97c-d) 
That is, in order to discover the αἰτία of anything a “man” (ἀνθρώπῳ) can “look to 
nothing but what’s most excellent and best (ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον).” (97d) 
Everything in the universe would be explainable, intelligible, and would answer to human 
conceptions of the best order. This would be pleasing indeed.337  
                                                
335 It is interesting to note that Anaxagoras was also said to have been tried by the Athenians – 
specifically, by Cleon – for impiety. Diogenes Laertius says that he was accused for claiming 
“that the sun was a red hot mass of metal.” (DK51A1) It was in some sense for atheism that he 
was tried (see Plutarch’s Pericles). Rather than being executed, as a result of Pericles 
(Anaxagoras’ student) giving a speech on his behalf, he was simply exiled. In the Apology and 
Crito, Socrates refuses exile, choosing to stay in Mother Athens and face execution instead. 
336 Commenting on the pun Socrates uses to say that Anaxagoras is a teacher “after his own mind 
(νοῦς),” Burger argues: “The pun Socrates constructs out of a colloquial expression discloses 
why the claim of teleology should be suspect: a universe constructed “in accordance with mind” 
is so pleasing to us, just because it projects onto the whole the operation of the human mind, 
without necessarily acknowledging that projection.” (1984, p 140) 
337 Cf Davis 1980: “[Socrates] says that he found Anaxagoras a teacher "to [his] mind" (kata noun 
emautoi). Socrates finds it good and to his mind that mind should rule all. What is the 
significance of this meeting of minds? What is accomplished by making mind the ruler of all? To 
really make mind order everything for the best would have two effects. It would immediately 
make a place for something like soul in a pre-Socratic cosmos, something not reducible to 
prepsychic elements and itself fundamental. Secondly, it would introduce what reductionist 
science can never give us, purposes, and thus open the way for an understanding of things as 
wholes. In a pre-Socratic world I would be hard pressed to determine where a table stopped and a 
coffee cup began. I would be hard pressed to explain what made this single being a one. With the 
introduction of purposes the integrity of beings is assured. Beings are distinguishable from each 
other on the basis of that good or purpose which they serve.” (p 564, emphasis added) We will 
soon be turning to how materialistic explanations obscure the good of beings, and to how 
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 Socrates hoped to find what was lacking in the materialistic explanations of the 
physical philosophers; that is, he hoped to find a conception of the universe in which the 
human mind was given a central place in the causal structure of what is. The second 
sailing is, in some sense, a reaction to this failing, and a second method for reaching the 
same end – i.e., of locating and explaining the centrality of the human soul to the being of 
the world. Instead of having a direct causal relation to the structure of the world – e.g. the 
position of the earth in relation to the sun – the centrality of the ψυχή will be found to be 
mediated by the λόγος. 
 Unfortunately, the book did not live up to Socrates’ expectations. He thought the 
text would teach “the cause of the things that are (τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων)” in terms 
of what is best, since that is, Socrates presumes, how Νοῦς would order the world. (97d) 
Unfortunately, what he finds in the book is a series of materialistic explanations for 
phenomena. He says he was “swept away” (ᾠχόμην φερόμενος) from this “wonderful 
hope (θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος).” (98b)338 He says the text did not “make use” (χρώμενον) 
of νοῦς  as αἰτία that “put things in order” (διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα), but rather “put 
the blame on (ἐπαιτιώμενον) air and ether and water and other things many and absurd 
(ἄτοπος).” (98c) It is in response to this that Socrates gives his famous account of his 
“bones and sinews.” In framing his denial of materialism, we will find Socrates’ final 
refutation of the idea of the soul as a ghostly presence – one which can even be seen 
                                                                                                                                            
understanding the determination of that good requires understanding the soul. Thus, I disagree 
with Ross, and others, who take the ‘second best’ character of the second sailing to be ironic: “. . . 
it is clear that to the degree to which the deuteros plous passage suggests that the later method is 
inferior to the earlier ones, it must be ironical.” (Ross 1982, p 23) 
338 The translators note that there is a nautical imagery to the term φερόμενος, which “echoes 
Odysseus, who was swept back out to see within sight of home by the folly of his companions 
(Odyssey X 48).” (note 18 to pg 78). If they are right to detect this image of the sea, then we have 
more reason to expect the second sailing to be a reaction to specifically this disappointment.  
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haunting graveyards! (81d) – and as continuing to exist as a physical presence, visible to 
the gods, in another τόπος after death. In his second sailing, then, we will find the true 
Platonic conception of the ‘higher,’ non-physical level of reality toward which the 
philosopher must turn, stripped of the mythological quasi-physicality of a “realm” of 
forms in which the soul “dwells” before birth and after death.  
 
1.6 The “True Cause,” Mind, Bones, and Sinews 
 
 Socrates articulates what he finds lacking in the materialistic explanations he 
found in Anaxagoras’ book by referring to his own situation in prison. He describes the 
stance that Anaxagoras (who chose exile over execution) – and by extension, any “natural 
philosopher” – takes toward phenomena as a sort of πάθος:  
. . .to me his condition (πεπονθέναι) seemed most similar to that of somebody 
who – after saying that Socrates does everything he does by mind (πάντα ὅσα 
πράττει νῷ πράττει) and then venturing to assign the causes of each of the 
things I do – should first say that I’m now sitting here because my body’s 
composed (σύγκειται) of bones and sinews, and because bones are solid and 
have joints keeping them separate from one another, while sinews are such as to 
tense and relax with the flesh and the skin which holds them together. Then since 
the bones swing in their sockets, the sinews, by relaxing and contracting, make 
me able to bend my limbs now, and that is the cause of my sitting here with my 
legs bent. And again, as regards my conversing with you, he might assign other 
causes of this sort, such as voice and air and hearing and a thousand other things 
of the sort as causes, and not taking care to assign the true causes (ἀληθῶς 
αἰτίας). . . (98c-d) 
 
Socrates’ account of the physical causes which Anaxagoras might find responsible for his 
sitting in prison focuses on the disposition of his body. It is easy, then, to think of 
whatever account he is about to give of the “true causes” as rooted in the soul, and thus 
this passage would play into the simple dichotomy of body and soul set up by Simmias’ 
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answers early in the conversation. However, this explanation is insufficient. A few lines 
later Socrates refers to his bones and sinews as having desires based in their “opinion” as 
to what is best (δόξης . . .τοῦ βελτίστου – 99a). However, in this first account, the body 
is not held responsible as cause in virtue of tendencies toward action, but rather in terms 
of the simple physicality of having a body. Thus, a few lines after this initial account, 
Socrates complicates the picture of the body as “tomb” or vehicle for the active, 
motivating soul by pointing to the diversity, multiplicity, and conflict within the self – 
here explicitly said to be based in differences of opinion (δόξα) – which we have 
identified as a central problematic in the dialogue. That is, in identifying the way the 
desires “of the body” respond to opinions of what is best, Socrates again complicates the 
simple picture of a body with “its” (irrational) desires, struggling with the soul.  
 
  Socrates then lists what he takes to be the “true causes” (ἀληθῶς αἰτίας) of the 
phenomena of his sitting in prison:  
. . .that since the Athenians judged (ἔδοξε) it better (βέλτιον) to condemn me 
(καταψηφίσασθαι)339, so I for my part have judged (δέδοκται) it better to sit 
here and more just (δικαιότερον) to stay put and endure whatever penalty 
(δίκην) they order (κελεύσωσιν). Since – by the Dog! – these sinews and bones 
of mine would, I think, long ago have been in Megara or Boetia, swept off by an 
opinion about what is best (ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου), if I didn’t 
think it more just and beautiful (εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον ᾤμην καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι), 
rather than fleeing and playing the runaway, to endure whatever penalty the city 
should order. (98e-99a)  
 
This is one of the most important passages in Plato’s corpus, and it has received scant 
attention. Vlastos, for example, passes over it as simply a bridge to the “important” 
passages where Plato uses Socrates as his mouthpiece to express his own theory of 
                                                
339 Καταψηφίσασθαι means literally, “to vote against,” and thus implies choice based in having 
been persuaded of Socrates’ impiety and danger to the polis.   
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causes, “the Theory of Forms or Ideas.”340 Vlastos immediately notes that Plato “makes 
no effort to conceal from the reader that he has yet to reach a clear-cut conception of 
what "participation" involves. . .”341 However, despite recognizing that the presentation of 
this “Theory” does not give an explanation of the one of its central tenets – the nature of 
μέθεξις – Vlastos does not take this as an opportunity to think beyond what Socrates 
explicitly states in the text. Thus, he misses the fact that the account that Socrates gives of 
the “true causes” (ἀληθῶς αἰτίας) of his situation in the dialogue makes no reference to 
forms as causal forces. Rather, it is the judgments of the Athenians, and of Socrates – 
their opinions, based in the state of their souls – which are named as the true αἰτίαι. That 
is, it is not The Good itself which puts Socrates in prison; rather, it is the λόγοι that the 
Athenians, and Socrates, believe to be true of the good that are the cause.342 Their λόγοι 
mediate their access to the forms. Vlastos, and many others, miss this point, and thus 
miss the importance that the rest of the dialogue bears on how we are to understand 
Socrates’ presentation of the forms as causes in this specific situation, and to these 
specific interlocutors.343 
                                                
340 1969, p 298. 
341 1969, p 301. 
342 Cf Burger 1984: “Nor does either of these causes express the operation of mind based on 
knowledge of the good, for each is simply an opinion of what is better; such opinions were 
apparently of no interest to Anaxagoras, but they are decisive for Socrates.” (p 143) 
343 “Our passage falls into two divisions. Division One (95E-99C) recounts the youthful 
infatuation of the Platonic Socrates with the physical philosophers and the disappointment in 
which it ended when he found that all they could offer was material aitiai and mechanical causes, 
while he had become convinced that only teleology provides the "true" (98E) or "real" (99B) 
aitiai of natural phenomena. There is no talk of the Forms as aitiai-no mention of them at all-
throughout the whole of this division, though the way is prepared for them by the laying out of a 
series of perplexities whose solution would elude Socrates until he had hit upon the Theory of 
Forms. This part of Division One I shall discuss at some length in due course. The rest of it I shall 
ignore. Though its historical importance is incalculable-this is one of the great turning points in 
European natural philosophy, the conscious abandonment of the line of thought which had led, in 
the systems of Leucippus and Democritus, to the first rigorously mechanistic conception of the 
order of nature-its message is familiar and, superficially at least, quite clear. I shall, therefore, 
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 Thus, Socrates makes it clear that the “true cause” is a judgment about what is best. 
He admits to the internal multiplicity that we seen arise at several places in the dialogue 
by admitting that he has the drive to flee – a motivation which he ironically imparts to his 
bones and sinews – but the “part” of him that wants to flee is ruled by his judgment that 
flight would be unjust.  
 Further, we see that Socrates identifies a political dimension to his situation. The 
cause of his sitting in prison is not the result of physical conditions – which are necessary 
conditions, but not causal conditions.344 Nor is the cause said to be the relation of some 
particular to some form (the form of sitting? the form of being in prison?).345 Rather, the 
                                                                                                                                            
bypass it in this paper to concentrate on the far more hazardous task of figuring out what is going 
on in Division Two (99C-105C), where Socrates, frustrated in his search for teleology, falls back 
on a second-best method of inquiry of his own.” (1969, p 297, emphasis added) In focusing on 
the education of the soul, I hope to have shown how Socrates’ account of his philosophical 
development – whether or not this account “prepares the way” for Plato’s (cursory, limited, and 
incomplete, as Vlastos admits) presentation of his “Theory of the Forms” – is central to 
understanding the philosophical life, which even a brief look at the dialogue presents as a central 
concern. Further, treating the importance of these passages as of only “historical” significance is 
to miss the subtlety of Plato’s writing. In addition, his claim that the perplexities in the ‘first’ 
division simply ‘prepare the way’ for the Theory of the Forms is odd considering that his own 
analysis of these later sections of the Phaedo argues that this Theory cannot deal with these 
perplexities, especially without a developed conception of participation. 
344 Socrates goes on to articulate the difference between a necessary condition for sitting in prison 
–  having a body – which is that without which he “wouldn’t be able to do what seemed best,” on 
the one hand, and the cause “through” which he is doing what he is doing. (99a) If someone were 
to say that he couldn’t sit in prison without a body, “he would be speaking the truth.” (ibid.) “If 
however, he should say it was through these things that I’m doing what I’m doing, engaging in 
these acts by mind but not by the choice of what’s best, why the slackness of his speech  would 
be abundant and tedious.” (ibid.) 
345 Taylor argues that reference to a form might be the ultimate explanation of this phenomenon: 
“It may, however, be that Plato thought that even the explanation of human action depends 
ultimately on the Forms, in that every action gives rise not to a single explanatory proposition 
stating that the agent acted because he thought it best to act in that way, but to a chain of 
explanations terminating in a reference to Forms. An example of such a chain might be 'Why is 
Socrates sitting in prison instead of escaping to Megara?’ ‘Because he judged it best to stay in 
prison.' ‘Why did he judge it best to stay in prison?’ ‘Because he is a good man.’ ‘Why is he a 
good man?’ ‘Because he participates in the Form of the Good.’” (1969, p 46-47) However, we 
will see that the unhelpful generality of this form of answer is not actually presented by Socrates 
as a sufficient answer to the cause of phenomena; further, Taylor’s reading ignores the specifics 
of the passage by ignoring the contrast to the opinions of the Athenian “judges,” and thus to the 
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“true cause” is identified to be complex and fully involved in a human, political context.346 
Thus, any interpretation which claims that the second sailing simply and unequivocally 
explains the cause of phenomena as “participation in a form” is simply missing this 
aspect of the text. We live in a human and political world; it is precisely because of the 
failure to account for this fact about our experience that Socrates abandoned the natural 
philosophers, and for this reason that he found such hope in the rumors about Anaxagoras 
placing Mind at the center of being.347 To account for the αἰτία of anything, one must 
attend to the λόγοι through which the situation is gathered, and thus through which the 
judgment about what course of action is best gets made; further, one must understand the 
political dimensions of the situation, and attend to how the πόλις, and how tradition, 
mediates the λόγοι that have a “wondrous hold” on us. Socrates is in prison for 
challenging the λόγοι of Athens. While in prison, he identifies the power of the λόγοι, 
and the place of λόγοι in the way the soul determines the “being and benefit” of 
phenomena. Socrates claims that the best life, the examined life, is one which does not 
take the λόγοι of the polis as fixed or obviously true, but which undergoes a process of 
inquiry into the truth of these λόγοι.  
 Thus, Socrates poses a threat to the πόλις because he challenges the very 
                                                                                                                                            
place of judgment and the soul. Perhaps Taylor assumes that μέθεξις is solved by Plato, or that 
its mystery is not a problem for explaining phenomena. That is, if it is not clear what it means to 
say that Socrates is in prison because he “participates” in the form of the good, it is not clear how 
this sufficiently explains the phenomenon, any more than saying this sunset is beautiful because it 
“participates” in beauty. In his defense, Taylor expresses some uncertainty about Plato’s 
adherence to this form of explanation, saying that his comments are “admittedly speculative,” and 
that this kind of explanation is “safe,” but “the safety of the answer seems to lie just in its total 
lack of information” (ibid.) 
346 The importance of the political is indicated by the reference to the judgment of the Athenians, 
Socrates’ mention of the “Athenian Eleven” at 85b, and by the situation of the dialogue as a 
whole. Thus, I cannot understand Hackforth’s claim that “the Phaedo is notably silent regarding 
political institutions and government; its ethics are wholly individualistic. . .” (1955, p 7) 
347 Cf Davis 1980. 
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conception of reality, as well as the conception of the ‘best life,’ which is central to 
maintaining order in Athens, and in any political regime. As we learn from the Republic: 
Controlling the λόγοι of a people is central to controlling the people themselves. It is 
through these λόγοι that we gather the world together into an intelligible order; it is only 
on the basis of the intelligibility of the world that we are called to act. Our ethical 
demands appear against the horizon of the world that is gathered by the λόγοι which we 
hold to, and which have a hold on us.348  
 As we know, attacking the narrative unity of the culture can have a traumatic effect 
by fragmenting the people subject to Socratic elenchos – the sting of the torpedo fish can 
“leave its stinger behind.” (91c) By turning to the λόγος, and to the place of the λόγος in 
gathering together the unity of the self, Socrates is grounding the possibility of virtue as 
harmonizing the self – a harmony that makes possible actions such as Socrates’ 
resistance to the fear of death. That is, in the face of the trauma of self-fragmentation and 
cognitive dissonance, the Phaedo calls for the healing power of narrative to gather the 
self to itself.349 Only in the light of this unity and harmony can we understand how 
                                                
348 Consider an ethical situation: e.g. what is our ethical reaction to criminals from the inner city? 
Do we A. treat them as people who chose their life of crime and thus should be punished? Or do 
we B. treat them as victims of terrible societal conditions, as products of their environment? The 
answer to this ethical (and political and juridical) question depends absolutely on our conception 
of the being of a human being. If we take the human to be a self-transparent, unified, self-
coherent being endowed with conscience and thus an innate sense of right and wrong who only 
does wrong out of weakness, and thus these criminals make the ‘free’ choice to take the ‘easy’ 
way and hurt others instead of working hard for themselves, then we take path A. If, on the other 
hand, we understand that human is an inherently interpersonal and political animal that is in large 
part the product of its environment, then we will choose to educate and reform the individual and 
attack the social conditions which created the behavior. It is our ontological conceptions that 
guide what is taken to be the best course of action (as I will make clearer in the next chapter).  
349 Consider a modern approach to this issue: “The narrative psychological approach can be 
classified as broadly social constructionist insofar as it attempts to examine the cultural 
structuration of individual experience. However, building on recent criticism of certain social 
constructionist approaches (such as discourse analysis), it is argued that these approaches tend to 
lose touch with the phenomenological and experiential realities of everyday, practical life. 
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Socrates is able to face death with such calm and poise.  
  
 
§2 The Second Sailing in Search of the Cause  
 
 
2.1 The Failure of the First Sailing 
 
 
 Socrates says that those who seek physical causes are not “able to distinguish that 
it’s one thing to be genuinely the cause, and another to be that without which the cause 
                                                                                                                                            
Accordingly, they overplay the disorderly, chaotic, variable and flux-like nature of self-
experience. Drawing on recent research on traumatizing experiences such as living with serious 
illness, this paper argues that the disruption and fragmentation manifest in such experiences 
serves as a useful means of highlighting the sense of unity, meaning and coherence (the `narrative 
configuration') more commonly experienced on an everyday level. Moreover, when disorder and 
incoherence prevail, as in the case of trauma, narratives are used to rebuild the individual's 
shattered sense of identity and meaning.” (Michele L. Crossley 2000, from: “Narrative 
Psychology, Trauma and the Study of Self/Identity”) The use of narrative in dealing with the self-
fragmenting effects of trauma is widely recognized. See also Barvosa 2008, Berkowitz 2010. See 
also Stolorow 2011. Stolorow tries to understand trauma from within a Heideggerian- 
Existentialist framework. Drawing upon the significance of being-toward-death in Being and 
Time, he shows that in traumatic experiences, “the system of everyday significance we take for 
granted suddenly falls apart, and we are faced with the unprotectedness of our existence brutally.”  
This shattering of the unity of the self can be seen as a traumatic result of facing our finitude, that 
is, in facing death. As he says in a blog entitled “Trauma and the Hourglass of Time”: “. . . 
because trauma so profoundly modifies our ordinary experience of time, the traumatized person 
quite literally lives in another kind of reality, completely different from the one that others 
inhabit. This felt differentness, in turn, contributes to the sense of alienation and estrangement 
from other human beings that typically haunts the traumatized person. . . Emotional trauma brings 
us face to face with our existential vulnerability and with death and loss as possibilities that 
define our existence and that loom as constant threats.” 
(http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-d-stolorow/coping-with-trauma_b_826995.html) It is on 
the day he faces his death that Socrates reveals the depths of the threat of human multiplicity, and 
gives us the tools we need to understand that diversity, and to begin to forge a harmonious, 
unified life.  
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wouldn’t be a cause.” (99b)350 In this, he affirms that without a body there would be no 
cause for anything we might seek. Is this true of the act of thinking? Thinking was 
Socrates’ second example (at 96a-b), after human growth, which certainly requires a 
body. The answer is unclear, but Plato obviously wants to consider the possibility that 
thinking is impossible without the body. That is, Socrates implies that the body is that 
without which ‘the cause would not be a cause’ – the body is a necessary condition, while 
not the cause of the phenomena to be explained. Since one of his initial examples was 
thinking, this would imply that there is no thinking without a body. 351 
 In any case, people unable to make this distinction are “groping around as if in the 
dark” when they call the body, or any necessary physical condition, the “cause.” (99b) 
They fail, then, to look for (οὔτε ζητοῦσιν) the power (δύναμιν) which would place 
everything in the best way possible, just as it is “now.” (99c) They “don’t at all suppose 
that it’s the Good-and-Binding (ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον) that truly binds and holds things 
together.” (ibid.) Socrates says that to discover such a cause “it’d be a pleasure to become 
anybody’s student.” (ibid.) We saw above how this would place the cause of all things 
easily within the grasp of the human mind – including thought, growth, the position of 
the earth and stars; the cause of everything in the heavens and beneath the earth would be 
knowable. Unfortunately, Socrates says, “But since I was robbed of this and never 
                                                
350 Cf Gonzalez 1998: “These kinds of causes, in Socrates’ view, are only necessary conditions, 
that is, that without which real cause could not function. Thus we have another way of 
characterizing a thing’s elements or parts: they are only conditions of a thing being what it is, not 
the real cause.” (p 192) Here, again, we can see the primacy of the form – as we saw in our 
analysis of the harmonious whole that is the cause of the bow or lyre in the last Chapter. 
However, here, Socrates subtly emphasizes the necessity of the physical parts – e.g. the body.  
351 Burger says: “Socrates brings to light the inseparability of body and psyche; for his opinion of 
the best, which should represent the intention of psyche in contrast to the mechanical operation of 
the body, would have been carried not only through the bones and sinews but in their service.” 
(1984, p 143) 
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became capable of discovering it myself or learning it from another. . .” he had to create 
his own method. It is important to understand what Socrates is saying here: the claim is 
that discovering what is best, according to our own standards of good, will tell us the 
nature and cause of all things in the Universe. Socrates finds himself unable to discover 
this cause. This is proof enough that things are not arranged according to what we would 
think is best. If everything that is was structured according to human conceptions of the 
good, surely discovering the truth of things would not be difficult! However, as we will 
see, human finitude places limits on what can be discovered – it is sadly, and for the 
worse, not the case that we can discover the true cause of all things. The second sailing 
becomes necessary in light of an awareness of our inability to discover the cause of all 
things – an inability occasioned by the fact that the world is not structured according to 
our conception of the good. We find ourselves at a distance from things; there is no 
“short cut,” as the “true-born philosophers” would have it, and we cannot bridge this 
distance with hope and expectation.352 All we can do is rub our limited, human λόγοι 
together like fire-sticks, and hope to catch some partial vision of the truth. It is to the 
τέχνη of this “rubbing” that Socrates now turns. 
 
2.2 Turning to the Λόγος  
 
 Socrates continues, “since he was robbed” of this full teleology, he asks: “. . . do 
you want me to make a display (ἐπίδειξιν), Cebes, of the way by which I’ve busied 
myself (πεπραγμάτευμαι) with the second sailing in search of the cause (τὸν δεύτερον 
                                                
352 Davis 1980: “Socrates abandons his first sailing because he finds it unnatural.” (p 561) 
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πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν)?” (99d) The term “second sailing” (δεύτερος 
πλόυς) refers to a situation in which the wind has failed, and so the sailor has to turn to 
the use of oars.353 If the image is to be taken seriously, then, the goal of the journey 
remains the same – the sailor is still trying to reach the same destination.354 It is also clear 
that the image denotes a situation in which the natural elements have proven 
uncooperative – the wind did not carry us directly and smoothly to our desired goal. As a 
result, a slower and far more difficult and straining method is called for.  
 There is a great deal of debate about what the ‘first sailing’ is, the failure of which 
causes Socrates to develop his ‘second sailing.’355 The passage seems to claim that the 
‘first sailing’ is the failure of the ability to give an account of the cause of all things based 
                                                
353 Gallop 1999, p 176, Hackforth 1955, p 127, Rowe 1993, p 238, Sallis 2004, p 154, et al.  
354 Goodrich says that the second sailing is a change of “method not of goal.” (1903, p 382) 
355 Davis takes the ‘first sailing’ to be to be all physical speculation, what he calls “Socrates’ 
‘natural science’.” (1980, cf p 562 et al.) Cf Sallis 1996: The second sailing is second “in contrast 
to the other two taken together.” (p 42) Burger agrees. (1984, p 144) Murphy, on the other hand, 
argues: “In reaction from such [teleological] attempts he had hoped for a completely rational 
account of gignomena but had failed; so he now takes refuge in a method which will give a semi-
rational account. . . If he had used the phrase deuteros plous in this respect and relatively to the 
physicist's method, it would certainly have been ironical. But his own method is not deuteros 
except in relation to the teleological protos plous, and though it may be said that its indirectness 
(discussed later) does, as such and so far as it goes, constitute a certain inferiority in comparison 
with the physicist's method, yet Socrates does not want us to take this too seriously. (1936, p 42) 
Goodrich agrees, arguing that the second sailing must be second to Anaxagorean teleology “and 
nothing but.” (1903, p 382) Ross says that this second interpretation is the most common: “The 
most common interpretation of the deuteros plous passage, however, is that the deuteros plous is 
really second-best to a teleological account of things, involving the form of the Good, which 
Socrates failed to find in Anaxagoras' philosophy.” (1982, p 23) Cf Spitzer 1976, p 117, Frede 
1978, p 28, Vlastos 1969, p 297ff., Rose 1966, p 464ff., Hackforth 1955, p 127&137, et al. Ross 
disagrees with this common interpretation (thus agreeing with Davis, broadly speaking) that the 
protos plous is searching for “all physical aitiai.” (1982, p 24) I will discuss this in Section 2.2.1 
below. Tait writes: “The whole of 96a up to the introduction of the second method at 99e is 
concerned with explanation or, perhaps better, kinds of explanation of natural phenomena. If 
Socrates "destination" were not a kind of explanation of natural phenomena, therefore, then he 
would be radically changing the subject. Moreover, at 99e he says that his method consists in 
studying the truth of things in theories (λόγοι) and he contrasts this with studying them directly 
by means of the senses. This would not be coherent if the "things" being studied were not sensible 
things. Thus, it seems clear that the second best method is a method for obtaining explanations of 
some kind of the phenomena.” (1986, p 457)  
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in what is best, including an account of how the Good and Binding truly holds all things 
together (ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν), and the failure to 
discover of this cause “how it works” (ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει). (99c) This ability would, of 
course, be super-human; the more serious problem is that the world is not, in fact, 
structured in such a way. If it were, again, we would be able to access the cause of all 
things, and the first sailing would not have failed Socrates. On the other hand, it also 
seems to be the case that the ‘second sailing’ is second to Socrates’ youthful inquiries 
into physical αἰτίαι. If this were the case, however, it is difficult to see how the second 
sailing would be second best, since that method created such confusion.356 I think that the 
ambiguity in the text is intentional, and that it is intended to make us consider the 
commonality between the different methods that Socrates had tried before turning to the 
λόγος.357 Specifically, by considering this ambiguity we find that all such inquiries did 
not fully understand the human role in determining causation. While Anaxagoras seems 
to place the human at the center of discourse – and it is for this reason that Socrates was 
so excited to read his book – he resorts to physical explanations; further, while a full 
teleology based in νοῦς would seem to recognize the place and power of the soul, by 
forgetting the mortal and embodied nature of knowing, it fails in this regard as well; as 
such, this knowledge of the cause of all things is found to be beyond the realities of 
                                                
356 Cf Rose 1966, Murphy 1936.  
357 This is thus another instance of commentators trying to disambiguate the text, assuming that 
Plato must have a single “meaning” – a view which stems from their treating the text as intending 
to convey Plato’s own opinion. If Plato had intended for us to take only one of the interpretations 
offered by commentators as “fact,” he possessed the skill to make his meaning clear. On the issue 
of the commonality of the two ‘first sailing’ methods, Burger writes: “Since this [second sailing] 
would seem to represent a third mode of inquiry, only the common ground of mechanism and 
teleology as “investigation of the beings” can explain why Socrates’ replacement of that 
enterprise constitutes what is presumably a second-best alternative. But Socrates’ second sailing 
would be a compromising alternative only if the first way were both desirable and possible and 
that is precisely what he proceeds to deny. . .” (1984, p 144, emphasis added) 
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human knowing.358 Considering the connection between these two failings – one which 
does not consider the place of mind in nature, and the other which, by making mind the 
ultimate cause of everything that happens, exaggerates and misunderstands that place – 
gives us occasion to consider the true place of the human ψυχή in the world. If we 
understand these passages to be simply a pre-cursor to a Platonic epistemology – as 
Vlastos does – then we miss the true import of the text; that is, we miss the fact that 
Socrates is still trying to work through his “original question,” as Davis puts it: “What is 
the nature of man [sic]?”359 
 In any case, it is not clear what aspect of the first sailing is the goal that is still 
desired by the rowing Socrates. That is, is he still trying to find a teleological account of 
things? Is he still trying to discover how the mind is at the center of all things? Is he, 
rather, trying to figure out how the world is arranged for the best? Or, is he simply still 
trying to discover the αἰτίαι of phenomena, without any of the more specific strategies of 
the ‘first sailing,’ whatever that might be? 
 
 Upon Cebes’ understandably emphatic expression of desire to hear this ἐπίδειξις, 
Socrates continues:  
Well then after these [experiences], since I had had it with this looking into 
beings (τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν), it seemed to me I had to be on my guard so as not to 
suffer the very thing those people do who behold and look at (θεωροῦντες καὶ 
σκοπούμενοι) the sun during an eclipse. For surely some of them have their eyes 
destroyed if they don’t look at (σκοπῶνται) the sun’s likeness (εἰκόνα) in water 
or some other such thing. I thought this sort of thing over and feared I might be 
totally soul-blinded (ψυχὴν τυφλωθείην) if I looked at things (βλέπων πρὸς τὰ 
πράγματα) with my eyes and attempted (ἐπιχειρῶν) to grasp (ἅπτεσθαι) them 
                                                
358 In this regard, my own interpretation is closest to that of Davis 1980. 
359 Davis 1980, p 565. Cf Burger 1984: “[Socrates] implicitly criticized Anaxagoras for 
constructing a cosmological theory of mind without reflecting on his own human perspective in 
doing so.” (p 142) 
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by each of the senses. So it seemed to me I should take refuge in accounts 
(λόγους καταφυγόντα) and look in them for the truth of beings (ἐν ἐκείνοις 
σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν). Now perhaps in a certain way it isn’t quite 
like what I’m likening it to (ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν). 
For I don’t at all concede (συγχωρῶ) that somebody who looks into beings in 
accounts (ἐν [τοῖς] λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα) looks at them in likenesses 
to a greater extent than one who does so in actions (ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ 
τὸν ἐν [τοῖς] ἔργοις). (99d-100a, translation altered) 
 
 Many commentators have puzzled over this passage. With the preparation we have had 
in reading the rest of the dialogue with care, and with attention to the issues that we have 
seen arise again and again in the conversation, we will be able to unravel this passage.  
 
2.2.1 Λόγος vs Materialism and Anaxagorean Teleology 
 
 The first thing I want to note about this passage is that, in context, it constitutes a 
refutation of materialism and of concern with the speculations of “natural philosophers,” 
and thus a turn to the human; at the same time, the second sailing seeks to remain free of 
the fantasy of the “full teleology” of the Anaxagorean position, which places the human 
mind in total control of everything.  
 The turn to the λόγος is a turn to the human, in that it is a recognition of that 
force which mediates our relation to a reality which is itself shot through with the 
necessity of physicality. The second sailing does not attempt to go straight to “things” (τὰ 
ὄντα, τὰ πράγματα), because it recognizes that the being of human being stands at 
remove, and considers the truth of beings from across a χωρισμός. This mediation must 
be central to all discussion of the second sailing, but for now, I want to note how it 
demonstrates Socrates’ concern for the place of the human in the world, and thus a 
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concern for the nature of the soul, its place in the whole, and the connection of ψυχή and 
λόγος.  
 Earlier in this dissertation (cf Chapter 3, §2.3, et al.), I noted the Pythagorean 
context of the discussion. Simmias and Cebes are said to be “Pythagoreans,” but with 
their ignorance of the prohibition against suicide, they reveal themselves to be 
Pythagoreans who are unconcerned with ethical questions of the “best life,” and are 
focused on cosmological concerns. On this point, Gadamer says:  
(Simmias and Cebes) stand for that particular sort of mathematical investigation, 
theory of music, and cosmological knowledge which has, as not the least of its 
sources, Pythagorean teachings. And beyond this, as we shall see, they are quite 
at home in the natural science, biology, and medicine of their day. Now one 
should keep in mind that in the Apology Plato represents Socrates, not as an 
expert in modern science at all but, on the contrary, as one who himself 
repeatedly asserts his own ignorance of science and who restricts himself to the 
moral problems of mankind and to self-knowledge.360  
 
 
Gadamer goes on to say that  Plato’s choice of Pythagoreans for the discussion with 
Socrates on the day of his death “is obviously meant to show that Plato saw it as his own 
task to unite the moral introspection for which Socrates stood with the scientific 
knowledge represented by Pythagoreanism.”361 This conclusion is far from obvious, 
however; the second sailing shows that such “scientific knowledge,” understood in the 
wrong way, poses the threat of misology and blindness to the questions of “moral 
introspection.”  
 Rather than “uniting” these concerns, Plato seems to be strategically employing 
the language of “scientific knowledge” to allow Socrates to appeal to the characters of 
Simmias and Cebes; Socrates is trying to turn them away from such investigation, to a 
                                                
360 1980, p 23. 
361 Ibid., emphasis added 
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concern with their own souls and lives. The narrative structure of Socrates’ comments 
points in this direction; that is, he frames his turn from metaphysical and cosmological 
materialism to the human as a development of his philosophical concerns: When he was 
young, a youth in arguments, he was concerned with such investigations. When he 
became nearly soul-blinded, he turned to the λόγος – to the place of the human in the 
cosmos. As such, it makes sense that in his response to Cebes – whose question revealed 
his desire for abstracted philosophical certainty – Socrates would be trying to guide him 
along the path of this development, and thus away from such speculation.  
 The danger that such concerns pose can be seen clearly in the way Simmias and 
Cebes understand the fate of the soul after death as a quasi-physical substance that 
‘travels’ from this τόπος to another. In Chapter 3, §2, I showed that this conception of 
the soul’s non-physical reality is wedded to a conception of being as presence. With this 
materialistic understanding of being, Simmias and Cebes are destined to think of the 
separability of the soul as physical, spatial, and thus to think of the soul as an independent 
substance “entombed” in a body, which can haunt graveyards or make the journey to 
Hades.  
 I have further argued that there are subtle indications within the text which reveal 
an essential unity between body and soul (cf Chapter 6, §2.1, and just above in §2.1), 
marked by the being of a ζῶον as ensouled body.362 However, the fact that a division 
between body and soul is made in almost every human culture, and is referenced in many 
Platonic dialogues, cannot be ignored. Further, the division between body and soul – 
originally established by Simmias and Cebes’ traditionally-based answers to Socrates’ 
                                                
362 Cf Burger 1984, p 143, as noted above.  
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questions (at 64c and 79b) – is used to guide much of the discussion of the dialogue. As 
such, we have to ask how this separation is to be thought of, if not as a materialistic 
division between two reified entities, one entombed in the other.  
 By looking to the second sailing, we see that a one – e.g. the self – can be said to 
be divided into two (ones) – e.g. the body and soul – by the activity of the soul. Thus, we 
can argue: The soul is separable in λόγος. It is by an activity of mind that the soul can be 
separated and considered separately from the body, just as the soul can be spoken of as 
divisible into parts in accordance with the λόγος in which the interlocutors are engaged 
(cf. Republic 435d-e, as discussed in Chapter 6, §3.1).  
 Further, we see that this λόγος, which claims that the soul is a separable entity, 
attaches itself to the whole which arises out of the material parts. In understanding the 
person ‘Socrates’ we engage in the same activity as understanding the bow or the lyre; 
an account of the material constituents does not explain the being of Socrates any more 
than it measures the understanding of a bow. Our knowledge attaches itself to a whole 
which arises out of the physical parts; to fail to make this distinction is to be “groping in 
the dark,” according to Socrates, and to be unable to distinguish the cause (of a being 
being what it is – e.g. a bow or a person) from the conditions without which it could not 
be (a cause). This truth, to which knowledge adheres, is the form, the ‘formal cause’ of 
the being in question (as will become clear when we turn to Socrates’ account of the 
causal power of the forms). In the case of the bow, as we saw, the form precedes the 
existence of the physical wood and string (just as equality precedes the individual 
equals).  In the case of a human being, on the other hand, the formal cause – the good, the 
telos – is also subject to the opinions and activity of the individual him or herself. In 
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order to understand Socrates’ being, we cannot simply refer to the form of human being, 
we have to attend to his specific conception of what is best (which we saw, in our reading 
of the Meno, all people have – Chapter 5, §1.2.1), and to his political situation.  
 Thus, we can see that it is a product of how we humans are engaged in a project – 
how we are “striving” – that the soul can be spoken of separable from the body. All 
human beings seek what they see as good. In order to understand human beings one 
cannot simply resort to a sensory, materialistic analysis of the physical presence of the 
person; to understand a person, we have to see how their conceptions of what is best 
guide their actions. In order to understand a person, then, we have to speak of that which 
is not present to the senses – just as to speak of a bow is not to speak of strings and wood. 
In recognizing the individuality of the person as distinct from their physical being, we 
separate Socrates from his body in λόγος, just as he does when he speaks of himself 
sitting in prison. This is the separability of the soul from the body – it is separability in 
λόγος only. This being does not, sadly, survive the death of the body – the condition 
without which it could not be a cause.363   
 At the same time, just as a human is not reducible the pure physicality of the body, 
the second sailing – as equally a rejection of Anaxagorean teleology – recognizes the 
central importance of the physical condition of life – the healthy body. We are not a 
being structured purely by our projected intentions, as “pleasing” as that would be to us, 
and to young Socrates. When considering ourselves, we are also faced with a being 
immersed in a political situation in which our behavior is constrained, and a material 
                                                
363 Thus, this account parallels that of Aristotle in the De Anima. The psyche is best understood as 
the “first actuality” of a living body – that is, the soul is the δύναμις of the body such that it can 
be alive (which is indistinguishable from actual living, but which answers to a conceptual 
distinction between first actuality and full activity). Thus, the soul is distinguishable from the 
body only in λόγος.  
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condition, which can, at times, severely interfere with our purely projected desires – 
including our desire for immortality. Our body is a site of extreme vulnerability and 
necessity. The specter of Socrates’ cold, silent corpse will not let us forget this fact. As 
much as we might wish, with the “true-born philosophers,” to be rid of it, Socrates says 
quite clearly that the body is a condition without which we could not said to be a cause – 
that is, without which we could not form opinions about what is best, or about anything 
else, for without the body we could not be alive.  
 This recognition of the constraints of necessity in the second sailing also allows 
us to see that Socrates understood the significance of cultural indoctrination in the 
process by which we become who we are – a fact that is made quite clear by even a 
cursory glance at the cave allegory in the Republic. While not fully determinative of who 
we are, the influence of the πόλις, and its stories – about what it means to be a man, to be 
Athenian, etc. – are the ground out of which we begin our philosophical development; we 
must begin where we are because we are who we are (cf Chapter 2, §1.2).364 Like the 
body, this cultural education does not stand as the cause of our actions, but is rather the 
condition without which we could not be a cause – without which, we would not be 
                                                
364 When we realize the power of λόγοι to influence our understanding of the world, our ethical 
responsibilities in it, and our conception of the “best life,” we begin to understand Socrates’ 
concerns about the power of the poets, as expressed in the Republic, the Laws, and elsewhere. See 
also the Ion, where Socrates argues that the poets have the power to lead people’s souls along like 
a magnet, turning them wherever they wish. On the power of speech and the Ion in particular, see 
Russon 1995. Russon argues that Plato’s method of writing in general, and Socrates’ description 
of the work of the rhapsode in particular, argue for a hermeneutical stance toward all λόγοι 
which, when developed, can ‘protect’ us from the power of λόγοι to lead our souls without 
knowledge. He states that this work of interpretation – when applied to a Platonic dialogue 
specifically – is centrally to try and find a unitary meaning to the text which arises out of the 
parts. This is, put simply, to make sense of a text, or of any λόγος. See Russon 2000, p 80-82, for 
an account of how this method of reading a text, as seeking the formal unity which arises out of 
the parts, is connected to the formal analysis of πράγματα in the Phaedo, and thus provides the 
possibility for a unitary and coherent account of the nature of the forms.  
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human. However, until we own the decisions which guide our life, and examine the 
conceptions which draw together our world into an intelligible structure in which we are 
called to act and respond ethically to human, political situations, we are like slaves365; we 
remain chained in the cave, and our actions are as answerable to necessity as physical, 
mechanistic reactions.  
 
 This account, which seeks to draw together many of the threads running through 
the labyrinth of the Phaedo, helps us understand why Socrates (and Plato) spend so much 
time arguing for a separable immortal soul, if that is not, in fact, their “doctrine.” 
Gadamer says: “. . . it seems appropriate to me to first examine Plato’s mode of 
demonstration to see if it indicates whether Plato was fully aware of the insufficiency of 
these proofs and, if we find that he was, to ask then what the actual intent of his 
                                                
365 As I noted in my discussion of the Meno, Sallis argues: “. . .the Meno especially brings to light 
the appropriate comportment of man as one of mediating between part and whole; it exhibits such 
mediating as that which enables man to be what he properly is. Since that which allows man to be 
what he properly is constitutes nothing less than human virtue itself . . .” (1996, p 64) Insofar as it 
is the activity of the soul to gather parts into intelligible wholes, consciously examining the λόγοι 
through which we engage in this “mediating” activity – which Sallis identifies as central to the 
Meno and the Phaedo – is to engage ourselves with the virtuous condition of our souls. While the 
relation of parts and wholes initially appears as an ontological or epistemological issue only, 
Sallis is here correctly identifying the ethical aspect of any such inquiry by identifying how the 
development of the excellence of the essential and defining work of being human is at issue in 
these texts. On the excellence of the soul being rooted in the defining work of the human being, 
see Vlastos 1969b; of Socrates’ claim that justice is to do what is “one’s own” (τὰ αὑτοῦ 
πράττων, at 441e and elsewhere), Vlastos writes: “If [Plato] had wanted to be more explicit he 
would have filled out 'its own' with ergon ("work" or "function"), a term introduced in Book I, 
and explained as follows: the ergon of anything (of a tool, like a pruning knife, or of a bodily 
organ, like an eye or an ear) is that activity which can be "performed either exclusively by that 
thing or else more excellently by it than by anything else" (353A)- i.e., the activity in which that 
thing gets its best chance to realize the excellence (ἀρετή) proper to its own specific nature' and 
to contribute to the excellence of other things associated with it. The things the definition has in 
view are the components of the soul. . .” (p 506) If the defining work of the soul is gathering parts 
into wholes and naming them, then to do this well is (one aspect of) the virtue of the soul.  
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demonstration is.”366 To what end does Socrates spend such effort to convince his 
listeners of the immortal separability of the soul? This account helps us understand that 
there is, in fact, a sense in which the body and soul are separable; in fact, one cannot face 
the being of a human being – or anything else – by only considering the physical 
presence of that being: “We sense that they strive.” In the second sailing, we see that to 
attend to the being of anything is to attend to the good of that being (as we saw in our 
discussion of Equality in Chapter 5, especially §2.4 and §2.5). In that sense, all things are 
beyond what they are; beings point beyond themselves to a form, to a telos – which in the 
case of human beings is, or should be, (partly) self-created.  
 It is only by considering this aspect of the separability of the soul that we can 
understand the true unity of body and soul; only so can we face up to the responsibility of 
being a being which determines the good for itself; only so can we know ourselves as a 
being faced with acting in the context of a fully-developed social environment in which 
we exist as limited by the physical vulnerability of a body – we live as a being which can 
challenge the social order only at risk of being seized, locked away, tortured, and put to 
death. That is, it is only by considering the possibility of a pure, disembodied soul, and 
the kind of knowing proper to its pure, direct access to the pure beings themselves, that 
the reality of an embodied form of knowing begins to make sense. Further, it is only by 
considering (the failing of) the account which names blood, fire, or the brain, as the αἰτία 
of our thinking that we begin to understand how we are not simply what we are, but are 
essentially a striving. 
                                                
366 1980, p 22. 
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 That is, the considerations that have been taken to be Plato’s true teaching –  
knowledge as direct contact with the forms, and the soul as properly a unity separable and 
distinct form the body – turn out to be provocations designed to place the reader (as well 
as Simmias and Cebes) in a position to understand the embodied situation of human 
being. They are a provocation to develop the conception of the soul necessary to find 
harmony and unity in a philosophical life – that is, to understand how knowledge occurs 
for limited, finite beings.367 A recognition of how we are a unity – a whole which arises 
out of the parts, above and beyond the physical being, just as a bow is something more 
than wood and string – recognizes how that whole, named and gathered according to the 
λόγοι we tell ourselves about ourselves, is the object of self-knowledge. This recognition 
is only possible on the basis of an understanding of how we – and every other being – are 
not understandable on the basis of bare physicality, nor on the basis of pure teleology. 
Plato did not write the dialogues in order for us to repeat what he teaches; he wrote them 
to provide an opportunity to face the task of self-examination.368  
                                                
367 Sallis draws the conclusion that the dialogues, and the Phaedo in particular, point to the 
essential finitude of human knowing. Cf Sallis 1996, p 42, as quoted above.  
368 While it is unfortunately well beyond the scope of this dissertation, this “new” conception of 
the separation (χωρισμός) between the body and soul – seen as a unity which can be divided in 
λόγος into a variety of organizations of “parts” – could provide the basis on which to re-interpret 
the transcendence of the forms. Cf Burger: “The attempt to reinterpret the meaning of 
“separation,” . . . is, one might say, the fundamental intention of the Phaedo. The clue to this 
intention is provided by the very first word of the dialogue – αὐτός. The very expression that will 
be used to designate the “idea,” that which is “itself by itself,” refers at the outset to the individual 
and identifies the self with the living being, without implying any separation of ψυχή from 
body.” (1984, p. 7). Thus, an understanding of the transcendence of the forms – and the problem 
of μέθεξις, of which Socrates has no adequate solution (100d-e) –  would have to be based in an 
analysis of the unity of the individual. On the importance of the “individual” for ontological 
understanding of form, cf Long 2004, esp. 157ff. It is possible that Plato’s emphasis on individual 
characters in his dialogues, in addition to what we have discovered here in the word “αὐτός,” in 
our understanding of Socrates’ situation in prison, and in our discussion of the individual in the 
Meno, shows that his teacher was the root of Aristotle’s recognition “that the term tode ti 
indicates that which is neither singular nor particular, rather, it names, quite precisely, the 
inherently ambiguous, precariously situated individual.” (p 157) 
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2.2.2 Τὰ Πράγματα and the Mediation of Λόγος 
 
 The second thing that I want to note is the provocative switch from the term “τὰ 
ὄντα” to the use of “τὰ πράγματα” at 99d-e. In beginning his account of the turn, 
Socrates says he “had had it” with looking into beings (τὰ ὄντα), and so decided he had 
better be careful not to suffer soul-blindness. A few lines later, he says that he fears this 
soul-blindness if he looks at “things” (τὰ πράγματα) with his eyes, or other senses. In 
the next line, he adds the significant point, saying that he has taken refuge in λόγοι, 
“looking in them for the truth of beings” (ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν 
ἀλήθειαν – emphasis added). Thus, he has returned to speaking about τὰ ὄντα, but this 
time he has added τὴν ἀλήθειαν – the truth of beings. His turn to the λόγος has 
introduced the issue of truth. Truth is now a mediating factor with λόγος.369 Why the 
shift to τὰ πράγματα, and then back to τὰ ὄντα with this important addition?370 
 Τὰ πράγματα can mean “things,” in the sense of physical beings, but that is not 
in any way its usual sense. It’s primary sense is an undertaking, business, an occurrence, 
an affair to be dealt with, a matter for concern. The issues in the Middle East are a 
πρᾶγμα to be concerned about, to be dealt with. An excellent example of a πρᾶγμα is 
Socrates sitting in prison. When he introduces the substitution, and begins speaking of τὰ 
πράγματα, Socrates says that it is the πράγματα that cannot be investigated by the 
                                                
369 Cf Burger 1984: “To pursue the Socratic second sailing is to replace investigation of the beings 
themselves with investigation of their truth. Like the light, in Socrates’ image, that serves as a 
bond between the eye and the visible object, the truth must be the bond between the mind and the 
noetic object. . . investigation of the truth of the beings is investigation of what makes knowledge 
possible.” (p 147)  
370 I will thus be taking this shift to be more significant than Hackforth, who claims that both 
terms “are as vague and metaphysically non-committal as the word 'things.’” (1955, p 137) 
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senses. When we attend to the central meaning of τὰ πράγματα, this makes perfect 
sense: How can one understand the situation of Socrates sitting in prison, or the tensions 
in the Middle East, by using our senses? However, having said that for Socrates the truth 
of πράγματα are not discoverable by the senses clearly does not equate to the denial of 
the value of this world in favor of some mythical other τόπος. The truth of the things we 
encounter is revealed when we attend to the sort of thing Socrates says are the causes of 
his sitting in prison: His opinions about the good and justice, and the political situation in 
which he has been condemned. That is, we must understand how λόγοι mediate our 
access to beings in order to understand how the truth of beings becomes manifest; this 
becomes clear only when we understand the place of λόγος as mediating force. It is 
through λόγος that we gather the situation into an intelligible unity, in which a course of 
action appears as most choiceworthy.  
 Socrates turns to the λόγος to reveal the truth of beings; these beings are not the 
atomic entities discovered by scientific investigation. As we saw in our discussion of 
Equality (Chapter 5, 2.4ff.), attending to things we encounter discovers beings which are 
shot through with relations, and are thus intelligible only on the basis of understanding 
their context – the context in which they can be held together (by an act of the soul, of 
mind) for comparison, and thus determined as what they are by difference (delimitation, 
ὁρίζω), in the context of better and worse (the good). This is especially clear when 
attending to the shift to the language of τὰ πράγματα. That is, when we think of the 
situations in which ethical action is called for, and when we think of the incredible 
complexity of political situations, and of the ‘matters’ and ‘concerns’ of any individual 
human life, we find that the principle of unity cannot be taken to be received through the 
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senses. On what principle are we able to say “this situation?” On what basis do we unify 
“a” life? How are we able to take the stance by which we treat our own life as a unity, 
and as a πρᾶγμα, or matter for our concern? Does not any such determination and 
delimitation leave out countless details and relations? On what basis, and through what 
power, is this delimitation made? How do the principles which effect this delimitation 
affect our understanding of our ethical responsibilities in that situation?  
 Self-care is only possible on the basis of a stance toward the self which takes our 
life as a whole, as a unity, into its view as a matter of concern. The second sailing 
emphasizes that it is through our λόγοι that we gather our lives into a unity as an object 
for concern; we gather ourselves to ourselves through the stories we tell to ourselves and 
others, through our spoken and unspoken narratives about human life, our own past, and 
our place in the whole. It is only in light of this interrelated, political human life – the 
human situation – that beings can become manifest in their proper being. These 
narratives form the horizon against which beings can have meaning. That is, it is only by 
understanding how every situation is a part of the whole that we come to understand how 
our ethical responsibilities arise against the horizon of our understanding of our life as a 
whole.371 To defend any given action is defend our life as a whole.372 The philosophical 
                                                
371 Cf Sparshott on Aristotle’s take on this idea: “That shows, incidentally, why the distinction 
between the overall end of action and particular goods cannot be maintained: young people 
experience one thing at a time, just as older people do, but they don’t understand their 
experiences, don’t relate them to other events and to the whole fabric of life. To grasp life as a 
whole is to grasp each event as related to other events. (1996, pg 229, emphasis added) Socrates’ 
explanation of the recognition of two sticks as equal involves understanding how everything we 
encounter is rendered intelligible by how it relates to, and differs from, the things around it – its 
situation; just so does an event, such as Socrates’ being condemned to die, only gain its meaning 
insofar as it is held together with (yet held apart from) other events. This context, gathered in 
accordance with λόγος by an activity of the soul, gives the event the specific meaning that it 
acquires – a meaning which is vastly different for one of the Athenians who voted to condemn 
Socrates than it is for Socrates himself, or for his followers.   
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life is a choice which does not simply affect a specific set of decisions that we might 
make; rather, if we choose the life which rationally examines the λόγοι through which 
we present to ourselves the intelligibility, as well as the ethical structure, of our world, we 
make a decision which affects everything we do and everything we experience. To turn to 
the λόγος, and to find in them the truth of beings, is to fundamentally shift what we take 
to be “real.”  
 To attend to the truth of beings through λόγος is to understand that beings are 
essentially determined in their being against the horizon of a situation; in this situation; 
they become manifest as striving; this striving is revealed by attending to their relation to 
(and differing from) other beings. This striving character makes no sense in the context of 
atomic, isolated entities which simply “are what they are” – the bow is not wood and 
string, Socrates is not bones and sinews. Attending to the striving character of things, 
which is revealed only once we have abandoned physical investigation, is attending to the 
being of what we encounter; thus, the good of the beings we encounter is revealed when 
we attend to the way we gather together the situation in which beings become intelligible 
though λόγος. This observation helps articulate the connection between the good and 
                                                                                                                                            
372 When we stand before another person, it is a fundamental human desire to be recognized as 
valuable. For the most part, we do not recognize this as a desire for self-esteem, as a desire to 
have our life as a whole validated. Instead, this desire gets hijacked by a number of different 
mechanisms which conceal from the individual the source of their desire – it is seen as a desire 
for fame, money, sex, to be seen as beautiful etc. As a result of this lack of understanding, people 
go to great extremes to achieve self-esteem in ways that are not conducive to fulfilling the desire 
on its proper grounds. People seek money and cars, sexual attention, going to the point of body 
alteration and wild acts of desperation in order to be seen as valuable. For the most part, this 
desire gets turned by social context into seeking to be honored in terms of what the society deems 
valuable, and is largely not understood in terms of what is most our own. We are not our beauty, 
nor our possessions, nor our fame; we are what is most dominant in us, and this is always the 
conception of being, thus of excellence, that guides our life, whether we are aware of this 
guidance or not, willing to defend this conception or not.  
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being. The truth of beings is discovered when we realize we do not have direct access to 
these beings themselves with the mediating force of λόγος. To attend to the mediating 
power of λόγος is to attend to the “light” in which beings become manifest to us.  
 
 Further, understanding how situations are determined not through a passive 
reception by the senses, but rather by the activity of the soul, we better understand the 
place of the soul in determining the intelligibility of the world. To care for the soul, then, 
is to make the way the soul gathers the world into its intelligibility a matter for concern; 
to care for the soul is to care for the way we hold ourselves with respect to the λόγοι in 
which this gathering takes place. To turn away from λόγος (misology) is to turn away 
from the essential activity of the soul. 
 This account also begins to make it clear why Socrates insists that the person who 
turns to the λόγος is not simply looking at “reflections,” while the advocate of the first 
sailing is (attempting to) look directly that the beings themselves. Socrates says that he 
does not “at all concede (συγχωρῶ) that somebody who looks into beings in accounts 
(ἐν [τοῖς] λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα) looks at them in likenesses to a greater extent 
than one who does so in actions (ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν [τοῖς] ἔργοις).” 
(100a) Often, people claim to be bypassing λόγοι, and going straight to the beings 
themselves; such people prioritize action (ἔργον), and ‘direct engagement.’ They 
criticize the ‘intellectual distance’ from the ‘matters themselves’ created by theorizing 
rather than acting. However, the second sailing insists that they, too, are only engaging 
with likenesses (εἰκόσι).373 The difference is: The philosopher recognizes the mediating 
                                                
373 I do not agree with readings like that of Crombie (1963) who argues that this passage indicates 
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force of the λόγοι, and thus is better positioned to engage with this mediation. 
Philosophers are thus better positioned to understand themselves, and their active role in 
determining the ‘being and benefit’ of what they encounter. The philosopher is also better 
able to understand the role played by others’ conceptions in the way they react to the 
world.374 Thus, any deed – like that of Socrates remaining in prison – has to be 
                                                                                                                                            
nothing more than the standard account which says that physical things themselves are images, 
specifically, images of the forms: “physical things are just as much images as are λόγοι, from 
which it follows that he was really turning not from realities to their images, but from one kind of 
image to another.” (p 157) See also Bedu-Addo 1969, p 112. All such accounts seem to miss the 
importance of the soul and the limited, finite perspective of the individual in this passage, 
assuming that the answer lies in a pre-established Platonic metaphysics; that is, nowhere in the 
Phaedo is it argued or even implied that the things of this world are unreal, or are merely images. 
If they were right, and all physical things are images just as much as λόγοι, then it is not clear 
why one would turn to the λόγοι any more than to the physical things. We have seen that it is 
necessary to understand that the intelligibility of any physical thing is not discovered by sensory 
investigation, but this does not mean that particulars are unreal, nor that they lack intelligibility. 
Socrates in prison is a particular situation, and it calls to be investigated and made intelligible, 
not treated as unreal and of no importance to “Platonic epistemology.” 
374 This observation can help us understand why Socrates, in the Phaedrus, calls for a τέχνη of 
the soul before we seek to teach people. Opposing his own idea of the proper method to that of 
Anaxagoras (270aff), Socrates says that proper speech about the soul should aim toward health of 
the soul, just as the medical art does in relation to the body; this speech should operate by τέχνη, 
rather than “experience” (ἐμπειρία): “Must one therefore think in the following way about the 
nature of anything? First, to consider whether that thing is simple or of multiple form about which 
we wish to be artful (τεχνικοὶ) ourselves and to be able to make someone else artful? And next, if 
it is simple, to consider its power (δυνατοὶ): what power does it naturally have for acting  in 
relation to what, or what power for suffering from what? And if has many forms, having 
enumerated these, to see this very same thing regarding each that one saw regarding one: by what 
does it naturally do what or by what does it naturally suffer what from what?” (270d) Socrates 
goes on to say that the approach which fails to do this is groping blindly, as he says of the first 
sailing in the Phaedo. Thus, at 271a, he says that any rhetorician must “first with all precision 
write, and make us see, the soul – whether it is naturally one and homogeneous or of multiple 
form, in the manner of the body’s shape.” (emphasis added) However, we have seen that it is a 
difficult and “long road” to make this description, and even so, such a treatise is no guarantee that 
the reader will be made to see this truth. Thus, a form of writing is necessary by which the reader 
is called to realize the truth of their own soul. This is one sense in which the “writing in the soul” 
Socrates speaks of can be distinguished from bad rhetoric (276a). Thus, in some sense, the λόγοι 
of the soul in the Phaedo can be expected to aim at an analysis of the soul in terms of its powers, 
to be dedicated toward developing a healthy condition of the soul, and to speak of any 
multiplicity within the soul as like the multiplicity of the parts of the body – that is, as a 
multiplicity of parts separate only in λόγος, divided along the lines of δύναμις, which operate 
within an organic unity. Cf Phaedrus 264c on the organic unity of λόγοι, and Protagoras 329eff 
on the organic unity of the body (specifically, of the parts of a face).  
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understood as presenting itself to us only on the basis of likenesses, images, λόγοι.375 To 
ignore the λόγοι is to ignore the basis of their appearance.   
 This process of determining the unity and intelligibility of things through λόγος 
equally well describes self-knowledge. To know the self is to understand the λόγοι 
through which we gather ourselves to ourselves, and this knowledge displays the same 
basic structures. We understand ourselves qua some quality – I am a good man qua 
husband, bad qua money-maker, good qua soldier, bad qua athlete. We understand 
ourselves as striving toward a set of more-or-less clearly defined goals; these goals 
determine the relative value of the ways in which we find ourselves to be good or bad – 
being bad qua athlete might be devastating for one person’s ego, and make absolutely no 
difference to another – it is an issue of what matters to us; that is, the issue is how the 
soul determines the benefit of being athletic.  
 The being of the self, and the unity of life, is determined in accord with a striving 
toward a projected τέλος – a τέλος gathered in the λόγοι we adhere to, and which have a 
wondrous hold on us; this is one aspect of the significance of Plato’s presentation of 
Socrates “grown young and beautiful”: Plato intends to present us with a model toward 
which to strive. To live in ignorance of the way λόγοι are active in determining our self-
understanding is to live in ignorance of the self.  
                                                
375 Cf Burger 1984: “Socrates does not, therefore, present his turn to investigation through λόγοι 
as a complete replacement for investigation in deeds but suggests, rather, their complementary 
relation. . . To look directly at things, without turning to speeches, would be to look directly at the 
corpse of Socrates and expect to understand everything at stake in this last conversation. But if, 
on the other hand, investigation of λόγοι were sufficient in itself, the Phaedo would have 
consisted in treatises outlining several possible arguments for the immortality of the psyche, 
without illuminating their context, the efforts they produce, and the interests from which they 
arise, nor, consequently, the slues for determining the intention behind and unsoundness in the 
arguments.” (p 146) 
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 We cannot have access to the πρᾶγμα except through λόγοι; to understand a 
situation we have to understand how it is through λόγος that the πρᾶγμα is gathered and 
made intelligible. Thus, to fundamentally change the λόγοι through which we organize 
the intelligibility of the πράγματα in which we are engaged – our families, our political 
situations, and indeed, our own selves, our own lives – is to fundamentally alter the way 
we are called to respond to the world. The ‘being and benefit’ of every being we 
encounter is determined, on the basis of παιδεία, by an activity of the soul. Here, in the 
second sailing, we see that each of these beings only appears against a horizon 
determined by λόγος; it is in virtue of λόγος that the meaning of anything we encounter 
becomes manifest. The manifestness of beings occurs against the background of a 
situation and a set of values (the ‘benefit’) which determine the way we understand the 
beings we encounter. For the most part, the horizon, the background upon which the 
beings are “projected,” as well as the beings themselves, are determined by the 
traditional λόγοι which “have a wondrous hold on us” – just as shadows are projected 
upon the wall of the cave. The philosophical life takes as its central value a recognition of 
the finitude of human being which throws us into this situation, and recognizes that we 
will never be able to fully wrest ourselves from these traditions. But, to paraphrase 
Socrates in the Theaetetus, we have to begin where we are, for we are who we are.   
  
 Unfortunately, as we have already seen, the λόγοι through which we gather 
ourselves to ourselves are multiple, and can often be odds with each other. This creates a 
disharmonious condition of the soul – a condition in which self-mastery becomes 
necessary, since we discover ourselves to be Typhonic in nature, and are pulled in 
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multiple directions; our life is, for the most part, not experienced as directed toward a 
single, unified goal. We organize our lives and gather the intelligibility of our world 
through λόγοι that are socially constructed; thus, our lives have multiple salient 
complexes of λόγοι through which we present to ourselves the desirability of different 
courses of action.376  
 As we saw in Chapter 5 (§1.3), the way we identify the meaning of a situation is 
determined by our erotic attachments, our personal history, as well as by our παιδεία and 
the λόγοι which we have come to believe. Of recollecting our lover upon seeing a lyre, 
Socrates says: ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος (73d): into our thought we receive the 
εἶδος, the form, of the person evoked by the experience. This seems to indicate that we 
are largely passive in how we receive the meaning and intelligibility of the situations we 
encounter (based, of course, in an “active condition,” a ἕξις, informed by παιδεία, etc). 
The meaning and intelligibility of most situations simply appears, and I am initially and 
for the most part unaware of the active role my own past and conceptions of the truth 
play in forming any intelligible experience.  
 In self-examination, we discover that this unconscious gathering can happen on 
the basis of multiple salient “frames” that are operative in us. Thus, by examining the 
λόγοι through which we often unconsciously gather the meaning of the world, we 
become active and engaged in the process of determining which εἶδει we receive into our 
souls when attending to the world. When these λόγοι are not harmonized – when we 
discover ourselves to be truly Typhonic – we can become confused by, for example, our 
                                                
376 At 77e, the interlocutors lament Socrates’ death, for they need someone to sing charms to allay 
their fears. Socrates replies that they themselves might be the best suited to accomplishing this 
task. Socrates thus implies that the community of discourse and dedication to philosophy that he 
has left behind is critical to developing the proper, philosophical mode of life, and stance toward 
fear and other emotions.  
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inability to follow-through on decisions that we were certain we would stick to. For 
example, I might decide “once and for all” to quit smoking while in my home, 
surrounded by influences which make concern for my health the salient “frame” through 
which the choiceworthiness of smoking appears slight; thus, the λόγος that tells me that 
health is the most important thing, and that I must not smoke, will win the day; however, 
once I go out to a bar, and another “frame” is operative, the λόγος that says “life is short, 
have fun, we all die sometime” might take precedence. It is to the techne of harmonizing 
such λόγοι that Socrates now turns. 
 
2.2.3 The Second Sailing and The Good 
 
 It is important to my interpretation that Socrates’ second sailing continues to 
reveal the being of beings in light of the good (of those beings). However, there are 
strong reasons to doubt this; that is, there are indications within the text that in turning 
away from Anaxagoras’ teleology, Socrates has turned away from the connection 
between the good and being. That is, some commentators argue that there is no sense in 
which the good can be said to be determinative of the cause that Socrates is seeking with 
his second sailing.377 I will argue that while turning to the second sailing is turning away 
from one way of revealing the good of beings – specifically, by conceiving of that good 
as answering directly to human conceptions of the good – Socrates is still ‘sailing’ in the 
same direction; that is, Socrates is still uncovering the truth of beings by revealing how 
they strive. I will show that this striving (as I argued in Chapter 5) necessitates an 
                                                
377 Cf Gonzalez 1998, p 192, Tait 1986, p 457, Rowe 1993, p 238-239, Vlastos 1969, et al.  
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understanding of the good of that being; that is, to turn to the λόγοι to uncover the truth 
of beings is to reveal them as striving toward their own good. This good does not always 
answer to what we think is best.  
 Francisco Gonzalez takes any such claim that Socrates maintains a focus on the 
good to indicate that Socrates is still seeking specifically Anaxagorean teleology as an 
explanation for the cause of anything. He cites Dave Wiggins as an example of someone 
who claims  that, as Gonzalez phrases it, Socrates seeks the “same teleological 
explanation he found lacking in Anaxagoras.”378 Gonzalez says that he finds this 
“extremely implausible,” since: “After this point in the text Socrates does not refer to 
teleological explanations again.”379  
 Thus, in order to counter Gonzalez, I will have to show 2 things: 1. It is not the 
case that connecting the good with determining the truth of beings is the same as 
returning to the “same teleology” he found lacking in Anaxagoras, and 2. In his 
explanation of the forms as causes, Socrates is, in fact, showing how he is still committed 
to revealing the truth of beings in light of the good.  
 The first task is easy, and has already been accomplished: beings become 
manifest in light of striving toward the good. To understand a human being is, as we have 
seen, to see that we are faced with a being operating on, and defined by, a conception of 
what is best. In our reading of the Meno, we encountered the familiar Socratic claim: All 
people seek the good.380 All people, insofar as they act, are acting toward a goal which is, 
in their opinion, the best possible course – just as Socrates is in sitting in prison, and just 
                                                
378 Gonzalez 1998, p 351, note 3, citing Wiggins 1986. 
379 Ibid. See the criticism of Wiggins in Rowe 1993b.  
380 This insight is usually connected to the “Socratic Paradox” that no one does evil willingly; this 
“denial of akrasia,” as it is usually understood, is commonly connected to the claims that virtue is 
knowledge, and all virtues are one. I will turn to these in the next Chapter.  
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as the Athenians were when they voted to convict him. Thus, to reveal the being of a 
human being is to understand that being in light of the good for which they strive. Thus, 
to know the self is to examine the conceptions of the good which guide our actions (and, 
in finding them to be initially multiple and in conflict with themselves, to seek harmony, 
as I will argue in the next Chapter).  
 In Chapter 5 (§2.4 and §2.5) I showed that to understand any being is to “sense 
that it strives.” Beings are not self-enclosed atomic entities, but are rather discovered to 
be shot through with interrelation, and understandable only on the basis of an act of soul 
which identifies the unity of the being in question; that unity is determined in an act of 
naming which, in determining the “being and benefit” (that is, the being and good), 
identifies the bundle of perceptions as participating in a form. To identify a bow is not to 
see the wood and the string, but to see the bow as a harmonious unified whole which 
arises out of the physical parts; that harmonious unity is the cause of that being. Thus, we 
see that to identify the being and benefit of a harmonious whole is to identify the form of 
what we encounter, and this activity necessarily determines the form (the bow) in terms 
of the good of that being, that is, in terms of that which it strives toward (the ability to 
fire arrows). To identify the good of a being is to give a formal account of the cause of the 
being.  
 Thus, we see that we have also answered the second point we needed to resist 
Gonzalez’s claim that Socrates turns away from the good: To give an account of the 
cause of a phenomena in terms of form is to identify the unity of a being (or situation) in 
light of the good of that being. As Russon argues: “. . . in putting form in the proper 
position in the recollection account, we also found that we were operating in the space of 
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the good; that is, we found comparison – the recognition of equality – to be the invoking 
of the good as the highest cause.”381 We add that the act of the soul which draws anything 
into an intelligible unity in terms of a form does so by invoking the good – that for which 
the being strives – as highest cause. Thus, whether we are right or wrong in our 
assessment, when we perceive a being and claim to understand it, we invoke a value 
relative to the thing we perceive, through which we understand the “being and benefit” of 
the being. That is, we do not invoke “the good as such, but some good relative to the 
things compared” or, a value relative to our comparison of the thing to that for which it 
strives (and necessarily falls short).382 This good of the being in question, is not the good 
as such, and our determination of the value can be in error; nevertheless, the necessity of 
identifying the good for which a particular being strives shows that this activity of the 
soul happens in terms of our conception of the good of that being. “But to be able to 
recognize any good. . . depends on being able to operate with the very notion of 
goodness. Differing is thus possible only in light of the good. The good, we might say, is 
the ultimate defining form for all differences, for it is the ground of the possibility of 
differences as such.”383 It is only in light of the good, of revealing beings as striving, that 
the soul is able to determine the unity, and thus delimit ‘this’ being from all other 
beings.384 To turn to the λόγοι through which we present to ourselves the being and 
                                                
381 Russon 2000, p 78. 
382 Russon 2000, p 79. 
383 Ibid. 
384 As I argued in Chapter 5, it would be necessary to turn to the Theaetetus to delve deeper into 
how delimiting beings, and thus difference, is essential to determining their “being and benefit.” 
At Theaetetus 208cff, Socrates tests the hypothesis that to give a λόγος is “to have some sign to 
say by means of which that which is asked about differs from all things.” As Russon argues: “The 
determinateness of determinateness is precisely how, as a specific not, this one differing makes 
out that from which it differs – both its finite others and the values it invokes with which it is not 
identical. Any determinateness can thus only exist in a double harmonious tension. It is at odds 
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benefit of the beings we encounter is to turn to the activity of the soul in light of the good 
– that is, in the light both of 1. the good which we conceive as the best state (arete) of this 
particular being (including human being, and our own selves) and 2. the good itself. The 
manifestness of beings, as described in the second sailing as occurring through the power 
of λόγος, could not happen except in the light of the good.  
 Thus, we see that Gonzalez was wrong on both points: 1. Socrates does abandon 
Anaxagorean teleology, but does not turn away from the good, and 2. Socrates’ insistence 
on the form as cause is precisely an insistence that we understand any phenomena as 
striving, and thus as accessible only in light of the good. Socrates turns to the λόγοι in 
order to discover the good of beings; it was not looking to the good of beings, to how 
they strive, that failed Socrates. The danger of blinding, and the failing wind, was the 
failure of the attempt to determine the good of beings without the explicit recognition of 
the mediation of λόγος. Socrates seeks to understand the formal cause of phenomena 
through the λόγοι, and as such maintains an insistence on the connection between the 
good and being – indeed it is precisely for this reason that Anaxagoras’ claim that “Mind 
is cause” was so enticing to young Socrates. 
 
 Obviously, the connection between the good and being is an enormous and 
complicated issue. It is my opinion that a full explication of the relation in Plato must go 
beyond a study of the Phaedo – specifically, to the Republic. Gonzalez hints at this 
position as well; even as he claims that Socrates turns away from the good as cause, he 
                                                                                                                                            
with others from which it cannot separate its identity. It is at odds with a value it itself projects. 
To be a determinateness is to be a striving – a striving to be this and not that, and this striving to 
be not that is thus a pursuit of itself, which means that it projects a good in terms of which it is to 
be measured – what Aristotle would call its telos.” (2000, p 79) 
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says: “An understanding of how the good might be the cause of mathematical truth must 
wait until the discussion of the Republic. . .”385 One path deeper into this issue would be 
to follow Sallis’ interpretation of the image of the eclipsed sun in the Phaedo as drawing 
attention to the “light” in which beings become manifest.386 He connects this to his 
analysis of the sun image in the Republic, which is, of course, an image for the good.387 
Specifically, we would be able to draw out more on the connection between unity – i.e. 
the whole that is the object of knowledge made manifest in light of the good – and the 
good by attending to Sallis’ claim that “there is reason to call the good also the one.”388 
Sallis says: “. . .once we recognize that the good is the one, then, we can begin to 
understand how it is related to being and truth; that is, what it has to do with the mode of 
showing in which something can show itself as one. . .the coming forth of such an image 
                                                
385 1998, p 192. Gonzalez argues against any claim that “teleology” is at work in the second 
sailing, and thus claims clearly that “Though the good is introduced as a form at 100b6 and is 
therefore one of Socrates’ new aitiai, it is given no prominence over the other forms.” (1996, p 
351, note 3) However, he also seems to understand the validity of my point that revealing the 
good of the being is central to revealing the being of the being. He states: “Perception of a thing 
reveals only its physical parts; in this way, however, perception blinds us to the good that defines 
the thing and gives it its unity.” (1996, p 195) While I do not know how to reconcile these two 
claims in his work, it seems that perhaps I have stated his position too strongly, and he should be 
credited with recognizing the importance of the good to revealing the truth of beings in the 
second sailing. He continues: “By now taking refuge in propositions, Socrates will avoid being 
blinded by the senses and thus will be better able to see the good that is eclipsed in physical 
objects.” (ibid.) Gonzalez’ excellent analysis thus reveals the central connection between the 
good and unity, as evidenced in the second quote above. However, his stance toward perception is 
still caught within the traditions of Platonism. I hope to have shown that the Phaedo (in light of 
the Theaetetus) argues for a richer conception of perception in which the unity of any being, or 
any situation (such as a situation of comparison, in which we might judge two things a ‘equal’) 
also involves an active conception of the good of the beings/πράγματα. Thus, Socrates is not in 
danger of being “blinded by the senses,” as Gonzalez claims, nor is the good “eclipsed in physical 
objects.” Rather, it is certain mode of discourse which turns to materialistic understanding of 
beings, and which takes sensory experience to be pure passive reception of truth, rather than 
recognizing the activity of the soul in constituting the unity of “physical objects,” and thus 
unaware of the mediation of λόγος, which threatens blindness.   
386 1996, p 40ff. 
387 Ibid., 402ff. 
388 Ibid., p 410-411. 
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(of the good, of the one) is identical with something showing itself as one, which, in turn, 
amounts to its standing in truth, i.e., being knowable, i.e., having being conferred on it. 
Thus the good confers being and truth, i.e., confers a showing in which things can show 
themselves as one. . . “389 Of course, I take Sallis’ excellent analysis of these images to 
lack a sufficient account of the place of the soul in this constellation – a lack which I 
hope to have, in part, filled in this dissertation by noting the way the activity of the soul is 
implicated in the space in which this making-manifest occurs. Again, we can see why 
“mind as cause” fascinated young Socrates. As Russon says:  
Our argument shows that what is is a field of differences striving after their own 
goods, where this striving takes the form of a struggle for place within this field – 
a mutual opposing which is inseparable from a striving after mutual recognition – 
and this field is the field of the human psyche itself: For us, to be is to be 
recognizing this differing, this striving. Our soul differs – is determinate – as the 
ability to differ from the whole  sphere of differences as differences. It is our soul 
which is the space of universal differing – the chora – or, as Aristotle says of 
mind (which he describes as Timaeus describes the chora) the place of all forms. 
Mind is the cause of all things being able to be what they are, because it is the 
space of recognition – the space of comparison in terms of forms, that is, in terms 
of the good as such.390 
 
Thus, as I have argued from the beginning, to understand the transcendence of the forms 
it is necessary first to articulate this power of the soul as the cause of the determinateness 
of all beings.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
389 Ibid., p 411.  
390 Russon 2000, p 80.  
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Chapter 8 
Forms and Participation 
 
§1 Harmony 
 
 We have seen that the internal multiplicity in the self – that which gives rise to 
“all factions and strife and wars” – is far more complex than speaking in terms of an 
opposition between soul and body, or in terms of a tri-partite soul, can explain. By a close 
reading of the second sailing, we see that these different accounts of multiplicity arise 
from the different λόγοι in which we present ourselves to ourselves, and attempt to come 
to grips with our own cognitive dissonance and inner conflict. One source of the 
multiplicity in our own souls is the multiple λόγοι which have a “wondrous hold” on us – 
in addition to discernible powers of the soul, which are not seriously discussed in the 
Phaedo. We will, then, never be able to develop a unified, harmonious condition out of 
which to act unless we engage in the philosophical process of harmonizing these λόγοι. 
Unfortunately, while Socrates’ call for this harmony is clear, the “method,” if it is such, is 
anything but.  
 Beginning his account of his “randomly smushed together” method, Socrates says 
he “on each occasion puts down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest 
(ἐρρωμενέστατον); and whatever seems to me to be consonant (συμφωνεῖν) with this, I 
put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t I put 
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down as not true.” (100a) Socrates rightly assumes that Cebes will not have understood 
him, saying “right now I think you do not understand.” (ibid.) When Cebes agrees that he 
is not following, Socrates makes a strange move that has generated a considerable 
amount of debate: He begins to speak of the forms. Without immediately clarifying how 
his talk of the forms is related to the turn to the λόγος, nor to the method of hypothesis, 
Socrates returns to speaking about the “cause” of things; he says “all I mean is this – 
nothing new but the very thing I’ve never stopped talking about at other times and in the 
account (λόγος) that’s just occurred as well.” (100b) He says he will return to the “much 
babbled about” forms and begin from them. (ibid.) Is the existence of the forms, then, 
merely a hypothesis? Does Socrates use the theory of the forms to convince Cebes 
because Cebes has already assented to the existence of the forms? Or is there a necessary 
connection between the method of hypothesis and explaining generation and corruption 
with reference to the forms? 
 
1.1 Method and Confusion 
 
 There is endless debate in the secondary literature about how the harmonization of 
λόγοι that Socrates has called for here can explain generation and corruption – if that is, 
in fact, its goal – and about precisely what procedure Socrates is calling for in these 
passages. This confusion arises from a simple fact: The text is not at all clear about what 
the procedure is, and how it is supposed to explain the cause of coming to be and passing 
away. I will argue, briefly, that the text gives us strong reason to believe that, in fact, 
Plato does not want us to accept the presentation of the “Theory of the Forms” in the 
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Phaedo as given, nor as a solution to issues of causation. To fully accomplish this 
exegesis would take a considerable effort, and literally thousands of pages have been 
spent working through the details of this section of the dialogue (100a-107a).391 I will 
here give only a brief and cursory account of the confusions that have arisen in order to 
give some idea of how difficult these passages are; then I will show that one reason 
commentators have been unable to discover clear instructions for a philosophical 
“method,” in the modern analytical sense, is that this is not the intention of the passage.392  
                                                
391 There is lack of clarity at every stage of the argument, and I hope I can be forgiven for not 
performing the textual exegesis necessary to articulate Plato’s intent here. As Klein puts it : “The 
‘demonstration’ he offers resembles indeed a most intricate maze.” (1965, p 136) Ronna Burger 
also does a good job of working through many of these problems, and articulating the lack of 
clarity (1984, Chapters 11 and 12). I agree with most of her conclusions. There is also an 
excellent discussion in Gonzalez, 1998, p 195ff, which focuses on the “methodological” concerns 
that I am not giving sufficient attention to here. See also Dorter 1982. The variety and breath of 
the interpretations in the secondary texts that I will be working from further testify to the depth of 
confusion these passages give rise to. Cf Gentzler: “There is much that is mysterious about 
Socrates' description of the first two steps of the hypothetical method in the Phaedo.” (1991, p 
166) Cf Tait 1986: “For in my opinion there is no way to read the text that is compatible with this 
view of the role of the doctrine of Forms in the method and the attempt to do so has led to a 
variety of disparate readings.” (p 456) Cf Sharma 2009: “Yet as to what precisely is going on in 
the passage, there has been considerable disagreement. And although scholarly dispute is often a 
source of interpretative riches, the lack of agreement here extends, quite remarkably, even to the 
broadest outlines of an adequate interpretation.” (p 137) 
392 Hubby, after arguing that commentators have been wrong to work so hard to derive a method 
from these passages, since, she argues, no such method is provided from 99d-102a, says: “What 
then has Plato been trying to do in this passage? If we think he is saying something of profound 
importance about logical method, we have to admit that he is saying it badly. But it is probably a 
mistake to suppose that Plato at this stage at any rate had a clear concept of method in the 
abstract.” (1959 p 14) Cf Bluck: “. . . the passage as a whole cannot be primarily concerned with 
general logic, for it would be irrelevant to its context if its theme were not the causes of 
generation and decay.” (1955, p 103) However, it seems that Socrates has dropped any talk of 
generation and corruption, and is only speaking about the cause of the being of anything, no 
longer concerned with matters of becoming. Cebes fails to notice this transition, and so it is not 
commented on. Sayre disagrees, arguing that there is a clear method being described: “if we think 
of the relationship of agreement at 100a as holding between convertible propositions, then the 
difficulties. . . disappear, and Socrates' comments on method become perfectly lucid" (1994, p 
21) Bedu-Addo counters, saying “But surely propositions like 'Participation in Beauty is the 
cause of beautiful things' and 'Participation in Duality is the cause of two' which accord with 
Socrates' 'safe hypothesis' can hardly be said to be mutually deducible, or convertible.” (1969, p 
130) Robinson laments: "Plato's methodology in the Phaedo is at variance with his epistemology 
as stated in the Republic" (1953, p 146) Robinson, unfortunately, does not conclude that neither 
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 These commentators generally make the mistake of removing this passage from 
the context of the dialogue as a whole; they fail to see that this is advice given on a 
specific occasion to specific interlocutors, and thus is not intended as advice for all 
philosophizing everywhere. Further, by being attached to a concept of “method” which 
has no place in Greek philosophy, commentators have been approaching these passages 
in the wrong way.393 Specifically, I argue that almost all of these commentators have 
mistaken the nature of λόγος by taking Socrates’ comments to be about harmonization 
between arguments – and thus, have taken the passage to provide an (erroneous) system 
of “logic.” They have failed to place these comments in the proper context of the 
dialogue, and have not taken proper consideration of the ethical and psychological 
importance of harmonization. Considering that Socrates has called this argument the 
“husband” of Simmias’ λόγος which, immediately preceding this section of the dialogue, 
                                                                                                                                            
of these accounts are to be taken at face value without critical assessment; rather, he assumes 
Plato was in earnest at both times, and changed his mind about the best philosophical “method.” 
His basic argument, contra many of other commentators, is that the method of hypothesis is 
introduced not as a general method, but rather specifically to prove the immortality of the soul. 
Unfortunately, having discovered that fact, he does not assume that Socrates is using it to 
convince a specific interlocutor of a specific conclusion; rather, he assumes that Plato is 
employing this method to prove a conclusion that he actually believes. (ibid. p 134) 
393 Plass, for example, is so confused by the inconsistencies of the argument that he assumes Plato 
was himself confused. He is unable to discern any reason that these inconsistencies would have 
been intentional on Plato’s part – since that would imply that Plato wanted his readers to be 
critical of the theory of forms. Thus, he implies that the Phaedo was the product of a thinker 
uncertain of himself, and of a youth trying to find his way in philosophy. He argues: “Most of the 
problems of interpretation stem from the conflict between the apparently precise statement of 
method with its emphasis upon a hypothetical proposition and the much greater looseness of 
Socrates' practice, even in the argument which he cites as an example. The simplest explanation 
of this conflict can be found in Plato's continuous philosophic development. He wrote the Phaedo 
at a time of transition from the earlier dialogues which are probably accurate reflections of 
Socrates' views to the later dialogues which advance and develop Plato's own more clearly 
defined views. Method was all-important to Socrates, and Plato was still looking in two directions 
when he handled the problems raised in the Phaedo: in the statement of method he attempts to 
formulate Socrates' somewhat formless procedures and at the same time he has an eye on his own 
definite commitment to the theory of Forms upon which much of his argument depends. (1960, p 
114) 
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treated the soul as a harmony, it is startling how few commentators have inquired into 
this connection. Preferring to treat this λόγος in isolation, as an account of logical 
method – and then finding it lacking – they fail to ask what connection might exist 
between the harmonization of λόγοι and the harmony within the soul that Socrates 
frequently calls for in the dialogues as a call to ethical life394 – including his use of this 
image in this dialogue immediately preceding this section. In their defense, commentators 
are right to find fault with the logic of Socrates’ arguments in this section. The problem 
is, since Socrates calls upon the “much babbled about” forms, which they take as a matter 
of dogma to be the heart of Plato’s “doctrine,” commentators almost universally assume 
that in these passages we find an accurate account of Plato’s own thought, however faulty 
at the time of the writing of the dialogue. How can we take any argument which uses the 
existence of the forms as a hypothesis to be ironic? I will briefly show that attention to 
the dialogue as a whole reveals these arguments to be intentionally incomplete.   
  
 The first problem in these readings is that they operate on unexamined assumptions: 
1. They assume that Plato believes in the immortality of the soul, and 2. They assume that 
Plato believed in “the forms,” without being critical enough about what this belief means, 
                                                
394 As yet another example, see the Laches 188d. In describing how he might be thought to be a 
misologue, Laches says: “Whenever I hear a man discussing virtue or some kind of wisdom, , 
then if he really is a man and worthy of the words he utters, I am completely delighted to see the 
appropriateness and harmony existing between the speaker and his words. Such a man is exactly 
what I understand by “musical,”—he has tuned himself with the fairest harmony, not that of a 
lyre or other entertaining instrument, but has made a true concord of his own life between his 
words and his deeds, not in the Ionian, no, nor in the Phrygian nor in the Lydian, but simply in the 
Dorian mode, which is the sole Hellenic harmony. Such a man makes me rejoice.” (188d) As 
Burnet notes: “The different modes or scales in Greek music were associated with different moral 
feelings. The Dorian was most favored, as having a manly, stately character: the Ionian was more 
passionate and contentious. The Phrygian and Lydian were foreign modes, on the character of 
which there were various opinions.” Cf. Rep. 398-399. 
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what the εἶδει actually are, and what their relation to particulars is. As such, they assume 
that, since this is Plato’s “final word” on the soul in the dialogue, and since the argument 
uses the existence of the forms as a hypothesis, the argument must have been intended as 
valid proof.395 However, there are many indications within the text that place this in 
doubt, as I will argue below. Before turning to these, I will give a short account of some 
of the major points of disagreement in the literature to give an idea of the multiplicity of 
confusions arising from this passage.  
  
 Commentators have had special trouble with Socrates’ suggestion that the 
consequences of a hypothesis can be dissonant with one another. (101a) That is, if 
Socrates is describing a method of deducing results form a hypothesis, unless the 
deduction is logically invalid, all consequences deduced will necessarily be in agreement. 
Secondly, it is not clear why we should take any proposition which is simply “consonant” 
and thus logically consistent with our hypothesis as true. As Gonzalez puts it, simply 
because “The moon is made of green cheese” is not logically inconsistent with “Virtue is 
                                                
395 Bedu-Addo, in his influential paper on this section of the dialogue, claims that “Plato 
undoubtedly regarded” the final argument for the immortality of the soul “as the most satisfactory 
and convincing.” (1969, p 111). Cf Hackforth, “Surely the purpose of the method is to establish 
the truth of a single proposition: in the example, the proposition that the soul is immortal.” (1955, 
p 139). Bedu-Addo, however, feels that the hypothetical method is not designed to prove the 
immortality of the soul: “That is to say, the method which Socrates is describing here as his 
'second voyage' in search of the cause of generation, existence and destruction is the method 
whereby he attained knowledge of that cause; it is not a process of proof. Indeed, the proof of the 
immortality of the soul which immediately follows Socrates' description of the hypothetical 
method (102a-107a) is not really an illustration of the hypothetical method; it is rather meant to 
be seen as a proof based on knowledge of the cause of generation, existence and destruction 
attained by means of the hypothetical method.” (1969, p 119) However, startlingly, Bedu-Addo 
does not make it clear how he thinks reference to the forms “solves the puzzling problems of 
generation, existence and destruction.” (ibid) He is right that the interlocutors agree that it is 
solved, but he does not make it clear why that agreement should be sufficient to make us draw 
conclusions about the actual sufficiency of Socrates’ argument, and certainly not about Plato’s 
own belief about the sufficiency of this “method.” I think it is clear that this “safe but stupid” 
method, as Socrates explicitly calls it, certainly cannot explain generation and corruption.  
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knowledge” doesn’t make it true.396 Robinson famously suggests that Socrates might thus 
be referring to logical entailment; any proposition that is logically entailed by our 
hypothesis must be taken to be true.397 However, this interpretation has problems of its 
own, as Robinson himself points out. Specifically, he argues that Socrates would have to 
then mean that anything which is not entailed by our hypothesis is assumed to be untrue, 
as Socrates says, so he can’t mean “entailment” after all.398 Bostock simply concludes, as 
a result of this necessary confusion (when this statement is taken as an account of a 
logical method), that it is “a slip on Socrates’ part” to talk of agreement.399 Sayre 
concludes that Plato was unable to distinguish between the appropriate methods for 
                                                
396 1998, p 196. 
397 1953, p 134ff. 
398 “It has often been suggested that Socrates' statement of the method here involves a logical 
impossibility, for the notion that a hypothesis can itself entail consequences that contradict one 
another is logically absurd, since any propositions that follow from a given proposition are 
necessarily consistent with one another.” (Bedu-Addo, 1969, p 120). Cf Vlastos 1969. See also 
Plass 1960: “It seems either high-handed or naive simply to reject as false whatever disagrees 
with your proposition and accept as true whatever agrees with it. In so bald a form such a 
procedure is neither method nor meaningful dialogue. . . ‘Agreement’ and ‘disagreement’ are 
similarly broad in meaning. Propositions shown to be true are commonly in agreement with the 
initial proposition, but often not specifically with it as 100a implies, since Socrates often refers to 
the entire argument as the basis of proof. Each step of the argument is also "in agreement" and 
true (though not the object of proof) through its admission by the interlocutor. "Agreement" 
means "fits into", "is agreeable"; it is a matter of consistency rather than of strict inference.” (p 
110). Cf Genzler: “ “To be consistent with" seems to be the most natural reading of συμφωνεῖν. 
However, it is unlikely that Socrates would advocate, even in a "second best" method, that we 
posit as true all propositions that seem to us to be consistent with our hypothesis.” (1991, p 266) 
Robinson argues that “a hypothesis as complicated as the Theory of Forms it could reasonably be 
expected to reveal any hidden contradiction in this way.” (1953, p 14) Thus, he assumes that the 
hypothetical method is not supposed to apply to hypotheses in general, but only to the specific 
hypothesis Socrates speaks of in this passage. Gonzalez 1998 has a good discussion of the 
problems and various interpretations of this passage (p 196-199 and notes). See also Bailey 2005, 
who gives a persuasive argument that “we should take the musical connotations of the term 
[συμφωνεῖν] seriously, and that Plato was thinking of a robust analogy between the way pitches 
form unities when related by certain intervals, and the way theoretical claims form unities when 
related by explanatory co-dependence.” (p 95) Pointing to the difficulty of interpreting this 
passage, Bailey states: “. . .it seems that we must either impute an ambiguity to his use of 
συμφωνεῖν, or give him a lunatic methodology that no one could possibly follow.” (p 96) 
399 1986, p 162ff. 
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mathematics and philosophy.400 What, then, does Socrates have in mind when he suggests 
this procedure of testing the coherence of the conclusions of a hypothesis?401 
 
 Connected to this problem is the issue of whether or not examining the things that 
“spring forth from that hypothesis” is supposed to be a test of the hypothesis itself; how is 
an examination of the consequences of something we assume to be true supposed to help 
us discern if that hypothesis itself is true?402 Bedu-Addo suggests that: “The retention of 
Socrates' initial hypothesis will depend on how successfully it is considered to have 
explained particular cases of generation existence and destruction in comparison with 
other explanations that are not consistent with his hypothesis. The procedure is, in effect, 
a test of the hypothesis.”403 Thus, he suggests that we take Socrates to allow for the 
philosopher to check the results of a hypothesis against empirical results; if the 
hypothesis makes a prediction, and that prediction does not come true, then this counts as 
a refutation of the hypothesis. Thus, examining the conclusions deducible from the 
hypothesis is not a test in itself, but rather allows for specific predications to be made 
                                                
400 1983, p 196. 
401 At 436d in the Cratylus, speaking of the “method of hypothesis” as used in “geometrical 
constructions.” Socrates says that even if all the consequences of a hypothesis are consistent with 
each other and with the hypothesis itself, they may still be false if the hypothesis itself is false: 
“That’s why every man must think a lot about the first principles of anything and investigate them 
thoroughly to see whether or not it’s correct to assume them.” (436d) At  533c in the Republic, 
Socrates asks: "For where the beginning is something one does not know, and the conclusion and 
all that intervenes are constructed out of what one does not know what contrivance is there for 
ever turning such an agreement into knowledge?” (533c, emphasis added) Clearly, since the 
hypothesis of the forms is not adequately proven, but simply agreed upon by Cebes, we have 
reason to doubt its conclusions, and further, to suspect that Socrates is being ironic in saying that 
this method has reached truth. Cf Nehamas 1973.  
402 Sternfield and Zyskin argue that hypothetical arguments “are not grounded in the nature of 
things.” (1977, p 56) 
403 1969, p 117. 
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such that the hypothesis can be tested against experience.404  
 
 Another question on which there has been little agreement is whether or not 
Socrates intends his ‘method’ specifically for agonistic eristics. Many commentators have 
assumed that Socrates is specifically presenting the method of hypothesis as a technique 
for dealing with challenges to one’s beliefs. Some have gone so far as to assume that the 
manuscripts are in error, and susbstitute ἔφοιτο  for ἔχοιτο at 101d.405 Others simply 
                                                
404 Bedu-Addo argues: “That this is what Plato has in mind is indicated by the fact that when he 
makes Socrates undertake to explain this statement more clearly (100b-c), what he does is to 
make him state his general explanation of the cause of generation, existence and destruction, 
namely, the theory of Forms, and then proceed to posit as true the explanations of particular cases 
of generation, existence and destruction which are consistent with it, and as false those that are 
not consistent with it, namely, all mechanistic explanations of generation, existence and 
destruction. (100c-101c) Here, Socrates seems clearly to consider that whereas the applications of 
his principle to particular cases are consistently tenable, the corresponding explanations of the 
physicists lead to conflicting consequences.” (1969, p 117). Cf Hare, who says that this: “may 
show (however reluctant Plato would have been to admit it) that there is after all an empirical 
element in the elenchus: are we not in practicing it looking for possible falsifications of the 
empirical hypothesis that, in their ordinary discourse, people use a word in a certain way." (1965, 
p 34) It seems odd to draw this conclusion form the Phaedo, and then claim that Plato would have 
been reluctant to admit it, especially given the importance of sensory experience in the 
recollecting equality. We will find that their suggestion here – while it does not sound much like 
traditional Platonism, and is seemingly in tension with Socrates’ claim that we turn away from the 
senses in the second sailing – is attested by the 7th letter at 344b. Robinson disagrees that the 
hypothesis is intended to be falsified: “To Plato an hypothesis was primarily a premiss and not a 
demonstrand, a proposition posited in order to prove something else and not in order to be 
established or refuted. The original statement of the method makes the hypothesis unequivocally 
a premiss (100a). The employment of the method in the dialogue is equally unequivocal. The 
hypothesis chosen is the theory of Ideas. There is no question of testing or recommending this 
theory in any way; but it is used as a premiss for inferring another proposition, namely that the 
soul is immortal. . ." (Robinson 1953, p 134) Cornford disagrees that testing against sensory 
experience is referred to in this text, claiming that "the fact that sensible experience may be the 
occasion of Recollection is lost sight of." (1957, p 6) Bluck 1955, p 149, disagrees. Dorter argues 
that the hypothetical method does not allow us to rise above the confusions of everyday 
experience. (1982, p 134) Cf. Gonzalez 1998, p 176-177. 
405 For a discussion of this debate, see Byrd 2007, p 146-147. Byrd disagrees with the change, 
first proposed by Madvig. Burnet, Gallop, Bluck and Hackforth agree with her, myself, and the 
translators of the edition I am using – Brann, Kalkavage and Salem – in taking the verb in its 
usual sense of “hold to.” Burger 1984, surprisingly, disagrees.  
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translate ἔχοιτο as “to attack” rather than its far-more-common “to hold to.” 406 
 
 As a result of not agreeing on these points, it is not surprising that the commentary 
leaves it unclear what is to be understood by the ‘upward way’ of testing the hypotheses 
until something ‘adequate’ is reached. Some assume that the final, sufficient stopping 
place Socrates speaks of is the good; others say that there is no evidence for this, and that 
the method in the Republic is substantially different from that sketched in the Phaedo, 
and so their highest goals should not be assumed to be the same.407  
 
 I argue that the failure of this method is not confined simply to a lack of clarity in 
its method; the hypothetical method fails by not giving us adequate understanding of the 
                                                
406 Bedu-Addo argues: “The view that the 'upward path' described here is for the benefit of the 
'objector' or the 'outsider' is untenable if only because on this view 'drawing the consequences of 
an hypothesis to see whether they accord with one another or not', becomes necessary only when 
the initial hypothesis is 'attacked'. Surely, Plato is only using the language of the 'dialectical 
process of questioning and answering' (Phd. 75d); and 'objectors' are not ruled out in the 
description of dialectic in the Republic either.” (1969, p 131) Byrd says: “Despite these apparent 
similarities between the two methods, though, some argue that the method of hypothesis is 
separate from and inferior to dialectic. Recall that the main objections here are twofold: (a) the 
adequate stopping point in the two dialogues is different, and (b) the method of hypothesis is, 
unlike dialectic, a deuteros plous often translated as 'second best'. According to proponents of (a), 
the 'higher' hypothesis is merely a hypothesis adequate to meet an opponent's challenge. Richard 
Robinson, for example, argues that the passage concerns someone objecting to your hypothesis; 
thus 'adequate' can only mean adequate to satisfy the critic.” (2007, p 145, emphasis added) She 
argues that the method in the Republic and that in the Phaedo “mirror” one another. In agreement 
with her are Gulley 1986, and Hackforth 1955. Gallop 1999, and others, disagree.  
407 Cf Bedu-Addo: “I shall argue that the widely accepted view that the anhypothetos arche 
reached at the end of every dialectical enquiry is the Good or a proposition about the Good, is 
mistaken.” (1969, p 131) See also Sayre 1983, p 46 ff. Gonzalez 1998 has a good discussion of 
the confusions in this “upward path.” (p 198ff) Robinson agrees that this sufficient account is the 
anhypothetos arche of the Republic. (1953, p 138) Cherniss disagrees, saying there is “every 
reason” to make this equation. (1947, p 141) Friedlander also claims that there is “hardly anyone” 
who has not identified the hikanon of the Phaedo with the anhypothetos arche of the Republic.” 
(1945, p 246) Tait agrees with this identification. (1986, p 476) Dorter disagrees with the 
identification. (1983, p 133ff) See also Hackforth 1955. I will speak about the ‘upward path’ 
briefly below.  
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forms, or of the soul, or of participation, or of life; what is called for is not deductive 
logic, but inquiry into these concepts and how they operate in our understanding of our 
world. Robinson argues that the problem with the hypothetical method is that it cannot 
prove the hypothesis, only decide what is consonant with it.408 Gonzalez argues that the 
problem is much deeper: “The main problem is that Robinson insists on locating the 
provisionality of the argument in the form of deduction involved, while Socrates clearly 
locates it elsewhere, namely, in a failure to examine the meanings of the terms used. 
What the method of hypothesis is lacking is not logical rigor, but understanding.”409  
 
 Rather than trying to sort through these problems (something done adequately by 
Gonzalez and Burger), I would like simply to point out that there is ample evidence 
within the text that Plato did not intend for us to take the hypothetical method, nor the 
hypothesis of the forms, as his central teaching in the Phaedo.410 First of all, we note that 
the theory of forms has not been proven, but simply agreed upon explicitly as a 
hypothesis – one which Socrates chooses because it is a hypothesis to which Cebes has 
                                                
408 For another account of the problems with the fact that the Phaedo fails to ground the theory of 
forms in anything ‘higher,’ see Byrd 2007, p 151. Cf Robinson (1953, p 135), Ross (1982, p 29), 
(Rose 1966, p 466), Bluck (1955, p 22). Kenneth Dorter argues that this work is carried out in the 
Parmenides. (1983, p 139) On this point, see also Gallop (199, p 189), Robinson (1953, p 142). 
409 1998, p 342, n. 52. Cf Bluck (1955, p 88) Of the problems with Cebes and Simmias’ 
acceptance of these arguments (102a: “ ‘What you say is very true,’ said Simmias and Cebes 
together.”), Burger says: “Yet their enthusiasm is suspicious: they have never even asked if the 
hypothesis of the causality of the eidei is only one illustration among others of the general 
procedure of hypothetical reasoning, and if not, what the necessary connection between them is.” 
(1984, p 158) 
410 Much of the belief that Plato took these arguments as conclusive come from Aristotle’s 
account; cf. Aristotle On Generation and Corruption 335b: “But one party has thought the forms 
sufficient aitia of generation, as Socrates says in the Phaedo: for he too, after reproaching others 
for having explained nothing, hypothesizes that some existents are Forms, others participants in 
the Forms, and that each thing is said to be in virtue of the Form, and to become in virtue of 
participating [in the Form] and to perish in virtue of shedding [the Form]. Hence, if this is true, he 
must believe the Forms aitiai both of becoming and of perishing." Cf. also Metaphysics 99b3-4: 
"In the Phaedo the matter is put thus: The Forms are aitiai both of being and of becoming." 
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already affirmed his commitment.411 We further note that Socrates calls for us to re-
examine this theory, and any hypothetical agreement, at 107b; after Simmias (reluctantly) 
admits that he still harbors doubts about the immortality of the soul, saying that he “still 
has some lingering distrust within” himself, Socrates responds: “What you say is good, 
but also our very first hypotheses – even if to all of you they are trustworthy – must 
nevertheless be looked into for greater surety.” (ibid.) Simmias expressed uncertainty 
about the conclusion alone – that the soul is immortal; Socrates asks, as (nearly) his final 
request, that they extend that doubt to their ‘first hypotheses’; his failure to specify what 
those ‘first hypotheses’ are serves to extend that doubt to anything that they have agreed 
upon. It seems clear, then, that we are not supposed to simply accept any argument which 
follows from an untested hypothesis without adequately examining that hypothesis – a 
process which is not carried out in the Phaedo – partly due to the fact that Cebes 
immediately affirms the existence of the forms without questioning their applicability to 
the question at hand, despite Socrates’ trying very hard to elicit Cebes’ distrust, as I will 
                                                
411 Unfortunately, there has been no agreement about the status of this hypothesis. Bluck is so 
certain that Plato believes the theory of forms to be the highest and most unquestionable truth that 
he claims the hypothesis cannot be the existence of the forms, arguing that if the hypothesis 
“were indeed the theory of Forms itself, it is impossible to see what the 'higher' hypothesis could 
be by means of which the theory of Forms might have to be explained.” (1955, p 161). Bedu-
Addo recognizes that the text makes it clear that any “Theory of the Forms” is presented merely 
as a hypothesis: “It is important to recognize here that since a hypothesis is an opinion, it does not 
constitute knowledge, however strong it may be.” (1969, p 114) However, certain in his faith that 
Socrates subscribes to the explanatory power of the forms, and that therein lies Socrates’ 
confidence in the face of execution, Bedu-Addo concludes: “Thus we are not supposed to think 
that Socrates is merely taking for granted the truth of the theory of Forms on which the final proof 
of the immortality of the soul is based. At this stage the theory of Forms is only an opinion. 
Socrates believes, or rather thinks he knows that Forms do exist; but for the moment we are to 
regard his explanation of generation, existence and destruction in terms of the theory of Forms 
only as an assumption. He chooses the theory of Forms as his strongest λόγος here precisely 
because (1) the quarry for this particular enquiry is the cause of all generation, existence and 
destruction, (2) that theory itself has already been shown to the satisfaction of his interlocutors to 
be plausible by the arguments adduced in support of the theory of recollection (72e-78b).” (ibid.) 
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show.412 
1.2 Μέθεξις 
 
 The first indication we get that Socrates does not want his interlocutors to take the 
theory of forms, or the proof, as a dogma without further analysis, comes in Socrates’ 
initial introduction of the hypothesis to Cebes at 100b. Socrates says that he has “never 
stopped talking about the same thing,” which he calls “the much-babbled-about 
(πολυθρύλητα)” forms. He says that he has always done what he is going to do 
explicitly with Cebes – that is, he is going to assume, to “put down as hypothesis that 
there’s some Beautiful itself by itself, and a Good and a Big and all the others.” (ibid.) 
This certainly implies that, on his deathbed, Socrates is saying that the forms have always 
been a hypothesis laid down for further investigation and discovery, and thus not to be 
taken as doctrine, but rather as something that would need to be grounded in something 
“higher.” Further, in referring to them as “much-babbled-about,” Socrates implies that 
there is something lacking in the λόγοι that have been given, by himself and others, 
                                                
412 As Gulley puts it: "Plato recognizes.. . the limitation of the method of hypothesis, and of 
human argument in general, as a means of establishing with certainty the truth of any postulate.” 
(1986, p 43). In the Meno, for example, the hypothesis chosen by Socrates – that virtue is 
teachable – is explicitly argued to be false. Cf Republic 533c and Cratylus 436d, as quoted above. 
Again, I will unfortunately not be able to discuss all of the positive aspects of this theory, as an 
account of the theory of forms would take an entire dissertation, and would take us too far afield 
from our concern with the method of hypothesis as advising a harmonious condition of soul. As 
such, I will simply be showing that the argument is presented as questionable, and is not intended 
to “prove” what it claims. I argue that this method, and this example, are not intended to be taken 
as Plato’s teachings, but rather to have been chosen specifically to convince Cebes; in addition to 
his confessed attachment to the theory of forms, the method of hypothesis, as drawn from 
geometry, can be expected to appeal to Socrates’ Pythagorean audience. Cf Bedu-Addo: “It is 
clear from the Meno, as Bluck sees, that Plato is indebted to the mathematicians ‘for his own 
conscious practice and development of a ‘hypothetical method’.’ This applies to the search for 
'higher' hypothesis, i.e. the 'upward path' of the method. Socrates' interlocutors, Cebes and 
Simmias, as well as Echecrates in the 'outer dialogue' are all Pythagoreans, and may reasonably 
be expected to listen to the description of the hypothetical method with a familiar ear.” (1979, p 
131) Bedu-Addo cites Bluck. (1955, p 85)  
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concerning the forms – including in this very dialogue. (65b, 76d, 78c)  
 I will argue that one of the central ways in which this ‘theory’ has been lacking, and 
continues to be lacking, is by failing to provide a coherent account of μέθεξις; this is 
significant because, as I will show, this is precisely the account that would be necessary 
to finalize the proof of the immortality of the soul. Considering that Plato explicitly calls 
attention to this failing, as I will show, he was obviously aware of the insufficiency of 
this final argument.413  
 Cebes immediately agrees with the hypothesis, and Socrates says that if anything 
is beautiful, it is beautiful by participating in the beautiful. The way he expresses this 
participation makes it clear that the argument is lacking; Socrates says that a beautiful 
thing is beautiful “by the presence or communion (παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία) with that 
Beautiful – or however and in whatever way you say it happens.” (100d, emphasis 
added)414 Socrates compounds this startling admission by saying, “As for that, I don’t yet 
make any definite assertion. . .” (100d-e) The “yet” is especially troubling given his 
situation. Earlier in the dialogue, when calling for the development of a τέχνη of λόγος, 
Socrates expressed concerns that he might “leave his stinger behind,” by convincing his 
friends of λόγοι that are not true (91c); in this light, he asked them to “give little thought 
to Socrates and much more to the truth.” (ibid.) In that light, his admission that he makes 
no assertions how forms “cause” particulars, coupled with his insistence that forms are 
                                                
413 Cf Nehamas: “All else apart, this view is vague not only because its theoretical domain (the 
Forms) is unspecified, but also because the relation connecting Forms and particulars needs to be 
explained. Plato himself underscores this (100D4-6) : ‘. . . nothing else makes it (viz., a beautiful 
particular) beautiful but the presence of, or its communion with, or whatever it is that connects it 
to, that beautiful (viz., the beautiful itself).’ His language shows his uncertainty about that 
relation.” (1973, p 463) 
414 I am thus disagreeing with Bluck, who claims that the Phaedo includes a “full statement of 
Plato’s theory of Forms.” (1955, p 2) 
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this cause, is troubling. It is more troubling that most commentators take this account of 
cause to be Socrates and Plato’s final word on the nature of cause, implying that Socrates 
has, indeed, left his stinger behind in the form of “Platonism.”  
 How are we supposed to think that the beautiful itself by itself causes the beauty 
of anything beautiful? It seems that the cause is not simply the existence of the beautiful 
itself, but rather participation – that is, the bare existence of the form is irrelevant unless 
there is a causal relation between the form and any given particular thing which is 
responsible for the beauty of the particular; as Burger says: “In fact, however, Socrates 
seems now to have identified the cause of such an attribution not with the eidos, but with 
the relation of “participation.”415 Thus, without an account of μέθεξις, it is premature to 
claim that the forms “cause” generation and corruption, or being.  
 Certainly Socrates and Plato want us to consider these questions: What do all 
beautiful things have in common? What is the nature of beauty? How can it be known? 
However, in leaving μέθεξις as a “common search,” as Aristotle put it in the 
Metaphysics, he clearly did not intend any proof based in the forms as a hypothesis to be 
taken as dogma.416  
 After Simmias and Cebes say together that they take Socrates’ arguments to be 
“very true,” (102a) Plato draws us out of the conversation, back into the frame dialogue. 
As if to highlight the confusion that an attentive reader should be feeling, Plato has 
Echecrates say: “. . .it seems to me wonderful (θαυμαστῶς) how lucid (ἐναργῶς) that 
man made all this – lucid even to someone who didn’t have much of a mind (σμικρὸν 
νοῦν ἔχοντι)!” (ibid.) After Phaedo agrees that everyone understood Socrates perfectly, 
                                                
415 1984, p 149. 
416 Again, for a fuller account of the lack of clarity in Socrates argument, which Cebes misses, see 
Burger 1984, esp. p 150-160. 
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he demonstrates the falsity of this claim; Echecrates asks what was said next, and Phaedo 
is uncertain: “This, I think (ἐγὼ οἶμαι).” He then says “it was agreed that each of the 
forms was something, and that everything else that has a share (μεταλαμβάνοντα) in 
them gets its name from these very things.” (102a-b) Of this summary, Burger notes: 
“What should presumably constitute the philosophical peak of the dialogue, Phaedo 
presents as a mere conclusion with no argument in defense, introduced by the 
qualification ‘I believe.’”417  
 Despite these problems, Cebes does not object; Socrates thus concludes that he 
does not need any of the other “wise” or  “sophisticated” (σοφάς) causes (100c). 
However, having said this, Socrates very soon has recourse to a more “fancy” or 
“sophisticated” (κομψοτέραν) account of causes;418 thus, it is unclear how we should 
understand the status of this early “safe but stupid (ἀμαθῆ)” answer (105c).419  
                                                
417 1984, p 159-160. 
418 Cf Burger: “Socrates’ refined answer represents an advance in knowledge of cause in the 
ordinary sense, but only at the price of giving up irrefutability. It assigns a cause that is neither 
sufficient – since its safety depends upon its essential connection with some independent opposite 
– nor necessary – since the result it produces might just as well have been produced by some 
other cause. The argument that prepares for this refined answer has established that fire can be the 
cause of heat only and not of cold, but it did not and could not have established that fire is the 
only cause of heat; conversing might just as well be the cause of heat (cf. 63d), or even fever, as 
Socrates suggests by adding it between his original examples of fire and number.” (1984, p 172) 
419 The more “sophisticated” account has its own trouble. See Vlastos 1969 for a good 
examination of its many problems. After arguing, convincingly, that this account is confusing and 
incomplete, and listing the problems with it, Vlastos says: “It is impossible to tell from this 
passage to what extent Plato was assailed at this time by such doubts. Here, as elsewhere, he has a 
way of keeping the spotlight of his discourse on just those areas where he is most confident of the 
answers, content to leave much else in obscurity. This artful chiaroscuro makes life difficult for 
anyone who tries to expound his thought systematically. Time and again we come across gaps in 
his thought, not knowing how he would expect us to fill them. This way of writing philosophy is 
not to be excused, and I have no desire to excuse it. But this much can at least be said for Plato: 
his silences are themselves suggestive not of confusion but of a canny, self-critical awareness of 
the limitations of his theory. The problems he persistently declines to discuss in the middle 
dialogues are those whose solution eludes him. This is conspicuously true in the present case. If 
Plato had really thought we could syllogize our way the secrets of the natural universe, his 
confidence in such a fantasy would have been pathetic.” (p 323) I, of course, disagree with this 
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1.3 The Sophisticated Answer 
  
 I will now take a brief look at the “more sophisticated” argument concerning the 
forms. Again, my goal is not to give an exhaustive account, but merely to show that there 
are serious problems with the presentation of the hypothesis of the forms which indicate 
that Plato was aware of the insufficiency of this argument, and thus expected his readers 
to use his comments to begin an inquiry into the nature of the truth of beings, and not to 
rest content with any supposed answers found in this or any other book. 
 After drawing us into the frame-dialogue at 102a, Phaedo returns to direct 
discourse, saying that they agreed that “everything gets its name (ἐπωνυμίαν)” by 
participation in the forms, then reporting that Socrates then asked “whenever you claim 
Simmias is bigger than Socrates but littler than Phaedo, aren’t you on those occasions 
asserting that both these things, Bigness and Smallness, are in Simmias?” (102b) In The 
Republic (523aff.) Socrates uses the example of a finger that is both big and small to 
illustrate a similar point; here, he refers to three proper names to make his point about 
how things get their name. Burger writes:  
To say that things receive their names from the eidei in which they participate 
might seem to suggest, as its paradigmatic illustration, the individual person 
designated by his proper name. The proper name operates like the Athenian 
λόγος that each year declares the sacred ship, despite its being worn away part 
by part, to be the very “ship of Theseus”. . . Socrates points out rhetorical power 
                                                                                                                                            
conclusion; I have shown that Plato was fully aware of these problems, and that he left several 
hints to the attentive reader such that we would share his doubts. Plato does not want us to be able 
to “expound” his thought systematically, but to develop our own. Unfortunately, Vlastos does not 
turn his remarkable insight into asking why Plato would present an intentionally faulty argument, 
since he seems to assume that Plato was either unaware of these faults, or was attempting to hide 
them – however, clumsy those attempts must be thought to be.  
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of the proper name right before he drinks the poison, he tries to comfort Crito by 
commanding him not to say, as he buries the corpse, that he is burying 
“Socrates,” for to speak in that way produces terrible effects (115e). By means of 
this restriction, Socrates hopes to convince Crito of the identification of self with 
psyche that is unaffected by death and burial; the proper name betrays the pathe 
that motivate our particular interest in positing the identity of the self that 
remains the same through all change. But while Socrates chooses Simmias as an 
example of a pragma, he does not ask in which eidos he must participate in order 
to receive the name Simmias.420 
 
Socrates will go on to argue that “Bigness itself is never willing to be big and small at the 
same time,” and that “the Bigness in us never abides the Small, nor is it willing to be 
exceeded.” The problems with this formulation have been well attested; specifically, it is 
not at all clear that Bigness itself can be either big or small, since it is not a physical 
entity, as the first claim implies. Secondly, in his account of how the bigness in us never 
“abides” the Small, he claims that Simmias “by submitting his Smallness to the Bigness 
of the one for that one to exceed it, while supplying his Bigness for the other’s Smallness 
to be exceeded by it.” (102c-d) This account clearly implies that Simmias can only be 
“named” “big” or “small” based in how his size is “submitted” by conscious comparison 
to another magnitude. Thus, the power of the soul is again implicated in making this 
“submission.”421 If someone that was once called small is to become big, either the 
                                                
420 1984, p 161. 
421 This is a very important passage; unfortunately, it would be necessary to make a lengthy 
digression into the Republic to explicate its full importance. Klein (1965, p 116ff) has an 
excellent discussion of the passage in the Republic. He says that Socrates indicates that while 
some perceptions have enough clarity such that they do not raise any questions (e.g. “What is a 
finger?”) others seem perplexing “because ‘opposite’ qualities have been somehow ‘mixed up’ in 
them. . .” This experience ‘calls our thought,’ since apprehending “‘opposition’ or ‘contradiction’ 
is the province of διάνοια, not of the senses. . .” (ibid.) Our thinking is called to solve the 
perplexity, and it “removes the confusion, contradiction, or obstacle arising in our perceptions by 
distinguishing the relations in which a finger stands with regard to its neighbor. A finger may be 
big in relation to its left neighbor and small in relation to its right neighbor. Or, as we read in the 
Phaedo (102b-c), Simmias is tall not by virtue of being Simmias but by virtue of being taller than 
Socrates. . . Simmias is tall and short in different respects. In distinguishing those respects, our 
thinking, our διάνοια, both discriminates between and relates the things under consideration. In 
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smallness in her has “fled” (φεύγειν) and “gotten out of the way,” (ὑπεκχωρεῖν) or it 
has been “destroyed (ἀπολωλέναι).” (102e) Unfortunately, Socrates does not explain 
what “fleeing” or “being destroyed” means in this context, which will be central to his 
argument for the immortality of the soul. 
 Notably, Socrates says nothing about how Simmias comes to be called 
“Simmias,” or “Human,” or “A man.” Something must remain constant in order for this 
comparison to be made, namely, Simmias himself. But what is the status of that 
“himself?” The dialogue has been driving us to ask this question since the first word, and 
now it appears, once again, that an answer to this question – to the nature of the 
separation between the self as ψυχή and the body, which we determined to be a 
separation in λόγος – is connected to understanding the transcendence of the forms.  
 Immediately after giving his account of how we come to be named big or small 
by submitting our bigness or smallness to comparison, Socrates sheds serious doubt on 
the completeness of this account by smiling, and saying: “I seem to be even on the verge 
of book-speak! But it really is pretty much the way I’m describing it.” (102d)  
 By failing to make a distinction between how we come to have the “name” Big 
and Small, Sick and Healthy, as opposed to names such as Human or Simmias, Socrates 
leaves a great deal out of this account of the forms, and of the nature of participation. 
However, his interlocutors nearly pose no questions, nor challenge the completeness of 
the λόγος. However, one person objects; provocatively, Phaedo cannot remember his 
name. (103a) Socrates has claimed the opposite must “flee” or be “destroyed,” and thus 
that no contrary can ever become its contrary. The unnamed speaker objects, saying that 
                                                                                                                                            
the case of a finger, the διάνοια has, first of all, to explore whether its being both big and small 
means that we are facing something which is ‘one’ or whether it means that we are, for example, 
facing something which is ‘two.’” (p 116) Also, see Dorter 1982, Burger 1984.  
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earlier (at 70dff), they had agreed to the opposite conclusion – specifically, that opposites 
come to be from the opposite, e.g. the living from the dead. Socrates replies easily, saying 
that one must simply attend to the difference between the forms themselves, and the 
particulars which participate in them; the particulars come to be from their opposite, but 
the forms can never do the same.  
 However, after this easy answer, he turns to Cebes, and asks if anything the 
interlocutor said troubled him. (103c) Cebes is not troubled, but what did Socrates have 
in mind with this question? Why did Socrates feel that this argument should have upset 
him? Without doing an in-depth analysis of the passage, we can see that, once again, that 
the objection has drawn to the fore the “insufficiency of Phaedo’s summary of the 
fundamental hypothesis on the participation of the pragmata in the eidei.”422  
 In any case, it is seemingly this objection which causes Socrates to introduce his 
“more sophisticated” (κομψοτέραν) answer (as Gonzalez argues). Socrates says that not 
only will hot never admit cold, but fire will never admit cold “while still being fire,” and 
like cold itself, snow will never admit being hot “while still being snow.” (103c-d) At 
104c, he repeats that these “bearers” of the form (as they have come to be called) will 
either “perish or give way” (ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα) when the contrary eidos 
“comes at them.” (104b-c) Thus, the presence of fire (and not just the form of heat) can 
be said to be the cause of something being hot. This reference to fire as cause is an 
example of Socrates’ more sophisticated answer. Unfortunately, this answer, by turning 
our attention to particulars as cause, has taken us even further from understanding 
participation in the forms. As Gonzalez puts it: “We are still postulating between forms 
                                                
422 Burger 1984, p 165, emphasis added. On this unnamed objector and his λόγος, see also 
Gonzalez 1998, p 204-205.  
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and particulars a relation that we do not understand, and we are still speaking of forms 
without knowledge, but in now using particulars as causes we are less aware of this 
ignorance than ever.”423  
 Without articulating the nature of participation, it is impossible to be fully 
convinced of Socrates’ final proof. Socrates says that since ψυχή is a bearer of life – just 
as fire is of heat, and three is of odd – it can never admit death. There is certainly some 
truth to this: insofar as ψυχή can be understood as the separability, in λόγος, of the life-
force of a living body, it makes little sense to speak of the ψυχή “dying;” it is the human 
being, the ζῶον that dies. However, Socrates has said twice that it might “perish” at the 
approach of the opposite; it is not as if snow flees and is safe “somewhere” at the 
approach of heat. (cf 106a) How do we know that soul, at the approach of death, does not 
suffer the same fate as snow at the approach of heat, as Socrates asks (106c)?  
 Socrates says they would “need another argument” to prove that the soul did not 
perish. (106c-d) However, he immediately retracts this, saying that they need no other 
argument since “hardly anything else could fail to admit destruction (φθορὰν μὴ 
δέχοιτο) if the un-dying (ἀθάνατον), which is everlasting, will admit destruction 
(φθορὰν δέξεται).” (106d) In this argument, Socrates plays on the terms “death”( 
θάνατος) “un-dying” (ἀθάνατος), on the one hand, and “destruction” (φθορά), 
“imperishable” (ἀνώλεθρος), and “perish” (ἀπόλλυμι) on the other. If something is 
ἀθάνατος, Socrates insists without argument, it cannot experience φθορά, destruction. 
Cebes says this is true with “great necessity (πολλὴ ἀνάγκη).” (106d) However, the 
relation between particular and form has been left unthematized; Socrates has further 
                                                
423 1998, p 205. 
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explicitly said the “bearer” can perish at the approach of the contrary, and has explicitly 
not argued for the position that the bearer of life, since it does not “admit” death (and is 
thus ἀθάνατος) is therefore also ἀνώλεθρος. Thus, we are left to wonder about the 
outcome of the argument Socrates fails to give.  
 Surely fire, as such, is as ἀνώλεθρος as is heat itself; however, any individual 
instance of fire can be quenched and thus perish. Why is this not also true of soul? Why 
is it not the case that soul as such is both ἀθάνατος and ἀνώλεθρος, but any individual 
soul, at the approach of death, is destroyed? Without a clarification of participation, and 
without more clarity concerning the relation between particular and universal, the 
introduction of the “bearers” proves merely to be a distraction which hides our ignorance 
of this relation, as Gonzalez argued, and not a solution to our troubles.  
 Further, we note that this argument would equally claim that the soul of any 
animal or plant – anything that could said to be “alive” – would be equally immortal; 
Socrates’ final argument has completely removed the aspect of the ψυχή which links it to 
reason, and has thus reduced ψυχή to a principle of life in order to carry off this final 
argument to Cebes’ satisfaction. 
 
 Cebes is convinced, but Simmias is not as certain. (107a-b) Socrates explicitly 
applauds his mistrust of these (as we have seen, insufficient) arguments, and says “What 
you say is good, but also our very first hypotheses – even if to all of you they are 
trustworthy (πισταὶ) – must nevertheless be looked into for greater surety (ἐπισκεπτέαι 
σαφέστερον).” (107b) Socrates does not make it clear what these “first hypotheses” are, 
but the most obvious textual reference would be to the assumption that the beings 
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themselves are. In any case, I hope to have shown that the hypothetical method has not 
led to certainty in the Phaedo, and that there is thus some purpose to Socrates’ 
introduction of this method other than the desire to prove the immortality of the soul, or 
the existence of the forms (which he simply assumes). 
 
1.4 Harmony of Soul  
 
 What these commentators fail to see is how Socrates’ call for harmonizing our 
λόγοι – since it is obviously not intended as a final, thorough account of philosophical 
method – must be understood in connection to the rest of the dialogue.424 Luckily, 
understanding that there is an obvious connection between ἁρμονία and συμφωνεῖν, we 
find that the section of the dialogue immediately preceding the one in question offers us 
ample clues on an alternate way to understand the call for harmony.425 Specifically, we 
saw that there, as in many of the dialogues, harmony is explicitly linked to virtue. 
Secondly, as we have seen that the dialogue has raised the issue of unity and multiplicity 
– part/whole, one/many – we have reason to think that the call for harmony resonates 
with the concerns of the dialogue.  
 Thus, we can begin to sketch a double connection between harmony and human 
virtue. First, we have seen that cognitive dissonance is a problem in the dialogue, and has 
been shown to lead to unethical reactions, and to being governed by emotions rather than 
                                                
424 For example, Sharma says that, given the problem of the confusion and disagreement 
surrounding the second sailing passage: “Confronting that problem head-on will necessitate a new 
account of the ‘autobiography’ as a whole.” (2009, p 139) However, even recognizing that a 
broader textual analysis is necessary to try and work through the confusion evidenced in 
secondary literature, Sharma fails to interpret these passages in terms of the Phaedo as a whole, 
expanding his analysis only to the autobiography as if it was intended to be read in isolation.  
425 On the connection between these terms, see Cratylus 405c. 
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rational, ethical responsiveness to the world. Secondly, we have seen that the 
characteristic activity of the soul – the defining ἔργον, the excellence of which equates to 
human ἀρετή – is to identify the unitary wholes that are the locus of intelligibility in the 
world. When the soul is divided against itself – i.e. when the λόγοι through which we 
gather beings (and situations - πράγματα) into their intelligible unity are multiple and 
disharmonious – it is difficult to know how to act. The soul pulls in multiple directions 
because, for example, fleeing the prison and remaining and awaiting your sentence both 
appear as the best action. Insofar as the soul fails to be harmonious, so too does the world 
fail to settle into simple intelligibility. The condition of the soul – as knower, as the 
“field” in which differences and determinateness of intelligible πράγματα become 
manifest – is reflected in the way the world, the whole, appears. To call the self into its 
proper unity is directly connected to calling for a recognition of the intelligible unity of 
the whole. It is, again, in this sense that Mind is cause.  
 
1.5 No One Does Wrong Willingly 
 
 I will now turn to a brief suggestion of how this interpretation of the activity of 
the soul in the Phaedo can help us understand some of the more puzzling things Socrates 
says about virtue.  
 As I have repeatedly argued, it is through λόγοι that we gather the world into an 
intelligible order in which we are called to act. Our ethical responsibilities appear against 
the horizon of our ontology. Everyone has a conception of the good which operates in 
their lives and is visible in their actions because everyone acts in a more-or-less 
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intelligible world. It is easy to see that this account makes sense of Socrates’ famous 
“paradoxes” that virtue is knowledge, that no one does wrong willingly, and that all 
virtues are one.426 If someone performs an action, we know that they (or, as we have seen, 
at least some part of them) operates on a λόγος that gathers the πράγματα into its 
intelligibility as a place in which that action is the best – that is, that action is called for 
and demanded as a rational response to their situation. The “Socratic denial of akrasia” 
has puzzled commentators because the paradigmatic “ethical situation” which they 
envisage is one in which an individual stands transfixed before a moral dilemma, 
rationally puzzling out how to act. For the most part, however, our ethics are revealed in 
how we go about our days acting largely without such (rather rare) moments of crisis. 
Our everyday stances toward the world – the way we gather the world into its 
intelligibility – can be, however, revealed by how we act in what might be incorrectly 
thought of as “crisis moments”; specifically, by observing our behavior we can see why 
these crisis moments are so rare.  
 To use a common example, think of seeing an expensive cell phone left sitting on 
a table; what we would do, perhaps, is call some of the numbers in it, give it to some sort 
of lost and found, etc. We would immediately try and return the phone to its owner – no 
moral crossroads, it is simply what we would do. When I was working as a bouncer, 
several of my coworkers simply pocketed phones fairly regularly. It wasn’t an issue for 
them either – pocketing the nice phone was simply the reasonable response to such a 
lucky occurrence. The difference is not how we process the different arguments for and 
against the actions – no process is necessary. We can begin to speak about class issues, 
                                                
426 The best analysis of these paradoxes, by far, is Roslyn Weiss’ The Socratic Paradox and Its 
Enemies.  
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and upbringing, but the fact is any route we take to explain this has to begin with the 
recognition that the response arose naturally from how the world appeared to the 
individual – for us, the world appears as a place in which a lost phone calls for us to 
return it without question; for them, the world simply appears as a place in which a lost 
phone is great luck, and a moment to be celebrated and bragged about.427 To “know” the 
world in these different ways is to have our actions flow immediately out of that 
knowledge; to know the good is to do the good; or, what we know as “good” is revealed 
in what we immediately do; or, in everything we do (as well as in our conception of the 
world, and of any given πράγματα), a conception of “good” is revealed.  
 A more striking example would be the startling number of incidences of date rape 
in fraternities that involve alcohol. For us, coming upon a naked girl unconscious in a 
room is not an occasion for a moral dilemma – raping an unconscious girl just doesn’t 
appear as an option, let alone as a temptation. However, as astonishing as it is when we 
think about it, for thousands and thousands of young men, finding a drunk, unconscious 
girl is a stroke of luck, and obviously the thing to do is take advantage of her. They do not 
take it as a point of shame, as something to be hidden. They film it, brag to their 
fraternity brothers about it, and engineer situations such that they can do it again. 
Astonishing, disgusting, but true. The answer is that these boys live in a culture of rape. 
What has to be addressed is the λόγοι through which the world – and specifically, the 
                                                
427 I also experienced, during this same time period, a situation in which a friend regarded finding 
a lost iPhone as a moral dilemma. He asked my wife what she thought he should do – return it or 
keep it. By asking her advice, instead of one of his more unscrupulous friends who were plentiful 
and ready-to-hand, he must already have known what the “right thing” to do was (as Sartre 
pointed out). His question was about his commitment to the right thing vs. the ‘easy’ or 
irrationally self-interested course. This example shows that finding such situations to be moral 
dilemmas – and thus finding oneself open to akrasia – can be a step from total vice toward virtue, 
but is certainly not yet fully-developed virtue.  
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nature of women – appears to these boys in such a way that rape is a rational response to 
the situation. While it may be a temporary response, teaching boys to withstand the 
temptation of taking advantage of these girls should not be the final solution; there needs 
to be an ontological shift such that rape is no longer a temptation to be resisted.  
 This is not to say that akrasia does not exist; the situation in which the right thing 
to do immediately appears without question is a situation in which our souls are in 
harmony with themselves, and this is not always the case. As we know from other 
everyday examples – like resisting the desire to eat chocolate, or call in sick to work 
when we simply don’t want to go – there are often situations in which multiple courses of 
action appear as choiceworthy, and akrasia appears as a reasonable explanation for the 
phenomenon.  
 However, here we have reason to believe that Socrates is offering a different 
account of the phenomena than the claim “desire is overcoming reason.” Rather, the 
account here appears to be that both ‘appetitive’ and ‘rational’ aspects of ourselves are 
offering differing opinions about what is best.428 The soul is disharmonious because it 
                                                
428 There is a great deal of debate about this point. See Hoffman 2003: “The standard 
interpretation of Plato's account of desires attributed to the appetitive part of the soul, most 
notably the biological desires for food, drink and sex, is that they are blind in the sense that they 
do not involve a conception of their object as good (alternatively, a belief that their object is 
good). They all read the passage as implying a denial of the Socratic view that all desire is for the 
good, or at least the perceived good.” (p 171) For examples of commentators who take this 
standard position, see Penner 1990, Irwin 1977 p 191ff., White 1979, p 124ff., Reeve 1988 133ff. 
Reeve claims that by rejecting the view that all desire is for the good at Republic 438a, Plato is 
laying the foundation for his rejection of the Socratic view that akrasia is impossible (1988, p 
133-134). Hoffman disagrees, claiming: “I do not think it could be more plainly stated by Plato, 
at least on the usual translation, that he thinks every soul in every action aims at the good. This 
applies to those ruled by appetite as well as those ruled by spirit or reason.” (2003, p 172) While I 
have shown that the structure of this debate is mistaken – since the soul harbors far greater 
multiplicity than the tri-partite theory suggests – I think it is clear from the Republic, as well as 
from Socrates’ claim that his “body’s” desire for flight is a conception of what is best, that we 
should consider the self to harbor conflicting opinions of what is best.  
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contains different conceptions of good. Ideally, of course, this would no longer be the 
case, as we would have attained a level of virtue in which we flow immediately and 
silently to the right course of action because we have harmonized our own souls; the 
prerequisite for this is, of course, that we undergo the process of self examination. Once 
we have examined our own lives, and undergone the work of developing a harmonious 
condition of the soul by harmonizing the λόγοι through which we gather the world into 
an intelligible structure in which the proper course of action will appear immediately. We 
have hope that we will be drawn to the good without faltering, and without need of the 
violence of self-mastery.  
 While this account certainly does not solve all of the problems arising from the 
“Socratic paradoxes,” hopefully this brief discussion will suffice to show how a fruitful 
beginning can be made when we attend to the connection between ethics and ontology in 
the Phaedo; specifically, headway can be made when we focus on “care of the soul” as 
concerned with the activity of the soul, gathering the world into intelligibility, and to the 
place of our (ideally harmonized) λόγοι in this process.  
 
Epilogue: Dialectic and Nοῦς 
 
 I would like to end by briefly indicating that I have said nothing about νοῦς. I 
have said that our beliefs, λόγοι, and the desires in our soul must harmonize, but why 
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could there not be perfect harmony directing a soul toward injustice?429 I have argued that 
we are caught within the horizon set by our λόγοι, but what of truth?  
 There is a radical suppression, in the Phaedo, of the issues of the body as the 
source of reproduction, of eros, and of phusis; how does nature resist our conceptions, 
our λόγοι, our naming, and drive us toward better explanations? How is this essentially 
physical dimension of our existence figured by a contact with a natural world whose truth 
is never fully captured by our λόγοι?430 It is Plato, after all – surely there is a contact 
with something beyond our own social or private worlds that drives us toward Truth?  
 In Chapter 7 (§2.2.3) I claimed that the evaluative stance of λόγος does not 
immediately reveal beings in light of the truth, the good itself, or the actual good of 
whatever is being made manifest. The account I have given has perhaps made it seem like 
the truth of beings is simply projected onto the world – that we live in a world which is 
simply constructed by a projection of our conceptions.  
 We have seen many places in the dialogue where the issue of the projection of a 
set of pre-conceptions has limited the ability to understand an issue. The second sailing 
has allowed us to better understand the wonder in the “wondrous hold” that these λόγοι 
                                                
429 To consider the possibility of a harmonious soul which is not equivalent to full virtue, we 
might offer the Spartan warrior as an example; surely the (ideal) Spartan is unified, and 
experiences little to no cognitive dissonance. However, I hesitate to claim that such a soul is the 
Socratic ideal. Above, I pointed-out a double relation between virtue and harmony; the virtuous, 
harmonious soul is self-reflexive, and concerned with its own essential activity (ἔργον). Surely, 
the (mythical, ideal) Spartan has not achieved this level of self-awareness.  
430 We note that Socrates often – for example, in the Theaetetus (171d, 178cff.) – uses physical 
health as an example with which to distinguish truth from empty rhetoric, the expert from the one 
who merely convinces fools; in such examples, Socrates argues that the body presents its own 
standards of interpretation to the soul – i.e. man is not the measure of what will heal the body. See 
also the use of this image in Socrates initial argument with Gorgias. With a longer examination of 
the Republic’s account of the healthy condition of the soul, we might begin to see how harmony 
in the self necessarily, not incidentally, leads to a healthy and virtuous condition of the soul. Cf 
Phaedrus (261b through the end) for an account of how the proper τέχνη of speech, specifically 
dialectic (which I will turn to in a moment) leads toward truth and a healthy soul.   
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have on us. Λόγοι are not simply a reflection set over against the immediate 
manifestness of beings; rather, it is only through λόγοι that the world can come into 
manifestness. As Burger noted, in Socrates’ musings on pleasure and pain there is a 
projection “onto the feelings themselves of the human will to separate them.”431 Further, 
we saw that the projection of a conception of death can go ahead of a thinker and 
determine what he takes death to be – that is, a προδοκέω can limit our access to the 
truth, to “the way it is with the things the argument is about.” (Chapter 2, §2.3) Without 
any access to the true nature of things, caught in our own conceptions, have we any 
access to the truth of beings?  
 The Protagorean thesis rears its head here: Is man the measure of all things? Plato 
considered this stance toward λόγοι to be a danger for a reason. If we risk blindness in 
any attempt to transcend our individual perspective and go “straight to the beings,” if we 
are thus caught within the horizons of our λόγοι, determined by our παιδεία and the 
limits of the πόλις, is there any hope of finding truth? It is clear how this threat can arise 
in this context of turning to the λόγοι. However, the second sailing is supposed to allow 
us to avoid precisely this danger. In Socrates’ warning against misology, he claims it is 
through developing a τέχνη of λόγοι that the Protagorean position can be avoided. How 
is it – on the account of the second sailing – that we are able to discover truth outside the 
limits of our current conceptions of what is true?  
 In fact, Socrates has not saved his companions from the minotaur at the end of the 
Phaedo – he has not given them a “sufficient” λόγος. Thus, the certainty to be found in 
λόγοι is not demonstrated by Socrates’ arguments. That is, the danger of misology has 
                                                
431 1984, p 27, as noted in Chapter 3, §2.1ff. 
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only been delayed, and the interlocutors, while temporarily ‘cured’ of their fear of death, 
still face the danger of thinking that no truth is to be found in λόγος. This danger will be 
made especially poignant if they follow Socrates’ advice and “go over the things said 
from the beginning.” 
 All Socrates has done is postpone the experience of disillusionment by 
temporarily convincing them of the soundness of λόγος, without giving them an 
adequate instruction in the ‘upward way.’ It is this upward way – dialectic, left unspoken 
in the Phaedo – that will lead them to truth, test their own conceptions, and challenge the 
λόγοι which they currently think are strongest.  
 The error in Socrates’ description of his “mixed up” method is its failure to 
distinguish the upward way from the downward. Socrates ‘mixes up’ “the way from, and 
the way to, first principles.”432 As Klein shows:  
These two ways of proceeding, Socrates takes care to remark, the one towards 
consequences which spring from the safe supposition, the other concerning its 
source [περί τε τῆς ἀρχῆς], should not be ‘mixed up,’ if one wants to find 
something genuinely true. We cannot fail to observe, however, that Socrates, in 
the very choice of his words, does not separate clearly the downward and upward 
motion of the διάνοια and merges the meaning of “supposition” [ὑπόθεσις] 
with that of “source” in his use of the term ὑπόθεσις. These ambiguities are tied 
to the general mythical character of the dialogue.433 
 
What then, can we briefly say about the relation of the Phaedo’s account of λόγος and 
dialectic – which is, I suggest, the ‘upward way’ – the nature of which is not adequately 
revealed in the dialogue? 
 In the Republic, Socrates describes dialectic: “Isn’t this at last the song (νόμος) 
itself that dialectic performs? . . . when a man tries by discussion (διαλέγεσθαι) – by 
                                                
432 Burger, 1984, p 157. 
433 1965, p 137. 
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means of argument (διὰ τοῦ λόγου) without the use of any of the senses – to attain each 
thing itself that is and doesn’t give up before he grasps by intellection itself (νοήσει) that 
which is good itself. . .” (532a emphasis added) Socrates then connects this process to the 
upward way out of the cave. Thus we see that it is through λόγος that we come to be in a 
position to have the noetic vision which can challenge the λόγοι with which we begin the 
search. Socrates says that this “journey” (πορείαν) is called dialectic (διαλεκτικὴν). It is 
a journey which begins in λόγος and works through λόγοι by “rubbing them together 
like fire sticks” (Republic 435a); by challenging one another’s accounts, and by 
responding to the truths we experience in the world, and in our own souls, we are not 
caught within the accounts with which we begin (ὑπόθεσις).434 As Plato tells us in the 7th 
letter, without getting a hold of the λόγος, we will never achieve ἐπιστήμη or νοῦς 
(342bff.) He states: “Only when all of these things – names, λόγοι, and visual and other 
perceptions – have been rubbed against one another and tested, pupil and teacher asking 
and answering questions in good will and without envy – only then when reason 
(φρόνησις) and intellection (νοῦς) are at the very extremity of human effort, can they 
illuminate the nature of any object.” (344b, emphasis added) Thus we begin to see that it 
is in the good-natured ἀγών of dialectic, as well as in attending to our experience 
(“visual and other perceptions”), that we can follow the upward way toward noetic vision 
of the truth. As Sallis says: “. . . the intellection, the noetic vision (νόεσις) that would 
                                                
434 I have pointed, at several places in this dissertation, to the importance of interpersonal 
dialogue, and to the development of philosophical community for the philosophical life. There is, 
further, a conspicuous lack of an account of ἔρος in the Phaedo, and I take ἔρος to be the drive 
that pushes the philosopher along the ‘upward way’ toward a unified vision from which we are – 
as embodied and finite beings – essentially alienated. Thus, I take there to be a deep connection 
between the suppression of ἔρος and the failure to give an account of the ‘upward way.’ The 
proper maintenance of our interpersonal erotic connections is, then, in some sense essential to the 
work toward the “sufficient” vision of the whole.  
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comprehend that which is always one with itself must be μετα λόγου, with discourse, by 
way of discourse.”435 However, as Plato tells us, it is essential that the individual first 
prepare their souls: We must develop our natural capacity to be “akin to justice and all 
other forms of excellence” in order to “attain the truth that is attainable about virtue.” 
(344a-b) As we have seen, λόγος is anything but external to this preparation of the soul 
for contact with the truth. In fact, it is only through λόγος and with respect to λόγος that 
the ψυχή actualizes its natural kinship with the truth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
435 1999, p 48.  
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